Heidegger and Spinoza on Substance

Did Heidegger treat Spinoza unfairly concerning his substance?

It is very clear that Heidegger is against any form of self-sufficient substance as constituting the fundamental ontology, since this would mean an ontical, instead of an ontological ground. For any human being/Dasein, every other being/entity appears within an equipmental totality, a sort of Indra's net, where everything refers/reflects everything else and nothing stands on its own. For this reason, Heidegger speaks negatively about Spinoza (this in his lectures on Schelling).

This, at first sight, seems logical, given that Spinoza posits a very clear form of substance monism (which, from the point of view of a human being, is a dual-aspect monism). However, the way in which Spinoza further develops his point makes it clear that his idea of a Substance comes close to a Neoplatonic One, and does not include any separate entities/beings, just forms of activity of the one substance. In that sense, the word 'substance' as used by Spinoza might have confused Heidegger into thinking that it points at the same type of substance as talked about by Aristotle (which is a type of substance which indeed comes way closer to Heideggers ontic beings/entities, and which Heidegger rightfully critiques).

Am I misinterpreting Heidegger and/or Spinoza, or is Heidegger misinterpreting Spinoza?

In a similar vein, I also have the feeling that Heidegger misinterpreted Bergson when he stated that Bergson still treats time (or rather, duration) in a spatial manner (i.e., as subsequent durations on a timeline). However, this point has already been discussed in multiple papers, while the above point concerning Spinoza has not.

Any thoughts?

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  1. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    One thing you have to know about Heidegger is that he was excessively harsh in his criticisms of the history of Western philosophy, because he was making a point. He exaggerated the flaws of this history early on in his career, in Being and Time, and later distanced himself a little from those exaggerations.

    The later Heidegger may have been more open to partially reappraising Spinoza's philosophy.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      >The later Heidegger may have been more open to partially reappraising Spinoza's philosophy.
      no he wouldn't

  2. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    read Heidegger regarding the onto-theological determination of modern philosophy (and Spinoza) and you'll understand why he would criticise Spinoza

    It's not a matter of "ontic" or "ontological", but rather the conception of substance, of being, that is perceived as "real" or "present" only in relationship to God (primary cause, ur-sache) and efficient causes

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Yes, I understand why Heidegger would critique Spinoza, given that Spinoza's ontology indeed seems to fall into the category of onto-theologies (it being panentheistic).

      My question isn't really why Heidegger critiques Spinoza, but whether you, the reader, think that this critique is justified, or, as

      One thing you have to know about Heidegger is that he was excessively harsh in his criticisms of the history of Western philosophy, because he was making a point. He exaggerated the flaws of this history early on in his career, in Being and Time, and later distanced himself a little from those exaggerations.

      The later Heidegger may have been more open to partially reappraising Spinoza's philosophy.

      states, simply too harsh (because, even though I admire his work, especially his emphasis of average everydayness, I do have to say that he developed quite the ego).

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      I think this Anon is really hitting the heart of the issue here . The issue isn’t that Spinoza’s metaphysics are (or aren’t) comprised of a network of interconnected small s substances which form the big S Substance which acts like a Hegelian form in that it arranges the constellations in an intelligible way but that Spinoza’s methodology of reaching his big S Substance is reliant on a hierarchical understanding of being which has yet to progress past the present-at-hand. Heidegger’s issue with Spinoza is more that Spinoza’s ontology is still essentially an ontology of thought rather than an ontology of zuhandenheit. There is no fundamental relation of the subject with his being as it exists prior to expression in thought. And as far as present-at-hand ontology goes Spinoza has to rank among the most egregious. Although, as I think about it I suppose there is an argument to be made that Spinoza’s God isn’t necessarily a thinking/conscious God and that the cumulative efforts of thought dissolve into a sea of pre-conscious order which acts as the true motor of the system although I am unsure how far one would be able to push this thought given that my grasp on Spinoza is pretty rusty.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        What's wrong with thinking, a world made of thoughts, nous as the framework, etc.?

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          Because it only encompasses a fraction of what it means to be. Without a framework that can accommodate both pre-conscious being and conscious being then you’re left with only half the puzzle. Think of it like this, Heidegger’s whole project was to save western philosophy from what he saw as a kind of obsession with the definable, the nameable. When you name a thing you split it into two pieces: the name and it’s associated concepts and the real, physical/mental thing. As long as we pursue ontology with a blind eye to this split then eventually we will forget that it’s only the names we’re discussing and not the actual thing. That’s what Heidegger saw happening all around him. That’s why zuhandenheit is such a central concept for him: it’s the way that humans rationally relate to the world outside of the frame of language. As long as things are analyzed outside of the backdrop of the pre-conscious experience of being then we only end up setting our own thoughts up against us like a mirage. This is because that pre-conscious experience of being is always what drives us for Heidegger so any unraveling of the monolith of present-at-hand ontology must begin all over again with each generation as it occupies a new experience of the world as ready-to-hand. Think of Shakespeare for instance: his plays could mean literally anything and, in essence, they do. For Shakespeare’s contemporaries the morals of his work were likely quite obvious given they they inhabited the same world. For us, denizens of a completely different world, it’s also obvious what the morals of his work were and although these two conceptions of Shakespeare’s work may not overlap they are nonetheless 100% true for their respective contexts. Present-at-hand ontology misses the forest for the trees.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            He criticises Platonism too so why would reading it as a neoplatonic One cause Heidegger to re-evaluate his philosophy in any major way?

            [...]
            The problem is that by calling the eternally present more real you impair people's ability to relate to reality authentically. To call a representation more real than the thing its representing is insane.

            These problems go away if ideas, intelligibility, etc., are the underlying substances of reality, full stop. Or if we stop emphasizing a hard split between material and ideal, unconscious and conscious, etc. The universe is mind, and it is constantly evolving and reacting towards and against itself.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            What's the point of saying that? I don't have any reason to hamstring myself by subscribing to some abstract model like Idealism. I can just follow pure experience.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            There's nothing to be hamstrung by. You couldn't experience anything if there wasn't anything to experience. The only thing guaranteeing experience is the virtual connection between you and the world, in which your mind becomes like the world, changing as you sail through it in space and time. In fact, by not having a solid bedrock for how it is possible for you to experience anything at all, you are hamstringing yourself out of a coherent philosophy.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Experience itself is the bedrock. I can conceptualise the world but that always has a lesser epistemological status than the experience itself.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            There's nothing to conceptualize. All you're doing is collecting, dividing, and labeling what is already there. That's what you're not understanding here.

            Saying all of reality boils down to mind-substance is definitely not following pure experience, because it's making claims beyond what experience can justify. Any form of monism is beyond the pale really. Proceeding from experience inevitably leads to pluralism.

            You're using mind too strictly and experience too loosely. And there's no need for monism here in a strict sense. Substance monism is fine because there needs to be a common fabric, but what you should really be concerned with is how can everything be one and many.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            "Proceeding from experience inevitably leads to pluralism."
            This, I dont get.

            Everything I have ever experienced, thoughts, feelings, emotions, sense perceptions (the five classics + heat, cold, pain, balance etc.) and thus also the physical world, those I have all experienced within... my experience. Mind-body dualism often boils down to distinguishing between internal experiences (thoughts, feelings, emotions etc.) versus external experiences (sense perceptions), but these are all still experiences!

            As Andrei Linde says it:

            "Now let us turn to consciousness. According to standard materialistic doctrine, consciousness, like space-time before the invention of general relativity, plays a secondary, subservient role, being considered just a function of matter and a tool for the description of the truly existing material world. But let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my “green” exists, and my “sweet” exists. I do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything else is a theory. Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. But in fact we are substituting reality of our feelings by a successfully working theory of an independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never think about its limitations until we must address some really deep issues, which do not fit into our model of reality."

            Here, he is attacking materialism, but his critique also holds true for forms of dualism/pluralism

            I have experience of physical things, I have experience of mental things, I have experience of the connection between these two things, but I see no good reason to reduce one to the other. Or to reduce anything to anything for that matter. To be a phenomenologist is to be against reduction.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            To me, it seems that you are confusing the content of experience, or the content of a phenomenon, with different experiences/phenomena still all being experiences/phenomena.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Saying that all experiences are experiences doesn't lead to all reality being mind-substance. The former is a tautology the latter is a metaphysical claim.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            True.

            But look at it like this:
            All (human) experience takes the form of 'mind' (thoughts, feelings, emotions) or of 'substance' (sense perceptions). The CONTENT of experience (for me, at least) thus can show itself via the attributes of mind or substance (with possible connections between the two).

            Thus, I am not equating reality with mind-substance; I am equating reality with experience, where the content of experience can be mind and/or substance. Experience in this sense is synonymous with Spinoza's substance. The confusing thing is, of course, that Spinoza's substance is not the same substance as referred to when talking about mind/substance. Same word, different meanings.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            This amounts to saying that we never touch reality outside our experience, not that there is no reality outside our experience. I really don't think this is Idealism, just mainstream metaphysics ever since Kant.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            "This amounts to saying that we never touch reality outside our experience, not that there is no reality outside our experience"

            This is completely true and exactly what I am saying.
            However, I am saying even more.
            I am also saying that there IS a reality outside OUR experience and that this reality ALSO is experience; its just not our (nor mine, nor yours, nor God's, or any other personal pronoun) experience. Its just is 'experience' inner of itself. If this doesn't make any sense, then just use another word for 'experience' (consciousness-at-large, the one ultimate substance, whatever).

            "I really don't think this is Idealism"
            That might be, given that the word "Idealism" has had many different definitions.

            "just mainstream metaphysics ever since Kant."
            Well, I wouldn't call it mainstream, but it is indeed similar to German Idealism (mainly Schelling). That's also why I did refer to it as Idealism.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            And how do you know that this reality-outside-experience is experience-in-itself ? How do you know that there can be such a thing as experience-in-itself, or what it even means to refer to experience without an experiencer?

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            "And how do you know that this reality-outside-experience is experience-in-itself?"

            I would first of all rephrase the question as:
            And how do you know that this reality-outside-[a personal form of]-experience is experience-in-itself?

            My argument relies on something which you might consider wonky, wishy-washy, woo-woo; but bear with me.

            Instead of stepping outside ones person to try to find this 'experience-in-itself' (since this is difficult), we can also go the other way and step further inside our own experience, namely towards one's dream.

            Within a dream, one experiences both mind (i.e., thoughts, feelings, emotions etc.) and matter (sense perception). The only difference between a dream and awake state, is that the connections between various modes of mind and matter seem (only when one is capable of lucid dreaming; otherwise only in hindsight, when one is awake) illogical. However, during normal dreaming, everything seems (or even, is) perfectly real. Furthermore, not only you (or rather, your dream-you) exist, but also other people (or rather, dream-people), who behave in various ways and whose thoughts you cannot read.

            Now, from the perspective of the awake-you, this is weird. Why cant you read the thoughts of the dream-people, since they - of course - exist within you? Well, simply because they are dissociated parts of your inner experience. They are not fully dissociated (because then, you could just as well say that they do not exist at all, following an argument similar to Russells teapot), since they can still interact with dream-you, but dream-people are dissociated from dream-you to the same extent that people in the awake-world are dissociated from awake-you.

            "or what it even means to refer to experience without an experiencer?"

            I agree that this seems weird and in my analogy, there is still an experiencer, namely you-who-is-dreaming. This is also why Reality is sometimes said to be a dream in God. I am saying that there can be experience without an experiencer, because I am defining an experiencer as a person with a/one perspective. However, the "experiencer-at-large" does not have one perspective, but ALL, and therefore, in a certain sense NO perspective. This, I do not see as constituting a person, but I can see why some people would still call it God (but then, not a personal god, of course).

            I fear that I cannot respond any more, because I have to leave. I might return later to the discussion though, since it is a good one.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >Why cant you read the thoughts of the dream-people
            This is sort of what a dream is doing. The dream people aren't people as such, they're simplified characters on the stage of the dream. It is showing you your own thoughts and reintegrating fantastical unconscious forms of thought with more straightforward conscious forms of thought.

            Now you could say this still mirrors the waking world, but I think the important difference is that progress is different. Psychic development operates on a (roughly) linear trajectory from pure unconscious to ego growth to reintegration of the ego and unconscious through the archetypal Self.
            Whereas the waking world goes through endless cycles of birth-growth-decay-rebirth everywhere you look.

            So if reality is a dream by a Dreamer, why do those dreams not work towards something the way our dreams do?

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            ideas are present in "physical" things lol, that's why you can perceive them and understand them

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            "I can just follow pure experience."
            As

            There's nothing to be hamstrung by. You couldn't experience anything if there wasn't anything to experience. The only thing guaranteeing experience is the virtual connection between you and the world, in which your mind becomes like the world, changing as you sail through it in space and time. In fact, by not having a solid bedrock for how it is possible for you to experience anything at all, you are hamstringing yourself out of a coherent philosophy.

            is (implicitly) saying, following pure experience is exactly what some types of Idealism are about. Not Platonic Idealism, but Neoplatonic idealism falls more into this category.

            Then again, there still is a very big vocabulary problem, where the same word gets used in different senses (e.g., idealism, naturalism, consciousness) and where different words might mean the same thing, depending on the author (e.g., some rename sub- or unconsciousness to consciousness and 'regular' consciousness to meta-consciousness). A lot of philosophical bickering stems from confusing words (where 'confusing' here serves both as a verb and adjective).

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Saying all of reality boils down to mind-substance is definitely not following pure experience, because it's making claims beyond what experience can justify. Any form of monism is beyond the pale really. Proceeding from experience inevitably leads to pluralism.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            "Proceeding from experience inevitably leads to pluralism."
            This, I dont get.

            Everything I have ever experienced, thoughts, feelings, emotions, sense perceptions (the five classics + heat, cold, pain, balance etc.) and thus also the physical world, those I have all experienced within... my experience. Mind-body dualism often boils down to distinguishing between internal experiences (thoughts, feelings, emotions etc.) versus external experiences (sense perceptions), but these are all still experiences!

            As Andrei Linde says it:

            "Now let us turn to consciousness. According to standard materialistic doctrine, consciousness, like space-time before the invention of general relativity, plays a secondary, subservient role, being considered just a function of matter and a tool for the description of the truly existing material world. But let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my “green” exists, and my “sweet” exists. I do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything else is a theory. Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. But in fact we are substituting reality of our feelings by a successfully working theory of an independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never think about its limitations until we must address some really deep issues, which do not fit into our model of reality."

            Here, he is attacking materialism, but his critique also holds true for forms of dualism/pluralism

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            I suppose it’s kind of the classic “if a tree falls in the woods” problem we’ve run into here and I fall on the side of “yes, it does make a noise” and you fall on the latter. I’m inclined to agree with you on the idealism point though as I consider myself to be roughly a Hegelian but in faithfulness to Heidegger’s thought I think there still exists a modicum of mind-independent being. Besides, it’s not so much that the elements of being are contained in a mind-like substance but that there are elements of being which cannot be described in the terminology of the mind. The flow state for instance is an example of when being is expressed through a mind-like substance but not necessarily in the capacity of thought proper.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >there still exists a modicum of mind-independent being.
            Which mind do we need to be independent of? Your mind, or the universal mind?
            >The flow state for instance is an example of when being is expressed through a mind-like substance but not necessarily in the capacity of thought proper.
            I don't know why people want to divide conscious states into states that are mental or non-mental. It's all mental, just different flavors, tempos, etc.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >Which mind do we need to be independent of? Your mind, or the universal mind?
            The individual mind and the collective mind. I mean it in the same way that Hegel means there has to be a zero level reality where things happen contrary to how Geist expects it such that dialectics can happen. This isn’t really the main point though.
            >I don't know why people want to divide conscious states into states that are mental or non-mental. It's all mental, just different flavors, tempos, etc.
            The issue of whether or not Heidegger thought we could have direct access to reality as it is in itself with no mediation from the mind is pretty moot imo. It doesn’t matter that things come to us through mediation in the senses and such but that thought (or meta-cognition as the other Anon put it) is distinctly different than base level senses. The way that we deal with things (or if you want to use the Heideggerian term Cope) as they exist as tools or elements of our surroundings is drastically different than thought which operates on itself. An ontology which does not take into account the 90% of our lives that we spend in the other distinctly different mode of being is obviously deficient. And you can say but this is still mind-dependent but at the same time it’s still not yet thought. If we characterize a man nailing shingles on the same ontological level as a man reflecting on God then we’ve overlooked the subtle differences between the two.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >The individual mind and the collective mind. I mean it in the same way that Hegel means there has to be a zero level reality where things happen contrary to how Geist expects it such that dialectics can happen. This isn’t really the main point though.
            As in, chaos, or nothing qua nothing? I'm not sure where what you mean by "things" and "happen" since these should be, by default, some kind of mental phenomena in themselves. Our minds are merely antennae for us to receive and respond with the signals of said content. Better put, the content and the signals are the same.
            >The way that we deal with things (or if you want to use the Heideggerian term Cope) as they exist as tools or elements of our surroundings is drastically different than thought which operates on itself.
            Very true, I'll give you that. But this is more of a privileging of a certain kind of thought at the expense of other thoughts.
            >And you can say but this is still mind-dependent but at the same time it’s still not yet thought.
            We need to explore what it means for something to be mind-independent at the scale where everything is mind. Mind-dependent would no longer mean "needing consistent structure, intelligibility, etc." because the mind is the stable medium that requires certain boundaries to be maintained or else it simply cannot exist.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >But this is more of a privileging of a certain kind of thought at the expense of other thoughts.
            I don’t really see it that way. Heidegger on multiple accounts says that present-at-hand ontology fulfills what it’s there for and in man cases he even expresses satisfaction with their arguments and logic. His point is that it’s not the full picture though. I find it hard to understand how after millennia of present-at-hand ontology the first one to give recognition to the ready-to-hand is disdained as being unfair.
            >We need to explore what it means for something to be mind-independent at the scale where everything is mind. Mind-dependent would no longer mean "needing consistent structure, intelligibility, etc." because the mind is the stable medium that requires certain boundaries to be maintained or else it simply cannot exist.
            But I’m agreeing that it’s mind-dependent, I just don’t agree that it’s thought.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            I feel like we're *so* close to being on the same page.
            >I don’t really see it that way. Heidegger on multiple accounts says that present-at-hand ontology fulfills what it’s there for and in man cases he even expresses satisfaction with their arguments and logic. His point is that it’s not the full picture though.
            I agree with this. Though, could you give me some examples of where Heidegger views some present-at-hand ontology with satisfaction? It's too easy to develop a caricature of Heidegger's thought where ready-to-hand is awesome and present-at-hand is garbage.

            What I mean is that by thinking that only present-at-hand thoughts are thoughts is what is the problem. To quote Charles Sanders Peirce:
            >"Matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws."
            I think this is why when you say:
            >But I’m agreeing that it’s mind-dependent, I just don’t agree that it’s thought.
            We're completely disagreeing on the scope of what is considered thought. To me, it's all thought of various shades. That's why I think we're privileging a certain kind of thought as being *THE* thought.

            However, I'm getting ahead of myself. I need to have a specific definition of thought in mind (no pun intended) and if you have a problem with me expanding the scope of thought in such an Anaxagoran/Platonic/Peircean way.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      I think this Anon is really hitting the heart of the issue here . The issue isn’t that Spinoza’s metaphysics are (or aren’t) comprised of a network of interconnected small s substances which form the big S Substance which acts like a Hegelian form in that it arranges the constellations in an intelligible way but that Spinoza’s methodology of reaching his big S Substance is reliant on a hierarchical understanding of being which has yet to progress past the present-at-hand. Heidegger’s issue with Spinoza is more that Spinoza’s ontology is still essentially an ontology of thought rather than an ontology of zuhandenheit. There is no fundamental relation of the subject with his being as it exists prior to expression in thought. And as far as present-at-hand ontology goes Spinoza has to rank among the most egregious. Although, as I think about it I suppose there is an argument to be made that Spinoza’s God isn’t necessarily a thinking/conscious God and that the cumulative efforts of thought dissolve into a sea of pre-conscious order which acts as the true motor of the system although I am unsure how far one would be able to push this thought given that my grasp on Spinoza is pretty rusty.

      Again, I understand why Heidegger would critique Spinoza, but my question revolves around whether this critique is justified.

      I have always understood Spinoza's Substance using a field analogy (like an electromagnetic field). Here, activity of the field (which can also be spoken of as the Conatus or even as Schopenhauer's Will, but within the context of the analogy, EM-field activity could simply be seen as an electron) without any reflection (e.g., without two electrons repelling one another) can be seen as a zuhanden/ready-to-hand entity, in that there is an undisturbed flow. Activity with reflection would then constitute a vorhanden/present-at-hand entity, in that the flow gets disrupted and one (or rather, Dasein) becomes aware of the entity. During a zuhanden activity, during which one is in flow (e.g., everyday, undisturbed hammering), one still experiences the hammering (there is of course not no experience (excuse the double negative), the Dasein isn't in a coma (if I may assume that that equates with having no experience)), so there is a ground level of consciousness, but there is no meta-consciousness, since this only arises when one becomes aware of the hammering (i.e., the hammer presents itself as vorhanden/present-at-hand). And to get back to the analogy, the electro- and magnetic aspects of the EM-field can be seen as the (internal) mind- and matter aspects of Spinoza's substance (and yes, I now that there are an infinite number of aspects, but only two can be present for us humans). And to be clear: if we were to say that the one substance is consciousness, then this would still work, since (inner) mind would constitute the inner thoughts and emotions, while matter would constitute the external world (which of course is present within consciousness, albeit not any personal/dissociated consciousness)

      Here, a major vocabulary problem arises, since Heidegger uses the word Bewustssein in a meta-consciousness/awareness sense (which is the everyday use of the word, so that's not surprising), which - by definition - results in him saying that only present-at-hand entities appear in consciousness. His point throughout Being and Time is that this is not the fundamental way in which we/Dasein generally, in our average everydayness disclose the world: we disclose it largely via ready-to-hand activity. This is where I would use a different vocabulary by saying that this already occurs in consciousness (since there is experience), and that the present-at-hand activity would be meta-consciousness (since there is an explicit awareness of this experience).

      So now replying to: "Heidegger’s issue with Spinoza is more that Spinoza’s ontology is still essentially an ontology of thought rather than an ontology of zuhandenheit."
      Yes, Spinoza's ontology is one of thought, if we define thought as (ground level) consciousness. However, it is not one of thought if we define thought as explicit thinking/reasoning/dialectic.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        Cont.

        Now I am tempted to say that Spinoza saw his ontology as being defined by the first thought definition, while it seems to me that Heidegger understood it following the second thought definition.

        Following the first definition, an ontology of thought is, at the same time, an ontology of zuhandenheid/ready-to-handness. Following the second definition, an ontology of thought indeed is not one of zuhandenheid.

        Now, concerning "the cumulative efforts of thought dissolve into a sea of pre-conscious order which acts as the true motor of the system": I would agree with this, but change 'pre-conscious' to 'conscious', since I think that we refer to the same phenomenon (your definition of consciousness seems to be the same as my definition of meta-consciousness). Also: "thought dissolve into a sea" seems to say the same thing as my analogy, where here electromagnetic activity comes to rest and dissolves into the EM-field (e.g., an electron and positron colliding).

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        Cont.

        Now I am tempted to say that Spinoza saw his ontology as being defined by the first thought definition, while it seems to me that Heidegger understood it following the second thought definition.

        Following the first definition, an ontology of thought is, at the same time, an ontology of zuhandenheid/ready-to-handness. Following the second definition, an ontology of thought indeed is not one of zuhandenheid.

        Now, concerning "the cumulative efforts of thought dissolve into a sea of pre-conscious order which acts as the true motor of the system": I would agree with this, but change 'pre-conscious' to 'conscious', since I think that we refer to the same phenomenon (your definition of consciousness seems to be the same as my definition of meta-consciousness). Also: "thought dissolve into a sea" seems to say the same thing as my analogy, where here electromagnetic activity comes to rest and dissolves into the EM-field (e.g., an electron and positron colliding).

        I understand your argument now and yes, it is extremely similar to my last sentence and I think we’re hitting on the same point there. As far as my knowledge of Spinoza goes this is a really good reconciliation with Heidegger although im sure you would ruffle the feathers of the more orthodox Spinozans. I also agree with your point that the crux of our issue comes down to how one labels what is conscious and what is not. I am just not confident enough in my knowledge of Spinoza to be able to attack your characterization of him as understanding thought to be ground level consciousness given that from everything I’ve ever read on Spinoza he seems to adhere to the latter to me. I think that we may be projecting a frame back onto him which he was thinking without reference to such that the overall structure ends up lying on both sides of the split. For instance, in his transition from his metaphysics to his morals he makes the claim that activity produces itself in the mind as rational cognition. Taken at face value this would seem to invalidate your point as God is nothing but activity and therefore rational thought but who can really tell as he also seems to use acting in a more zuhanden way in the predicate form of “actions of the mind are adequate ideas which increase its power of acting.” To progress further on this point would require a retroactive doubling of activity and passivity into their respective zuhanden and vorhanden components.

  3. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Well, first and above all, Spinoza's use of substance merely keeps up with the Cartesian conception of substance. He employed it for he needed to group together what Descartes had separated, mind/thought and body/extension, the way he found to refer both to one single substance, as attributes of it, was this. Now I think that it is still some inheritance from Scholasticism and by consequence Aristotelian philosophy. Spinoza's God, the Substance, has thought and extension as attributes, God, the subject, and its predicates, its modes. I haven't read Heidegger yet, so I can't comment further.

  4. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >It is very clear that Heidegger is against any form of self-sufficient substance as constituting the fundamental ontology
    The more I read philosophy, the less I understand Heidegger's critique of the ontic vs. ontological distinction, at least in this sense. Was Heidegger's problem the fact that we reify things as self-sufficient substances that, if we look at it strictly, are not actually so? (e.g. any living being will require something from its environment to be born, to live, etc.) Or is it the fact that he thinks that identifying anything on the basis of how it is self-sufficient or any other kind of "fixture" is besides the point?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Can I ask what you think the distinction is between ontic and ontological?

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        I'll put an Aristotelian spin on it. Every "thing" that can be described is a primary substance or a secondary substance, and Heidegger refers to this domain as the "ontical". But if are asked what "is" in the most vaguest sense possible and determine whether Being qua Being is a kind of substance (e.g. an individual or a genus), we must emphatically answer no (for a variety of reasons, Aristotle had his own). This is the origin of the ontical-ontological distinction.

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          I believe that any reason heidegger would have to disparage spinoza's philosophy is that he treats being as if it's reality (which he defines in B/T as the presence-at-hand of entities within-the-world), which is a subordinate mode of conceptualizing things as "in-themselves", and glosses over the fact that in order to understand entities within-the-world, you have to be-in-the-world.

          That, and (I believe, althoughbeit i could be wrong, i have to reread the ethics) Spinoza treats existence as a predicate, which presupposes the subject object distinction. Even though spinoza works with that presupposition, I still think he does a whole lot to dismantle it, even if he didn't explicitly explore the conclusion.

          so, to simplify

          ontical: the immediate accessibility of the things of existence (the furniture of the world/beings)

          ontological: "what" determines things *as* things
          (how things are accessible/intelligible to beings)

          this is how I understand it, but if I'm wrong or anybody can strengthen this I'm open to it.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            it sounds about right to me but I'm waiting for some more heideggerians to come and see if

            [...]
            [...]
            is this a good understanding of the ontical-ontological distinction? what is missing from it?

            works too

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        I'll put an Aristotelian spin on it. Every "thing" that can be described is a primary substance or a secondary substance, and Heidegger refers to this domain as the "ontical". But if are asked what "is" in the most vaguest sense possible and determine whether Being qua Being is a kind of substance (e.g. an individual or a genus), we must emphatically answer no (for a variety of reasons, Aristotle had his own). This is the origin of the ontical-ontological distinction.

        was that a good definition?

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          Huh, I didn't see that, the rest of the thread filled in so quick.

          I think that's about right from my reading, but it could do without language like "the vaguest possible etc." Aristotle's answer, from Heidegger's perspective, looks like it sidesteps Aristotle's own questions, so that instead of answer to what being qua being is, we get an explanation of what makes certain existent beings stand out as existent beings, and a question like "what does it mean for fire or air to be?" is dismissed. There's a great passage in Introduction to Metaphysics where Heidegger gives all of these examples of the use of "is" where you could say it means "to presence" until he gets to an example of a brief poem by Goethe, where it doesn't work. Poetry and metaphor and how they inform how we understand things gets untreated in favor of things.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >but it could do without language like "the vaguest possible etc." A
            Yeah, I think the problem is that it makes it seem like I'm talking about a being, e.g. a universal at its most general, but the thing is that at that point, Being becomes so equivocal where you can't even distinguish between a universal and a particular, and that does NOT make it "the most general" universal either. It's like you have to step off the "vertical hierarchy" of genera, species, and individuals and towards something else that is "horizontal" to these ontical categories.
            >Aristotle's answer, from Heidegger's perspective, looks like it sidesteps Aristotle's own questions, so that instead of answer to what being qua being is
            Well, from what I recall from what I've read in Metaphysics, Aristotle has a few abortive starts in trying to speak about being qua being, and the best that he can do is that being is something like a unity, or that being goes hand in hand with unity, but that's the best we can say of it. Also, I know this is a bit off point, but Aristotle does have a lot to say about what it means for something to be fire, water, etc., in Physics, Generation and Corruption, and Meteorology, and the answer is surprisingly phenomenological rather than physical. The elements are conglomerates of active and passive qualities. So the qualities themselves are superior to the provisional material substance of the universe.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        Huh, I didn't see that, the rest of the thread filled in so quick.

        I think that's about right from my reading, but it could do without language like "the vaguest possible etc." Aristotle's answer, from Heidegger's perspective, looks like it sidesteps Aristotle's own questions, so that instead of answer to what being qua being is, we get an explanation of what makes certain existent beings stand out as existent beings, and a question like "what does it mean for fire or air to be?" is dismissed. There's a great passage in Introduction to Metaphysics where Heidegger gives all of these examples of the use of "is" where you could say it means "to presence" until he gets to an example of a brief poem by Goethe, where it doesn't work. Poetry and metaphor and how they inform how we understand things gets untreated in favor of things.

        >but it could do without language like "the vaguest possible etc." A
        Yeah, I think the problem is that it makes it seem like I'm talking about a being, e.g. a universal at its most general, but the thing is that at that point, Being becomes so equivocal where you can't even distinguish between a universal and a particular, and that does NOT make it "the most general" universal either. It's like you have to step off the "vertical hierarchy" of genera, species, and individuals and towards something else that is "horizontal" to these ontical categories.
        >Aristotle's answer, from Heidegger's perspective, looks like it sidesteps Aristotle's own questions, so that instead of answer to what being qua being is
        Well, from what I recall from what I've read in Metaphysics, Aristotle has a few abortive starts in trying to speak about being qua being, and the best that he can do is that being is something like a unity, or that being goes hand in hand with unity, but that's the best we can say of it. Also, I know this is a bit off point, but Aristotle does have a lot to say about what it means for something to be fire, water, etc., in Physics, Generation and Corruption, and Meteorology, and the answer is surprisingly phenomenological rather than physical. The elements are conglomerates of active and passive qualities. So the qualities themselves are superior to the provisional material substance of the universe.

        would love a followup to this convo

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        Huh, I didn't see that, the rest of the thread filled in so quick.

        I think that's about right from my reading, but it could do without language like "the vaguest possible etc." Aristotle's answer, from Heidegger's perspective, looks like it sidesteps Aristotle's own questions, so that instead of answer to what being qua being is, we get an explanation of what makes certain existent beings stand out as existent beings, and a question like "what does it mean for fire or air to be?" is dismissed. There's a great passage in Introduction to Metaphysics where Heidegger gives all of these examples of the use of "is" where you could say it means "to presence" until he gets to an example of a brief poem by Goethe, where it doesn't work. Poetry and metaphor and how they inform how we understand things gets untreated in favor of things.

        >but it could do without language like "the vaguest possible etc." A
        Yeah, I think the problem is that it makes it seem like I'm talking about a being, e.g. a universal at its most general, but the thing is that at that point, Being becomes so equivocal where you can't even distinguish between a universal and a particular, and that does NOT make it "the most general" universal either. It's like you have to step off the "vertical hierarchy" of genera, species, and individuals and towards something else that is "horizontal" to these ontical categories.
        >Aristotle's answer, from Heidegger's perspective, looks like it sidesteps Aristotle's own questions, so that instead of answer to what being qua being is
        Well, from what I recall from what I've read in Metaphysics, Aristotle has a few abortive starts in trying to speak about being qua being, and the best that he can do is that being is something like a unity, or that being goes hand in hand with unity, but that's the best we can say of it. Also, I know this is a bit off point, but Aristotle does have a lot to say about what it means for something to be fire, water, etc., in Physics, Generation and Corruption, and Meteorology, and the answer is surprisingly phenomenological rather than physical. The elements are conglomerates of active and passive qualities. So the qualities themselves are superior to the provisional material substance of the universe.

        is this a good understanding of the ontical-ontological distinction? what is missing from it?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      He criticises Platonism too so why would reading it as a neoplatonic One cause Heidegger to re-evaluate his philosophy in any major way?

      What's wrong with thinking, a world made of thoughts, nous as the framework, etc.?

      The problem is that by calling the eternally present more real you impair people's ability to relate to reality authentically. To call a representation more real than the thing its representing is insane.

  5. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    crazy the amount of mental effort people put into understanding heidegger being an atheist

    he became a catholic again at the end of his life anyway

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Why do christcucks pretend the only religious view except theirs is atheism?

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        heidegger would be against islam and judaism (obviously) too

        any religion that has a god that is eternal is essentially "why we cant have nice things" according to heidegger but he reverted back to catholicism at the end of his life

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          All three are the same worldview with the names swapped around so yeah. But Taoism for example is not at odds with Heidegger.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            yes void worship religions are what heidegger (and derrida) wants

            It was just a pragmatical affair regarding burial

            keep coping

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      >he became a catholic again at the end of his life
      Did he?

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        heideggercels will read hundreds of pages of heideggereise and not know this basic fact

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        Nta, but yeah. To the surprise of everyone in his life just about.

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          I see. I searched and found corroborations, but it is odd how little this is noted by the academy (even the Catholic ones - https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/search/?as_sitesearch=churchlifejournal.nd.edu&entqr=3&q=heidegger#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=heidegger&gsc.page=1), especially when compared to, say, Wallace Stevens, for whom even the possibility of conversion is critical. There are interesting comments about his headstone having a six-pointed Marian star as opposed to a cross, but it appears I'll have to read a biographical work for more details.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Eh, Catholics aren't too thrilled to have him either

            https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/the-anti-catholicism-of-heideggers-black-notebooks/

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      It was just a pragmatical affair regarding burial

  6. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Hei-tan just took his view of Spinoza from Fichte; read him and you'll get it.

    It's to do with that fundamental cleft which divides Kant and Post-Kantian Idealism from Classical Philosophy: the nature of the relation of the finite to the infinite. In the classical world they're (in the Scholastic sense) Realists, with the Kantians being tacit Nominalists. (The 'tacit' being because an ontology that was uniformly nominalist for all objects all at once self contradicts: their Nominalism is a dog chasing its tail: effect seeking cause.)

    Spinoza's Substance is Realist whereas Fichte/Kant/Hei 's are all Nominalist. The Neo-Platonic bit is Plotinus' historical preemption of the Kantian solution to an infinite Nominalism: The One is an infinite series yet is Reified by The Word as one single entity. This is a proto-Kantian dialectic, as begun in Parmenides.

    Just ask and I'll try to answer.

  7. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    The israeli author/translator Stephen Mitchell has said that Spinoza is the peak of the israeli experience. The runner-up? Jesus.

  8. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Heideggerbros, help me:
    >Unlike the temporal “now,” understood as a point in time, the “instant” is not in time—it is not “temporal” in the ordinary sense. However, in Heidegger’s reading, the “instant” is not within time, but rather manifests the essence of the temporality of Being as such: “As to the exaiphnēs, we say it is time itself. Time is not eternity, but rather the instant [Augenblick].”53 And Heidegger sums up the third passage even more bluntly: “Being is metabolē [transition / overturning], metabolē is exaiphnēs [instant].”54
    What the hell is Heidegger talking about here? How can an instant be different from the now? When Heidegger talks about how the instant is the essence of the temporality of Being as such, is he referring to... the unity of the sequence of each and every instant, taken together as a whole, and every division of time that can be identified from that? Or is he talking about something like how Lenin once said there are decades in which nothing happens, and days in which decades happen?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Also, I'm reminded of a Straussian analysis of Aristotle's Physics, where he makes arguments about the nature of time, which boils down to:
      >time exists, but barely, since it is always coming to be and passing away
      Is that a similar project here, since Aristotle is also talking about the essence of temporality (and I suppose, the essence of the temporality of Being)?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      He’s trying to illustrate how the experience of time for Dasein isn’t like a point on a line but that it’s the medium of being’s unfolding instead. Time in the traditional sense of a point on a line moving forwards is merely an abstraction. No one experiences the flow of time like that. The prevailing understanding of what one has meant by time in western philosophy has been eternity, the whole of the timeline. That’s the result of centuries of abstraction and treating time as a concept and not an experience. He’s saying that the past and future don’t ontologically exist, only the present.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        Okay, I can buy that he's trying to get rid of eternity here (because it's like a self-fulfilling prophecy when misapplied to human beings). But how can we say that he's trying to deny the ontological existence of the past? What happened to thrownness? I was buying your explanation of Heidegger advocating for some kind of block universe, except that the future is built ecstatically moment by moment, but then you threw a curveball at me.

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          The past may not exist ontologically but it’s remnants do so long as they exist in one form or another in the present. Random legionnaire #2300 doesn’t exist but Caesar does by virtue of the fact that records survived for him. Even if every physical record of him were destroyed tomorrow he would still exist because he’s an integral part of Dasein’s understanding of the world by this point. I don’t really see an issue with thrownness either here either because that’s a factor of Dasein’s relationship to the present world to begin with. Rome or the Ottomans may not exist physically with us today but they do exist in the present in the sense that they are a constellation in the understanding of Dasein. If everyone forgot that Tom Cruise existed tomorrow then he would still physically exist and be ontologically real in that sense of course but determinations like “the main actor in Top Gun” wouldn’t. Rome and the Ottomans exist in the sense of that second category.

          [...]
          [...]
          [...]
          >According to Heidegger, the cost of an "authentic resolute" grasp of our ownmost possibility (our own finality, a phenomenological death) is retroactively destroying the hermeneutic constitution of time as the finite horizon of involvement in everyday things. The reality of an everyday time, acknowledged in our everyday involvements in the world, is here relinquished by virtue of the more originary time: a temporal river, flowing beneath our quotidian time engagements, and reached in the "rupture" (Krell, 1991, loc. 1171) of the Augenblick. For Heidegger, the moment's sole purpose is initiating the transcendence of everyday time into the supposed primordiality (a priori temporality) that infrastructures it.
          I can't tell if Heidegger emphasizes the whole unity of time, or merely the instant moment. Because it sounds like Heidegger is trying to have his cake (ekstasis) and eat it too (augenblick). Is he saying that only the instant is ontologically real, and that the ekstasis is a constructed unity or something that allows us to define ourselves or something?

          (2/2)

          Iirc the moment is a controversial part of Heidegger’s system and many have even considered that it just wasn’t finished yet. You may want to read some Levinas here as he takes issue with Heidegger on this point. (and many others too) You should try Totality and Infinity. As far as orthodoxy goes however I believe that the standard interpretation is that the moment is essentially the inaugural step into presence-at-hand. The recognition of death and the abstraction required to reach it act as the primary ekstasis from which reason is born. It’s not so much that Dasein jumps out of himself into the timeline to center his temporal present which is already centered. Dasein’s exstasis is never a full one: he is still reliant on time as a hermeneutic mechanism to make sense of time as an abstraction. I admit that the logic seems a little strange, you just have to understand that time as an abstraction is merely a foil for the development of reason. Yes, Dasein requires a sense of abstract temporality for authenticity. However, it is only insofar as time as a hermeneutic permits Dasein to *imagine* himself as he would be that the stepping back from the future is possible. What I mean to say is that the circularity of the argument is avoided once you realize that the abstract Dasein at the future pole is merely a mirage projected by the objective conditions that hermeneutic time opens up. For example, as a kid I wanted to be a pirate and measured myself by the action of future-pirate-me which obviously doesn’t actually exist.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >The past may not exist ontologically but it’s remnants do so long as they exist in one form or another in the present. Random legionnaire #2300 doesn’t exist but Caesar does by virtue of the fact that records survived for him. Even if every physical record of him were destroyed tomorrow he would still exist because he’s an integral part of Dasein’s understanding of the world by this point. I don’t really see an issue with thrownness either here either because that’s a factor of Dasein’s relationship to the present world to begin with. Rome or the Ottomans may not exist physically with us today but they do exist in the present in the sense that they are a constellation in the understanding of Dasein. If everyone forgot that Tom Cruise existed tomorrow then he would still physically exist and be ontologically real in that sense of course but determinations like “the main actor in Top Gun” wouldn’t. Rome and the Ottomans exist in the sense of that second category.
            This helps out enormously. I would like to say, at the cost of annoying Heideggerians everywhere, that only the "moments" are real and the unity of time as ekstasis (past present and future) exists only as an "ideal" (or perhaps less tortuously "phenomenological") construct. But then I would have to add that even as they exist side-by-side, they are not quite in harmony as they could be. I suppose that's the reason why Heidegger is emphatic about the difference between present nows and the augenblick. The present now is a sequence of dead units without something with care to bind it to something else, forwards and backwards in the sequence.
            >Dasein’s exstasis is never a full one: he is still reliant on time as a hermeneutic mechanism to make sense of time as an abstraction
            >that hermeneutic time opens up
            Could you say more about hermeneutic time? I've only seen hermeneutics referenced as part of a development or intensification of interpreting literature, so I'm a little bit uncertain as to what you are trying to get into here.
            And I guess, after that:
            >I admit that the logic seems a little strange
            Could you go into what you see as potentially circular in Heidegger's line of thinking?

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >Could you say more about hermeneutic time?
            Hermeneutics is a difficult thing to pin down in all of its variations. Roughly it’s a sort of user-end epistemology which concerns itself with interpretation. By user-end I mean that regular epistemology usually takes the subject’s recognition of all the messages from an object as a given and focuses on how the object originates in consciousness instead. Hermeneutics on the other hand takes the object as given and focuses on how the messages which can be interpreted from it differ. For example, a mathematical proof that proves wormholes exist. The epistemology would consist of questions like “how can we be sure the math is a true model of reality” “what if X theorem which the proof takes as presupposed is wrong” etc. The hermeneutics would consist of questions like “how does the effects of popular culture around wormholes color our understanding of the findings” “could our conception of the boundary between quantity and quality be effecting our understanding of the results” etc. So, by as far as I can reckon, what they mean by hermeneutic time is the world in which Dasein is born is already the given and the search for being within it is a matter of interpretation. Ontology, the quintessential art of man qua Heidegger, is a hermeneutic where progression is made by examining the everydayness (as Heidegger puts it, or inauthenticity if you like) of our lives in a kind of progressive overturning of bad ideas and misconceptions. However, unlike some in philosophy I believe that things can be read too far and I believe they were simply using the term as a convenient adjective to delineate between the two conceptions of time. I’m referencing the greentext here

            [...]
            [...]
            >Heidegger militates against the "ordinary" or "vulgar" conception of time as an eternal procession, a thing caught up in "dating", or "calendrical time-reckoning" (1927/2010, p. 412). He notes, for example, that "[time is not the] ... vulgar ... succession of constantly 'present' ['vorhanden'] nows that pass away and arrive at the same time" (p. 412). Instead, time for Heidegger is an expressly hermeneutic enterprise; that is, time's function is to mean for us. By resisting the entitative characterization of vulgar time as a physico-mathematical property, delineable into discrete and successive units, we instead consider time as a sense that conglomerates these units into a unified field of experience, that is, into temporality. Temporality is here explicitly thematic: Temporalität makes timeliness (Zeitlichkeit), an ontic determination of Dasein, appropriately ontological as "the condition of possibility for the understanding of being and of ontology as such" (1967/ 1998, p. 228). For Heidegger, time is thus not occurrent, but operant: it "temporalizes" (1925/1992, p. 410).
            --
            >Enter the Augenblick. In Heidegger's futurally-oriented temporal schema, the Augenblick is the ek-stasis (εκστασις, "to stand outside oneself') in which we step outside of ourselves as hermeneutically-constituted by the finite, lived-in world of everyday things and render ourselves visible - here Heidegger's perceptual metaphor derives from Kierkegaard's moment-of-insight - on time's (now) infinitely transcendental horizon.
            >"In resoluteness," Heidegger says, the present is not only brought back from its dispersion in what is taken care of closest at hand, but is held in the future and having-been. We call the present that is held in authentic temporality, and is thus authentic, the Moment [Augenblick]." (1927/2010, p. 338)
            >Notice the operative term: "brought back." Where was the present? Bound up in the finite sense of meaning as taking care of everyday things, that is, "ensnared in our everydayness" (Krell, 2015, loc. 570-571). Where is it brought to? The transcendental a priori temporality of the future.
            --
            (1/2)

            by the way.
            >Could you go into what you see as potentially circular in Heidegger's line of thinking?
            That hermeneutic time begets abstract time which begets ontology which was already implicit in hermeneutic time to begin with. I believed that’s what you were getting at with your “have his cake and eat it too” comment no?

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >The epistemology would consist of questions like “how can we be sure the math is a true model of reality” “what if X theorem which the proof takes as presupposed is wrong” etc. The hermeneutics would consist of questions like “how does the effects of popular culture around wormholes color our understanding of the findings” “could our conception of the boundary between quantity and quality be effecting our understanding of the results”
            I'm still having a hard time of understanding the gravitas behind hermeneutics. Maybe I just don't like your examples lol. The only way I can wrap my head around it is if hermeneutics is the investigation of whether our "culture" has implanted in us a false criteria, false goals, etc., by which we use to pursue our research and judge our findings. I'll try to test my understanding for you by giving an example of hermeneutics on myself: has reading Scholastic literature affected my understanding of knowledge, since I'm constantly looking for anything that confirms the like = like model instead of investigating what knowledge is on its own terms? Have I been chasing ghosts this whole time? Hopefully that works.
            >That hermeneutic time begets abstract time which begets ontology which was already implicit in hermeneutic time to begin with. I believed that’s what you were getting at with your “have his cake and eat it too” comment no?
            Uhmmm... I'm not sure. I'll repost my quote for clarity.
            >I can't tell if Heidegger emphasizes the whole unity of time, or merely the instant moment. Because it sounds like Heidegger is trying to have his cake (ekstasis) and eat it too (augenblick). Is he saying that only the instant is ontologically real, and that the ekstasis is a constructed unity or something that allows us to define ourselves or something?
            I suppose it's only circular if ontology is spontaneously created. Idk. I'm having trouble understanding what you're seeing in my statement because I was only operating at the lens of analyzing ontology, at least as far as I'm aware.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Also, I'm reminded of a Straussian analysis of Aristotle's Physics, where he makes arguments about the nature of time, which boils down to:
      >time exists, but barely, since it is always coming to be and passing away
      Is that a similar project here, since Aristotle is also talking about the essence of temporality (and I suppose, the essence of the temporality of Being)?

      He’s trying to illustrate how the experience of time for Dasein isn’t like a point on a line but that it’s the medium of being’s unfolding instead. Time in the traditional sense of a point on a line moving forwards is merely an abstraction. No one experiences the flow of time like that. The prevailing understanding of what one has meant by time in western philosophy has been eternity, the whole of the timeline. That’s the result of centuries of abstraction and treating time as a concept and not an experience. He’s saying that the past and future don’t ontologically exist, only the present.

      >Heidegger militates against the "ordinary" or "vulgar" conception of time as an eternal procession, a thing caught up in "dating", or "calendrical time-reckoning" (1927/2010, p. 412). He notes, for example, that "[time is not the] ... vulgar ... succession of constantly 'present' ['vorhanden'] nows that pass away and arrive at the same time" (p. 412). Instead, time for Heidegger is an expressly hermeneutic enterprise; that is, time's function is to mean for us. By resisting the entitative characterization of vulgar time as a physico-mathematical property, delineable into discrete and successive units, we instead consider time as a sense that conglomerates these units into a unified field of experience, that is, into temporality. Temporality is here explicitly thematic: Temporalität makes timeliness (Zeitlichkeit), an ontic determination of Dasein, appropriately ontological as "the condition of possibility for the understanding of being and of ontology as such" (1967/ 1998, p. 228). For Heidegger, time is thus not occurrent, but operant: it "temporalizes" (1925/1992, p. 410).
      --
      >Enter the Augenblick. In Heidegger's futurally-oriented temporal schema, the Augenblick is the ek-stasis (εκστασις, "to stand outside oneself') in which we step outside of ourselves as hermeneutically-constituted by the finite, lived-in world of everyday things and render ourselves visible - here Heidegger's perceptual metaphor derives from Kierkegaard's moment-of-insight - on time's (now) infinitely transcendental horizon.
      >"In resoluteness," Heidegger says, the present is not only brought back from its dispersion in what is taken care of closest at hand, but is held in the future and having-been. We call the present that is held in authentic temporality, and is thus authentic, the Moment [Augenblick]." (1927/2010, p. 338)
      >Notice the operative term: "brought back." Where was the present? Bound up in the finite sense of meaning as taking care of everyday things, that is, "ensnared in our everydayness" (Krell, 2015, loc. 570-571). Where is it brought to? The transcendental a priori temporality of the future.
      --
      (1/2)

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        [...]
        [...]
        [...]
        >According to Heidegger, the cost of an "authentic resolute" grasp of our ownmost possibility (our own finality, a phenomenological death) is retroactively destroying the hermeneutic constitution of time as the finite horizon of involvement in everyday things. The reality of an everyday time, acknowledged in our everyday involvements in the world, is here relinquished by virtue of the more originary time: a temporal river, flowing beneath our quotidian time engagements, and reached in the "rupture" (Krell, 1991, loc. 1171) of the Augenblick. For Heidegger, the moment's sole purpose is initiating the transcendence of everyday time into the supposed primordiality (a priori temporality) that infrastructures it.
        I can't tell if Heidegger emphasizes the whole unity of time, or merely the instant moment. Because it sounds like Heidegger is trying to have his cake (ekstasis) and eat it too (augenblick). Is he saying that only the instant is ontologically real, and that the ekstasis is a constructed unity or something that allows us to define ourselves or something?

        (2/2)

        Think of it as the simple Given and Being. Being is parasitical of the simply Given: when we 'are' (we can't use 'experience', remember) the Given, that is all there is. But we are myopic: having had the Given we remember the existence of Being, and that this was what enabled the Given to be given as we have it.
        The Given exists purely in itself, but then is reminded from without, by Being (which is equally out and in: this is the Hegelian side of Hei), of the fact that the Given not unconditioned, but is constructed by Being.

        The Given is a whole, unitary and unchanging picture; at least until reminded of Being. In this state, temporal instants are stretched to an arbitrary length, as predefined by the Being which conditioned it. E.g., a fly's Given, as an instant, which exhausts the whole of the Given's content, would be a lot 'shorter' than a human's, though we can't quantify these, as such instants aren't commensurate. Remember: the Given IS the instant; there is no transformation process or anything. If we imagined cutting the Given in half, we would cut the instant in half, too. There is no epistemological time in which it is given, and then an instant in it: the Given is just given as it is with the instant in it, as if we'd stumbled across it without seeking it.

        Or in other words: the Given and Being have qualitatively separate times. These interact dualistically, never fully mixing, as in Aristotle. Their mediator is Being, which, as in Hegel, combines two contradictory poles. Their harmony has the myopic unity as its centre and cause.The confusion arises because we can't fully meld the one into the other to measure it; we have to keep them apart, though remembering, in action, they work solely in tandem.

        Do ask if there's anything you're unclear on.

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          This is embarrassing but I genuinely don't recall anything called "the Given" from when I studied Being and Time. And I don't think it's a question of translation of terms but rather a blind spot from when I took the class and what I've been interested in since. I want to ask something like
          >Is the Given like a subset of Being?
          But then you describe Being as being parasitical of the Given, and that throws me off completely. I also see you using the Given in a way that makes it seem like it falls under presence, e.g. when you describe it as having "a whole, unitary, and unchanging picture." I also find it difficult to map your explanation on to the original framework that I had here:

          [...]
          [...]
          [...]
          >According to Heidegger, the cost of an "authentic resolute" grasp of our ownmost possibility (our own finality, a phenomenological death) is retroactively destroying the hermeneutic constitution of time as the finite horizon of involvement in everyday things. The reality of an everyday time, acknowledged in our everyday involvements in the world, is here relinquished by virtue of the more originary time: a temporal river, flowing beneath our quotidian time engagements, and reached in the "rupture" (Krell, 1991, loc. 1171) of the Augenblick. For Heidegger, the moment's sole purpose is initiating the transcendence of everyday time into the supposed primordiality (a priori temporality) that infrastructures it.
          I can't tell if Heidegger emphasizes the whole unity of time, or merely the instant moment. Because it sounds like Heidegger is trying to have his cake (ekstasis) and eat it too (augenblick). Is he saying that only the instant is ontologically real, and that the ekstasis is a constructed unity or something that allows us to define ourselves or something?

          (2/2)

          >Because it sounds like Heidegger is trying to have his cake (ekstasis) and eat it too (augenblick).

          I have a few more questions, too.
          1) How does the Given relate to the moment (augenblick)?
          2) How does the Given mix with Being in Aristotle? (I know more about Aristotle's conception of time, so this would be helpful for me).
          3) What do you mean by "their mediator is Being"? The two contradictory poles of Given and Being are mediated by Being? I think I'm missing something here.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            The Given is just the ultimate datum. It is Logos, i.e., the most ultimate explanation possible for a thing. In classical philosophy, the Given is contrasted to the essence. As in, here, the Given is just the appearance of the Thing, which is in truth an essence, and we must go behind the Given to get to the truth.

            The Given is basically an idea of phenomenology. I won't get into this. Suffice it to say the thread goes: Kant > Hegel and Schelling > Husserl, both terminating in Hei.
            Stop. Go look out the window/eat something (I just had a lovely apple) whilst not thinking about this thread. Now mentally cast an eye over what you did. Any collective batch which you make of that sequence of events can be turned into a whole. (This is like what Bergson said of maths: 1, 2, 3. Is this a sequence, or the stating of the number 6? It's impossible to say without context.) That whole is a Heideggerian Instant, merely by thinking of it as such.
            The idea is about imposing subjective Teleologies onto an empty canvass. You have to understand Aristotle a bit. The imposed Teleology is the 'batching' we do when we think of our past, or our Being determines what we are given in the 'present' ('present' is a reflective concept, and isn't applicable). We impose an extraneous Reason/Why/Logos onto something that is ontologically different from it. This is the blank canvass. And that is the Given, what we 'experience' unreflectedly.
            So, again: the blank canvass is the Given we experience. This is blank, because there is no cause or why implicit in it. It just is. But a thing can't just Be. It has to have a reason, otherwise it wouldn't exist. For if it truly had no reason at all, we couldn't interact with it at all. So it does have a reason, it's only latent or hidden in it, and needs to be brought out.
            This reason is formed by our Being before the canvass is even made, with that making merely being forgotten for a time as the Given is experience wholly as it is. Being then remembers that it is, and that it made the canvass that we thought blank. This is the 'Reason' through which we interact with the unconditioned, that which lacks a Reason itself.
            So again: the canvass appears blank at first, but then we remember we made it, and this is the medium through which we then interact with it further. The key is to remember that the canvass occupies these two separate positions alternatively.

            'Parasitical' might have confused you: a parasite is unnecessary. This parasite is necessary to the whole. The reason I used the word is to convey that it isn't necessary when we consider the Given alone. Then it it just the Given, and there can't be anything more than that.

            Questions.
            The Given is the moment, or Instant, as I've said it. The confusion is, as said, what is quantitative. An instant is usually meant in measurable time. It is the measure. In Hei, the measure is the primordial Instant, which is determined by Being.
            Cont:

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            : a fly's Instant is shorter than a man's. This is because their reactions/lives are shorter. Let's say their Instant is like 0.25 seconds. Man's might be like 1, factoring in a bit of thought. These quantities are the primordial ones that measure out all subsequent time. So when we talk of time it's fly-time, or human-time. This is weird, as we'd think it'd be the same time. For instance, 4 fly-instants = 1 human-instant. But this doesn't work, as these times, though 'objectively' the same in scientific fact (we must forget this) are constructed through different primordial times, which aren't quantifiable, or commensurable. They just are products of the fly/human 's Being.
            So, an Instant is just what it is felt to be. It'l like if the base10 which defines modern maths varied depending on how we felt, going down to base8 or lower when we felts sad, and base12 when happy. The measuring stick with which we quantify time. the Instant, changes depending on the state of our Being, and our Being is time. This is a Hegelian dialectic, as it's an infinite regress.

            Aristotle is different. For him time is infinitely divisible, and the only divisors that exist are mortal men doomed to die. i.e. infinitely is only partially actualisable by actual entities, Beings. In Aris the Instant is quite separate, as it is a fact of the objective world, not of a Being, and hence isn't conditioned by it. In scholastic philosophy, the world-Instant IS God's, he makes it. This goes quite a bit deeper, but isn't important here. The tldr is that for finite creatures the instant has a set time, but for God it's infinite. The limitation in the finitude, then, it what causes time to pass. The instant straddles times, as it is finite, and traverses in accord with its maker, Being.

            >The two contradictory poles of Given and Being are mediated by Being
            Exactly. Being occupies two places in the syllogism. This is Hegelian. It occupies each place in a different logical moment, wherein it fulfills a different role.
            You have to get an intuitive feel for it. Imagine a 2d plane. Given is lying flat on the floor. This is absolute stasis. It can't alter itself at all. Being, that is, the first 'being', the parasite, then remembers itself and comes down from above and merges with the Given. It is drawn to the Given, the blank canvass, because it remembers that the Given was made by the second being. This is still itself, just in a different way. So when we say it's drawn to the Given, it's drawn to itself within it. In doing this both are altered.
            So: the Given is unalterable, but can be altered when the Being (the first) from above remembers that the Given is made by being (the second), and hence it knows how to interact with it.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Thank you, a lot has been made clear, but I have more questions!
            >The Given is just the ultimate datum. It is Logos, i.e., the most ultimate explanation possible for a thing.
            As in, particular things? Everything? Or something more general and vague than that?
            >'Parasitical' might have confused you: a parasite is unnecessary. This parasite is necessary to the whole. The reason I used the word is to convey that it isn't necessary when we consider the Given alone. Then it it just the Given, and there can't be anything more than that.
            That helps enormously. I get the sense that the Given represents Dasein's ability to tie "unities" into everything it sees. And if the Given and the moment are connected at the hip, then it raises interesting questions for what time is. The moment is indivisible, but it's not the infinitesimal "eye look" (at least, not in the quantitative dimension that we experience in every waking moment). It's the "eye look" that informs care.

            However, earlier you say something about the Given being capable of being "stretched", but later you speak of a more... persistent "human-instant" or "human-time" measure... like a refresh rate I guess. Are you referring to human-time as like a conscious refresh rate, something quantitative? Or is it something back in the qualitative dimension but can also change due to mood (hence the stretching of the unities that we call the Given)? And is there something we can say about the motion of how it all changes?

            >The idea is about imposing subjective Teleologies onto an empty canvass. You have to understand Aristotle a bit. The imposed Teleology is the 'batching' we do when we think of our past, or our Being determines what we are given in the 'present' ('present' is a reflective concept, and isn't applicable). We impose an extraneous Reason/Why/Logos onto something that is ontologically different from it. This is the blank canvass. And that is the Given, what we 'experience' unreflectedly.
            Could you say more about teleology and the empty canvass? I suppose Heidegger departs radically from Aristotle, in that there is no "mean" to look out for, or some unmoved mover to mimic, but rather an entire canvass in which countless possibilities can be pursued, and none prioritized over the other.
            >Go look out the window/eat something (I just had a lovely apple) whilst not thinking about this thread. Now mentally cast an eye over what you did. Any collective batch which you make of that sequence of events can be turned into a whole. (This is like what Bergson said of maths: 1, 2, 3. Is this a sequence, or the stating of the number 6? It's impossible to say without context.)
            I feel like Aristotle would have a lot of negative things to say about Heidegger's Givens then, considering that this kind of thinking would resemble what he criticized in the Pythagoreans, who "saw" number everywhere. Also, do you think that Heidegger criticized Bergson's conception of time unfairly?

            (1/2)

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            The (Italics) Given, as in, THAT particular Given, though concepts like particularity don't enter into it. It just is. It transcends all explanation. Do you remember being born? What was the first thing you experienced? That. It's just what is given to us. We can't explain why. This is the unconditioned. In traditional metaphysics this is the ultimate explanation, usually God, and hence we can just say there's One. Here, though, there are lots. These are the Givens/ blank canvasses. It's just when we are 'before' and one, we can't remember that there are others; it alone is.

            The Given already has a unity implicit in it: this is preprogrammed in by the second being antecedently. This is then revealed by the first Being. This Given can't be quantified at all. Quantification is the (for Hei) erroneous later one, performed by the first Being on the Given which is programmed by the second being. This programming is done unconsciously, and is analogous to Kant's alternating dialectic. You can't understand it if you don't grok that.

            Again, I'm speaking externally to the Hei-logic when I use words like 'stretch'. There is, for Hei, only one thing, the Instant, and that can't be stretched. 'Stretch', as in, the way we usually think.
            Basically just think of empirical time as infinite and flowing. Each Being has a time. But each of these infinite times has to be started by a supra-time. This is the Aristotlean logic. That starter-time is primordial time of each Being, be it fly or man. We would think these are commensurable, but they're not. This has to do with Cantor's infinite series. Again, tldr, but the infinite amounts of empirical time vary depending on the initial primordial time. So the fly's infinity is different from man's infinity, even when they traverse the same mathematical quantities of time. This because each time sequence is a whole, and hence affects the whole of the sequence. Thus any difference in it renders the individual terms different.
            Hence the fly's (.25, .50, .75), 1
            Is different from the man's
            1.
            The bracketed terms change the 1, so even though it looks the same, it's different.

            Teleology:
            Aristotle says it's baked in from the start, Hei says we impose a Telos on a world lacking one. This leads to the situation just described. The 1, in the world, is just a 1, and thus should be the same, be it fly or man's. But men impose a different Telos on it, and hence the, objectively considered, 1, is different from the subjective one. This is impossible in Aris, as the two, empirical and teleological, coincide.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            There is just Being. That is ours. Again, it's epistemological. I'm moving between speaking it purely Heiish terms, and the objective ones we use to consider separate philosophies. For Hei, there is only one Being, us. When I speak of Beings, I mean how other things experience reality. The fly, the man, you. I only know my Being. Hence I can't really pretend to know anything of yours, yet I pretend to to try to explain it. beings exist only for A, one, Being.

            Second question:
            This is the dialectic. Being, ourselves, is myopic: it forgets part of itself. Close your eyes. Consider your hands. Imagine the right arm builds something which requires the left to do some action to complete it. The left arm doesn't know anything of the right; it is we, the brain, that knows it, and conveys what the lft needs to do to complete what the right started. Now imagine that we have to brains, or two hemispheres/minds, one we use when using our right arm, the other the left. There is no cross memory between them. This is the situation of the two Beings. They operate in tandem yet can't explain why, as there's no single link, no third or mediator that they can both point to and say 'we're doing what THAT tells us to'. They operate blindly.

            That's enough for now. Hope you get it a bit more. 🙂

            Thank you for the thorough explanation and for answering all my inane questions. I have to get going myself, but I'll check back later or look at it in the archive when I get the chance.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            : a fly's Instant is shorter than a man's. This is because their reactions/lives are shorter. Let's say their Instant is like 0.25 seconds. Man's might be like 1, factoring in a bit of thought. These quantities are the primordial ones that measure out all subsequent time. So when we talk of time it's fly-time, or human-time. This is weird, as we'd think it'd be the same time. For instance, 4 fly-instants = 1 human-instant. But this doesn't work, as these times, though 'objectively' the same in scientific fact (we must forget this) are constructed through different primordial times, which aren't quantifiable, or commensurable. They just are products of the fly/human 's Being.
            So, an Instant is just what it is felt to be. It'l like if the base10 which defines modern maths varied depending on how we felt, going down to base8 or lower when we felts sad, and base12 when happy. The measuring stick with which we quantify time. the Instant, changes depending on the state of our Being, and our Being is time. This is a Hegelian dialectic, as it's an infinite regress.

            Aristotle is different. For him time is infinitely divisible, and the only divisors that exist are mortal men doomed to die. i.e. infinitely is only partially actualisable by actual entities, Beings. In Aris the Instant is quite separate, as it is a fact of the objective world, not of a Being, and hence isn't conditioned by it. In scholastic philosophy, the world-Instant IS God's, he makes it. This goes quite a bit deeper, but isn't important here. The tldr is that for finite creatures the instant has a set time, but for God it's infinite. The limitation in the finitude, then, it what causes time to pass. The instant straddles times, as it is finite, and traverses in accord with its maker, Being.

            >The two contradictory poles of Given and Being are mediated by Being
            Exactly. Being occupies two places in the syllogism. This is Hegelian. It occupies each place in a different logical moment, wherein it fulfills a different role.
            You have to get an intuitive feel for it. Imagine a 2d plane. Given is lying flat on the floor. This is absolute stasis. It can't alter itself at all. Being, that is, the first 'being', the parasite, then remembers itself and comes down from above and merges with the Given. It is drawn to the Given, the blank canvass, because it remembers that the Given was made by the second being. This is still itself, just in a different way. So when we say it's drawn to the Given, it's drawn to itself within it. In doing this both are altered.
            So: the Given is unalterable, but can be altered when the Being (the first) from above remembers that the Given is made by being (the second), and hence it knows how to interact with it.

            Thank you, a lot has been made clear, but I have more questions!
            >The Given is just the ultimate datum. It is Logos, i.e., the most ultimate explanation possible for a thing.
            As in, particular things? Everything? Or something more general and vague than that?
            >'Parasitical' might have confused you: a parasite is unnecessary. This parasite is necessary to the whole. The reason I used the word is to convey that it isn't necessary when we consider the Given alone. Then it it just the Given, and there can't be anything more than that.
            That helps enormously. I get the sense that the Given represents Dasein's ability to tie "unities" into everything it sees. And if the Given and the moment are connected at the hip, then it raises interesting questions for what time is. The moment is indivisible, but it's not the infinitesimal "eye look" (at least, not in the quantitative dimension that we experience in every waking moment). It's the "eye look" that informs care.

            However, earlier you say something about the Given being capable of being "stretched", but later you speak of a more... persistent "human-instant" or "human-time" measure... like a refresh rate I guess. Are you referring to human-time as like a conscious refresh rate, something quantitative? Or is it something back in the qualitative dimension but can also change due to mood (hence the stretching of the unities that we call the Given)? And is there something we can say about the motion of how it all changes?

            >The idea is about imposing subjective Teleologies onto an empty canvass. You have to understand Aristotle a bit. The imposed Teleology is the 'batching' we do when we think of our past, or our Being determines what we are given in the 'present' ('present' is a reflective concept, and isn't applicable). We impose an extraneous Reason/Why/Logos onto something that is ontologically different from it. This is the blank canvass. And that is the Given, what we 'experience' unreflectedly.
            Could you say more about teleology and the empty canvass? I suppose Heidegger departs radically from Aristotle, in that there is no "mean" to look out for, or some unmoved mover to mimic, but rather an entire canvass in which countless possibilities can be pursued, and none prioritized over the other.
            >Go look out the window/eat something (I just had a lovely apple) whilst not thinking about this thread. Now mentally cast an eye over what you did. Any collective batch which you make of that sequence of events can be turned into a whole. (This is like what Bergson said of maths: 1, 2, 3. Is this a sequence, or the stating of the number 6? It's impossible to say without context.)
            I feel like Aristotle would have a lot of negative things to say about Heidegger's Givens then, considering that this kind of thinking would resemble what he criticized in the Pythagoreans, who "saw" number everywhere. Also, do you think that Heidegger criticized Bergson's conception of time unfairly?

            (1/2)

            >Aristotle is different. For him time is infinitely divisible, and the only divisors that exist are mortal men doomed to die. i.e. infinitely is only partially actualisable by actual entities, Beings. In Aris the Instant is quite separate, as it is a fact of the objective world, not of a Being, and hence isn't conditioned by it. In scholastic philosophy, the world-Instant IS God's, he makes it. This goes quite a bit deeper, but isn't important here. The tldr is that for finite creatures the instant has a set time, but for God it's infinite. The limitation in the finitude, then, it what causes time to pass. The instant straddles times, as it is finite, and traverses in accord with its maker, Being.
            To me, what seems to be the difference between Aristotle and Heidegger is Heidegger's willingness to merge the infinitesimal moments of Heidegger's time as we like to form a united moment or Given. And I guess both agree that the infinitesimal, dead moment is the only aspect of time qua time that exists, but only barely so because it is always created and then destroyed as quickly as it was created (and as an infinitesimally small now that is meaningless without something to unite it). Heidegger goes one step forward to say that our intentionality, for the lack of a better word, is capable of uniting more than the present for the horizon of meaning, for better or worse. And, to give them a fair treatment, Scholastics don't treat time as something that gets created or destroyed necessarily since God is what sustains and keeps track of everything.

            I'd like if you could say some final things about Being vs. Beings here, as we've had Beings playing around with the Given earlier, but now we just have Being who is the maker of time. Are there two kinds of time we should be keeping track of here?

            >You have to get an intuitive feel for it. Imagine a 2d plane. Given is lying flat on the floor. This is absolute stasis. It can't alter itself at all. Being, that is, the first 'being', the parasite, then remembers itself and comes down from above and merges with the Given. It is drawn to the Given, the blank canvass, because it remembers that the Given was made by the second being. This is still itself, just in a different way. So when we say it's drawn to the Given, it's drawn to itself within it. In doing this both are altered.
            Three questions here. First, why are we first speaking of Being then Beings? I'm confused here due to the ontological difference. Second, why is the first being remembering what the second being has done? I'm confused about the ordinal labeling and thus the order of causality. Third, is the Given like a Platonic form that can be "fixed" and then "unfixed" at will?

            (2/2)

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            There is just Being. That is ours. Again, it's epistemological. I'm moving between speaking it purely Heiish terms, and the objective ones we use to consider separate philosophies. For Hei, there is only one Being, us. When I speak of Beings, I mean how other things experience reality. The fly, the man, you. I only know my Being. Hence I can't really pretend to know anything of yours, yet I pretend to to try to explain it. beings exist only for A, one, Being.

            Second question:
            This is the dialectic. Being, ourselves, is myopic: it forgets part of itself. Close your eyes. Consider your hands. Imagine the right arm builds something which requires the left to do some action to complete it. The left arm doesn't know anything of the right; it is we, the brain, that knows it, and conveys what the lft needs to do to complete what the right started. Now imagine that we have to brains, or two hemispheres/minds, one we use when using our right arm, the other the left. There is no cross memory between them. This is the situation of the two Beings. They operate in tandem yet can't explain why, as there's no single link, no third or mediator that they can both point to and say 'we're doing what THAT tells us to'. They operate blindly.

            That's enough for now. Hope you get it a bit more. 🙂

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Also, I'm reminded of a Straussian analysis of Aristotle's Physics, where he makes arguments about the nature of time, which boils down to:
      >time exists, but barely, since it is always coming to be and passing away
      Is that a similar project here, since Aristotle is also talking about the essence of temporality (and I suppose, the essence of the temporality of Being)?

      He’s trying to illustrate how the experience of time for Dasein isn’t like a point on a line but that it’s the medium of being’s unfolding instead. Time in the traditional sense of a point on a line moving forwards is merely an abstraction. No one experiences the flow of time like that. The prevailing understanding of what one has meant by time in western philosophy has been eternity, the whole of the timeline. That’s the result of centuries of abstraction and treating time as a concept and not an experience. He’s saying that the past and future don’t ontologically exist, only the present.

      [...]
      [...]
      >Heidegger militates against the "ordinary" or "vulgar" conception of time as an eternal procession, a thing caught up in "dating", or "calendrical time-reckoning" (1927/2010, p. 412). He notes, for example, that "[time is not the] ... vulgar ... succession of constantly 'present' ['vorhanden'] nows that pass away and arrive at the same time" (p. 412). Instead, time for Heidegger is an expressly hermeneutic enterprise; that is, time's function is to mean for us. By resisting the entitative characterization of vulgar time as a physico-mathematical property, delineable into discrete and successive units, we instead consider time as a sense that conglomerates these units into a unified field of experience, that is, into temporality. Temporality is here explicitly thematic: Temporalität makes timeliness (Zeitlichkeit), an ontic determination of Dasein, appropriately ontological as "the condition of possibility for the understanding of being and of ontology as such" (1967/ 1998, p. 228). For Heidegger, time is thus not occurrent, but operant: it "temporalizes" (1925/1992, p. 410).
      --
      >Enter the Augenblick. In Heidegger's futurally-oriented temporal schema, the Augenblick is the ek-stasis (εκστασις, "to stand outside oneself') in which we step outside of ourselves as hermeneutically-constituted by the finite, lived-in world of everyday things and render ourselves visible - here Heidegger's perceptual metaphor derives from Kierkegaard's moment-of-insight - on time's (now) infinitely transcendental horizon.
      >"In resoluteness," Heidegger says, the present is not only brought back from its dispersion in what is taken care of closest at hand, but is held in the future and having-been. We call the present that is held in authentic temporality, and is thus authentic, the Moment [Augenblick]." (1927/2010, p. 338)
      >Notice the operative term: "brought back." Where was the present? Bound up in the finite sense of meaning as taking care of everyday things, that is, "ensnared in our everydayness" (Krell, 2015, loc. 570-571). Where is it brought to? The transcendental a priori temporality of the future.
      --
      (1/2)

      >According to Heidegger, the cost of an "authentic resolute" grasp of our ownmost possibility (our own finality, a phenomenological death) is retroactively destroying the hermeneutic constitution of time as the finite horizon of involvement in everyday things. The reality of an everyday time, acknowledged in our everyday involvements in the world, is here relinquished by virtue of the more originary time: a temporal river, flowing beneath our quotidian time engagements, and reached in the "rupture" (Krell, 1991, loc. 1171) of the Augenblick. For Heidegger, the moment's sole purpose is initiating the transcendence of everyday time into the supposed primordiality (a priori temporality) that infrastructures it.
      I can't tell if Heidegger emphasizes the whole unity of time, or merely the instant moment. Because it sounds like Heidegger is trying to have his cake (ekstasis) and eat it too (augenblick). Is he saying that only the instant is ontologically real, and that the ekstasis is a constructed unity or something that allows us to define ourselves or something?

      (2/2)

  9. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >Spinoza
    >Bergson
    Does it really have to be said?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Based. Also look up what Levinas thought of Heidegger to see what's really going on here.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        What? That he respected the man and his work enough to build his own philosophy out of it? No one here with two brain cells to rub against each other takes you people seriously anymore. Go haunt one of the million pol threads currently active on this board ffs.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        why not just say it?

  10. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    last gump

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