Well, what did he think about them?
>This is why Heidegger was so keen on the method for his phenomenology [ref. ¶ 7, page 56]. Heidegger argues that the comparative methods of judging actually obscures the truth, because it is a placing of something in front of something else. Therefore in order to discover the truth, one must apprehending the being of an entity in and for itself.
>The term "apophantic" first appeared in the works of Aristotle. The concept appears in the Arabic Aristotelian tradition as jâzim.[1] In phenomenology,[2] Edmund Husserl considered apophantic judgment central to his 'transcendental logic'[3] but his student Martin Heidegger argued later that apophantic judgements are the least reliable means of obtaining truth because they are cut from the original interpretive framework of relations to the subject.
The first quote makes it sounds like he prefers apophantic statements over others (and comparative statements sound like the mechanism by which aletheia, the concealment and unconcealment of Being, functions). The second quote makes it sounds like it's part of the problem of presencing he is constantly talking about. Personally, it sounds like Heidegger would have preferred apophantic statements the least because of what that second quote points out. But we still have this weird apophantic (declarative?) vs. comparative clash.
What other kinds of judgments are there, anyway? Apophantic and comparative? That's it?
Does nobody have serious conversations about Heidegger here anymore?!?!
dude just plagiarised zen
Nobody gives a shit about your fortune cookie philosophy
>but his student Martin Heidegger argued later
there is your hint
>there is your hint
You forgot to read the first quote:
>This is why Heidegger was so keen on the method for his phenomenology
>Heidegger argues that the comparative methods of judging actually obscures the truth, because it is a placing of something in front of something else.
The fact that comparative judgments (as opposed to apophantic judgments) "place something in front of something else" is uncanny in its resemblance to truth as aletheia.
Since you didn't give any info on the quotes I assumed that the former was an early take and the latter a late take of heidegger
Actually both were supposedly referencing Being and Time. You can find the former easily by opening up your B&T Macquarrie copy to p. 56. The latter made the most sense, given the thrust of Heidegger's work, but the former threw me for a loop. I was wondering how often people engage with "apophantic" statements with Heidegger's work. I see it as related to Heidegger's work on Aristotle's categories, his hermeneutic method, his theory on truth, and later his Kantbuch.
I just refuse to let a Heidegger thread slide on IQfy before getting at least one good answer. Call me spoiled if you want, but goddamn I'm disappointed.
Anon, Heidegger is the single hardest philosopher to approach, at least of the ones who have something to say and aren't just complete schizos publishing their literary meltdowns. He's not really someone you can drop a very specific question about and expect lots of answers.
I'm hugely fond of his work but even I don't have anything to say about this.
First of all, these are secondary sources and they are unclear in reference to points in highBlack person's life. He could have very much changed his opinion over time.
Secondly, these statements aren't contradictory. Heidegger's whole shtick is reworking subjectivity away from cartesian object/subjext distinctions.
So, "Being" is a general mega catchall category that everything participates in. Everything exists. However, a human being is a special kind of being, that has access to its own being. You are, but you know that you are. From this, you are able to abstract away yourself, and understand the bigger fact of Being as a general category. However, it's not so easy to understand that category. You have instead many intermediary steps where you understand others, and objects around you. You get sucked into l these intermediate steps and develop systems of truth around them. This causes you to forget your access to your own being.
So to answer your question, the truth being obscured in the first quote is the perception and fact about Being in general and your own being. In the second quote, he notes how perception of this fact cuts you off from the world of truth relations youve built up.
Kinda unrelated but I think analogia entis deals with how to understand apophaticism
>analogia entis
huh?
qrd?
Medievals solved everything
How
why could we not recognize that
Childish protestant rebellion against ancient and medievals
Protties loved to look back to the ancients. and what was stopping everybody from taking the thought and stripping the Catholic shit from it?
these are all just from the Wikipedia page, right? looking at the source with Husserl, it takes one to a page that seems to indicate the opposite—that Heidegger approved of the apophantic method. i don’t know where that Husserl party is coming from.
Reading the talk page of the apophantic article has a big brain take:
> It suggests here that Heidegger considers aphophantic statements to be something good/desirable (best way to get to 'truth') but Heidegger was very cricial about such statements because they actually cover up a much more basic way of making statements that lead to an understanding of the world, which are grounded in circumspective understanding through skilled action (working with hammers in the workshop and so on). What is said here is not wrong - apophantic statements get you to 'truth' but 'truth' itself does not get you to the most basic way of being, you already need to understand in that more basic way in order to make a truth-statement in the first place. So Heidegger posits apophantic statements as something uncritical that needs to be set aside in order to first analyse the kind of stuff that comes before language starts to 'declare' things in a proposition that can be true or false. That primordial kind of 'statement' (understanding something as something in dealing with it) he calls Ermeneia (Hermeneutics, existential-hermeneutic). (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, page 158).
Ermenia (hermeneutics, from that cited source page):
>Heidegger asserts that a phenomena can be grasped in and for themselves in immediate perception. The function of language (logos) is to reveal what phenomena show. However language has a different Being from the phenomena it describes, so the danger is that language will only a 'appear' to tell us what the phenomena is. In other words, the inherent danger of describing phenomena in language is that the Being of language (because it is different from the Being of phenomena) can effectively a cover up the being of phenomena.
Therefore, in order to sort out the covering up of language from the truth of language, we need a method of interrogating language which is both systematic and reflexive enough to hopefully alert us to any potential covering ups. This method is what Heidegger calls, "hermeneutics," or the business of interpretation. As Heidegger asserts - our investigation will show that the meaning of phenomenological description, as a method, lies in interpretation. It is therefore through hermeneutics, as a systematising approach to interpreting, that the authentic meaning of Being can be articulated. Language, in the form of words (logos), when it represents the phenomenology of Dasein, always has the character of hermeneutics. [ref. ¶7, page 61 - 62]
Thank you anon for the thorough explanation. My main takeaways are:
>1) Things in their Being are generally ineffable to some extent, which causes problems for the goal of the apophantic.
>2) Apophantic statements either participate in an action of "placing in front of" which obscures Being, or they only describe something to be "true" in a facile and irrelevant way.
>3) To pay homage to the ancient question of Being = Thought... Being =/= Language.
>4) There is an interplay between appearances and phenomena, revealing and showing, etc., that is mentioned here.
I asked a question on IQfy about 4) a couple months about, about seeming and semblances, and the more I think about it, the more I think Heidegger has a "phenomena behind the phenomena" interpretation of causality and truth. Things can appear without showing their Being, or they can appear in a way that deceives others to their Being. And there is a certain desire to not get lost in the semblances, too.
Unfortunately, the existence of semblance leads me to believe that Heidegger still had some difficult to understand, non-Heideggerian even, theory of truth. Even if truth is only known as truth of appearances, and if truth of appearances is known through systematically comparing existential relations with everything else, it still appears as if Heidegger has accidentally smuggled noumenon back into the world thanks to the problem of semblance. Furthermore, he made it part of his mission to dispel semblances from the world, like the good little metaphysician of presence that all Neo-Kantians strove to be.
You’re welcome. I don’t know about any of that stuff, I’m no expert in philosophy/Heidegger. this thread interested me because i always took H’s saying that, “language is the dwelling of the essence of being” pretty literally and would investigate a word’s etymology to get to its essence; i would compare synonyms and antonyms to get more of an understanding. I took it all a bit too literally, i think. Still, the comparative method has been useful to me.
I’ll have to read and think on all this more, but i get the impression H isgetting at simmering like Husserl’s bracketing/epoche. But again, I’m probably wrong i don’t know enough about this sort of stuff.
bump. Where my Heidegger experts at? I know you folx are here somewhere.