These are the haunting last words of doomed airplane pilots

Black boxes record everything going on in the cockpits of crashing planes. These are the last words of their doomed pilots.

It’s statistically safer to travel in an airplane than by car, but that doesn’t mean accidents don’t happen. While airplanes go through rigorous maintenance and crashes are relatively rare, airplane crashes happen for a wide variety of reasons — attacks, miscommunication, and electrical malfunctions are all possible risks. There are rarely survivors.

Here are the most haunting last words from pilots moments before their fatal crash.

Pacific Southwest Airlines, Flight 182 – September 25, 1978

PSA Flight 182 seconds after the collision with a Cessna 172.

Pacific Southwest Airlines was founded in 1949, and it wasn’t until September 25, 1978 when they had their first fatal accident.

The Pacific Southwest Airlines was descending and about to land at Lindbergh Field, but at the same time a private Cessna 172 light aircraft was in the path practicing instrument landing system approaches.

The Pacific Southwest Airlines crew was notified by air traffic control that the Cessna 172 was nearby, but they lost sight of the small plane, which led to the crash. 135 passengers were killed on PSA Flight 182, two were killed on the Cessna. Seven bystanders, including two children, were also killed when the plane crashed into houses.

09.01:21 CAM-1 Oh yeah, before we turned downwind, I saw him about one o’clock, probably behind us now.
09.01:38 CAM-2 There’s one underneath.
09.01:39 CAM 2 I was looking at that inbound there.
09.01:45 CAM 1 Whoop!
09.01:46 CAM 2 Aghhh!
09.01:47 CAM Sound of impact
09.01:48 CAM 1 On shit!
09.01:49 CAM-1 Easy baby, easy baby.
09.01:51 CAM [sound of electrical system reactivation tone on CVR, system off less than one second]

Seconds before final impact.

09.01:51 CAM-1 What have we got here?
09.01:52 CAM-2 It’s bad.
09.01:53 CAM-2 We’re hit man, we are hit.
09.01:56 RDO-1 Tower, we’re going down, this is PSA.
09.01:57 TWR Okay, we’ll call the equipment for you.
09.01:58 CAM [sound of stall warning]
09:01:59 CAM 1 This is it baby!
09:01:59 CAM ? Bob [name of F/O]
09:02:03 CAM 1 Brace yourself.
09:02:04 CAM ? Hey baby..
09:02:04 CAM ? Ma I love you..
09.02:04 [End of recording]

Vladivostok Airlines, Flight 352 – July 1, 2001

About 21 miles from Irkutsk, Russia, a Tupolev Tu-154M plane crashed and exploded in flames in the Siberian wilderness on July 1, 2001.

All 145 people on board died.

The aircraft crashed during the third turn in a landing approach to Irkutsk, which was an intermediate stop for refueling. When the pilots lowered the landing gear, the co-pilot realized that the plane was banking. The plane was at a 45-degree angle, and the nose was starting to drop. The co-pilot reacted by violently pulling back on the control column. The aircraft’s nose rose sharply and caused an immediate stall. The plane spun for 22 seconds until it slammed down to the ground and exploded in flames.

136 passengers and 9 flight crew members died in the accident, making it the third deadliest aircraft crash over Russian territory.

02:07:53 CAP … Fuck, push it up! (throttles)
02:07:53 F/O Stop! Stop! Where! Where!
02:07:55 CAP Stop! Stop! Stop! (said in patter)
02:07:55 NAV This way, this way, this way.
02:07:57 CAP We’re recovering!
02:07:58 NAV Easy, make it easy, easy!
02:07:59 F/O Lets to the right!
02:08:01 — Audio tone of Radio-altitude alert (duration 4 sec) and audi
02:08:02 ?? Power! Add thrust!
02:08:05 ?? Power!
02:08:06 F/E … got it!
02:08:08 ?? Add thrust!
02:08:09 F/O Take off power! Oh my God!
02:08:10 F/E Take off power set
02:08:11 ?? That’s all guys! Fuck!

Air Canada, Flight 621 – July 5, 1970

The Air Canada Flight 621 crash, near Toronto Pearson International Airport, took place on July 5, 1970, when an Air Canada Douglas DC-8 was attempting to land. It crashed in Toronto Gore Township, now part of Brampton, and at the time it was Canada’s second deadliest aviation accident.

The pilots had flown together before and had an agreement that, when the captain was piloting the aircraft, the first officer would deploy the spoilers on the ground as the captain preferred, and when the first officer was piloting the aircraft, the captain would arm them on the flare as the co-pilot preferred. But on July 5, the captain was piloting the landing and said, “All right. Give them to me on the flare. I have given up.”

This was not the pilots’ usual routine. Sixty feet from the runway, the captain began to reduce power in preparation for the flare and said “Okay” to the first officer. The first officer immediately deployed the spoilers on the flare instead of just arming them. The aircraft began to sink heavily and the captain, realizing what had happened, pulled back on the control column and applied full thrust to all four engines. The nose lifted, but the aircraft still continued to sink, hitting the runway with enough force that the number four engine and pylon broke off the wing, and the tail struck the ground. Realizing what he had done, the first officer began apologizing to the captain. Apparently unaware of the severity of the damage inflicted on the aircraft, the crew managed to lift off for a go-around, but the lost fourth engine had torn off a piece of the lower wing plating and the aircraft was now trailing fuel, which ignited. The first officer requested a second landing attempt on the same runway but was told it was closed (because of the debris the DC-8 had left earlier) and was directed to another runway.

Two and a half minutes after the initial collision, the outboard section of the right wing above engine number four exploded, causing parts of the wing to break off. Six seconds after this explosion, another explosion occurred in the area of the number three engine, causing the pylon and engine to both break off and fall to the ground in flames. Six and a half seconds after the second explosion, a third explosion occurred, destroying most of the right wing, including the wing tip. The aircraft then went into a violent nose dive, striking the ground at a high velocity of about 220 knots (410 km/h; 250 mph).

A doll in the wreckage.

All 100 passengers and 9 crew on board were killed.

CA We’ve lost number 4 engine
FO Have we?
CA (unintelligible)
SO Fuel
SO Fuel
CA Aye?
SO Fuel
CA Is it?
FO Yes
CA Okay, cut number 4
?O Number 4 engine
CA Yes
?O Number 3 engine
CA Number 4
?O Number 4, right.
CA Number 3 is jammed, too
FO Is it?
CA There it is.
CA The whole thing is jammed.
[crackling noise]
FO What was that?
FO What happened there, Peter?
CA That number 4 (unintelligible) Something’s happened (unintelligible)
FO Oh, look, we’ve got a (unintelligible).
[loud sound of explosion]
FO Pete, sorry.
[louder sound of explosion]
CA All right.
DEP 621. The status of your aircraft, please.
[sound of metal tearing]
CA We’ve got an explosion
FO Oh look, we’ve got (unintelligible) flame
FO Oh, gosh
?? We’ve lost a wing

Air France, Flight 447 – June 1, 2009

On June 1, 2009, the Air France Flight 447 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France, when the flight stalled and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean.

The aircraft reportedly went through a thunderstorm with strong turbulence and sent an automated message indicating problems with the electrical system minutes before the crash. The confused pilots lost control and were unable to react to the situation.

The 12 crew members and 216 passengers crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, and the remnants of the plane were left undiscovered for two years. The wreckage, including dead bodies, was finally discovered on April 3, 2011 using unmanned submarines.

02:11:45 (Bonin) We’ve lost control of the plane!

02:11:47 (Robert) We’ve totally lost control of the plane. We don’t understand at all… We’ve tried everything.

[By now the plane has returned to its initial altitude but is falling fast. With its nose pitched 15 degrees up, and a forward speed of 100 knots, it is descending at a rate of 10,000 feet per minute, at an angle of 41.5 degrees. It will maintain this attitude with little variation all the way to the sea. Though the pitot tubes are now fully functional, the forward airspeed is so low—below 60 knots—that the angle-of-attack inputs are no longer accepted as valid, and the stall-warning horn temporarily stops. This may give the pilots the impression that their situation is improving, when in fact it signals just the reverse.]

[The captain of the flight makes no attempt to physically take control of the airplane. Had Dubois done so, he almost certainly would have understood, as a pilot with many hours flying light airplanes, the insanity of pulling back on the controls while stalled. But instead, he takes a seat behind the other two pilots.]
02:12:14 (Robert) What do you think? What do you think? What should we do?

[As the stall warning continues to blare, the three pilots discuss the situation with no hint of understanding the nature of their problem. No one mentions the word “stall.” As the plane is buffeted by turbulence, the captain urges Bonin to level the wings—advice that does nothing to address their main problem. The men briefly discuss, incredibly, whether they are in fact climbing or descending, before agreeing that they are indeed descending. As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take back the controls, and pushes forward on the stick, but the plane is in “dual input” mode, and so the system averages his inputs with those of Bonin, who continues to pull back. The nose remains high.]
02:13:40 (Robert) Climb… climb… climb… climb…

02:13:40 (Bonin) But I’ve had the stick back the whole time!

[At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.]
02:13:42 (Captain) No, no, no… Don’t climb… no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert) Descend, then… Give me the controls… Give me the controls!

[Bonin yields the controls, and Robert finally puts the nose down. The plane begins to regain speed. But it is still descending at a precipitous angle. As they near 2000 feet, the aircraft’s sensors detect the fast-approaching surface and trigger a new alarm. There is no time left to build up speed by pushing the plane’s nose forward into a dive. At any rate, without warning his colleagues, Bonin once again takes back the controls and pulls his side stick all the way back.]
02:14:23 (Robert) Damn it, we’re going to crash… This can’t be happening!
02:14:25 (Bonin) But what’s happening?
02:14:27 (Captain) Ten degrees of pitch…
[Exactly 1.4 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder stops.]

Pan American, Flight 1736 / KLM, Flight 4805 – March 27, 1977

On March 27, 1977, two Boeing 747 passenger jets, KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736, crashed into each other on the runway at Los Rodeos Airport on the Spanish island of Tenerife.

A terrorist bombing at Gran Canaria Airport resulted in aircraft being diverted to the Las Palmas Airport, including these two flights. Unfortunately, the airport was too congested and both planes were instructed to occupy the same runway. It also didn’t help that thick fog was drifting across the airfield. As a result, the KLM flight reached its takeoff point while the Pan Am plane was still on the runway, and the two planes collided.

This tragic accident was the deadliest in aviation history, resulting in 583 fatalities between both planes.

1706:25.6 APP Roger alpha one seven three six report when runway clear.
1706:29.6 PA RT OK, we’ll report when we’re clear.
APP Thank you
PA CAM 1 Lets get the hell out of here!
PA CAM 2 Yeh, he’s anxious isn’t he.
PA CAM 3 Yeh, after he held us up for half an hour. Now he’s in a rush.
1706:32.43 KLM CAM 3 Is he not clear then?
1706:34.1 KLM CAM 1 What do you say?
1706:34.15 KLM CAM ? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM CAM 3 Is he not clear that Pan American?
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Oh yes. [emphatically]
1706:40 [PanAm captain sees landing lights of KLM at approximately 700 meters]
PA CAM 1 There he is .. look at him! Goddamn that son-of-a-bitch is coming! Get off! Get off! Get off!
1706:44 [KLM starts rotation]
1706:47.44 KLM CAM 1 [Scream]
1706:50 [Collision]

LOT Polish Airlines, Flight 5055 – May 9, 1987

Remains of the LOT IL-62M after an engine fire and cabin decompression caused damage to the elevator and electrical system causing the plane to crash.

On May 9, 1987, LOT Polish Airlines Flight 5055 crashed into the wilderness on the outskirts of Warsaw, Poland, killing all 183 people aboard the plane.

The flight was beginning its long flight to New York City’s John F. Kennedy International when problems happened with engines number 1 and 2. First, engine number 2 failed, which caused an engine fire and an unfortunate explosion that damaged engine number 1, which soon also started to burn. It wasn’t long until a fire started to rapidly spread throughout the plane.

The plane crashed while trying to land.

10.41.28 [Intermittent acoustic signal of autopilot disengage]
10.41.30 Crew: Hey! Pressurization!
10.41.32 [Acoustic ringing signal of cabin decompression]
10.41.34 Crew: Is [there a] fire? What’s going on?
10.41.35 Crew: Probably a fire.
10.41.37 Crew: Engine? Shut it down!
10.41.39 Crew: …shut down. That first one is burning!
10.41.42 Crew: …fire…
10.41.44 Crew: …all small [referring to engines’ throttles]
10.41.45 Crew: Warsaw?
10.41.46 Crew: …all small. Decompression.
10.41.48 Crew: Two engines are gone!
10.41.49 [Continuous acoustic signal of engine fire]
10.41.50 Crew: Two engines are gone!
10.41.50 Crew: Shut down…
10.41.50 Crew: We’re turning around! Fire!
10.41.55 Crew: Danger!!! Warsaw radar LOT! Warsaw radar! [calling flight control]
10.41.55 Okęcie Tower: From your current position you have about 15 kilometers to the runway.
10.41.55 Crew: Understood.
10.41.55 Crew: …[turn] to the left! Engines to the left!
11.10.13 Okęcie Tower: 5055, to the left, to the left zero-five-zero.
11.10.13 Crew: OK.
11.10.40 Okęcie Tower: 5055, to the left, course 360.
11.10.40 Crew: We want to turn. That’s just what we want. [implied meaning: “we’re trying”]
11.10.40 Okęcie Tower: Keep turning, turn to three-six-zero. Now you have about 12 kilometers to the runway.
11.10.40 Crew: OK.
11.11.02 Okęcie Tower: 5055, to the left, course 330.
11.11.02 Crew: We are turning to the left.
11.11.02 Okęcie Tower: Start final approach about 11 kilometers from the runway.
11.11.02 Crew: We will do all we can.
11.11.02 Okęcie Tower: Understood.
11.11.02 Okęcie Tower: [Turn] to the left, course 320.
11.11.02 Crew: Understood.
11.11.34 Okęcie Tower: You’ve come to the right hand side of the runway centreline, continue left, course 300.
11.11.34 Okęcie Tower: Wind is 290 degrees, 22 kilometers per hour. You are cleared for runway three-three.
11.11.34 Crew: OK.
11.12.10 [The transmitter was turned on four times. Fragments of unintelligible utterances.]
11.12.13 Crew: Goodnight!!! Goodbye!!! (scream) Bye!!! We perish!

Surinam Airways, Flight 764 – June 7, 1989

The Surinam Airways Flight 764 was a passenger flight on its way to Paramaribo-Zanderij International Airport in Suriname from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in the Netherlands when it struck a tree and crashed on June, 7 1989.

While the crew tried to land the plane, they crashed into a tree only 25 meters above ground level, but this caused the plane to crash into another tree, which resulted in the aircraft rolling and hitting the ground inverted. Only 11 passengers survived while leaving 176 total dead.

Later investigations revealed significant deficiencies in the crew’s training and judgement. The crew knowingly attempted to land using a dangerous navigation signal and ignored the alarms that warned them of an impending crash.

RT Would you put the runway lights up please?
GPWS Glideslope
CAM 2 How’s that.
CAM 1 Tell ’em to put the runway lights bright.
RT Please put the runway lights bright.
TWR Right on.
CAM 2 Three hundred feet.
CAM 1 ??
CAM 2 Two hundred feet.
CAM 1 Okay MDA.
CAM 1 I’ll level it out here right here.
CAM 2 One fifty.
CAM 3 Pull up
[Sound of first impact]
[Sound of momentary power interruption to the CVR]
[Sound of stick shaker starts and continues until the end of the recording]
CAM 3 Pull up.
CAM 3 That’s it I’m dead.

Air Florida, Flight 90 – January 13, 1982

Air Florida Flight 90 was a domestic passenger flight operated by Air Florida from Washington National Airport (now Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport) to Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport with an intermediate stopover at Tampa International Airport. The Boeing 737-222 crashed into the 14th Street Bridge over the Potomac River.

Striking the bridge, it hit seven occupied vehicles and destroyed 97 feet (30 m) of guard rail before plunging through the ice into the Potomac River. The aircraft was carrying 74 passengers and five crew members. Only four passengers and one crew member (a flight attendant) were rescued from the crash and survived. Another passenger, Arland D. Williams, Jr., assisted in the rescue of the survivors but drowned before he himself could be rescued. Four motorists on the bridge were killed.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the cause of the accident was pilot error. The pilots failed to switch on the engines’ internal ice protection systems, used reverse thrust in a snowstorm prior to takeoff, tried to use the jet exhaust of a plane in front of them to melt their ice, and failed to abort the takeoff even after detecting a power problem while taxiing and seeing ice and snow buildup on the wings.

15:59:16 CAM-1 Given.
15:59:16 CAM-2 Bleeds?
15:59:17 CAM-1 They’re off.
15:59:18 CAM-2 Strobes, external lights.
15:59:18 CAM-1 On.
15:59:19 CAM-2 Anti-skid?
15:59:19 CAM-1 On.
15:59:21 CAM-2 Transponder?
15:59:21 CAM-1 On.
15:59:24 TWR Palm 90 cleared for takeoff.
15:59:28 TWR No delay on departure if you will, traffic’s two and a half out for the runway.
15:59:32 CAM-1 Okay, your throttles.
15:59:49 CAM-1 Holler if you need the wipers.
15:59:51 CAM-1 It’s spooled. Real cold, real cold.
15:59:58 CAM-2 God, look at that thing. That don’t seem right, does it? Uh, that’s not right.
16:00:09 CAM-1 Yes it is, there’s eighty.
16:00:10 CAM-2 Naw, I don’t think that’s right. Ah, maybe it is.
16:00:21 CAM-1 Hundred and twenty.
16:00:23 CAM-2 I don’t know
16:00:31 CAM-1 Vee-one. Easy, vee-two.
16:00:41 TWR Palm 90 contact departure control.
16:00:45 CAM-1 Forward, forward, easy. We only want five hundred.
16:00:48 CAM-1 Come on forward….forward, just barely climb.
16:00:59 CAM-1 Stalling, we’re falling!
16:01:00 CAM-2 Larry, we’re going down, Larry….
16:01:01 CAM-1 I know it.
16:01:01 [SOUND OF IMPACT]

Alaska Airlines, Flight 261 – January 31, 2000

Alaska Airlines Flight 261 was an international passenger flight from Licenciado Gustavo Díaz Ordaz International Airport in Mexico to Seattle–Tacoma International Airport in USA, with an intermediate stop at San Francisco International Airport in San Francisco, California. Following a catastrophic loss of control that had the plane flying upside down for a while, the McDonnell Douglas MD-83 crashed into the Pacific Ocean roughly 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California. The accident killed all 88 on board: two pilots, three cabin crew members, and 83 passengers.

The National Transportation Safety Board investigation determined that the cause was inadequate maintenance: “a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly’s trapezoidal nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines’ insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly.”

1619:11 CAM-2 —it might be * mechanical damage too.
1619:14 CAM-2 I think if it’s controllable, we oughta just try to land it—
1619:16 CAM-1 you think so? ok lets head for L A.
1619:21.1 CAM [sound of faint thump]
1619:24 CAM-2 you feel that?
1619:25 CAM-1 yea.
1619:29 CAM-1 ok gimme sl— see, this is a bitch.
1619:31 CAM-2 is it?
1619:31 CAM-1 yea.
1619:32.8 CAM [sound of two clicks similar to slat/flap handle movement]
1619:36 CAM-? *
1619:36.6 CAM [sound of extremely loud noise] [increase in background noise begins and continues to end of recording] [sound similar to loose articles moving around in cockpit]
1619:37 CAM-? *
1619:37.6 PA [sound similar to CVR startup tone]
1619:43 CAM-2 mayday.
1619:49 CAM-1 push and roll, push and roll.
1619:54 CAM-1 ok, we are inverted… and now we gotta get it….
1619:59 CAM [sound of chime]
1620:03 CAM-1 kick *
1620:04 CAM-1 push push push… push the blue side up.
1620:14 CAM-1 push.
1620:14 CAM-2 I’m pushing.
1620:16 CAM-1 ok now lets kick rudder… left rudder left rudder.
1620:18 CAM-2 I can’t reach it.
1620:20 CAM-1 ok right rudder… right rudder.
1620:25 CAM-1 are we flyin?… we’re flyin… we’re flyin… tell ’em what we’re doin.
1620:33 CAM-2 oh yea let me get *
1620:35 CAM-1 *
1620:38 CAM-1 gotta get it over again… at least upside down we’re flyin.
1620:40.6 PA [sound similar to CVR startup tone]
1620:42 CAM-? *
1620:44 CAM-? *
1620:49 CAM [sounds similar to compressor stalls begin and continue to end of recording]
1620:49 CAM [sound similar to engine spool down]
1620:54 CAM-1 speedbrakes.
1620:55.1 CAM-2 got it.
1620:56.2 CAM-1 ah here we go.
1620:57.1 [end of recording]

United Airlines, Flight 93 – September 11, 2001

We all know the tragic story about United Airlines Flight 93 — one of the passenger flights that was hijacked by radical Islamic terrorists as part of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001.

The aircraft was hijacked after taking off from Newark International Airport. The hijackers took control of the aircraft and turned the plane toward Washington D.C. A struggle ensued between the brave passengers on board and the four al-Qaeda terrorists, which crashed the plane into a field in the Pennsylvania countryside instead of the nation’s capital. All 65 on board were killed.

Text in parentheses was translated from Arabic.

9:31:57 Ladies and gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining seating. We have a bomb on board. So sit.
9:32:09 Er, uh … Calling Cleveland center … You’re unreadable. Say again slowly.
9:32:10 Don’t move. Shut up.
9:32:13 Come on, come.
9:32:16 Shut up.
9:32:17 Don’t move.
9:32:18 Stop.
9:32:34 Sit, sit, sit down.
9:32:39 Sit down.
9:32:41 Unintelligible … (the brother.)
9:32:54 Stop.
9:33:09 No more. Sit down.
9:33:10 (That’s it, that’s it, that’s it), down, down.
9:33:14 Shut up.
9:33:20 Unintelligible
9:33:20 We just, we didn’t get it clear … Is that United 93 calling?
9:33:30 (Jassim.)
9:33:34 (In the name of Allah, the most merciful, the most compassionate.)
9:33:41 Unintelligible.
9:33:43 Finish, no more. No more.
9:33:49 No. No, no, no, no.
9:33:53 No, no, no, no.
9:34:00 Go ahead, lie down. Lie down. Down, down, down.
9:34:06 (There is someone … Huh?)
9:34:12 Down, down, down. Sit down. Come on, sit down. No, no, no, no, no. No.
9:34:16 Down, down, down.
9:34:21 Down.
9:34:25 No more.
9:34:26 No more. Down.
9:34:27 Please, please, please …
9:34:28 Down.
9:34:29 Please, please, don’t hurt me …
9:34:30 Down. No more.
9:34:31 Oh God.
9:34:32 Down, down, down.
9:34:33 Sit down.
9:34:34 Shut up.
9:34:42 No more.
9:34:46 (This?)
9:34:47 Yes.
9:34:47 Unintelligible.
9:34:57 (One moment, one moment.)
9:34:59 Unintelligible.
9:35:03 No more.
9:35:06 Down, down, down, down.
9:35:09 No, no, no, no, no, no…
9:35:10 Unintelligible.
9:35:15 Sit down, sit down, sit down.
9:35:17 Down.
9:35:18 (What’s this?)
9:35:19 Sit down. Sit down. You know, sit down.
9:35:24 No, no, no.
9:35:30 Down, down, down, down.
9:35:32 Are you talking to me?
9:35:33 No, no, no. Unintelligible.
9:35:35 Down in the airport.
9:35:39 Down, down.
9:35:40 I don’t want to die.
9:35:41 No, no. Down, down.
9:35:42 I don’t want to die. I don’t want to die.
9:35:44 No, no. Down, down, down, down, down, down.
9:35:47 No, no, please.
9:35:57 No.
9:37:06 (That’s it. Go back.)
9:37:06 (That’s it.) Sit down.
9:37:36 (Everthing is fine. I finished.)
9:38:36 (Yes.)
9:39:11 Ah. Here’s the captain. I would like to tell you all to remain seated. We have a bomb aboard, and we are going back to the airport, and we have our demands. So, please remain quiet.
9:39:21 OK. That’s 93 calling?
9:39:24 (One moment.)
9:39:34 United 93. I understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead.
9:39:42 And center exec jet nine fifty-six. That was the transmission.
9:39:47 OK. Ah. Who called Cleveland?
9:39:52 Executive jet nine fifty-six, did you understand that transmission?
9:39:56 Affirmative. He said that there was a bomb on board.
9:39:58 That was all you got out of it also?
9:40:01 Affirmative.
9:40:03 Roger.
9:40:03 United 93. Go ahead.
9:40:14 United 93. Go ahead.
9:40:17 Ahhh.
9:40:52 (This green knob?)
9:40:54 (Yes, that’s the one.)
9:41:05 United 93, do you hear the Cleveland center?
9:41:14 (One moment. One moment.)
9:41:15 Unintelligible.
9:41:56 Oh man.
9:44:18 (This does not work now.)
9:45:13 Turn it off.
9:45:16 (… Seven thousand …)
9:45:19 (How about we let them in? We let the guys in now.)
9:45:23 (OK.)
9:45:24 (Should we let the guys in?)
9:45:25 (Inform them, and tell him to talk to the pilot. Bring the pilot back.)
9:45:57 (In the name of Allah. In the name of Allah. I bear witness that there is no other God, but Allah.)
9:47:31 Unintelligible.
9:47:40 (Allah knows.)
9:48:15 Unintelligible.
9:48:38 Set course.
9:49:37 Unintelligible.
9:51:27 Unintelligible.
9:51:35 Unintelligible.
9:52:02 Unintelligible.
9:52:31 Unintelligible.
9:53:20 (The best thing: The guys will go in, lift up the) … Unintelligible … (and they put the axe into it. So, everyone will be scared.)
9:53:27 (Yes.)
9:53:28 (The axe.)
9:53:28 Unintelligible.
9:53:29 (No, not the.)
9:53:35 (Let him look through the window. Let him look through the window.)
9:53:52 Unintelligible.
9:54:09 (Open.)
9:54:11 Unintelligible.
9:55:06 You are … One …
9:56:15 Unintelligible.
9:57:55 (Is there something?)
9:57:57 (A fight?)
9:57:59 (Yeah?)
9:58:33 Unintelligible. (Let’s go guys. Allah is greatest. Allah is greatest. Oh guys. Allah is greatest.)
9:58:41 Ugh.
9:58:43 Ugh.
9:58:44 (Oh Allah. Oh Allah. Oh the most gracious.)
9:58:47 Ugh. Ugh.
9:58:52 Stay back.
9:58:55 In the cockpit.
9:58:57 In the cockpit.
9:58:57 (They want to get in here. Hold, hold from the inside. Hold from the inside. Hold).
9:59:04 Hold the door.
9:59:09 Stop him.
9:59:11 Sit down.
9:59:13 Sit down.
9:59:15 Sit down.
9:59:16 Unintelligible.
9:59:17 (What?)
9:59:18 (There are some guys. All those guys.)
9:59:20 Lets get them.
9:59:25 Sit down.
9:59:29 (What?)
9:59:30 (What.)
9:59:31 (What?)
9:59:36 Unintelligible.
9:59:37 (What?)
9:59:39 Unintelligible.
9:59:41 Unintelligible.
9:59:42 (Trust in Allah, and in him.)
9:59:45 Sit down.
9:59:47 Unintelligible.
9:59:53 Ahh.
9:59:55 Unintelligible.
9:59:58 Ahh.
10:00:06 (There is nothing.)
10:00:07 (Is that it? Shall we finish it off?)
10:00:08 (No. Not yet.)
10:00:09 (When they all come, we finish it off.)
10:00:11 (There is nothing.)
10:00:13 Unintelligible.
10:00:14 Ahh.
10:00:15 I’m injured.
10:00:16 Unintelligible.
10:00:21 Ahh.
10:00:22 (Oh Allah. Oh Allah. Oh gracious.)
10:00:25 In the cockpit. If we don’t, we’ll die.
10:00:29 (Up, down. Up, down, in the) cockpit.
10:00:33 (The) cockpit.
10:00:37 (Up, down. Saeed, up, down.)
10:00:42 Roll it.
10:00:55 Unintelligible.
10:00:59 (Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.)
10:01:01 Unintelligible.
10:01:08 (Is that it? I mean, shall we pull it down?)
10:01:09 (Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.)
10:01:10 Unintelligible.
10:01:11 (Saeed.)
10:01:12 … engine …
10:01:13 Unintelligible.
10:01:16 (Cut off the oxygen.)
10:01:18 (Cut off the oxygen. Cut off the oxygen. Cut off the oxygen.)
10:01:34 Unintelligible.
10:01:37 Unintelligible.
10:01:41 (Up, down. Up, down.)
10:01:41 (What?)
10:01:42 (Up, down.)
10:01:42 Ahh.
10:01:53 Ahh.
10:01:54 Unintelligible.
10:01:55 Ahh.
10:01:59 Shut them off.
10:02:03 Shut them off.
10:02:14 Go.
10:02:14 Go.
10:02:15 Move.
10:02:16 Move.
10:02:17 Turn it up.
10:02:18 (Down, down.)
10:02:23 (Pull it down. Pull it down.)
10:02:25 Down. Push, push, push, push, push.
10:02:33 (Hey. Hey. Give it to me. Give it to me.)
10:02:35 (Give it to me. Give it to me. Give it to me.)
10:02:37 (Give it to me. Give it to me. Give it to me.)
10:02:40 Unintelligible.
10:03:02 (Allah is the greatest.)
10:03:03 (Allah is the greatest.)
10:03:04 (Allah is the greatest.)
10:03:06 (Allah is the greatest.)
10:03:06 (Allah is the greatest.)
10:03:07 No.
10:03:09 (Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.)
10:03:09 (Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.)