Has this ever been refuted

Has this ever been refuted

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  1. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    I would like to place St. Augustine in a boiling pot of oil and see if he thinks evil isn't ontologically real.
    Unbaptized orphans dying alone empirically refutes privatio boni.
    Platonic Gnostic dualism is right.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      >place St. Augustine in a boiling pot of oil and see if he thinks evil isn't ontologically real.
      This isn't an adequate counterexample even if by appearance it strikes one as. If I take a crystal ball then smash it against a wall, the crystal ball has been deprived of its original form, an example of privation. No different for your tasteless example.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        What exactly is being deprived when we toss St. Augustine into the pot of boiling oil? St. Augustine's body remains intact and the movement of the atoms of the oil are something added, not subtracted, from the world.
        It seems that pain is positive, painlessness negative.

        • 3 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          The heat of the oil leads to the eventual loss of integrity of each of the body's organs. The experience of pain is irrelevant, because that's actually a sign that the body is working as it should, notifying the person, in this case, of present danger.

          • 3 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            But to be clear, the real reason the pain is irrelevant is because the pain is merely an effect of the "evil".

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        The heat of the oil leads to the eventual loss of integrity of each of the body's organs. The experience of pain is irrelevant, because that's actually a sign that the body is working as it should, notifying the person, in this case, of present danger.

        But to be clear, the real reason the pain is irrelevant is because the pain is merely an effect of the "evil".

        Outstanding explanation!

        Most philosophers today deny that evil is the privation of good.
        >One problem with the privation theory’s solution to the problem of evil is that it provides only a partial solution to the problem of evil since even if God creates no evil we must still explain why God allows privation evils to exist (See Calder 2007a; Kane 1980). An even more significant problem is that the privation theory seems to fail as a theory of evil since it doesn’t seem to be able to account for certain paradigmatic evils. For instance, it seems that we cannot equate the evil of pain with the privation of pleasure or some other feeling. Pain is a distinct phenomenological experience which is positively bad and not merely not good. Similarly, a sadistic torturer is not just not as good as she could be. She is not simply lacking in kindness or compassion. She desires her victims’ suffering for pleasure. These are qualities she has, not qualities she lacks, and they are positively bad and not merely lacking in goodness (Calder 2007a; Kane 1980. See Anglin and Goetz 1982 and Grant 2015 for replies to these objections).
        If you know formal logic, you can see this clearly in negation: the negation of p is ~p (i.e., not-p), ~p is conceptually distinct from q in the same way that not-good is conceptually distinct from evil. I'm not really convinced by this personally, even as an atheist (good and evil seem like semiotically opposite concepts in a way that p and q do not), but this might count as a "refutation" to many people, to answer your question.

        >Let's say the world is X and goodness is Y. X-Y = Evil. Therefore evil exists. This is like saying coldness is just lack of heat.
        You are affirming St. Thomas's argument. Everything created is good insofar as it participates in and emanates from God, the ultimate reality. Evil arises from departure from God.
        >X = God
        >Y = Goodness
        >X - Y = Nothing, which is to say evil

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      You're just a mad teenager.

  2. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Lying is generally evil, yet God lies in the Bible, and God does not lack anything, therefore etc.

  3. 3 weeks ago
    Literal Schizo

    If only Aquinas knew how bad things really are

  4. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >Has this ever been refuted
    Not even going to read the image. What a dumb way to look at things. I wonder if any philosophers have refuted the idea that OP is a gay. I'm not able to think for myself so I'll just assume this until a big boy philosopher tells me otherwise.

    • 2 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      Lying is generally evil, yet God lies in the Bible, and God does not lack anything, therefore etc.

      why do people make these posts

  5. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    That's a highly cogent definition of evil.

  6. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    To start with: define "good" and "evil" without using god.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      Evil: Selfishness.
      Good: Selflessness.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        So selflessly sacrificing your nice life, like Anders Breivik, would be considered good

        • 3 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          I would argue what Anders Breivik done was evil even though it was selfless in a twisted kind of way. It is wrong to kill people.

          My initial post was very simplistic but for the most part I still stand by it. Most acts of evil or bad are through not considering the lives of other people in your actions. Anders Breivik probably made up ontologically wrong arguments as to why what he was doing was righteous however he was inconsiderate of the lives of those killed, he breached the sanctity of human life and therefore this is evil.

          • 2 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            Why is killing people wrong or breaching the sanctity of human life evil?
            Because you say so?

          • 2 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            Depends on how you look at it but it's generally a taking away of something. Take this example from plato. If we assume that everything has a purpose to survive or ect to function within the world then harm only serves to worsen the things of the world in their purpose. For example harming a horse would only him worsen him in terms of him riding about or whatever it is what horses do. Harming a door would serve to worsen the quality of the portal between walls. Therefore killing another human is to eliminate its purpose and thereby its goodness.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        This. It’s not complicated. A human or anything else cannot be evil in isolation.

      • 2 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        >a starving man eating food is evil
        >a starving man giving food to a well fed man is good

        • 2 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          Yes.

  7. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    "it is evil that my government issued gf has not been provided to me" okay thomas

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      he's right

  8. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    no, and the seethe and coping wi continue until morale improves

  9. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >has this ever been refuted
    Yes, ethical statements are factually meaningless.

  10. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Most philosophers today deny that evil is the privation of good.
    >One problem with the privation theory’s solution to the problem of evil is that it provides only a partial solution to the problem of evil since even if God creates no evil we must still explain why God allows privation evils to exist (See Calder 2007a; Kane 1980). An even more significant problem is that the privation theory seems to fail as a theory of evil since it doesn’t seem to be able to account for certain paradigmatic evils. For instance, it seems that we cannot equate the evil of pain with the privation of pleasure or some other feeling. Pain is a distinct phenomenological experience which is positively bad and not merely not good. Similarly, a sadistic torturer is not just not as good as she could be. She is not simply lacking in kindness or compassion. She desires her victims’ suffering for pleasure. These are qualities she has, not qualities she lacks, and they are positively bad and not merely lacking in goodness (Calder 2007a; Kane 1980. See Anglin and Goetz 1982 and Grant 2015 for replies to these objections).
    If you know formal logic, you can see this clearly in negation: the negation of p is ~p (i.e., not-p), ~p is conceptually distinct from q in the same way that not-good is conceptually distinct from evil. I'm not really convinced by this personally, even as an atheist (good and evil seem like semiotically opposite concepts in a way that p and q do not), but this might count as a "refutation" to many people, to answer your question.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      this is just from people not being familiar with the metaphysics underlying the diea

      Goodness = being.
      Asking how this works in other definitions of goodness or metaphysics doesn't make any sense

      see brian davies book God and the problem of evil if you want something thorough, but as I said above just comes from understanding God's causality in creatoin/being and his relation to creatures.

      Evil: Selfishness.
      Good: Selflessness.

      also totally failing to understand the metaphysics

      Goodness, good morality (the will being directed to bring about the good) and the goodness of a human are all talking about the same thing.
      To be Good is to intellectually grasp your nature as a human and will your powers act as the ought to in accord with the rest of your nature so your "being" is most manifest, and also involves situationally responding however is best expressing your nature.

      Good morality in the traditional greek/medieval understanding is "selfish", you want what is best for yourself and seek to bring it about. However it's selfishness in the context of understanding your nature, and how it relates with other beings and how they are all ultimately rooted in the source of Being/God.

      Analyzing anything in terms of selfishness/selfnesses is just like totally bereft of wisdom. The old example of you jumping to save someone in a river, you have multiple motivations. To fear mastery over death, to want to be seen to be the hero, many selfish, and many selfless. What actually matters if you are willing yourself to fully express the beauty of your humanity part of which lies in maintaining it in others. You seeking their good IS seeking your good properly understood, at root they are identical.

      Convential views of selflessness and selfishness are totally blind to this, things doing good for themselves are good for others. It's a sick SICK view to think you doing good means you are doing harm to others.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        >You seeking their good IS seeking your good properly understood, at root they are identical.
        This in my eyes is the selflessness that feeds the appetites of the rational mind as plato puts. To be selfish is to harm others for personal gain and in doing so you harm yourself. Again my example is very simplistic but I believe the basis of it still stands. I may be very wrong though I am very entry level in philosophy.

        • 3 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          At that point it wouldn't really be selfishness, more vain or attempted but failed selfishness. At that point I'm not sure what the point of even using the words are. Vanity, or pride or hubris seem more fitting. So long as someone is mindful true good action is both good for you and the other person it is fine though I guess. Many people overlook that distinction and seem to think if you have any self interest in a decision in somehow undermines the goodness of the activity, you'll see/hear that pretty often if you look for it. That's the main sort of attitude I think is really dangerous to have and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of morality.

          I'm not fully clear exactly what is being proposed by the privation theory. That's not the theories fault, I'm sure, but my ignorance and lack of research.

          In some respects, to my ignorance thinking, it seems right on the mark: We tend to think of sadistically evil people as possessing some kind of satanic inner quality, of being under the shroud of some dark, ulterior order of things, but in reality most of them are just psychopaths, who psychologically lack the ability to empathise with others, and that is their only substantial divergence from us, like a flower that lacks a stamen.

          In other respects though it seems like we have to account in some way for a positivity to evil. The unnacceptability of intense pain certainly has a phenomenological uniqueness to it - as in, nothing in the experience and understanding of right health and happy living can prepare you for an understanding and appreciation of intense pain and how existentially unbearable it is until you experience it. I don't actually know if that is a problem for the privation theory or not, for after all finding something painful or even unbearably painful is not necesarily to enter into the domain of good and evil per se, more just to describe the psychology and phenomenological landscape of animals.

          I would ask some anon more knowledgeable on privation theory to explain it a bit but my ignorance is so general I feel like that would be too entitled a request.

          The clearest way to think about it is if you think of "what a human being is" as a collection of "functions" or "powers" that are capable of doing something. (speech, reproduction, movement, etc.)

          A moral evil, specifically refers to what your will is doing. To be morally good is to use those powers in a harmonious way that helps them function together better as a whole, and bring about the goodness of other beings.

          Your intellect "sees" the goodness, and harmony of those powers and you are choosing that sort of second order goodness. Say for reproduction part of it is pleasure, but that pleasure is only fully understood by it's part of uniting a couple, bearing children, and forming a good human life. To use your will to express your sexual function, in a way that is contrary to a good human life/expression of your human nature is the moral evil. It's acting contrary to the source of being for that power.

          So the privation/evil is a fundamentally a lack of the fundamental harmony of a human being expressed, in an act of the will that is making use of one of it's powers. It's a human power being used in an inhuman way.

          I believe I actually think I've heard Peterson make your point before? Suffering/violence is being forced to feel a privation of your being. If you cut someone's eye out that suffering is because it's disabling their human nature from reaching it's full expression. Even for someone born with a birth defect and missing eyes or something, that's tragic/suffering for that reason even if there was no "pain" felt when they had their eyes removed.
          I don't really see it as an issue, like I said above to me this is just people not getting the underlying metaphysical morality that is behind this. The fact goodness = being is the key thing that clarifies evil = a privation of being parasitic on an actually existent thing preventing it from being fully expression. A perversion/misuse of being contrary to what-it--is so that it's actual being cannot be expressed.

          The harder thing to explain are natural evils (ie. hurricanes/viruses that kill tons of innocent children and animals) which to be made sense of kind of requires talking about the fall and the idea that this is simply not how reality is supposed to be. I haven't read as much into that though.

          • 2 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            >The fact goodness = being is the key thing that clarifies evil = a privation of being parasitic on an actually existent thing preventing it from being fully expression.
            Ok but I still feel compelled to press the point that experiential pain is phenomenologically substantial - it is not an experience defined by the absence of something but by the presence of something - pain. Pain, phenomenologically, is a thing. It has being. Is this supposed to be just irrelevant to the privation theory? Is phenomenological pain supposed to be disregarded from the discussion of good and evil?

          • 2 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            A being is a substance, a particular kind of thing. The fundamental thing for sort of the Greek/medieval worldview is reality is built out of determinate things/"substances" ie. the most fundamental level of reality is human beings, dogs, trees, stone or whatever (yes i know stone is a combination of a bunch of different stuff just saying at some level there is some thingness).

            Then there are things dependent on other beings for their existence. Any sort of phenological experiential thing is just parasitic/dependent upon the actual human substance for it's existence. You can't have "pain" without a thing-experiencing pain. The pain is not an substance, a particularly existent thing.

            It's something that arises of a human being in relationship to some other sort of thing, physical circumstances, physical effects on their body, etc.

            Your body has of itself the "power" to create the phenological experience of pain in particular circumstances. Think of it like a match. Typically a match is just wood with a bit of mercury on it, but in the right circumstances a deeper otherwise hidden part of it's being reaches it's expression (it's potentialities being actualized). That potentiality is always in the match, it just requires a particular situation to bring it about, and what is brought about is dependent on the match's being and exists in some way before it brought about inside the match.

            So when you experience pain, your human substance interacts with something (External or internal, could remember a painful memory or be a traumatized war victim getting phantom limb pains) that in relationship with you causes your being to bring about the phenological experience of pain. It's not a thing in itself, but something that is part of your being that can be expressed in particular situations.

            I have no idea what you mean by
            >phenomenologically substantial
            or
            >Pain, phenomenologically, is a thing.
            Phenomenologically as an analysis of our experience it's not an analysis of what things are, that's metaphysics or natural philosophy not phenomenology. It might be useful for some additional insights but if you try to do metaphysics with phenomenology you're just going to end up w/ bad metaphysics. (and saying pain is a substance)

            But through all that I don't think pain is evil? The thing creating pain is evil. Pain helps us respond to those evil things better. If you step on a nail you have the structure/being of your foot compromised, that's the evil thing. The pain isn't evil it's probably a good indicator to deal with the nail so it doesn't get infected and so you don't die...

  11. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    The initial statement is correct but the conclusion is so utterly moronic it makes me question he entire field of philosophy. Let's say the world is X and goodness is Y. X-Y = Evil. Therefore evil exists. This is like saying coldness is just lack of heat. Pseud moron

  12. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Discussions that treat good & evil as objective always boil down to some kind of recursive bullshit that makes zero sense. Just like this

  13. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    I'm not fully clear exactly what is being proposed by the privation theory. That's not the theories fault, I'm sure, but my ignorance and lack of research.

    In some respects, to my ignorance thinking, it seems right on the mark: We tend to think of sadistically evil people as possessing some kind of satanic inner quality, of being under the shroud of some dark, ulterior order of things, but in reality most of them are just psychopaths, who psychologically lack the ability to empathise with others, and that is their only substantial divergence from us, like a flower that lacks a stamen.

    In other respects though it seems like we have to account in some way for a positivity to evil. The unnacceptability of intense pain certainly has a phenomenological uniqueness to it - as in, nothing in the experience and understanding of right health and happy living can prepare you for an understanding and appreciation of intense pain and how existentially unbearable it is until you experience it. I don't actually know if that is a problem for the privation theory or not, for after all finding something painful or even unbearably painful is not necesarily to enter into the domain of good and evil per se, more just to describe the psychology and phenomenological landscape of animals.

    I would ask some anon more knowledgeable on privation theory to explain it a bit but my ignorance is so general I feel like that would be too entitled a request.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      >in reality most of them are just psychopaths, who psychologically lack the ability to empathise with others, and that is their only substantial divergence from us, like a flower that lacks a stamen.
      A person with zero empathy can still be good if they don't lack the divine spark.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      >as in, nothing in the experience and understanding of right health and happy living can prepare you for an understanding and appreciation of intense pain and how existentially unbearable it is until you experience it.
      This affirms the theory. The evil is the lack of ability to prepare, not something positive.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        But something in the positive quality of pain itself seems irreducibly bad. As in, even if there was some way to rise above it mentally, given greater faculties, the mere existence of it as an experiential state seems like an essentially bad thing. And phenomenologically it seems identifiable as a positive, reified presence. Here is pain. Phenomenologically it is not the absence of some pleasure, bliss or contentment that should be there. But perhaps to say that it seems essentially bad is just a failure of imagination. Who's to say that pain, as horrible as it is for us, is actually not in essence a bad thing, but merely horrible when attended with the absence of some other mental faculty or capacity. Perhaps it is possible for God to feel intense pain and for there to be nothing bad about that at all, due to his ability to entirely rise above it. It makes me think of something I read a long time ago about corpus callosotomy patients, that if they were pricked on one side of their bodies, they reported that they would feel the pain but would not mind it.

  14. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Yes. If I come across a drowing child in a lake and don't react that is an absence of good.If I see a kid in a lake and drown it that is evil.
    Catholarping is the gayest and lowest form of humanity possible.

  15. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >call Evil "privation" instead of Evil
    >still say nothing

    A low point, even for Catholicism.

  16. 2 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >muh feelings
    is not a real refutation, schoplarpers.
    i swear homosexuals that just read a wiki article about will theory last week think they can just dress up their non-arguments in insulting le based truthnuke anon language and it somehow becomes valid philosophy

  17. 2 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Evil is whatever we say it is.

  18. 2 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    word salad

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