In hindsight this seems like it would have worked really well, rather than wasting troops on big offensives in a war that famously favored the defense (frederiksburg, chancellorsville) etc they could have sent large numbers of troops west. In the east the Union throughout the war had the confederates outnumbered at least 2 to 1 and could easily have held the line with defenses and fortifications with even numbers. In the west troops numbers were way lower, often only a few thousand on each side. The union could easily muster 40k men to send west which would very quickly end up with most of the confederacy back in union hands.
The best confederate generals were also in the east, and the west is expansive enough it would be basically impossible to dig in as any defensive lines could be outflanked.
>but Virginia is 90% of the southern economy or whatever
yeah but there's a psychological aspect to it, once the confederacy is reduced to a handful of states the war is pretty obviously going to be over.
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Main problem is Robert Lee could have captured Washington and psychologically break Union morale. Without the Union's overwhelming numbers, they could have broke and got ran over the ANV. McClellan constantly over-estimated Lee's army, thinking he had 100,000 troops at any time and could magically appear with a corp to flank or behind them. The Union also needed more troops to occupy territory as they captured it, while the Confederates had defender's advantage so the 2:1 advantage is less moot. The Union did have the advantage in replacing losses, but this could become extremely unpopular (New York Draft Riots) and public opinion demanding an end to the war. The Union general plan to take Richmond, which wasn't far from Washington. It was natural that having the two capitals so close at the border make the Eastern Theater become the largest commitment by both sides.
>once the confederacy is reduced to a handful of states the war is pretty obviously going to be over
It wasn't. Even after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Union public was skeptical that the Union would prevail. It wasn't until Sherman's March to the Sea and capturing Atlanta, Savannah that the Union public was convinced it was only a matter of time. The Confederacy was in the vise of the Anaconda, and Lee was the last major field army left reduced to some starving 50,000 men and dwindling supplies against 200,000. Lincoln had to contend constantly with a public who's support for the war wavered with each defeat, and wanted dramatic victories - otherwise the peace doves would be screeching. Lincoln did not always have a unified coalition in the Union to keep the war going no matter the cost and the Southern strategy basically relied on breaking that resolve (hence Lee's northern invasions)
>Lincoln had to contend constantly with a public who's support for the war wavered with each defeat, and wanted dramatic victories
Realistically not an Issue, Union was constantly getting wrecked early in the war in the real history and it didn't end up being an issue. If anything constant rapid victories in the west would have helped morale more. Even with equal numbers I don't think Lee could have taken Washington with competent defensive engineering commanders like Meade, Mcclellan in charge. Southern commanders did not win a single victory against entrenched union soldiers (as in a couple of days of building trenches) let alone extensive fortifications.
/2 even a small number of extra troops in the west would have a made a big difference when you had battles with only a few thousand men on each side. The union isn't going to suffer whatsoever from going from 120k men vs 50k or whatever to 100k, a lot of those men were never even engaged at antietam, chancellorsville etc.
No, it would have been another distraction while the Union was struggling formulating a cohesive strategy in the east. If anything the Union should have committed to taking Richmond.
I dunno, I think if there's one thing Grant recognized before anybody else it was that taking cities didn't guarantee anything, and hadn't in a long time. So long as confederate armies were in the field, the war would continue.
I've always thought that Lee should have abandoned Richmond, but that's personal opinion.
That's not true. The capture of Corinth for example netted control of the railways of the Mississippi. Not only was Richmind materially important, it would have been an intolerable loss of face for both Lee and the CSA, and it would have forced their hand into a protracted siege which they almost never succeeded at throughout the war once the Union had fortified it. Chasing Lee in the field always played into his terms and the Union suffered for it.
The Union had plenty of troops in the west and apart from a few setbacks, they rolled over Confederate forces, but things seemed to go awry with nice Grant left the theater. He wasn’t any kind of war god, but the subpar leadership left in the west led to a series of embarrassing defeats for the Union in 1864–Red River campaign, Steele in Arkansas, Brice’s Crossroads, etc. The Rebs even invaded Missouri, where they hadn’t been relevant since 1862, even though their force was eventually crushed. Sherman’s Atlanta campaign was just grinding along and along with the slaughter and stalemate in the East, things didn’t look good leading up to the 1864 elections until Mobile and the capture of Atlanta.
The isolated undermanned Confederate forces in the west really punched above their weight in 1864. The real game was in Virginia of course but the Union should have been able to mop up things in the west after Vicksburg.
Nathaniel Banks was an idiot but a politically important idiot so they couldn't get rid of him.
A competent general in Louisiana, not that the Union had any to spare, would have made a big difference. Taking Port Hudson in spring 1863 makes Vicksburg untenable and the Army of the Gulf could have linked up with Grant, as Banks hoped to do, with him taking command as he was Grant’s superior. A decent general would have easily taken Shreveport and beyond in 1864, sweeping aside inferior forces, or they would have never launched the ‘tarded campaign in the first place.
>A competent general in Louisiana, not that the Union had any to spare
McClellan, Grant even tried to get him appointed (not there specifically but somewhere) but was told it was impossible because democrat + political threat
McClellan might have been the perfect fit down there. The political thing could have been an advantage, as the whole reason Banks was there was because Ben Butler had enraged New Orleans citizens with his heavy handed occupation. Nudging states like Louisiana and Tennessee that were largely Union controlled back into the fold was a big goal as the war went on.
The theater would have played to McClellan’s strengths. Most regiments in the Army of the Gulf were green troops from the northeast. He could have whipped them into shape and won their loyalty (they openly loathed and mocked Banks). Supply and logistics were big concerns in such a remote outpost, and keeping your men alive and healthy was half the battle in the tropical miasma. McClellan knew how to work with the Navy after the Peninsula campaign, which was crucial on the rivers and bayous in the region.
As far as actual fighting, who knows? Banks toggled between being overly cautious and launching poorly planned bloody assaults. McClelan probably would have done well in grinding down the outnumbered Confederate forces in the region, and might have found his ticket to the White House as the man who took Vicksburg,
McClellan would have never gone though. He would have fought tooth and nail to stay in the east.
after antietam i think he would have accepted a command just about anywhere rather than sitting on the bench but idk
Ya, the timing would matter
ehhhhhhhh I see what you are getting at, but the west was never entirely crucial in the first place. Add to the fact that Grant did a good job cleansing the area so as to at least keep rebel push back minimum after he left., relatively speaking
Once Vicksburg was locked down there was no real reason to expand the campaign in the area beyond what they ended up doing. I am not saying everything went perfect after Grant left (or even while he was there), but relative to what the east meant to the war, the west was not worth pouring more resources into. Time is also a factor.
At least that's the way it seems. What real game changers could have realistically happened had more forces been sent that direction? I can only think of a large army eventually sweeping from west to east in a surprise movement, but even then, that's not easy
>but the west was never entirely crucial in the first place
The Trans-Mississippi never actually mattered, in fact Grant believed Virginia wasn't that critical either and the war would be won between the Mississippi and Appalachians.
After Pea Ridge the region wasn’t very relevant, though the campaigns after that should have gone better for the Union, given their superior forces. I think part of it had to do with breaking southern morale. If I was in an Arkansas regiment I’d be demoralized thinking the Yankees were slaughtering my hogs and boinking Liza Jane while I was off in Virginia.
I wonder how much of the emphasis on the far west, especially after 1863, was aimed at sending a message to the French in Mexico?
Almost all Arkansas regiments fought in the West, only the 3rd Arkansas Infantry served in the ANV.
I knew most Rackensackers stayed in the west but didn’t realize only one regiment made it to Virginia.
t. ancestor in 15th Arkansas
>once the confederacy is reduced to a handful of states the war is pretty obviously going to be over.
the confederacy would have been just as well off - or better, if it was just virginia, the carolinas, and georgia
no, the West was ultimately not relevant and Lee wouldnt have surrendered until he had to. Virginia could prosecute the war alone for a short while, and Virginia plus the Eastern States for a couple of years at least, and as long as they could they would with Lee at the helm. The South East had to be taken down.
wasn't new orleans pretty importnat?
no and it fell rather early on
New Orleans was the south’s largest and wealthiest city but it was also a cul de sac for the south as it could be easily blockaded, whereas reopening the Mississippi was a huge strategic goal for the Union. It was a humiliating loss for the Confederates though as they thought things would go like with the Brits in 1815, only to have Farragut steam past the river forts with minimal casualties, then accept surrender without a shot fired.