>Being is static and unknowable, it appears not so only because humans r dumdums
>source: goddess told me in a dream
This is the origin of philosophy?!
>Being is static and unknowable, it appears not so only because humans r dumdums
>Being is static and unknowable, it appears not so only because humans r dumdums
>source: goddess told me in a dream
This is the origin of philosophy?!
Yes.
Tr00 Philosophy is Western Vedanta
?si=bAndwTGW9xtM4bKt
I could never take Parmenides seriously again after Aristotle btfo'd him.
Being is static. Not sure why or how you think it unknowable. Yes, this information was revealed by an extra dimensional goddess.
You do injustice to that final point - this wisdom was presented by one who clearly knew. First, she appears particularly qualified to know something difficult for us to grasp because she is a powerful non-human life form. Second, she gave a philosophical presentation explaining why she is correct.
Literally one of the few, if not only, revelations/non-human presentations we can believe.
Never happened.
Actually, Aristotle's interactions with the Eleatics are considered some of his absolute low points. See: his cringeworthy section about whiteness in response to Parmenides, and his constant seething over Melissus.
Stop running away from debates you coward. Don't think I haven't noticed that you still have yet to tell me about how one should predicate Being.
What debate am I running from? Make your point whatever it is and there can be a discussion. I swear the anti-eleatics here have been driven mad by their delusions and incoherent claims.
Well, there's two running arguments that you neglected to address:
>How would you describe Being, then? Give me the quick rundown of the predicates which apply to it. Being is ___, ___, and ___." (more or less predication, depending on what's necessary and complete)
>How does the painting metaphor, where the characters are subsumed by the painting, not violate the unity of Being? Aren't the characters still identified as parts?
So this is about the thread you keep bumping and talking to yourself in, days after I told you I was leaving because you weren't reading my responses? That's both hilarious and pathetic.
To your first point, I described it to you several times already. You know this because your second point uses the painting analogy. Being is presence, whatever you could possibly reference or mention "is". Hence reality/Being is perfect and unchanging for the reasons given in these texts.
To your second point, obviously I don't think the characters in a painting violate its unity. That's an argument for you to make. They aren't identified as parts in this anology where they totally lack any independence from Being/the painting and can't be generated or destroyed. But again, you haven't actually said anything that requires a response.
>So this is about the thread you keep bumping and talking to yourself in, days after I told you I was leaving because you weren't reading my responses?
I mean, I was reading your responses carefully, and I even tried to take on your torch after you left regarding the painting analogy because I was interested to see if the Eleatic position could hold against sustained criticism.
>To your first point, I described it to you several times already.
I wanted you to spell it out precisely. And also, so I can have good bite-sized statement from an expert about what Eleatic philosophy holds about Being. Like, I always said that:
>The Eleatics believe that Being is 1) Whole (Without parts); 2) Uniform (Undifferentiated); 3) Unchanging; 4) Timeless; and 5) Perfect (Complete).
But I'm not sure if that's a "clean", "complete", etc., encapsulation of the Eleatic position.
Regarding your second rebuttal:
>They aren't identified as parts in this anology where they totally lack any independence from Being/the painting and can't be generated or destroyed.
Why aren't the characters "parts"? Can something be spoken of without being "partitioned" in some way? How so?
Stop talking about yourself as some pure, good faith actor who responded with something of substance in the last conversation. It's not particularly relevant and obviously I disagree.
> I wanted you to spell it out precisely
I did so in the very post you are responding to, and in the previous conversation. It's ridiculous that you pretend otherwise while simultaneously referencing those very descriptions/accounts that I provided.
>But I'm not sure if that's a "clean", "complete", etc., encapsulation of the Eleatic position.
Since at least the late 5th/early 4th century, there has been dispute about Eleatic teachings. I would start with the expectation that such a position depicts existence as a perfect and unchanging Whole, if that's what you're asking.
>Why aren't the characters "parts"? Can something be spoken of without being "partitioned" in some way? How so?
I thought you had a particular objection, this sounds more like a fact finding expedition.
One, in the section you quoted I spell out why I wouldn't call them parts in the sense being objected to. It's literally copy and pasted by you. Two, yes, because again by speaking of it we're not separating it from what is or engaging in creation and destruction; the answer again follows from the section you copied and pasted. Finally, "how so", well we are speaking of things right now, so there is your demonstration.
I've dealt with all this repeatedly, we're literally just copy and pasting old answers that you received previously and never read or responded to. That is why I stop bothering you, it's not worth typing message to you.
I haven't ignored any supposed objections; you're quite welcome to raise some problem if you think there is one.
As for claiming that you're not the other anon, who seems fond of pointless bumping and sock puppets, just make your philosophical point. Your identity doesn't matter too much in this context.
>To your second point, obviously I don't think the characters in a painting violate its unity. That's an argument for you to make. They aren't identified as parts in this anology where they totally lack any independence from Being/the painting and can't be generated or destroyed. But again, you haven't actually said anything that requires a response
Not the anon you're responding to, but I have proposed an objection to your analigy in the other too (frankly it seems to me that it is a clear-cut refutation), dunno why you chose to ignore it. I'd like to hear your response
>So this is about the thread you keep bumping and talking to yourself in, days after I told you I was leaving because you weren't reading my responses?
Not that anon, but I have actually followed all those threads and you've basically accused everyone (so far I have counted 3 distinct interlocutors) who has argued with you about this issue of not reading your posts, being non-responsive and all that shit.
The funny part is that you're the guy actually doing that. They quote your posts extensively and ask questions, on the other hand you just say that they don't read you, and when you quote them you just cherrypick sentences in a very dishonest manner. Now that you've gone full schizo with the goddess bs your behaviour makes more sense.
You are deeply confused. I am not the one talking about the goddess, that's someone else. There are apparently multiple eleatic posters on this site these days.
Anyway, if you actually read this thread you will see that all questions asked of me were answered, others failed to explain what was going on with that non-responsive argument, so then another anon and my self discussed what could be behind the argument, concluded it is non-responsive to my position, and ended it there.
> appeal to authority
>Yes, this information was revealed by an extra dimensional goddess.
A Goddess told me in a dream that everything is in motion. The one you've talked to was probably a demon trying to trick you
Lol incredible interaction, imaginine falling for such explicit b8
Yes, I'm being baited by a mentally ill hegelian (redundant, I know) who spent days bumping his own thread and talking to himself. And now he tries to find me in other threads, just my luck. I'm about done here, made my point.
First you say here
that my identity is not important, then you mistake me (the mentally ill hegelian) for the OP of those other threads, even though you can find in those threads long discussions in which I ended up helping him change his mind.
Also why am I a "mentally ill hegelian"? In those threads I have just mentioned that Hegel offers a possible alternative to Parmenidean philosophy, but I never argued for its correctness. Is being aware of Hegel's philosophy enough to be an hegelian?
Wait... are you the guy who sperged for 3 days because people kept telling him that he should read the first 10 pages of the Phenomenology? And are you Tweetophon? If you're both that would be such an insane plot twist
Anyway you've asked for my arguments: here they are
I'll also add: to the other anon you've said
>One, in the section you quoted I spell out why I wouldn't call them parts in the sense being objected to. It's literally copy and pasted by you.
You actually haven't I think (Im trying to be charitable and assume that that's just an assertion, rather than an actual argument). Here's what you say:
>They aren't identified as parts in this anology where they totally lack any independence from Being/the painting and can't be generated or destroyed.
I am sure you know that a lack of independence is not a necessary condition for the absence of differentiation. As such you haven't really shown why the characters in the painting should not be treated as parts of the whole (namely, the painting).
I literally say in what sense they're not subject to the objection that was made regarding the acceptance of parts. You quote it repeatedly.
I am not denying the presence of details and/or "many signs" of Being. Again, the rejection of such was the hegelian's interpretation. I objected to his position for clearly stated reasons and rejected it in favour of my position. So you're not responding to what I've said, as usual.
If you stop referencing old discussions where you failed to read what I wrote, and instead started anew as a good faith participant, this would go differently. But like the other anon said, you're tossing out bait. Which is precisely why I walk away, you're a mentally deficient stalker.
In the other thread that the nutter keeps bumping and dragging into this one. I explained my position there, and it shows why your objections have nothing to do with me.
If you had a genuine point to make, you would have done so here. But you don't, you just have irrelevant attacks on some strawman you constructed in some other thread.
I've said my piece in this thread repeatedly and will depart as I see fit. This thread is clearly going to shit because of spill over from the other one, and if either one of you think youve said anything relevant and substantial, you’re utterly delusional.
>I literally say in what sense they're not subject to the objection that was made regarding the acceptance of parts. You quote it repeatedly
The only part Ive quoted is this one
, maybe you missed it since I posted it like 1 minute after having written my previous post.
>I am not denying the presence of details and/or "many signs" of Being
I know, that's why I have made my objection here
and here
> I objected to his position for clearly stated reasons and rejected it in favour of my position. So you're not responding to what I've said, as usual.
Are you going to do again the thing where you say that you have responded in some post have not responded to, and then refuse to tell me which posts are you specifically talking about? Like, in my previous post I specifically told you TWICE that I simply don't know which posts are you talking about. You even mentioned one where you've quoted a fragment, even tho none of the replies I have received in other threads contained it.
>If you stop referencing old discussions where you failed to read what I wrote, and instead started anew as a good faith participant, this would go differently. But like the other anon said, you're tossing out bait. Which is precisely why I walk away, you're a mentally deficient stalker.
Tf is wrong with you? First you tell me that I am a lucid participant, then you mention responses that were directed at other people and that I haven't read, now you call me a stalker even tho I have begged you for 3 posts now to make your position explicit. Like, are you doing alright anon? Fricking chill
Delusional bait.
If you want to make a point or ask a question, just do so. This was a new thread, it could have been genuinely productive.
If you want to reference some other thread and do all the things I've complained about, then just don't bother. I'm not going to bother myself with someone who pointlessly misrepresents old conversations over and over again, and seems wholly incapable of making their point in a new thread and reading the response in good faith.
Aight, let's start over then, and let's promise to each other not to reference anything we have said in other threads.
You said IN THIS THREAD
>>I am not denying the presence of details and/or "many signs" of Being
Now, I have a few questions:
1) what would be an example of a "sign of Being"?
2) is there any difference between these signs?
3) is there any difference between Being and its signs?
4) if there is no difference (which would mean that we are talking about a strict and perfect identity), why are we talking about both signs and its Being?
5) if there is a difference between Being and its signs, what prevent us from characterizing this scheme as a whole-parts relationship.
I know 5 questions is a lot, so if you would rather respond to only a few of them (in whatever order you want) that's fine to me. Or, if you want, you can avoid these questions altogether, and simply explain what you mean by that passage of yours.
I'll also sign my posts with "mentally ill hegelian" (even though im not mentally ill nor an hegelian), so that you won't mistake for other anons.
Mentally Ill Hegelian
Now that I think about it, for this conversation to start on a good foot you should at least respond to 1), so that we don't misunderstand each other when we talk about signs of Being.
Mentally Ill Hegelian
The "many signs" is a quote from the Goddess and goes to why I don't adopt a certain interpretation of the text. But to get to your point, which is about distinction, you can say that you and I are distinguishable. Just like characters in a painting are distinguishable.
The difference re: the painting and the characters is one of scope and/or perspective. If you talk about the characters, you are necessarily talking about the painting/Being. There's nothing you could say about the characters that wouldn't be about Being.
>There's nothing you could say about the characters that wouldn't be about Being.
But there's something about Being that could not be said about one character, right? Otherwise all characters would be indistinguishable.
And if that's the case, then we can make a distinction about Being and its sign, since in Being there would be something more. Does this conform to your understanding of Parmenides' philosophy?
Im a moron, I forgot to sign my post.
Mentally Ill Hegelian
I don't think you need to sign your post now that we started a new conversation thread and it's quite clear. It's an anon board but feel free to do so I guess.
Anyway, yes, that conforms where my position is one of scope. So the narrow scope is a lesser-included of the greater scope. As you know, you can say things about the painting that aren't restricted to a particular, depicted character.
>Anyway, yes, that conforms where my position is one of scope. So the narrow scope is a lesser-included of the greater scope.
Then, if you concede differentiation, I will copypaste (with a few modifications) the argument from Zeno (recounted by Simplicius) I have posted here on IQfy a few days ago:
"1) Hypothesis: A and B are different (A and B can be either two signs of Being, or Being and a sign of Being)
2) If A and B are different, they must differ in something
3) If they both are, they are not different with regards to their Being
4) If 3), then they must only differ with regards to their non-Being (since no third way is given)
5) Non-Being is not (and therefore it cannot be the basis for a positive distinction between A and B)
6) There is no ground for a distinction between A and B
7) A and B are the same entity, and the original hypothesis is refuted: there is no difference between A and B.
This of course could be applied to any concievable distinction (including conceptual ones)."
Is there any point in this argument you would disagree with?
Btw I think that signing my post was a good idea, considering that you've mistaken me for this guy
Mentally Ill Hegelian
Also I must point out that in 7) by "A and B are the same" (ignore that "entity", I forgot to erase it) and "there is no difference between A and B" I mean something like
8) A and B are two arbitrary names referring to the same referent
(I'm trying to avoid the word "thing" and "entity", since it could be argued that Being is neither a thing nor an entity).
Mentally Ill Hegelian
>argument
They would be "different with regards to their Being" if we must speak that way.
And yes, I see the wisdom of you signing your posts, there's another person trying to have a very similar conversation with me at the same time. If you're not hegelian then maybe pick a username that is more accurate. I assume you're also not the guy who keeps spamming and bumping the same thread for days, calling everyone tweetophon (sometimes it is me, sometimes it is not).
>They would be "different with regards to their Being" if we must speak that way.
I disagree, since they both are. Now, you could say that they are in different ways (or, to use another expression, they have different "modes of being"). But even then we could call these different modes (or however you want to call them, since the name we use doesn't really matter) A and B, and reapply the argument. The argument I have proposed is recursive: to answer to it you will have to posit another distinction, but that distinction will again fall under it. Basically, as long as there is any difference between A and B, the argument can be reapplied. As such it can be formalized, and applied to literally every possible distinction.
Anyway no, I am not the guy who keeps bumping the other thread. And at this point I'll keep the signature for the sake of consistency, at least in this thread (or in future ones, if we will meet again).
Mentally Ill Hegelian
Anyway Im going to sleep now (it's 3am here), so dont worry if you don't recieve an answer for a few hours
Mentally Ill Hegelian
Goodnight. I am in the PST/west coast us zone.
The basis of your disagreement is rooted in your own metaphysical model/assumptions, not mine. Your argument doesn't touch on my position.
Being is all possible meaning or presence. A figure wearing a dress literally is what it is, and same for a figure wearing a shirt and trousers. So they differ in what they are, same for every other detail.
>The basis of your disagreement is rooted in your own metaphysical model/assumptions, not mine. Your argument doesn't touch on my position.
It does, if you accept difference in the signs of Being. Instead of simply saying that I am mistaken because of my metaphysical assumptions, you should instead tell me a) what's my metaphysical assumption, and more importantly b) why it is mistaken. Otherwise yours remain a mere assertion that cannot be dealt with.
>Being is all possible meaning or presence. A figure wearing a dress literally is what it is, and same for a figure wearing a shirt and trousers. So they differ in what they are, same for every other detail.
If they only differed in what they are, they would be strictly identical. But as you've said, they're not strictly identical. If you want to call A the mode of pure Being, and B the mode of finite beings, you can plug those into my previous argument and see that this distinction is, once again, predicated on non-Being (since if they were the same with regards to their Being there would be no difference). This could be said about other distinction you've seemed to hint at, such as the one between Being as presence, and finite beings as manifestations of that presence, and so on
Frick I forgot to sign ahain agait
Mentally Ill Hegelian
remind me never to post before taking my daily dose of HRT... I just don't think the same without a bit of feminine flair... I need to feel like Diotima fr fr
Mentally Ill Hegelian
You're a weirdo
Your argument isn't based on the analogy and definition that I provided. Therefore it is non-responsive. However, presumably it is based on something, hence I point to your unstated assumptions/model.
Why you expect me to guess what your specific assumptions or beliefs are, I don't know. It is enough for me to point out that when you say "Being" in your argument, you are not using the definition I provided, and you are not using the analogy I provided.
I could venture to guess that in your model, "being" is used to reference some particular attribute or status of a thing. So if we say a and b both possess this attribute of "being", then they don't differ in the sense of possessing it. But that is non-responsive to my position. Also, I am not here to guess your meaning or general metaphysical model.
Anyway, I've said how two things differ, and it is in what they are. Which is affirmative, so I am not positing a literal "is not" or any contradiction of that sort.
>If they only differed in what they are, they would be strictly identical.
That's a contradiction. The sentence states that they differ per my terms, so one figure has a dress and the other figure has a shirt and trousers, and then declares them "strictly identical". They're clearly not identical per the first clause. To the extent you have some technical meaning for strictness, you can go ahead and define it, but the first clause has already accepted all that is needed for my point.
Anyway, you should also stop referencing a "non-being" or mentioning anything beyond being until you can explain what you mean by that. In the process, I suspect you'll have to devolve into gibberish or otherwise further reveal details about your assumptions/definitions and why your argument is non-responsive.
How can they differ in their being if they both are?
I think I have accounted for your definition (hell, I have given an argument that accounts for every possible definition of Being).
Anyway, to engage with what you've written (which is more than what you have conceded to me – not to be snarky, but it feels as if I have written nothing, that's how little you have engaged with my actual words), you say
>Anyway, I've said how two things differ, and it is in what they are. Which is affirmative, so I am not positing a literal "is not" or any contradiction of that sort.
You have stated that there is no strict identity between the signs of Being. If that is the case, then there is a "is not", since sign A is not sign B. Moreover you have conceded a difference between Being and its signs, and here too there is an "is not", since sign A is not Being (here I mean "Being as Being"), nor is Being sign A (since Being has something more than sign A, and therefore there is no strict identity).
>That's a contradiction.
Yes, but that's okay since it is a reductio ad absurdum. If they only differed insofar as they are, but they both are, then there is no actual difference. Maybe I should have said "if they differe insofar as they are", rather than "if they differ in what they are", my bad. The two formulations are identical in this context, but the first one might be clearer to you.
>Anyway, you should also stop referencing a "non-being" or mentioning anything beyond being until you can explain what you mean by that.
Non-Being is not. If you disagree with this you might as well stop trying to defend Parmenides. Now it is your turn to explain to us what you mean by "difference".
>in the process, I suspect you'll have to devolve into gibberish or otherwise further reveal details about your assumptions/definitions and why your argument is non-responsive
I think you're just projecting, considering that I keep engaging with your actual words, while on the other hand you just keep handwaving it all away by referencing some sort of nebulous misunderstanding. Moreover when I ask you what my misunderstanding is you again handwave it away, by telling me that you cannot know my presuppositions (if that's the case why don't you simply restate your point in different terms, so that I might understand it this time?). Basically you're trying to make it as hard as possible to have an honest conversation with you. I have been very patient with you so far and I have put up with most of your bs, but if it keeps going this way (and it you dont start chilling out and stop treating me like an idiot) I'll just quit the convo (since there would be absolutely no value in it).
Mentally Ill Hegelian
I don't see grounds to claim that I haven't engaged with your posts. I answered the questions about my metaphysical account, and I explained why an argument you made was non-responsive. If you're upset and need to leave, go ahead, I'm not chaining you to the thread.
Now to respond to the substance of your latest post. As I predicted, it does reveal a lot of issues on your side of the conversation.
>there is an "is not"
No, and now I need to ask you what you mean by "is not". Because when we say "is not" when comparing two things, we are saying that "A is other than B". Inherent to which is "there is an A, there is a B, there is some contextual relationship or comparability" - it's "is" all around.
We avoid positing something that could be considered "non-being" or "beyond being" or otherwise exempt from the context of Being, on pain of incoherence.
>(since Being has something more than sign A, and therefore there is no strict identity)
That's my position, hence the painting analogy, the definition provided for Being, the talk of scope, and everything else I've said up to this point. Hence why consider much of what you previously said to be non-responsive through no fault of my own.
This is a very strange moment in the conversation. It's like you now grasp what I've said, but you're presenting my model back to me as though it were not my model at all, but some sort of refutation or unforeseen error. Bizarre.
>non-being is not... explain to us what you mean by difference.
As stated above, you need to explain your use of the term "is not". Or accept my account of it meaning "is other than", I suppose, but then there's a problem with positing or equating it with "non-being". Regarding difference, I assume that's the definition you were after on my end.
>No, and now I need to ask you what you mean by "is not". Because when we say "is not" when comparing two things, we are saying that "A is other than B". Inherent to which is "there is an A, there is a B, there is some contextual relationship or comparability" - it's "is" all around.
Hol' up Tweetophon. I think you have a point. Let's go back to Zeno's argument:
>1)... 2)... 3)...
>4) If 3), then they must only differ with regards to their non-Being (since no third way is given)
Aha, now we have a new tool at our disposal. A is other than B! So, plug and play, we are looking at something other than their Being! Which is... well... uh... I think the goddess said... um...
Zenosisters... a little help here??
Don't bother, he's too personally invested in his bullshit, so he'll just resort to bullshit in order to protect himself. You'll find no serious inquiry with regards to truth in his posts, only self-serving bullshit
So... I gotta read Hegel now, huh? I can't keep giving people the Eleatic gauntlet and pretend that I'm a serious thinker who knows things anymore?
Zenosisters... Now that we know that Eleatic philosophy, if true, means that I can't say anything about it... I don't know how I can keep on living. It was bad enough that people IRL could beat me up to refute me... now they can just tell me to shut up because nothing I'm saying actually makes sense (and even back it up!).
Frick. How many years of reading am I looking at before I can start trolling people again? Ugh... man maybe I should consider euthanasia...
You're at the beginning of the history of philosophy, don't get discouraged. It's time for your Heraclitean arc now
>and I explained why an argument you made was non-responsive
No you havent, and when I asked for clarification you simply repeated the line. It's getting tiring, since you were doing this shit in the last thread too. I'll be a bit snarkier on this post, since you're keeping up this charade, which is honestly an butthole move.
>No, and now I need to ask you what you mean by "is not".
Dude literally read the paragraph I wrote wth
>Because when we say "is not" when comparing two things, we are saying that "A is other than B". Inherent to which is "there is an A, there is a B, there is some contextual relationship or comparability" - it's "is" all around.
Since you're daft, answer this question: is the proposition "sign A is sign B" true? What about "sign A is identical to sign B"? Actually dont, idc
>We avoid positing something that could be considered "non-being" or "beyond being" or otherwise exempt from the context of Being, on pain of incoherence.
Nah, you just pretend it's not there, even though you are clearly positing it once you accept differences. A mere sleight of hand of no substance.
>That's my position, hence the painting analogy, the definition provided for Being, the talk of scope, and everything else I've said up to this point. Hence why consider much of what you previously said to be non-responsive through no fault of my own.
b***h I was literally saying you're conceding that. Here's the full quote, since you're dishonest as frick:
"Moreover you have conceded a difference between Being and its signs, and here too there is an "is not", since sign A is not Being (here I mean "Being as Being"), nor is Being sign A (since Being has something more than sign A, and therefore there is no strict identity)."
Like, are you just fricking with me or are you being serious?
I love that here not only I take you to your word, but I also show why your reasoning is flawed, and since it obviously is you have to pretend that I didnt know I was reconstructing your position (as if I wasn't doing to show EXACTLY why it makes no sense).
>As stated above, you need to explain your use of the term "is not". Or accept my account of it meaning "is other than", I suppose, but then there's a problem with positing or equating it with "non-being". Regarding difference, I assume that's the definition you were after on my end.
And of course he doesn't respond to my question regarding his definition of difference, while pretending that I am being non-responsive.
Yeah, Im out of this convo, since you're not serious enough to be capable of engaging with it (at this point Im not even attributing malice to you, just mere stupidity). Given how braindead your responses are I see absolutely no value in continuing this discussion with you. I have pretty much already demolished your position, and it is obvious you have nothing to add, so it is of no interest for other lurkers either (since this discussion is de facto already over). Ill stop responding to you now
Hilarious; simply going silent would have been more dignified than whatever that was. Keep telling yourself you "demolished" something while you cry into your handkerchief. I'm honestly amused that you had an emotional breakdown because I refuted your objections.
What's even funnier is your last post doesn't add anything of substance, it's just pure cope and seething. You fail to justify your use of "is not" beyond my own explanation of the term. Hence, it does not posit anything beyond being. So it's done. Dry your tears and take this as an opportunity to improve your own flawed position.
Stop at 3 for the reasons provided. Also, have fun being ignored for the most part. You don't have anything to offer this conversation other than weird stalking behaviour, insults, and constant "bumps" "bumping" "bumperino". Pathetic.
>Stop at 3 for the reasons provided.
So then everything is the same and nothing is different? Is this what I needed to affirm, Tweeto-san? I thought you said there was a way out while keeping differentiation...
Things are different in what they are, hence it would be "in their being" to use that awkward phrasing. But of course, the phrasing is a result of other assumptions and problems unrelated to me.
Once the tables were turned and the other side had to explain their meaning, a melt down was inevitable. Sad!
nta but I've just read the whole thread and he owned you. take the L anon
Tweeto-san, if they were different in their being, then that means that one "is" and the other "is not" (meaning is other than, as you said). But you affirmed that they were the same in their being. So... what do we do?
>But of course, the phrasing is a result of other assumptions and problems unrelated to me.
This is Zeno-sensei's argument, Tweeto-san. How can you disregard the words of the 3rd highest ranked Eleatic master like that?
>So... what do we do?
He will tell you that has already given you an answer, and then refuse to tell you where.
For me, it's because sometimes by being patient I have managed to convince trolls to have serious and fruitful discussions. But it's always a bet, often you'll end up losing your time with bad faith charlatans, like Tweetophon and pseudo-Tweetophon.
There's a pseudo-Tweetophon now? There's way too many characters to keep track of in this thread.
There are a few eleatic posters now, I am pleased to say. I do have a chuckle when I see them get called tweetophon. I'm not here all that often, and I don't keep track of these things, so I don't know how many actual eleatic posters we have here. More the merrier.
Pseudo-Tweetophon is the guy who (unsuccessfully) tried defending Parmenides in this thread
>Tweeto-san, if they were different in their being, then that means that one "is" and the other "is not" (meaning is other than, as you said).
Incorrect. If they were different in their being, it would be a difference in what they are: there is an apple, and there is an orange, there is some relationship.
It doesn't make sense to say the apple is an "is not". Same for the claim that the orange is an "is not".
That phrase, "is not", per the only one who has bothered to define it (me), refers to the relationship or comparison between two things. The things, their relationship, that we are making a comparison, it all "is".
Of course, once I ask the other side to justify saying something like "the apple is not", table flipping and hysterics ensue. They can't do it, and it tears the heart out of their rotten system. It's a fatal objection to their position and 100% justification for their total conversion to eleatic philosophy.
No, because Aristotle has a number of incompatible mistakes. For example his use of a presentist form of change in his potential and actual model, and his apparent support of future indeterminacy.
>No, because Aristotle has a number of incompatible mistakes. For example his use of a presentist form of change in his potential and actual model, and his apparent support of future indeterminacy.
Lol you literally affirm presentism in this thread at
, and the poem agrees with Aristotle on future indeterminacy
I don't know how you reached those conclusions, sorry.
>Incorrect. If they were different in their being, it would be a difference in what they are: there is an apple, and there is an orange, there is some relationship.
I mean, that's what I just said. I was carrying forth your re-definition of "is not" from earlier. Didn't you see
>(meaning is other than, as you said)
But the problem is we can't affirm 3), as that would make the things identical, so we have to affirm 4), so say that Being is other than Being.
I agree you were following me fairly closely, but then you said that one "is not", which is part of the problem with these objections. The apple and orange both fall under "is", which is the only category or way to place them. The use of "is not" doesn't posit a new category to place them in, instead it identifies a relationship (which also "is").
3 doesn't make them identical, as explained and never responded to. Because when we say "their being", what do we mean? We mean the orange as the orange, and the apple as the apple. There is the difference, right there in what they are/their being.
The person putting forward the argument had much different, unstated assumptions, so to the extent the argument work it has nothing to do with me. But any attempt to have the argument giver explicitly state their position on "is not", "being", etc, results in an emotional breakdown. And for a real reason, because it's basically the death of their unexamined beliefs in favour of a radically different account of reality.
>then you said that one "is not",
... and then right afterwards I said "meaning is other than." I actually said this (to be in agreement with your definition) a few times now, so it's a bit frustrating that we're still stuck on clarifying this. But let's just admit that we agree on this and move on.
>Because when we say "their being", what do we mean?
We mean that they share being. Which is that they are. But this is not a property in which they differ. The predicate "being" applies to both of them identically.
>We mean the orange as the orange, and the apple as the apple
The orange does not share the appleness and the apple does not share their orangeness. So it can't be "their being" in that sense.
>we mean they share being.
No we don't. That might be what you mean, because you may have some theory of grounding, or "being" as one property of many. Again, that account from your side is missing and all I get is tears or crickets when I point this out.
We know they don't "share being" in your sense because I defined being and I provided the analogy of the painting. We know that this was understood by both sides because it was agreed that "A" is included within Being, which is greater. Just like a painting is greater than a particular figure depicted within.
This entire debacle is the result of (A) failing to pay attention to the provided analogy and definitions; and (B) refusing to state the assumptions and definitions behind the supposed objections.
>No we don't.
"Their" being. What they as a group possess.
>That might be what you mean, because you may have some theory of grounding, or "being" as one property of many. Again, that account from your side is missing and all I get is tears or crickets when I point this out.
What are your thoughts on the issue? Why do you see it as a problem?
>We know they don't "share being" in your sense because I defined being and I provided the analogy of the painting.
I don't see how the analogy of the painting applies just yet.
>"Their" being. What they as a group possess.
You're just repeating yourself, lol. These things don't possess Being like in some weird grounding theory. You can try to make that case, but basing an argument on it when responding to me is a non-starter.
>I don't see how the analogy of the painting applies just yet.
I can restate what was said. Being is different from an apple in that it is greater/broader, just like the painting is greater than a depicted figure in that it is greater/broader.
The apple exists as an apple, and the orange exists as an orange. Being contains/subsumes both, because its all that "is". Just like all the depictions in a painting have their particular position or relation within the whole composition. Each thing is therefore different by virtue of what it is, and you cannot represent its relationship to greater Being without acknowledging what it is (for example, how would you reference it or place it in the Whole).
Basically, point 3 is wrong because it assumes a model or definition where "existence" is just one property of many, it is "applied" to things, and it is identical identical to all things.
So,
"3) If they both are, they are not different with regards to their Being"
By saying "if they both are", the author creates fatal ambiguity for his argument.
The "are" could just mean that they are subsumed by Being. Which does not rule out difference, it just means that the things mentioned are within this context of Being or "isness".
If it is supposed to mean something more than that, then you can't say it in an equivelant or generic sense of two things. Because when you say "apple" you mean a specific thing, and same for "orange". The clause would need to be rewritten,
"If an apple and orange are each what they respectively are, they are not different with regards to what they are"
Which is laughably wrong. I could go on, but the argument is a complete and utter invalid mess if you try to apply it to my position.
Instead, I assume the argument should be applied to someone who thinks there's some generic source or property of "being/existence" that things can either have or not have, distinct from their other properties.
Do you know how a reductio an absurdum work?
>These things don't possess Being like in some weird grounding theory. You can try to make that case, but basing an argument on it when responding to me is a non-starter.
Nobody is arguing that they "possess" being when they say they "have" being. It's simply a part of what they are. They are, so they have being. If they were not, they would not have being, but that is a non-starter. Both things are, so they are the same in their being.
>Basically, point 3 is wrong because it assumes a model or definition where "existence" is just one property of many, it is "applied" to things, and it is identical identical to all things.
Well, isn't it a property in a very basic sense? Everything is, so everything has the property that it exists. It can at least be said of that thing, can it not?
The rest of your post has good points worth addressing, but I think we ought to get these points out of the way first or else it could get convoluted quickly.
This issue boils down to the ambiguity with the argument's handling of existence/being.
In one sense, things are the same "in their being" if the author just means that the various things are subsumed by the Whole (Being). This can be analogised to saying that apples and oranges are the same in their "being fruit". They both meet the criteria for being included in that category.
This is irrelevant, though. Nobody thinks the reason why two things are different is because they are both fruit, or because they are both in the same painting, or because they are both subsumed by Being.
The person would just say that they're different types of fruits, or different figures in the painting, or different things in Being. They don't need to posit a realm of "beyond fruit" or "beyond painting" or "beyond being" to accommodate these differences (and they cannot do so coherently because the analogised painting/Being is omnipresent).
So that's where we are when you assert "both things are, so they are the same in their being". I can make sense of it in the above sense, but that's silly. Beyond that, you have my previous posts explaining why clause 3 is wrong if we use my model/definition.
>Well, isn't it a property in a very basic sense?
You could talk about it as a property or category in the sense used above, but that's irrelevant to this discussion. I would talk about it that way when discussing problems with change, because it reveals an issue with creation and destruction.
Being is not a particular property because Being is all that is. It is truly omnipresent,
Hence the painting analogy. If you have a model where reality is divided into objects and attributes, or matter and form, or things and affairs, Being subsumes both sides of it.
So how can you treat it like one properry among many? To the extent it is "applied" to something, it swallows it whole. And in swallowing the apple whole and the orange whole, it has them both and is therefore the home of their differences so to speak.
>In one sense, things are the same "in their being" if the author just means that the various things are subsumed by the Whole (Being). >This can be analogised to saying that apples and oranges are the same in their "being fruit". They both meet the criteria for being included in that category.
>This is irrelevant, though. Nobody thinks the reason why two things are different is because they are both fruit, or because they are both in the same painting, or because they are both subsumed by Being.
This is a good argument. I think this is at least partially what Aristotle would have said to the problem by emphasizing that the "stuff" that underlies Being are substances, aka individuals, aka things as they are.
>Being is not a particular property because Being is all that is. It is truly omnipresent,
Can it be both a particular property and a "master" property, engulfing all other properties? You can absolutely speak of something's Being qua existence, so it has to at least be a particular property. But I think I understand what you mean if you also mean that Being envelopes all other things one could say about those apples, oranges, etc.
>This is a good argument. I think this is at least partially what Aristotle would have said to the problem by emphasizing that the "stuff" that underlies Being are substances, aka individuals, aka things as they are.
Thanks. I think it was a different anon who was discussing presentism, but I gave up on Aristotle's overall metaphysics because I don't think he appreciates "being" in the omnipresent sense.
>Can it be both a particular property and a "master" property, engulfing all other properties? You can absolutely speak of something's Being qua existence, so it has to at least be a particular property. But I think I understand what you mean if you also mean that Being envelopes all other things one could say about those apples, oranges, etc.
Well, what do we mean if we talk about something's "Being qua existence"? Is that a reference to the sense I mentioned (it is subsumed in the Whole)? That is true of literally everything, because reality is one perfect Whole. I think it's useful to say it this way, though, to stop us from incorrectly positing things outside of being, or potentially relying on creation and destruction.
Or do you we mean it in some Aristotelean or later sense of "actualised" or "instantiated"? In which case I think it's not related. Because both the potential and the actual, or the instantiated and the non-instantiated, exist in the sense we are talking about in this discussion.
But yes, you get my meaning, "Being envelopes all other things one could say about those apples, oranges, etc." That is my meaning when I said that Being swallows them all, there's no part of them that is independent, excluded from, or beyond its omnipresence. There is a nice line in an ancient Daoist essay that reads 包通天地/"envelops and threads through heaven and earth". Although I ultimately don't agree with that text for various other reasons.
>Thanks. I think it was a different anon who was discussing presentism, but I gave up on Aristotle's overall metaphysics because I don't think he appreciates "being" in the omnipresent sense.
For me, I'm mostly interested in taking the best hits of every philosopher I see and trying to reconcile their views together, rather than being a dogmatic adherent. If Aristotle does something that works, I'll take it and leave the rest (though not without careful, respectful consideration first).
>Well, what do we mean if we talk about something's "Being qua existence"? Is that a reference to the sense I mentioned (it is subsumed in the Whole)? That is true of literally everything,
I think so. Sometimes, we'll be debating something, and your language will be completely different, so I'll have to take a guess to see if we actually agree or disagree on something.
>But yes, you get my meaning, "Being envelopes all other things one could say about those apples, oranges, etc." That is my meaning when I said that Being swallows them all, there's no part of them that is independent, excluded from, or beyond its omnipresence. There is a nice line in an ancient Daoist essay that reads 包通天地/"envelops and threads through heaven and earth". Although I ultimately don't agree with that text for various other reasons.
For the time being, I don't think I have much more to say. I still think you hold to a heterodox interpretation of Eleatic philosophy, but I've noticed that you've placed less of an emphasis of being a strict devotee and more on coming up with a system of thought that makes the most sense, so I can't really fault you for that.
I still think that the most accurate interpretation of Eleatic philosophy fails in the sense that it makes philosophy impossible, but you allow for partition and differentiation, and partition and differentiation defeats that problem. Furthermore, I don't think Zeno's argument will make a difference (unless I have more coffee, I faintly saw a potential angle last night that unfortunately I didn't have the energy to explore) because it seems like it doesn't really "touch" the premises of partition and differentiation.
If we do revisit the issue of partition and differentiation, it'll have to be through another argument or exegesis of the Eleatics. Thanks for your time.
>Furthermore, I don't think Zeno's argument will make a difference (unless I have more coffee, I faintly saw a potential angle last night that unfortunately I didn't have the energy to explore) because it seems like it doesn't really "touch" the premises of partition and differentiation
Not that anon, but how so?
Well, you can see the back and forth happening. I think it could go on forever if it wanted to without touching the key points.That's just my intuition.
I actually had a similar back and forth with a different anon the other day with Zeno's argument, where I was in Tweetophon's position and the other anon was advancing a hardcore Eleatic position. I was winning in my advancement of differentiation until the other person pointed out that partition is impossible too, at least according to the Eleatics. As long as I held "no partition" to be true, then that collapsed my position, but if you don't, as Tweetophon doesn't (accepts partition), then you can accept differentiation.
As opposed to why differentiation holds as long as one accepts partition? Well, because partition and differentiation seem to be related. This is A, A is other than B. A and B are parts of a greater whole, A and B are different.
>but if you don't, as Tweetophon doesn't (accepts partition), then you can accept differentiation
I have no idea why this caveat would be relevant in the slightest, considering that the Zeno argument works against both partition and differentiation. And on what ground is difference even predicated according to this guy?
I don’t see it working against partition, at least without a reformulation. You’re free to try your hand though.
>I don’t see it working against partition, at least without a reformulation. You’re free to try your hand though
Wait, I thought you were saying that it works against partition, but not against non-partitioned differentiation (like, as long as there is no partition everything is fine).
I don't recall saying that, and the past few posts I've made don't seem to say this either, though tbh this is a conversation that has stretched across multiple threads with at least a half dozen characters popping in or out. Refresh my memory and I'll try to clarify.
Just checked back, I misread it because you're wording was a bit wonky, my bad.
Still, I must ask: are you now accepting partition? And with it are you accepting differentiation too?
>I'm mostly interested in taking the best hits of every philosopher I see and trying to reconcile their views together,
That is my approach, but the reconciliation is a very important part of the process and I'm doubtful that it gets done very often. These discussions are part of that process; unless people push each other around they might never see a contradiction, or they might not even be willing to see it if it means abandoning certain teachings. Perhaps the contradictions cannot even been seen until one is forced to rephrase what they've learned in their own words.
Actually, my old website got mocked as a "greatest hits of antiquity" on here at some point, don't know if that was you anon. But I have a new manuscript that I am submitting for editing this month and will put in print, and all will enjoy more greatest hits from ancient world.
>For the time being, I don't think I have much more to say. I still think you hold to a heterodox interpretation of Eleatic philosophy, but I've noticed that you've placed less of an emphasis of being a strict devotee and more on coming up with a system of thought that makes the most sense, so I can't really fault you for that.
Thanks, I enjoyed the tail end of the conversation.
Partition and differentiation is tricky because it can lead into all sorts of errors, as pointed out by people like Zeno. But I personally felt that an outright denial of all complexity or detail to Being was against the texts and/or not necessary to hold the core beliefs of a perfect and unchanging reality (at least, I think those are the core, and I expect them in any account of Eleatic philosophy, although some don't).
Speaking of Zeno, I wish the poster had a citation for that argument. I have seen it before from a couple of neoplatonists and thomists/aristoteleans. I don't recall them assigning it to a particular thinker, though, and it doesn't turn up in the collection of Zeno's fragments I have (at least not as paraphrased/formalised here). Obviously it has a "Zenonian" goal (refuting claims of plurality), but the form or style is much different than expected. Zeno is more about playing with infinities and divisibility, rather than positing an object and discussing its properties and where the properties could be obtained or grounded. But, there's a lot of testimonia/discussions of Zeno in Simplicius and elsewhere, and maybe they phrase or apply his arguments in that way. And they had more of the original material than we do (or something inserted into the material).
iirc he mentioned that it was recounted by Simplicius
Yes, and Simplicius wrote heaps of stuff and is a major source for eleatic material, so I'm very hesitant to say that the argument outright isn't Zeno's. On the other hand, Simplicius also has a particular interpretation of the eleatics (he thinks Parmenides is a dualist, with a real world and a shadow world), so I am wondering if it is just an argument from Simplicius, an argument from some other zeno or other thinker altogether, or Simplicius paraphrasing a zenonian argument and applying it in a new context that was of particular interest to whatever Simplicius was discussing at that time.
>Things are different in what they are, hence it would be "in their being"
So Aristotelianism, got it
Imagine trying to start a "New Eleatic" school of philosophy and never getting anyone to go along with it because you can't deign to explain anything to anyone. Embarrassing.
I'm trans btw, hope this doesn't have any metaphysical implications
Mentally Ill Hegelian
>The "many signs" is a quote from the Goddess and goes to why I don't adopt a certain interpretation of the text. But to get to your point, which is about distinction, you can say that you and I are distinguishable. Just like characters in a painting are distinguishable.
Ah, but Tweetophon, are the characters distinguishable in their being? No?
Then they must be distinguishable in their non-being. But non-being doesn't exist.
So the characters are not actually distinguishable. They are all the same. Any distinction is an illusion of a mind who is not capable of grasping Being in its unity, perfection, and simplicity.
>There's nothing you could say about the characters that wouldn't be about Being.
If I took one of the characters and dropped a nuclear weapon on it, and then tried to describe the aftermath, there are many things I could say about the character that I could never say about Being. e.g. fragmented (vaporized into smithereens), imperfect (no longer a fully matured human being), changing (transmutation from earth into fire), etc.
No, now you have stopped responding to the provided analogy. The characters in the painting are different, and at no point is there reference to a "non-being". They are different insofar as they are different scopes or details or perspectives within the context of Being: a perfect, changeless Whole (just like the painting is complete and unchanging).
"Illusion" is also being introduced here without reference to anything I've said. I say literally everything, all the details, it all "is".
>there are many things I could say about the character that I could never say about Being
No, because all such details would be wholly subsumed by Being. So your description, to the extent it is coherent, is only comparing two unchanging arrangements or things. It's a relative description, anything beyond that is gibberish and no description at all.
>The characters in the painting are different, and at no point is there reference to a "non-being".
You weren't following the argument. The reason why we referred to their distinguishable in their non-being is because we couldn't find how they were distinguishable in their being.
>They are different insofar as they are different scopes or details
I don't understand what a "scope" or a "detail" is, metaphysically speaking.
>They are different insofar as they are different scopes or details
Ah, so the details! Do the details exist? Are they beings?
You can't reference "non-being" because that term is incoherent, it's just a jumble of letters.
>I don't understand scope
Have you ever cropped an image or zoomed in or out on something? Using more or fewer data points, or types of data? Try doing those sorts of things and come back.
>I don't understand detail
Do you understand a painting may have one dancing figure wearing a dress, and another dancing figure wearing a shirt and trousers? Or some other example of a painting with various details like this? If not, try looking at some paintings and come back.
>Have you ever cropped an image or zoomed in or out on something? Using more or fewer data points, or types of data? Try doing those sorts of things and come back.
Yeah, you zoom in on a part, and that part is a thing, filled with things. It's different from the image in that it can be without the full image (hence allowing you to zoom in on it).
>Do you understand a painting may have one dancing figure wearing a dress, and another dancing figure wearing a shirt and trousers? Or some other example of a painting with various details like this? If not, try looking at some paintings and come back.
Yes, these are all things. You're digging yourself a bigger hole by trying to be vague and letting me sort it all out instead of precisely defining what these objects are, metaphysically speaking.
I remember you from that thread, you were the more lucid participant but you had a much different interpretation of Parmenides/the Eleatics. You stopped responding once I explained the pellet with your interpretation and how I came to mine.
I haven't been told to read the phenomenology, didn't have a three day argument about that, not sure who youre referencing. But I don't blame him for rejecting Germans if that was his overall message.
Regarding your arguments, those aren't arguments against what I've said. They're based on your own interpretation of Parmenides work. I reject that reading and i responded in that thread, you went silent.
Let me know if you have any arguments that are responsive to my beliefs, not some hegelian strawman used to justify the unjustifiable.
You're confusing several people, my only other post here is
, I replied to your claim about my interpretation in the other thread by citing the last fragment and *you* went silent.
Im p sure you're the one confusing people, since I have never received any response in that thread mentioning any fragment. I'm this guy btw
>You stopped responding once I explained the pellet with your interpretation and how I came to mine.
I really don't know which posts you're referring to, if you can quote them here that would be helpful. If you are the anon I think you are, then the conversation we've had ended after multiple attempts from my side in which I asked you to tell me exactly which were the posts in which you have proposed your position.
> I reject that reading and i responded in that thread, you went silent.
Again, I have no idea what you're talking about. Direct me to those posts if you want. That would be helpful, since I think these two posts
actually deal with your posts I am aware of (namely the ones in which you've mentioned the painting analogy).
Change literally does not make sense. There is obviously a superstructure that everything is a part of.
Nested structures, mutating. Each structure has a medium in which it evolves. Each structure forms the limits of the medium for the nested structure. Each medium forms the limits for the nested structure. All structures are self-similar, mirroring each other. Medium is always different, never mirroring. Structure is surface, medium is volume.
https://pastebin.com/P3rVFrue
>This is the origin of philosophy?!
This a rhetorical question? If so kys
Notice that in the poem, he also puts himself and the goddess in a chariot at the center of night and day symbolizing the center of all truth and knowledge.
SO the argument right now is 1) that this tweetophon homie hasn't thoroughly defined Being (according to the other dude responding to him) and 2) that the Parmenidean view of Being leaves lingering questions over whether parts/modes and potentialities are compatible with a view of Being that is static, unchanging, eternal, etc, illustrated by the analogy of the painting and its parts, correct?
Right, we could start fresh.
To 1), "Being is presence, whatever you could possibly reference or mention "is". Hence reality/Being is perfect and unchanging for the reasons given in these texts." It was analogised to a painting which absolutely subsumes all the content/materials.
2) isn't really for me to comment on, someone would need to come along and explain why they think 1) is incompatible with notion of Being as perfect and unchanging.
How do Eleatics explain the actual changes we perceive in everyday life? Is the material world an illusion like in AV or other systems or is the limited perspective of the individual human mind the cause of the perception of change?
I've only kept up with these threads sporadically so if this was answered at some point just give me keywords to look for in the archives.
Depends on the interpretation you adopt. Platonists might introduce "illusions" and/or posit some sort of shadow world where events take place.
Or you could posit that the chronology is complete, because being is complete. In which case you probably have a block world model.
But in a block world model it's immediately obvious that *something* about our perception is changing, otherwise we would either perceive everything all at once or nothing at all. Why do humans perceive being in the manner that they do, according to the Eleatics?
Nothing is being created or destroyed in the block world model. That's the only kind of change that Parmenides is against. You're simply sailing through layers of "is".
>Nothing is being created or destroyed in the block world model.
My perception from one moment to the next is being destroyed and created in a way, as the perception I have of one thing exists as I perceive one thing and then does not exist when I do not perceive that thing later, which sounds an awful lot like something that the Eleatics in this thread would have a problem with. Unless perception is in some special category where what differentiates it is different than what differentiates any other thing?
I agree it's an interesting topic. I would say you need to slow down a little, though. You say the moments are being created and destroyed, but you don't explain or justify that. Really all you can say is that the perception of one moment is different than the perception of another. At least until you posit some process of destruction that doesn't violate the nature of being. Also, the use of "moments" will be tricky, insofar as you may think that allows time to be divided into independent pieces that can be grasped, rather than one continuous whole.
I am being kinda breezy with my language here. I used created and destroyed as a device to highlight the seeming contradiction between what I'd seen written by Eleatics re: being and non-being and the nature of perception.
I think it's self-evident that time is divided somehow though, if only by the perception, as you obviously aren't perceiving all of time at once. Maybe that division isn't as cut-and-dry as seconds and minutes are, but the point still stands - we perceive things to happen to us now, or a little while ago, or to appear to be about to happen in a short while, and what we perceive now is not what we have just perceived or what we are about to perceive. In fact, it would seem as if perception is always in a state of flux or change.
>Every "Age of Enlightenment" proceeds from an unlimited optimism of the reason - always associated with the type of the megalopolitan - to an equally unqualified scepticism. The sovereign waking-consciousness, cut off by walls and artificialities from living nature and the land about it and under it, cognises nothing outside itself. It applies criticism to its imaginary world, which it has cleared of everyday sense-experience, and continues to do so till it has found the last and subtlest result, the form of the form - itself: namely, nothing. With this the possibilities of physics as a critical mode of world-understanding are exhausted, and the hunger for metaphysics presents itself afresh. But it is not the religious pastimes of educated and literature-soaked cliques, still less is it the intellect, that gives rise to the Second Religiousness. Its source is the naive belief that arises, unremarked but spontaneous, among the masses that there is some sort of mystic constitution of actuality (as to which formal proofs are presently regarded as barren and tiresome word-jugglery), and an equally naive heart-need reverently responding to the myth with a cult.
Parmenides is the purest distillation of what Spengler was talking here, he was a foreshadowing of the death of the Classical culture. His thought removes everything, and is ultimately nothing. It's a process of purer and purer logical reasoning that leads eventually to hyper-skepticism and then abolishes itself.
Parmenides is the original analytic philosopher, on the same level as any other non-kantian. "Being is" and "Non-being is not" are two purely analytic propositions, which tell us nothing more than what is already contained within the concepts of "being" and "non-being".
You seem to be confused about what analytic philosopher is. It has nothing to do with analytic and synthetic propositions.
If that's the case then I want nothing to do with analytic "philosophy". Anglo-analytic vs Continental is a false dichotomy.
The "analytic" in "analytic philosophy" has to do with logical linguistic analysis, and with the analytic method, for which philosophical issues can be treated independently one from the other.
Why should I believe in Eleatic philosophy? What use is there in positing that everything is unchanging, static, and eternal if it doesn't explain the nature of the change and finitude observed in everyday life?
Change is illusory. Learn quantum field theory and group theory. We build the action in QFT negatively via group representations (which we call 'particles' or 'quantum fields'). What I mean is that we state the redundancies (symmetries) first and build everything from there. For instance, one can choose any reference frame (coordinate system) in physics. This defines the Poincare group, fundamental representations of which constitute what we observe as matter. But the Poincare symmetry is ultimately a redundancy of our own description. Part of this redundancy are time translations, which we commonly associate with change. Cayley's theorem in group theory tells us that such changes are permutations of group elements that are ultimately reversible (bijective) and thus not really meaningful.
Why do autists always want to have the last word, no matter how inept and fruitless the exchange is?
the greeks were slave owning bums that spent their days fantasizing various idealistic drivel. actually investigating reality would inevitably lead them to some uncomfortable truths about themselves so they actively avoided doing so.
>source: goddess told me in a dream
Explain me how this is a bad source.
I had a horny dream yesterday that it seemed nothing more than that.
Asked ChatGPT about it and the interpretation was 100% spot on.
Who is this talking to me while I sleep?
any final thoughts?
Maybe the analytics are right, nailing down totally precise definitions is crucial to meaningfully discussing high-level philosophical issues and if we had a concrete set of agreed-on definitions half this discussion would have been unnecesary.
I agree, at least to a limited extent. The discussions don't necessarily need to be straitjacked by formal logic but a little bit of clarity goes a long way.
You cannot define these terms without going through the act of philosophizing beforehand. The analytics just end up dealing with readymade concepts without knowing beforehand wether they have any use at all (since more metaphysical sophistication might show them to be contradictory).