It makes sense why Aristotle wouldn't see a body moving in a circle as change, even though Newtonian physics demonstrates that that body is always changing direction. Aristotle is a systems thinker. Change is merely a successful movement from one stable system to another. Anything that falls short of that isn't change.
b-but the IQfy catholicucks told me that motion doesn’t mean physical movement and can be used to mean any abstract kind of change!
That's true, but not all physical movements lead to essential changes. The distinction here isn't physical versus abstract, but rather kinesis (no ends, ends not achieved) versus energeia (ends achieved, Being-at-work as the end-in-itself)
But the distinction between “motion” and “change” is impossible to hold if motion doesn’t correspond to something physical.
Why? Explain.
If circular motion is motion but not change, it must be physical, because the non physical is not spatial.
Motion can be physical or non-physical. I think motion and change are often used interchangeably in common parlance. Maybe a motion can be an "incomplete" change?
And I'm not sure if this has anything to do with the point of this thread, anyway. It sounds like you're rehashing an argument you had with somebody else regarding a viewpoint I don't necessarily ascribe to.
He’s wrong tho, you have to constantly transfer energy into the system to keep it moving in a circle. That’s change
What if the energy transfer into the system is stable?
Wouldn't that just imply zero acceleration ? In classical mechanics, a system can be thought of as having some energy made up of their potential energy and kinetic energy.
I don't know. How does gravitational energy work in terms of systems? Like I said here, it just seems to be "there."
what about gravitational energy? that just seems to be "there"
Newton himself admitted that gravity was the last remaining qualitas occulta, "hidden quality" or inexplicable feature of his system. You can measure it as a "what" but you can't say "why" it is or does what it is or does. Nietzsche:
>We say it is "explanation"; but it is only in "description" that we are in advance of the older stages of knowledge and science. We describe better, we explain just as little as our predecessors. We have discovered a manifold succession where the naive man and investigator of older cultures saw only two things, "cause" and "effect," as it was said; we have perfected the conception of becoming, but have not got a knowledge of what is above and behind the conception. The series of "causes" stands before us much more complete in every case; we conclude that this and that must first precede in order that that other may follow but we have not grasped anything thereby.
>The peculiarity, for example, in every chemical process seems a "miracle," the same as before, just like all locomotion; nobody has "explained" force. How could we ever explain! We operate only with things which do not exist, with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces; how can explanation ever be possible when we first make everything a conception, our conception! It is sufficient to regard science as the exactest anthropomorphizing of things; we always learn to describe ourselves more accurately by describing things and their successions.
>Cause and effect: there is probably never any such duality; in fact there is a continuum before us, from which we isolate a few portions; just as we always observe a motion as isolated points, and therefore do not properly see it, but infer it. The abruptness with which many effects take place leads us into error; it is however only an abruptness for us. There is an infinite multitude of processes in that abrupt moment which escape us. An intellect which could see cause and effect as a continuum, which could see the flux of events not according to our mode of perception, as things arbitrarily separated and broken, would throw aside the conception of cause and effect, and would deny all conditionality.
It was explained by Einstein
~~*Einstein*~~
Aristiotle's ontology of physical action and motion assumed that the reason objects move is because there is a proper place for them. You can express this in Galilean/Newtonian terms by transposing the "naturalness" of certain motions to inertia, force, and gravity. Now it is "natural" for objects to keep doing what they're doing unless something else happens, "natural" for massy objects to find their "proper place" with other massy objects, etc.
The beauty of Newton's discovery for most people was that it seemed to indicate that the entire universe obeys one mathematically definable and showable law of interaction. There aren't many kinds of movements, there is only one kind, representable in one equation. All movements in principle can be decomposed into functions of this one law. This was a massive change from the medieval and early modern conception of movement, as being divided between a terrestrial "sort" of motion and a sidereal/celestial sort of motion, which is the classical/Aristotelian conception.
Aristotle was trying to "save the appearances" by respecting the behaviors of different things in their different areas. On earth, things either go up or down. Aside from unnatural displacements, one obvious explanation for this is that they "seek" their "natural" place. Earth and water are heavy because they are of the terrestrial order of things, they are meant to be down here, so they try to seek their natural spot in that order, earth at the center/bottom and water above earth. Fire and air try to flee to the higher regions, air resting above water and fire trying to flee and disperse all the way up to the celestial.
When Plato and others looked at the celestial they obviously remarked that its form of motion isn't up or down but circular, around, including the "planetes" ("wanderers") which are not "fixed" like the "fixed stars" but still mostly obey circular movement. So one obvious or possible solution was to say that in the sidereal/celestial realm, the natural form of movement is circular, and that circular movement is also eternal - these beings have a sort of "completed" "perfected" motion that requires and is subject to no unnatural disturbances, like things down here on earth where there is constant bustle and arbitrary displacement.
OP is also definitely onto something with Aristotle's preference for rest over motion. His intuitive conception of movement is a derivation from his concept of rest, which is the more natural state. Things want to be what they are, and being what one is (for a Greek mind) meant not "having" to do anything else, thus it meant resting. Stillness and poise are the characteristics of things that are per-fect, literally, "made complete all the way through."
>OP is also definitely onto something with Aristotle's preference for rest over motion. His intuitive conception of movement is a derivation from his concept of rest, which is the more natural state. Things want to be what they are, and being what one is (for a Greek mind) meant not "having" to do anything else, thus it meant resting. Stillness and poise are the characteristics of things that are per-fect, literally, "made complete all the way through."
It is a contradiction though. Something is both at rest but also in motion because the motion is essential to what that thing truly is.
This is a very good effortpost, though I'm less certain about Aristotle having a preference for rest (wouldn't energeia and entelecheia both suggest there's always a dynamic activity at play in something being what it is?).
It's a restful motion.
homie doesn't know what a Hamiltonian is
I am a dyed in the wool Hamiltonian. I love Lin-Manuel Miranda
kys
another thread which shit the bed right before unveiling hidden knowledge
*sigh*
As an esoteric occultist, I must not only seek occult knowledge but occult my own knowledge from others with shitposts to prevent the uninitiated from defiling it as with so many pearls before swine.
Gang Strauss!!! We love telling skillful fictions!
gang gang gang gang
big wheel keep on turnin
you spin me right round baby right round