The fact that the "Third Man" argument has been repeated throughout history as if it were in any way effective or profound unironically makes me believe most people who are into philosophy are actual NPCs.
Like the first argument as it's given in Parmenides is probably just a joke (Parmenides asks "Will there not appear some one *large* thing by which all these appear to be large ?", to which the answer is no), and Aristotle's version is pretty much along those lines too.
The "TMA" that Proclus deals with in his commentaries is somewhat "nearer the mark" in terms of posing a real problem on a wrong understanding of platonic realism, but it is not the argument given by detractors anyways, though ironically it is basically the "TMA 2" given in Parmenides (so that we can say that Plato actually understood what a "real-er" objection could be, but nevertheless was unphased by it)
I guess if you're analytically minded like Proclus then yeah you can make that division between the participated and unparticipated term, but you still have to remember that it's little more than a semantic crutch for immediate use in debating non-platonists and that Plotinus' approach of simply pointing out that the sensible world *can be nothing but* the differentiated and discursive apprehension/appearance of true being, and not even acknowledging the midwits who think there is some sort of problem or contradiction with this.
pretty much the same goes for the "one over many" bullshit objections
>ideas have no "features in common" with instances
>the "otherness" of ideas from instances in not the kind otherness instances have between themselves
>there is no contradiction between transcendence and immanence
>ideas cannot not be ontologically prior to instances for reason of intelligibility, potentiality, and finality
k good talk