>the things-in-themselves are totally there bro, even if you do not sense them and only their representations. They are definitely not just metaphysical abstractions, trust me bro. I'm not dogmatic, you are!
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Midwit take. Nothing wrong with being a midwit though.
>representations of things-in-themselves
No
It’s a necessary conceit in the same way that denying solipsism is. Yes we can’t directly access noumena but a belief in noumena is necessary to function. If you reply to this post you’re conceding the point because you’re acting as if there’s a reality external to your perceptions
You're implying subjective idealism is solipsism. Its ok, Kant didn't understand Berkeley either.
Berkeley believed in things-in-themselves
Explain.
There's nothing to explain idiot, don't post if you're unfamiiar with the topic
Aren't existences things-in-themselves mind-independant?
No, they're just things perceived by God
AND WE'RE NOT GOD moron
... so?
So god perceives things and that is noumena or you know, god doesn't exist but you won't consider this because current right wing zeitgeist is about larping spirituality
Either write an argument or stop wasting my time brainlet. Berkeley accepted noumena in his system, which is what that poster said before you or someone equally moronic brought up Berkeley for no reason other than a failure to understand either thinkers. No wonder you're an atheist too, you're double digit IQ.
Do you have autism? I'm obviously not the anon further up thread but since you failed to parse that I'm guessing you're disabled. Maybe god will heal you if he's real lmao
I did account for you not being that person but I'm not surprised illiteracy accompanies your moronation
>Berkeley accepted noumena in his system...
This doesn't make sense to write unless you were assuming that the context of the prior conversation is relevant which it isn't. Again if god was real he wouldn't have made you
>If you reply to this post you’re conceding the point because you’re acting as if there’s a reality external to your perceptions
No I'm not.
>If you reply to this post you’re conceding the point because you’re acting as if there’s a reality external to your perceptions
How so? Maybe talking to yourself is the only way to keep yourself busy given that you're all that exists.
How come i can tallk to my self and then again in the process of tallking to my self tallk again to my self, yet the 2nd tallking i can control while 1st i cannot?
Kant never claims the thing-in-itself exists.
>If you reply to this post you’re conceding the point because you’re acting as if there’s a reality external to your perceptions
Your own perceptions are a reality external to you.
correct
See "The Critique of Pure Reason" by Immanuel Kant
None are satisfactory
Misread your post, I thought you were saying there wasn't a reality external to us.
Tis okay. I am agnostic anyways.
Hope ill finally have some time over summer to wrestle with CPR.
Altho both realists and idealist need to give me hard proof of why they are corect and other side not.
For all i see it, only way to confirm those belifes is to "exit" our for of existance as humans.
Then I'm all ears to hear how Maimon's arguments are not satisfactory.
I'm all ears for your recounting of Maimon's arguments.
bro i want to have sex with cute anime girls
>doing mental gymnastics to think reality doesn't exist outside human perception
reality existed before us and will be here after we are gone, so much of metaphysical philosophy is headass semantics
Imagine still seething over this guy like 300 years later. Kant has never been refuted in a satisfactory manner. And if you reply with Nick land I’m just going to laugh at you.
Jacobi, Wizenmann, Maimon, later Lockeans, have all criticized important points of his philosophy that were influential to the later idealists like Schelling, Hegel.
>Lockeans
Who cares
kys
>Locke
Most destructive man in the history of ideas, second only to Martin Luther and Ockham (Calvin doesn't even deserve a mention)
Destroying bullshit is not a bad thing
He was destroyed by Berkeley anyway.
>muh primary qualities!
>later Lockeans,
such as
>300 years later
yes because he was refuted retroactively by Descartes
Descartes was a moron.
he literally presumes noumena. it's self-refuting. he even uses noumena in an attempt to discredit phenomena. fricking clown.
>still seething over this guy like 300
WOW OP is old!
To highlight the contradiction of this speculative reductionism, we need only ask ourselves the quintessential Kantian question. Under what conditions is a critique of pure reason possible? Our question in no way contradicts the Kantian project, since in the Critique, reason takes itself as its object: "Pure reason is in fact occupied only with itself, and can have no other function". And yet, in Kant's own words: "That which limits must be different from that which it serves to limit". Consequently, reason can only limit the power of reason, which is what the work of criticism consists of, if it is superior to that power, i.e. if it is, in its essence, illuminated participatively by divine and absolute Reason. But then, and precisely, criticism is useless, and dogmatic metaphysics is right. On the contrary, if reason is not more than reason, if there is not, at the heart of reason, the receptivity of the intellect illuminated by the Logos "who enlightens every man who comes into this world", reason will never be aware of its limits, and criticism of reason by reason will never be possible. Unless we admit that, by a privilege unheard of since there have been philosophers, Kant is the first to have escaped the transcendental illusion and to have been able to see through it. But this is what Criticism itself absolutely denies: since intuition is conditioned and constructed, it follows that the knowledge that reason takes of itself, by virtue of the principles of Criticism, must also be conditioned, and that the object of critical reason (which is reason itself) is also necessarily a "constructed" object. Or else it would be the only object that can be known in itself. But if it is indeed a "constructed" object, then criticism loses all value of truth and certainty (not, no doubt, with regard to its detailed analyses, but with regard to its general thesis, which Kant himself calls the Copernican revolution).
In other words, the notion of an essential self-limitation of knowledge is simply contradictory, i.e. impossible. Just as the eye cannot see the edge of its vision, knowledge cannot draw the limits beyond which it cannot know. What knowledge can do - and this is what the doctrine of the intellect as a sense of being sufficiently accounts for - is to become aware of the limitations imposed on it by the existential conditioning of its human realization. But this limitation is extrinsic, not intrinsic, and awareness of it is only possible precisely by virtue of the internal limitlessness of knowledge.
This conditioning essentially determines, on the one hand, the forms with which knowledge is clothed and, on the other, its internal structure. But whatever these limitations may be, they would be inconceivable if, at its heart, the intellect were no more than what it knows and the knowing subject.
The question "what can I know?" cannot therefore be asked a priori. It may possibly make sense a posteriori, when man reflects on his own knowledge and notes its errors and limitations, due to his existential finiteness. But all we can say, a priori, about knowledge is that it assumes itself to be the unconditioned condition of any given cognitive act, and is therefore virtually absolute and unmanageable: there is knowledge, that's what we see. Knowledge grasps itself as the "universal witness" presupposed by all its acts. Such is the certainty of the Self, of which Shankara speaks: "The Self, [...] because it is the foundation of the operations of the norms and functions of knowledge, attests its own existence even before they operate. And of such an existence it is impossible to produce refutation, for you can repudiate what is adventitious to you, but not what is essential to you".
This is brutal. Look how the followers of the German gnome sistematically ignore it. PBUH.
About Kantgoblin's paradigm :
>This is how we discover that reason only deals with mental forms (of reason, of understanding, of sensibility), but never with realities. We are thus invited to enter into a symbolic philosophy that handles only signs without referent, "symbols" that reveal nothing of the noumenon they nevertheless require. In this way, Immanuel Kant's reason unfolds the prestigious picture of the imaginary of pure reason in its shadow theater, isolating the human mind from Reality, forever unknowable, and bewitching it with the spectacle of its own game. So much so that this multiple game, in which the subtlest abstractions interfere with the most rigorous discourse, and which excels in giving the impression of a perfectly self-conscious mastery, presents itself, whether we like it or not, as a substitute for Reality. Kant unburdens dogmatic reason by revealing that what it took to be real objects is pure appearance. But the show goes on. It is precisely these appearances that we will now be shown, and which will act as objects for reason. "Reason is only concerned with itself". What a terrible condemnation! Occupied with these empty forms that transcendental convention has ontologically castrated, it no longer runs any risks. Metaphysical conflicts are abolished, peace is established at last - and Kant is not a little proud of this - but at what price! At the price of the mortal derealization of all his cognitive acts.
Cool, can i see your proof that there is nothing external to us?
>can you prove a negative
Doing a high dose of shrooms partially convinced me that Langan's CTMU is somewhat correct, with some variations
How?
You wouldn't get it
Then be quiet.
Ok, sorry
I wish I had friends interested in mathematics. That’s pretty cool anon, you should share the wisdom you gleaned anyway
kys
>tfw a high dose of shrooms only convinced me that my giantess fetisch is righteous
I envy you.
>I'm not dogmatic, you are!
Kant's philosophy in a nussschale
What a schizophrenic and antisemitic thing to say
all Kant said is we are affected. He takes this as an immediate fact; we have sensations, but as soon as we go beyond these sensations and suppose a cause of these sensations we are already engaged in thinking. Again, thinking demands and unconditioned, but it can only legitimately use the category of causality to find the proximate cause WITHIN the phenomena. To attribute causality to the thing-in-itself, as a noumena in the positive sense, as a subject-independent reality, is an illegitimate move, but a rationally necessary one, that we cannot stop from doing, and which he calls transcendental illusion. BUT, it is not Berkeleyan idealism, because he is not affirming or denying there is a positive noumena (subject-independent object) causing our sensations. All we know is we have sensations. period. This is the limit of human knowledge, for the sake of knowledge (theoretical). Whether we have other (practical) reasons for belief in positive noumena is left for the second critique, but as far as the critique of reason purely in its speculative use, or in it's use purely for the sake of gaining knowledge, Kants conclusion is agnostic with respect to the thing-in-itself; Kant is agnostic even with respect to a cause our sensations. But he does not deny there is a mind-independent cause of sensations like Berkeley-- which means he is not a subjective idealist, but neither does he affirm it, theoretically, speculatively. He DOES affirm it practically, but not as knowledge, only as rational belief, but, again that is another topic.
But this point about having sensations goes much more in the direction of an empirical realism than that of transcendental idealism. The being-there of whatever we receive is what posits a dilemma to the the Kantian critique, for admitting the existence of things in themselves as ground of these sensations is problematic, but at the same time that denying them likewise is problematic, for it would result in radical subjectivism, solipsism (account only for the subjective activity). Asserting an agnosticism does not resolve, for it is admitting probability, and it is no less contradictory to admit probablity than it is to go with any of the consauences of affirming or denying the thing in themselves.
>The being-there of whatever we receive is what posits a dilemma to the the Kantian critique, for admitting the existence of things in themselves as ground of these sensations is problematic, but at the same time that denying them likewise is problematic, for it would result in radical subjectivism, solipsism
The rejection of a system for the implications of its apodeictic deductions is dogmatic. Kant's agnosticism towards the thing-in-itself does not lead to any contradictions. Additionally, our being affected sensationally is not taken as immediate fact; rather, that we're given presentations is taken as immediate fact. This is not physical sensation in the empirical sense.
But Kant does not go to the consequences of his own criticism, at least not until the time of the writings of the Opus Postumum, where he seems to go in the direction of a subjectivism. This is the issue here, he still wants to safeguard an objective external reality, even if he must posit them with empty regulative notions.
>our being affected is not taken as immediate fact
Being given or affected, it is, otherwise there would be no matter to be shaped by the understanding.
If the empirical language refers somehow to something purely transcendental, then why attribute a sensible faculty to the process of cognition and make them work togethet (this is Maimon critique, that both are different faculties and still somehow get to mix with each other).
>Being given or affected, it is, otherwise there would be no matter to be shaped by the understanding.
I said "being given or affected sensationally". My intent was to differentiate Kant's assumption from empirical realism. Intuitions are not a form of sense data. Regardless, intuitions aren't some axiom from which Kant builds his system - abstracting from intuition we find the pure forms, which are more primitive and don't rely on an assumption about intuitions to exist.
>he still wants to safeguard an objective external reality, even if he must posit them with empty regulative notions.
Elaborate
>If the empirical language refers somehow to something purely transcendental, then why attribute a sensible faculty to the process of cognition and make them work togethet
Elaborate again please, I'm not sure I understand what the issue is. What is meant by "empirical language"?
Both going with this sensible ground and its implication and going the other way with solely pure forms, will have problematic consequences. I was making my arguments regarding the former case. But see this passage, which gives a glimpse of the situation and from which we must decide whether there is external sensible reference or not:
>The only thing I can really call a supplement, and that only in the way of proof is what I have said at [B]2 73 in the form of a new refutation of psychological idealism, and a strict proof of the objective reality of outer intuition. No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics, it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof. Because there are some obscurities in the expressions of this proof between the third and sixth lines, I ask leave to alter this passage as follows: "But this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined." Against this proof one will perhaps say: I am immediately conscious to myself only of what is in me, i.e., of my representation of external things; consequently it still remains undecided whether there is something outside me corresponding to it or not. Yet I am conscious through inner experience of my existence in time (and consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more than merely being conscious of my representation; yet it is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which is only determinable through a relation to something that, while being bound up with my existence, is outside me.
>This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and so it is experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins the outer with my inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me; and its reality; as distinct from imagination, rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibility, which happens here. If I could combine a determination of my existence through intellectual intuition simultaneously with the intellectual consciousness of my existence, in the representation I am, which accompanies all my judgments and actions of my understanding, then no consciousness of a relation to something outside me would necessarily belong to this. But now that intellectual consciousness does to be sure precede, but the inner intuition, in which alone my existence can be determined, is sensible, and is bound to a condition of time; however, this determination, and hence inner experience itself, depends on something permanent, which is not in me, and consequently must be outside me, and I must consider myself in relationa to it; thus for an experience in general to be possible, the reality of outer sense is necessarily bound up with that of inner sense, i.e., I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time.
>Now which given intuitions actually correspond to outer objects, which therefore belong to outer sense, to which they are to be ascribed rather than to the imagination - that must be decided in each particular case according to the rules through which experience in general (even inner experience) is to be distinguished from imagination; which procedure is grounded always on the proposition that there actually is outer experience. To this the following remark can be added: The representation of something persisting in existence is not the same as a persisting representation; for that can be quite variable and changeable, as all our representations are, even the representations of matter, while still being related to something permanent, which must therefore be a thing distinct from all my representations and external, the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of my own existence, which with it constitutes only a single experience, which could not take place even as inner if it were not simultaneously (in part) outer. The "How?" of this can be no more explained than we can explain further how we can think at all of what abides in time, whose simultaneity with what changes is what produces the concept of alteration.
Regarding my argument on an external sensible givenness I cite this passage from Prolegomena:
>How is nature possible in general in the material sense, namely, according to intuition, as the sum total of appearances; how are space, time, and that which fills them both, the object of sensation, possible in general? The answer is: by means of the constitution of our sensibility, in accordance with which our sensibility is affected in its characteristic way by objects that are in themselves unknown to it and that are wholly distinct from said appearances.
The first page of the Transcendental Aesthetic:
>In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, <at least for us humans,> is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions.
These are some examples fleshing out my arguments concerning that empirical realism implicated in the dualistic nature of Kant's criticism.
>Elaborate
I think that in these examples, Kant is doing what I said, he is not isolating the understanding, the self, experience to purely subjective activity and production, he is retaining elements necessary not to be accused of a vulgar idealist.
>Elaborate again please
What I meant is the language that Kant uses in these passages: ''receptivity'', ''affecting the mind'', ''object given to us'', etc. implicate part, or elements, of empirical epistemology.
>having sensations goes much more in the direction of an empirical realism than that of transcendental idealism.
Kant
>If I take away from an empirial intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW that this affection or representation has any relation to an object WITHOUT me.
See:
>The being-there of whatever we receive is what posits a dilemma to the the Kantian critique, for admitting the existence of things in themselves as ground of these sensations is problematic, but at the same time that denying them likewise is problematic, for it would result in radical subjectivism, solipsism (account only for the subjective activity)
What part of
>Kants conclusion is agnostic with respect to the thing-in-itself; Kant is agnostic even with respect to a cause our sensations. But he does not deny there is a mind-independent cause of sensations like Berkeley-- which means he is not a subjective idealist, but neither does he affirm it, theoretically, speculatively.
did you not understand?
>All we know is we have sensations. PERIOD.
>>How is nature possible in general in the material sense, namely, according to intuition, as the sum total of appearances; how are space, time, and that which fills them both, the object of sensation, possible in general? The answer is: by means of the constitution of our sensibility, in accordance with which our sensibility is affected in its characteristic way by objects that are in themselves unknown to it and that are wholly distinct from said appearances.
Black person read the rest of the book
>n-Black person just ignore this blatant contradiction to what I'm saying and read the rest of the book... oh and if you find equally ambiguous or incoherent passages, just ignore them too and believe what I say.
>A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick out APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS, especially in a work written with any freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but are easily reconciled by THOSE WHO HAVE MASTERED THE IDEA OF THE WHOLE.
Black person, read the whole book. Stop being a pseud.
I mean, the passages (yes, it is not only one passage) concern something quite elementary in Kant's philosophy: the thing in itself. Can you explain, then, those passages that affirm the actuality of objects that contradict your claim of agnosticism by Kant's part?
You don't understand that Kant has no escape, even with his agnosticism. Agnosticism means probability, and he cannot admit probability of either affirming or denying the thing in itself because either way will have his critical project incoherent. That is why he does both deny and affirm the reality of the things in themselves throughout the CPR and the Prolegomena.
>Agnosticism means probability
moron no it does not-- it just means we don't fricking know. We have no postiive theoretical knowledge of anything beyond phenomena, and at best have the negative awareness of the limitations of empirical knowledge as human beings, and the concept of the non-phenomal as a void concept reified for purposes of theoretical completenes, but nothing else- it's literally just the concept of nothing, as opposed to something. We do have reasons to believe in noumena, and even attribute qualities to them/it, but it has frick all to do with probability. You would know this if you actually read the first AND second critique.
It seems like you don't know what words mean and can connote. Not knowing whether X can be actual or not means admitting either as probable. This is the theoretical implication of his agnosticism concerning the thing in itself. The rational step to form a totality from the limited scope that the understanding offers is theoretically unjustifiable, it is only justified in his practical terms, just like the idea of God, soul, etc.
I'm still waiting for the explanation of the passages I quoted above.
>Not knowing whether X can be actual or not means admitting either as probable.
Black person no it does not. how many times do I have to tell you this. No claims can be made about the thing in itself on theoretical grounds. And the claims about it based on practical grounds, have nothing to do with probability-- they are POSTULATES of Reason. Practical Reason dictates, commands, is a LAW opposed to natural law. Idk where the frick youre coming up with this probability bullshit
How many times do I need to tell you that what I'm affirming concerns his disposition toward the idea of thing in itself, and not the thing in itself itself.
>No claims can be made about the thing in itself on theoretical grounds
Hence there is a theoretical openness to the question whether they exist or not, hence there is a fricking probability (probability is a logical, theoretical inference).
>he claims about it based on practical grounds, have nothing to do with probability
Literally what I said before: ''This is the theoretical implication of his agnosticism concerning the thing in itself. The rational step to form a totality from the limited scope that the understanding offers is theoretically unjustifiable, it is only justified in his practical terms''
My point is that Kant's agnosticism cannot avoid the consequences of either possibilities of admitting or denying the thing in themselves; if the thing in itself exists then it contradicts part of his criticism, if the thing in itself does not exist then it contradicts another part of his criticism (as I explained above in another post). We cannot know them, but we can know that they are a problem for Kant.
>there is a theoretical openness
no there is not. This what you don't get. When it comes to the thing in itself all you can do, on theoretical grounds, is shut the frick up. There is no "theoretical openess"-- it is a shut door to theoretical reason.
Yes, we cannot choose because both are theoretically possible, but either of these possibilities posit contradictions to his philosophy. This is the fricking point.
>both are theoretically possible
*neither, dimwit
let me put it this way, the thing in itself, as MIND-INDEPENDENT cannot be actuality thought. If you are thinking about the thing in itself, and thinking your thoughts about the thing in itself apply to the thing in itself, you have fallen for transcendental illusion: you are not actually thinking about the thing in itself. It's similar to "The Tao that can be spoken of is not the Tao".
The transcendental illusion only refers to when you attribute operations of the understanding or the intuitions beyond its range. The thing-in-itself is not imbued with any of these operations. Kant makes no pronouncements about the being of the thing-in-itself. In fact, similarly to the self, the thing-in-itself cannot be known as real directly. The thing-in-itself is posited by reason by the act of critique as that which lies beyond the boundaries of knowledge. Hence, it is a pure concept of reason, insofar as it is conceptualized as that which reason cannot reach, and not an attempt to use the intuitions on noumena. It is posited purely as a barrier. Still though, this counts as positing it, even if only metaphorically, and Kant shows his reliance on his implicit admission of its existence every time he references it.
no. fricking. shit. ChatGPTanon, read what I just wrote again.
I'm not thinking about the thing in itself, I'm thinking about the consequences of both their existence or non-existence. How many times do I have to tell this to you? We cannot know which one is the case, but we can know what either of these possibilities would entail to Kant's system.
>I'm not thinking about the thing in itself
>I'm thinking about the consequences of both their existence or non-existence.
So, then, interrigentanon what are you referring to by the word "their"?
Their possible existence or non-existence in direct relation to the implications of and to Kant's critical philosophy.
You are moronic and the other anon should stop replying to you. From Pluhar, B310-311:
>Yet, in the end, we can have no insight at all into the possibility of such noumena, and the range outside the sphere of appearances is (for us) empty. I.e., we have an understanding that *problematically* extends further than this sphere; but we have no intuition - indeed, not even the concept of a possible intuition - through which objects can be given to us outside the realm of sensibility, and through which the understanding can be used *assertorically* beyond sensibility. The concept of a noumenon is, therefore, only a *boundary concept* serving to limit the pretension of sensibility, and hence is only of negative use.
Note "we have an understanding that problematically extends further than this sphere [of appearances]". From Pluhar, B100:
>Problematic judgements are those where the affirmation or negation is taken as merely *possible* (optional); *assertoric* ones are those where the affirmation or negation is considered as actual (true)."
The existence of noumenons is clearly taken as a problematic judgement, i.e. one in which its truth or falsity is indeterminate and thus either is possible, or probable.
holy. fricking. shit. the irony.
>noumenons
I'm fricking dying
You are a moron.
This is some serious mental gymnastics. If the noumenon is a problematic judgment, then you cannot use it to limit reason or sense experience, because to do so would be to make it assertoric. So if the noumenon is really problematic, we are as justified in saying that sense experience is all that exists (and therefore is the basic form of all reality), as that it isn't, which defeats the purpose of Kant's philosophy, because part of what he is trying to establish that sense experience is not fundamental or primary, because if it is, then Aristotelian philosophy is correct and Kant loses his claim over it. If our understanding does problematically extend further than this sphere (sense) by limiting the extension of the applicability of the understanding, that would then be an implicit affirmation of its (noumenon's) existence per modal collapse (the possibility collapses into a necessity through its mere possibility). But Kant obviously was not familiar with modal logic, so it's at least somewhat apparent why he didn't perceive that. Maybe you agree with all of what I just said, but if you do, then there is virtually no reason not to come full circle and arrive back at Aristotelian metaphysics, seeing as Kant cannot answer any meaningful questions for you, and Aristotle can. Due to the modal collapse I mentioned, both the affirmation and negation of the thing-in-itself leads you straight back to naturalist and realist metaphysics.
>deny and affirm the reality of the things in themselves throughout the CPR and the Prolegomena.
youre literally falling again for the transcendental illusion I keep talking about. If you'd actually read the whole book you'd know the context and understand when he afffirms it he does so only as a necessary product of thinking, an idea of reason, and, to correct your lack of reading, he does NOT deny it-- for the millionth time: he is agnostic about non-phenomena, whatever they may be in themselves.
In the citations I made here
, in the first of them Kant is literally addressing the constitution of our sensible reception, ''by means of the constitution of our sensibility, in accordance with which our sensibility is affected in its characteristic way by objects that are in themselves unknown to it and that are wholly distinct from said appearances''. Is this posited by the deceptive state of reason under transcendental illusion?
you have not read the whole book have you?
NTA but likely not. All of his replies are just him throwing quotes at people and then replying to and replies with “but just read the quote dude.” He can’t explain any of it in his own language.
I have. Will you address the issue at hand now?
I literally said what one of the quotes I cited is about, in reply to the poster who thought I was taking Kant's own explanation of the constitution of sensible reception as transcendental illusion.
They are mutually exclusive you fricking absolute moron. The problem is that I even admire and like a lot of things in Kant's philosophy but holy shit, you are just a impressionable stupid dogmatist.
>Will you address the issue at hand now?
I already have.
>you are just a impressionable stupid dogmatist
it's not an insult if the dogma is true
>it's not an insult if the dogma is true
That's how every cultist thinks too.
>I have.
sure.
Then post what that quote is about.
Reality either exists or it doesn’t dude
If it doesn’t there’s no point considering it
>Reality either exists or it doesn’t dude
Sure, it's just not physical or mind-indepentant
[Spoiler]as far as we know. Also, god[/spoiler]
What in the Gods name do you mean by "Reallity either exists or it does not'.
Reallity is not a being, entity or property.
The point is that they’re a an essential assumption you have to take in order to make sense of reality at all. The pure intuitions give us nothing in themselves, they are merely ways of structuring sensation like time or space or causality. They aren’t the sensations themselves. It is precisely a metaphysical abstraction, by its very nature that’s all it could ever be. That’s one of the few positive statements Kant gives on mataphysics.
>they’re a an essential assumption
transcendental illusion
Kant
>Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even after it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism. Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition: "The world must have a beginning in time." The cause of this is as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause it happens that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our conceptions, is regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore, because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion.
Kant never claims that the thing-in-itself causes perception in any way. He does not extract causality onto the thing-in-itself. He merely states that a substratum of existence exists such that the understanding has something to make sense of. Likewise, he doesn’t make any claims of permanence either. His point is that as long as you experience there is a thing to be experienced and that this thing to be experienced has independent reality of you at that point. In the argument you quoted he even had to make reference to the thing-in-itself as existent to explain his point. We cannot attribute positive reality to it, but it stands as a useful reference in the same way that the Kantian view of freedom stands on the assumption that Reason is not materialistically determined. We’re splitting hairs and for what?
>thing to be experienced has independent reality of you at that point.
no that is the transcendental illusion
So then Kant is a sophist?
no
Okay, we’ll for me he is because I have a different logical substance which our similar ways of understanding comprehended the same way but with different outcomes due to the different injection of data from the thing-in-itself. Am I right to say this?
no
Why
someone explain kant to me
pay me and I will
>Knutzen sought to strike a balance between Pietist Lutheranism and Christian Wolff's dogmatic philosophy, trying to compatibilize the teachings of Pietism with the hypotheses of Wolff's illustrated philosophy. Knutzen saw philosophy not merely as a propaedeutic for gaining access to theology, but as a separate science that established its own postulates. This is patent from one of his writings, published in 1740, the year in which Kant joined the university, titled “Philosophical Proof of the Truth of the Christian Religion” (Knutzen, 1740). This volume, which was to become his most famous work and built him a reputation in the 18th century, stated that philosophy is the depository of rational proof, even of religion itself. In writing this book, not only did Knutzen show how strongly rooted his thinking was in Königsberg's theological debate, but he also revealed his intimate knowledge of what had until then been an unknown aspect of British philosophy. The book also offers a good picture of Knutzen's theological standpoint. This work originally appeared as a series of articles in the “Königsberger Intelligenzblätter” (Knutzen, 1745). This way, Knutzen brought a breath of fresh, modern and advanced air into the Prussian cultural milieu dominated by Franz Albert Schultz’s Pietist theology.
>In 1744, an important controversy shook the scientific and academic media of the time. Years earlier, in 1738, Knutzen had predicted that a comet that had been observed in 1698 would reappear in the winter of 1744. This prediction was, apparently, based on Newton's theory about the course of periodic comets with elliptical orbits of the Sun. (Waschkies, 1987). When a comet actually did appear in that year, Knutzen became an instant celebrity in the town and gained a reputation as a great astronomer well beyond the confines of Königsberg. In 1744, Knutzen published a book titled “Rational thoughts on the comets, in which is examined and represented their nature and their character, as well as the causes of their motion, and at the same time given a short description of the noteworthy comet of this year”. This book was, according to Christian Jacob Kraus [de] (1753–1807), Kant's most intelligent disciple, responsible for awakening Kant's interest in this science, and it was this book that led him to write his own “Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens” (Kant, 1755), which appeared eleven years later. Like other students, Kant may have viewed Knutzen as a hero
This 'humanized' Kant to me, because he is probably the closest thing we've seen to actual alien grey super human consciousness. Kant is known for his complete lack of subjectivity, or having no subjective 'personality', which is why he was so able to defend the complete subject against the rule of objectivity. He proved subjectivity to be the real supra-objective. He freed Christianity from the complete objectification that Augustine locked it in.
>He proved subjectivity to be the real supra-objective. He freed Christianity from the complete objectification that Augustine locked it in
can you elaborate?
Kant is the image of the only true vanity. Kant is the image of the only true self respect. The same force of disinterestedness that Christ beckoned his followers with to stand on their own feet, while he sat down when he taught.
Carlyle on 'Kantism'
>according to these Kantean systems, the organs of the Mind too, what is called the Understanding, are of no less arbitrary, and, as it were accidental character than those of the Body. Time and Space themselves are not external but internal entities: they have no outward existence, there is no Time and not Space out of the mind; they are mere forms of man’s spiritual being, laws under which his thinking nature is constituted to act.
>This seems the hardest conclusion of all; but it is an important one with Kant; and is not given forth as a dogma; but carefully deduced in his Critik der reinen Vernunft with great precision, and the strictest form of argument.
>The reader would err who supposed that this Transcendental system of Metaphysics was a mere intellectual card-castle, or logical hocus-pocus, contrived from sheer idleness and for sheer idleness, being without any bearing on the practical interests of men. On the contrary, however false, or however true, it is the most serious in its purport of all Philosophies propounded in these latter centuries; has been taught chiefly by men of the loftiest and most earnest character; and does bear, with a direct and highly comprehensive influence, on the most vital interests of men
>To say nothing of the views it opens in regard to the course and management of what is called Natural Science, we cannot but perceive that its effects, for such as adopt it, on Morals and Religion, must in these days be of almost boundless importance. To take only that last and seemingly strangest doctrine, for example, concerning Time and Space, we shall find that to the Kantist it yields, almost immediately, a remarkable result of this sort. If Time and Space have no absolute existence, no existence out of our minds, it removes a stumbling-block from the very threshold of our Theology
>For on this ground, when we say that the Deity is omnipresent and eternal, that with Him it is a universal Here and Now, we say nothing wonderful; nothing but that He also created Time and Space, that Time and Space are not laws of His being, but only of ours. Nay, to the Transcendentalist, clearly enough, the whole question of the origin and existence of Nature must be greatly simplified; the old hostility of Matter is at an end, for Matter is itself annihilated; and the black Spectre, Atheism, ‘with all its sickly dews,’ melts into nothingness forever
>But farther, if it be, as Kant maintains, that the logical mechanism of the mind is arbitrary, so to speak, and might have been made different, it will follow, that all inductive conclusions, all conclusions of the Understanding, have only a relative truth, are truly only for us, and if some other thing be true
>Thus far Hume and Kant go together, in this branch of the inquiry: but here occurs the most total, diametrical divergence between them. We allude to the recognition, by these Transcendentalists, of a higher faculty in man than Understanding; of Reason (Vernunft), the pure, ultimate light of our nature; wherein, as they assert, lies the foundation of all Poetry, Virtue, Religion; things which are properly beyond the province of the Understanding, of which the Understanding can take no cognisance, except a false one.
>The elder Jacobi, who indeed is no Kantist, says once, we remember: ‘It is the instinct of Understanding to contradict Reason.’ Admitting this last distinction and subordination, supposing it scientifically demonstrated, what numberless and weightiest consequences would follow from it alone!
>These we must leave the considerate reader to deduce for himself; observing only farther, that the Teologia Mistica, so much venerated by Tasso in his philosophical writings; the ‘Mysticism’ alluded to by Novalis; and generally all true Christian Faith and Devotion, appear, so far as we can see, more or less included in this doctrine of the Transcendentalists; under their several shapes, the essence of them all being what is here designated by the name Reason, and set forth as the true sovereign of man’s mind.
>How deeply these and the like principles had impressed themselves on Novalis, we see more and more, the farther we study his Writings. Naturally a deep, religious, contemplative spirit; purified also, as we have seen, by harsh Affliction, and familiar in the ‘Sanctuary of Sorrow,’ he comes before us as the most ideal of all Idealists
>For him the material Creation is but an Appearance, a typical shadow in which the Deity manifests himself to man. Not only has the unseen world a reality, but the only reality: the rest being not metaphorically, but literally and in scientific strictness, ‘a show’; in the words of the Poet, ‘Schall und Rauch umnebelnd Himmels Gluth, Sound and Smoke overclouding the Splendour of Heaven.’ The Invisible World is near us: or rather it is here, in us and about us; were the fleshly coil removed from our Soul, the glories of the Unseen were even now around us; as the Ancients fabled of the Spheral Music.
>Thus, not in word only, but in truth and sober belief, he feels himself encompassed by the Godhead; feels in every thought, that ‘in Him he lives, moves, and has his being.’
>On his Philosophic and Poetic procedure, all this has its natural influence. The aim of Novalis’ whole Philosophy, we might say, is to preach and establish the Majesty of Reason, in that stricter sense; to conquer for it all provinces of human thought, and everywhere reduce its vassal, Understanding, into fealty, the right and only useful relation for it.
>This 'humanized' Kant to me, because he is probably the closest thing we've seen to actual alien grey super human consciousness.
Both Newton and John von Neumann are comparable.
KANT STILL DOING WERK and that’s on jah
Kant is literally just too much of a normie to understand how Berkeley's system works without the ding an sich. Berkeley's system was so simple but Kant had to frick it up and that's why all you little gaygies have to have these endless debtaes.
I mean yes Kant's work is literally demonstrating the limits of normie consciousness, although I would not call Kant a normie. And plus Berkeley is pre-Hume you midwit. Hume fricked it all up and it was Kant that fixed it back up with superior Prussian discipline and precision.
If you understand abduction and probabilistic induction you can “fix” Hume without undoing Berkeley and introducing a bunch schizo pseud german shit
>If you understand abduction and probabilistic induction you can “fix” Hume
HAHAHAHAHAHA
Ok, then explain how introducing the ding an sich fixes Hume? He could have just said all his shit about causality being an a priori condition of sensibility or whatever in a Berkeleyan framework.
no he couldn't because it was the Berkeleyan framework that led to Hume.
I'm too stupid to understand c**t or this thread but I read a single SEP article (skimmed it) so that qualifies me to ask:
He seems to be doubting the external world, almost like solipsism. He thinks the visual field around him is a representation of unknown thing(s).
BUT, when I hold up my hand, and punch myself in the face like a moron, how is this a representation? I can directly feel my fist hurting my face. What's his point?
These philosophers seem autistic to me. When people say external world they mean *points at tree*, the fricking world. out there. philosopher moron invents an inacessible 'out there' behind everthing not in space and time? why?
>We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves
Here's a quote from the sep article. This just seems blatantly stupid to me as well:
>all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself.
It's like he thinks himself as some sort of disembodied thinking ego, it's really quite autisitc. We are human bodies obviously. Why didn't he think.. hmm where did I come from? I popped into being as a disembodied ego in a world of representation? No idiot you came from your moms pussy you're a body in a world, not a mind.
you could have come from the world and still not have full access to it
evolution selects for survival not truth
Does anyone believe they have full access to the world? Our eyes only face one way, we can't see round corners, I can't see through the ground, and there's all manner of shit other animals do that we can't (eg, see in ultraviolet, have echolocation or electrical senses). Plus we know from tests there's radio waves and gravity and magentic forces but you can only really infer them.
But this guy is saying, as far as I understand, NONE of it is the world, it is all representation. But then, that makes no sense it would be as if I closed my eyes the world stops existing. Or the world comes in and out of existence every time I sleep. This can not be the case because someone could take a hammer and fricking kill me in my sleep. Obviously the world is shared and public. It seems moronic to doubt that. Or how would drugs work? You ever taken drugs? They affect your perception of the world, but the world itself doesn't change. That would be like saying taking acid makes the walls actually melt and morph around or salvia legoland hellscapes are actually real, instead of you just being a drooling druggie moron seeing shit.
and I guess from c**t's perspective there is no such thing as "actually" melting, if it's all just representation. It's as if when I put a pencil in a cup and it looks bent, there is no truth about whether it's bent or not.
just bizarre and moronic and OBVIOUSLY wrong.
but this is what modern morons actually believe anon
what you are describing is literally what passes for philosophy on this board. you know those crazy thoughts you have when you're 14 and having your first existential crisis ? that's pretty much it.
sartre himself said something to the effect that existentialism was "nothing more than drawing out the conclusions from atheism"
philosophy died after the 14th century.
only brainlets (that includes midwits) will deny this
You don't get the background so you don't understand it. 'Representation' means appearance. An appearance is what you call a varied viewing of a thing; I.E. I look at a tree from one angle, alter my position, and see a new one. These two separate tree percepts are different, yet surely so similar as to be of one tree. What is that tree, behind the appearances, yet that unifies them? This is the historic essence of the Greeks. Modern epistemology after Locke came to doubt the existence of this essence. But then what unifies the appearances? We can't know, but Kant speculated that it was the Thing in itself.
The mind is certain, representations aren't. Yet in that the representations are ordered by the mind, and we know of our own minds, then we can order the representations too.
If you hit yourself, you can't be sure the pain is from the having hit yourself. I once dreamed that someone punched me, yet still felt a pain. We need to know how the hitting-representation is created and then experienced before we be certain that hitting-representations necessarily cause blunt force trauma pains. Otherwise we wouldn't know if the hitting was illusory, and thus SHOULDN'T cause pain.
Representation means "re-presentation." Something is present, but then it is mediated for one reason or another, so it can be "re-presented" in some other setting.
Your hand is representation. Your face is representation. The pain is representation.
>inb4 nooo it's real!!!
It is real. It's also a representation.
my problem is how it suffices against modern science, if everything is created by atoms just in different arrangements to form different molecules, perceived through our eyes/brain, thoughts filtered through language, then where are with representations?
I honestly think it’s impossible to deny and that OP is being a homosexual and actually guilty ‘dude trust me’ they are not there.
Berkeley doesn’t assume noumena. There being things that god perceives but we dont is not the same as noumena. If there were noumena in Berkeley’s system then God would not perceive them because God is a mind and according to Kantianism his perceptions would then also be mere representation. Berkeley’s system only works because he assumes ideas are not representations at all
>according to Kantianism his perceptions would then also be mere representation.
No, Kant does not try to explain God's "perceptions", he's talking about humans.
Yes that’s my fricking point. In the Berkeleyan idealism God is a mind that perceives like human minds because esse est percipi. Kant doesn’t say that because it would imply God doesn’t have knowledge of the ding an sich. Berkeley can say it because there is no ding an sich.
>God is a mind that perceives like human minds
Not really, it's just by analogy not identity.
> esse est percipi
Not really, he thinks God and souls exist too.
>Kant doesn’t say that because it would imply God doesn’t have [...]
Kant doesn't say it because he's talking about human "rationality".
>Berkeley can say it because there is no [thing-in-itself]
There is an equivalent. How do you think Berkeley explains why you and I see a car in similar ways if there's nothing beyond mere perceptions? Just a coincidence that almost everyone perceives the world more or less the same visually despite everyone having seemingly independent perceptions?
I didn’t say it was identity. I said God has perceptions and the basic nature of perception (esse est percipi) is the same as in humans. God doesn’t have the identical perceptions as humans, but both humans and God have perception, which is the same in both.
>Kant doesn't say it because he's talking about human "rationality".
Ok, forgetting why Kant didn’t say it, it would still imply that God doesn’t know the ding an sich
>There is an equivalent
No, there isn’t. In Kantianism perception is representation. In Berkeley perception is the end all be all. That’s a fundamental difference. In Berkeley there is an objective reality, but it is sustained by God, NOT the ding an sich. Kant uses the ding an sich to explain it instead of God’s perception because he is a more conventional kind of theist and because the ding an sich is cleaner and more useful when it comes to scientific investigation.
Why are you trying to argue this point? Even Copenhauer admitted Kant betrayed classical idealism by the way he treats the ding an sich.
>In Berkeley perception is the end all be all.
It's not for reasons described above. You got duped.
>Why are you trying to argue this point?
Because you're wrong. Kant and Berkeley are different because of other reasons not because of the thing-in-itself.
Dude. Berkeley literally says esse est percipi. If you’re saying Berkeley says there’s something beyond perception, you’re implying he was some kind of apophatic theologian who says god is not, which is very far from the truth.
>you’re saying Berkeley says there’s something beyond perception
If you read Berkeley instead of his best-of quotes you'd find out he says this himself or do you think he was an atheist?
>he says this himself
Post the excerpt
He was a bishop moron
How is this relevant? What about my posts makes you think I think he was an atheist? Post the excerpt where he says there is something beyond perception
Do you know what percipi means? Or do you use Latin because you think it makes you sound smarter?
Holy shit dude, you must just be trolling. You clearly got filtered by Berkeley and can’t differentiate between subjective perception and God’s perception. If your reply to this with something totally irrelevant again I won’t respond
What's there to respond since you made no argument? Translate "percipi" or don't post again.
How would Berkeley explain the differences in perception though? Like colorblind people and such?
When reading about Kant I completely understand why Jesus taught in parables.
Blah blah blah subjective opinion about the nature of general human experience and "objective reality" written in a way that doesn't make any sense unless you read 100 other philosophers before and do semantic backflips.
It's all big words to seem all the more intellectual isn't it? Philosophy is meant to be the light of reason not layers and layers of pseudointellectual obscurity.
this describes the whole of modern philosophy:
some grandiloquent midwit giving his opinion and making up a moronic system as he goes, with no arguments to be found.
all philosophy is ultimately scepticism about everything, or something along the lines of scholastic though. there is only middle ground because midwits are incapable of drawing out the conclusions, and thus can remain stuck in half truths and truisms their whole lives, not realizing they're not saying anything or missing a key element.
it is customary to say it all went to shit because of Locke, Descartes or even as early as Ockham. I don't know because I have no interest in philosophy.
But it is manifest that at some point midwits took over, and that over the centuries they felt the need to disguise their lack of substance with big words and sentences. When you get to the core of it it's actually laughable.
scholastic thought*
no interest in the history of philosophy*
typing fast, sorry
Locke and Ockham are literally the philosopher who deconstruct the bs you’re taking issues with. Lockeanism a priori prohibits Kantian style “rationalism” word diarrhea because it recognizes the empirical origin of ideas and that “understanding” “representation” and whatever can’t be dealt with like mathematical objects.
itt: morons failing to understand that scholastic realism (which is obviously what both Plato and Aristotle meant btw) is the ONLY valid view, and that it necessarily implies something analogous to an intellect which knows and brings about the truth in all things.
filtered.
It's insane that some people will reply that being basically unreadable by regular people is a criterion for saying anything. Why is it that the ancient greeks and medievals can be read by pretty much everyone ? (all the while, as it happens, saying a hell of a lot more, and a lot more clearly, than modern midwits)
>"le filtered"
lmao
I can no longer read anything not written in plain language, it disgusts me and I know from experience that there is never any substance.
>Why is it that the ancient greeks and medievals can be read by pretty much everyone ? (all the while, as it happens, saying a hell of a lot more, and a lot more clearly, than modern midwits)
They can't. If you've truly read any serious amount of Plato then you'll realize it's not as trivial as just taking what he says at face value. That's not to mention that it's already in translation, so you're losing some of the meaning of the original. Also, have you ever once tried reading Aristotle, other than his simpler works like Ethics? It's insanely difficult to penetrate a text like the Organon.
I find Aristotle extremely clear. Actually had to take a lot more notes/time to think for Nichomachean Ethics than anything in the Organon. I think pretty much anything of his is harder than the Organon t b h. I don't know, it all seemed pretty obvious to me, maybe because I had already been exposed to a lot of aristotelianism prior to actually reading Aristotle. From Plato I have only read a few of the dialogues that discuss forms, but same problem, I had already been exposed to it so I wasn't reading it with a fresh perspective, I sort of started out with an interpretation of where he was headed, and all I can say is that it fit.
>All Aristotle is explaining is that there are concrete objects (like an apple sitting on a desk) and that there are also generalized conceptualizations that we can make about them that are themselves distinct from the object (an apple is a fruit) and that these have essential properties (an apple is a fruit by definition of the fact its an apple, as fruit is a plant by definition of the fact its a fruit, etc.) and that he got sorta confused about whether or not abstract generalizations of intangible objects such as knowledge, color, and love, or consciousness are concrete or abstract in their essential nature and so now thousands of generations of idiots are confused too.
What do you make of this paragraph? Do you think Aristotle was confused about abstract generalizations of intangible objects? I actually have a hard time figuring out what that refers to. Like, predicates of secondary substances? Abstract universals? Some care should be taken here, since at least secondary substances (species, genera, etc.) can be said to exist in some concrete fashion. I'm not familiar with how Aristotle would have described them. As qualities?
all universals are abstract (in the first sense of the word) in Aristotle, which is why aristotelian realism necessarily implies scholastic realism: obviously things are still true wheter we are around to abstract truth from them or not, so that means their truth is known at all times by some all knowing intellect. anyway that's what I always got from it. other than that I don't really get what the guy is driving at to be honest. we abstract from "inner" conscious experience much in the same way we abstract from the outside world (which is why mental imagery, imagination and the like are treated like sense in scholastic thought)
>Why does he still believe in following the Gods despite the contradictions in defining piety?
this is an example of what I was talking about
reading Euthyphro having first read a lot on scholastic thought and the like, it seemed obvious to me that the apparent "aporia" was only meant to invalidate both divine command and the idea of the divine being "posterior" to anything. it seemed obvious that what is implicit is that the divine just is the Good itself. the part about the "gods" ' ultimate disagreement with each other seemed also pretty obviously to be Plato's clearest jab at the very cogency/possibility of polytheism.
But then again, my whole point is that I have no idea how obvious all of this would have seemed to me if I read this 5 years ago. I have a very hard time not reading Plato as being essentially a monotheist, with some belief in folklore. Aristotle makes this even clearer by his repeated use of "o Theos" .Nowadays, for instance, when people (even some neo-scholastics) are discussing the whole third realm thing, I don't understand why I shouldn't take Plato to be talking about the Divine intellect. I mean this is what it came to mean (since Augustine) in christian thought, but for some reason (maybe there is a good one, idk), people want to believe that this is not what Plato meant. I mean the guy put the third man argument forward himself, and all people can say is "he realized his stuff doesn't make sense". I find that hard to believe. And I have a hard time believing that Plato was not ultimately commited to some sort of scholastic realism as well.
(that Plato and Aristotle were essentially in agreement was a very common view up until the time of Boethius, roughly. Lloyd Gerson has a book on this as well)
>all universals are abstract (in the first sense of the word) in Aristotle, which is why aristotelian realism necessarily implies scholastic realism: obviously things are still true wheter we are around to abstract truth from them or not, so that means their truth is known at all times by some all knowing intellect. anyway that's what I always got from it. other than that I don't really get what the guy is driving at to be honest. we abstract from "inner" conscious experience much in the same way we abstract from the outside world (which is why mental imagery, imagination and the like are treated like sense in scholastic thought)
What do you make of intangible objects according to Aristotle's view? Knowledge, love, etc. They're not really substances, are they? Yet they exist, don't they?
>From Plato I have only read a few of the dialogues that discuss forms, but same problem, I had already been exposed to it so I wasn't reading it with a fresh perspective, I sort of started out with an interpretation of where he was headed, and all I can say is that it fit.
Why does Plato write if he thinks writing actively harms your memory and is bad for philosophy, as per Phaedrus? Why does he still believe in following the Gods despite the contradictions in defining piety?
Because you don't need your memory as much if you have something written down. The stakes of forgetting are much lower, since you have a backup that you've outsourced the job.
To me, it is not necessarily, "logically" the case that writing ruins your memory, but rather an inevitability due to common sense, if that makes sense. And I don't see the point in looking at this statement as anything other than a common sense thing that COULD be overcome if somebody decided, for its own sake, to try as hard they could to remember everything as if they would lose everything if they failed.
If you'd read Phaedrus then you'd realize how absurd of a position this is to hold on Plato.
Why don't you explain why to me? Because we're also dealing with an absurd claim that you've taken from Phaedrus that clearly doesn't make sense outside of Phaedrus.
>Because we're also dealing with an absurd claim that you've taken from Phaedrus that clearly doesn't make sense outside of Phaedrus.
Why shouldn't it make sense outside of Phaedrus? How is it absurd, considering Plato's time period and in light of his other dialogues?
>Why don't you explain why to me?
Because memory is critical to Plato's project (see Meno, for example). To ruin your own memory through externalizing your thoughts is to degrade your ability to recollect the forms. Writing externalizes knowledge, thinking and philosophizing with others internalizes knowledge, the latter being necessary to the soul's navigation of the afterlife once dead. Additionally, it deadens a philosophy, by no longer allowing interlocutors to discuss it, but rather it becomes entirely weak to whosoever wishes to attack it, and without defense from the philosopher themselves. Clearly Plato felt this was seriously important, considering he wrote in dialogues to mimic speech and what he felt was the true method of philosophizing.
I refuse to believe when I look at my hand it's a phenomenal representation on an unknowable object that exists beyond my access.
it's time to get with the program moron, you don't know your own hands
Evolutionary psychology, it's there. It works, it's an accurate model. What more do you want?
What you see as "your hand" would look like something entirely differenr to a bat observing it with eco location.
There's still consistency between the two.
By this I mean, the bats interpretation of the hand will correspond to an interpretation made by humans. Much the same way languages can be translated if enough about the language is understood
>By this I mean, the bats interpretation of the hand will correspond to an interpretation made by humans.
You don't know that. Correspondence is not equivalence.
Words like "geist" and "dharma" have no equivalent in english.
>me wearing kant flesh mask pretending to be kant.jpg
>dere ist (kein) ding-an-sich brö
ding
>proves ping-an-sich
>shiddd :DDDDD
If there aren't things-in-themselves, what is producing the representations? It would seem it isn't our mind itself, given the ability to experience novel representations that aren't just recombinations of previous ones, and even a Cartesian demon could be said to be a thing-in-itself, just a surprising one. There has to be something behind the representations bringing them about (and if it's the representations themselves, that's just naive realism).
>what is producing the representations
Other representations
>But but what is producing the other representations?
No one can tell, Kant argues. That's why he's talking about the boundaries of so-called reason.
>other representations
Then what are the representations “representing”? This may be a flaw that’s simply due to the limitations of language, but, if you’re going to use that word and say it’s all just “representations” all the way down (like the famous “it’s just turtles all the way down” of mythology/the joke), it’s self-refuting. A word besides “representation” would be in order here, like “phenomena”, perhaps. But even changing the word still brings up that simple counter-argument/questioning the anon you’re responding to noted, making it more rational to deduce the existence of so-called “things-in-themselves” or “noumenal reality” behind what we are perceiving phenomenally.
Yeah, people get their knickers up in a bunch around “idealism” or any variations thereof — Berkeleyan idealism, Kant’s transcendental idealism, German idealism in general, any variation thereof, as if it’s saying something far more absurd than it’s actually saying. Like Samuel Johnson’s “Thus do I refute it!” and kicking a rock in response to Berkeley’s idealism. The experience of kicking the rock, the perception of its solidity, is still as “real” as can be, it’s just that someone like Berkeley, for instance, has a different belief on what the underlying reality of such an experience is.
>even if you do not sense them and only their representations
>Not intuiting shit after Spinoza
ishygdtkdt
>fixes Kant
Western philosophy is actually kind of moronic.
>everything is just a representation
>a representation of what?
>UMMM UHHH WELL YOU SEE - ACK!!!!
>tfw youre the only one in this thread who has actually studied the first critique
>tfw you totally missed it, and now there are 177 idiotic replies to OP's moronic objection
Damn, if only I caught it earlier I could have stopped all this nonsense at the root of it.
>refutes Kant
>thing-in-itself
lmfao what an autistic phrase. Philosophy really is infantile word games.