I got filtered
What point was Plato trying to make with this?
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I got filtered. What point was Plato trying to make with this?
I got filtered
What point was Plato trying to make with this?
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The eternal can't contradict but the "gods" fight, i.e. have contradictory goals and actions so they're not eternal and also there is then only one God.
Cope. He was showing that objective morality can't come from God. It has nothing to do with polytheism vs monotheism. Christianity is polytheistic anyways.
>He was showing that objective morality can't come from God
All he did was show that objective morality can't come from the capricious will of something which changes. Basically whatever is holy is already holy to begin with, including God's will. Therefore any thing that is good or holy has to already partake of the divine in some way, otherwise it wouldn't be that way.
>All he did was show that objective morality can't come from the capricious will of something which changes
God changes his mind in the Bible. And again that is not what Euthyphro is about. It's about whether God is the foundation for morality or whether he is justified by something outside himself. Either option is bad for the the theist since you can just as easily arbitrarily call anything the foundation for morality or if God is relying on something outside himself for moral authority he is only moral to the extent that he follows that outside power. The polytheism thing is something desperate christcucks came up with to shift attention away from the devastating attack Socrates made on objective morality coming from God. Hume was just kicking a dead horse with is/ought.
>It's about whether God is the foundation for morality or whether he is justified by something outside himself.
No, you completely misintepreted it. It's discussing what God actually is if anything.
>Either option is bad for the the theist since you can just as easily arbitrarily call anything the foundation for morality
That's still wrong, and Plato says nothing at all like this in the dialogue. You can't "easily call anything the foundation for morality", the only thing that can be the foundation for morality is the Good itself, which is divine in its essence. Anything else would be irrelevant to morality and therefore you could not say that it is the foundation of morality.
> The polytheism thing is something desperate christcucks came up with
No, Plato's refutation in the dialogue is only of the polytheistic gods interpreted literally from Homer, not a refutation of polytheism in itself. But the refutation is there, because it would be absurd to interpret those poems literally.
>Hume was just kicking a dead horse with is/ought.
No, he was kicking an invisible horse which didn't exist, or at best a straw man.
>You can't "easily call anything the foundation for morality", the only thing that can be the foundation for morality is the Good itself, which is divine in its essence
And since what you call Good as a foundation can't be justified by anything else your choice of Good is arbitrary. That's the way this works. If you call God the Good I can just as easily call liberalism the Good. Neither one of us have any justification since we are taking it as foundational. Arbitrary means without justification.
>You can't "easily call anything the foundation for morality", the only thing that can be the foundation for morality is the Good itself, which is divine in its essence. Anything else would be irrelevant to morality and therefore you could not say that it is the foundation of morality.
You are correct here. Everything else you have said itt is incorrect. To Plato, the good is an unchanging form without consciousness. The Christians try to reconcile this dialogue with their god but that is incorrect.
>To Plato, the good is an unchanging form without consciousness.
Operative phrase being "to Plato". His choice of Good is arbitrary
Oh, okay. Then your entire discussion with that other guy is entirely baseless because he (and I from what I was resding) was working on the assumption that you were arguing at what Socrates was trying to get at in the dialogue.
I'm quite happy that you use a trip when you share your moronic opinion on Plato, instead of thinking that many people got filtered and getting angry i'm just like "Oh that's that moron again"
>The eternal can't contradict but the "gods" fight, i.e. have contradictory goals and actions so they're not eternal and also there is then only one God.
Plato didn’t believe in one god as the first post said so right off the bat that first post is wrong. The dialogue refutes all divine command theory.
Yes and now he’s trying to say we don’t know Plato when he just said Plato was wrong and arbitrary so I dunno. He is more of a protean argument shapeshifter than Socrates was.
>Yes and now he’s trying to say we don’t know Plato when he just said Plato was wrong and arbitrary so I dunno.
I'm the one saying Plato was wrong. He is the one claiming Euthyphro was about polytheism vs monotheism.
Oh, okay. It is hard to follow this without ids or something. Socrates explicitly says something “even on things which all the Gods agree on, their agreement is not justification for moral basis.”
Anon was arguing that Socrates was saying there is only one God.
. That is definitely not what he was saying and is a Bible thumper myth made much later.
Well you can carry... uhhh and uh be carried. Something like that. Aw geez dude it looks I got filtered too.
Holy shit Plato is fricking moronic
That the one that should know the most about piety don't know shit?
Also the response of
[13e]
>Socrates
>Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.
>Euthyphro
>And what I say is true, Socrates.
>Socrates
>Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me, what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?
>Euthyphro
>They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.
>Socrates
You might, if you wished, Euthyphro, have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me.
>[14c] For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?
>if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness.
It is answered in Socrates Apology
He wanted to know what holiness itself was and it lead euthyphro into a circle. Ion was much better imo, " so inspiration is a kind of insanity? Of course, Socrates, would you question the esoteric symbolism in my dreams?"
There are plausibly several points.
- By placing this conversation in dramatic vicinity to Socrates' trial, the dialogue highlights the relationship between piety and the city; the city claims to know what piety is, such that it can exercise the power to punish for straying, even if the precise standard for recognizing impiety is the imprecise "I know it when I see it." And this points to the relationship between philosophy and the city, where, if philosophy must at least begin with examining opinions about thing, regardless of the conclusion (whether affirming or otherwise the existence of the gods), it will risk looking impious, insofar as to ask those questions is to put the city's claims in question.
- Piety, for the most part, has its respectability grounded in being old or traditional, the implicit opinion being that what is old or traditional = what is good.
- Euthyphro is chosen as the interlocutor, this not being an historical record of a conversation, because he differs from traditional piety in some respects, while not differing in others. To the extent that he differs, he's a more appropriate (i.e., safer) interlocutor to refute. To the extent that he's the same, one can infer the more general critique of ordinary piety.
- Euthyphro's first definition, usually called formally defective on account of being an example and not a formal definition, implies the definition "Piety is doing what the gods do, i.e., imitating the gods." His justification for choosing to imitate Zeus is on account of being the most just of the gods, so Euthyphro already thinks justice = good as a guiding opinion that informs his piety. Implicitly, he believes in gods who punish and reward for conduct. This is what he sees as his own good. He differs from the Athenians in claiming to regularly have direct access to the gods as a seer (in a way probably differing from traditional seers), and he's the same insofar as he accepts the poets' myths.
- The second def. (as already brought up in the thread) implies that "no Forms" = no reason to worship the gods (since their will may change; i.e., what's pious today may not be tomorrow, so no amount of worship will save you), and "if Forms" = then worship of the gods or being instructed by grasping the Forms are equivalent (but not necessarily the same).
- Socrates' own def., where Piety is a species of the genus Justice pertaining to the gods, resembles ordinary piety (sacrifices and prayers), which Socrates seems to be herding Euthyphro back to, but characterized in a way that disgusts Euthyphro (i.e., quid pro quo, a merchant relationship between men and gods).
- The second def. is generated by the implicit claim about imitation of the gods in the first def., the third def. is generated by Euthyphro's opinion about justice in the first def. as what ought to guide us.
>even if the precise standard for recognizing impiety is the imprecise "I know it when I see it."
PT Geach had an article on this where he said that Socrates was playing around with definitions because this is a decent standard wherein you can start with examples of an idea and then work back to definitions from there. I am not entirely sure I buy that but Socrates is a Protean beast with a thousand heads, each definition slips away like the one before it.
I don't thinkmuch of the paper, to be honest; Geach ignores that Euthyphro himself admits there's one unifying definition to the examples without hesitation. Geach would rather make it out to be Socrates bullying him into having to give one, which the dialogue doesn't support as a reading. And Geach, further, acknowledges at the start of his paper that Socrates is on trial for impiety, but doesn't put 2 and 2 together and notice that the city insists that piety is something such that impiety can be punishable by death. He wants to take it as a Cambridge man who afford to discuss the matter as an idle conversation, not as something with concrete consequences.