Books about intellectual intuition like Neoplatonism and German Idealism and general discussion on intellectual intuition
>Aristotle also notes that dianoia is discursive reasoning in general and noesis is the immediate intellectual intuition
>(Rep. 511b) Whereas dianoia reaches toward the whole by considering the parts and their relations, noesis is a grasps of the whole in its undivided integrity.
>(Kant) If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense.
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they
dont
exist
there is no intellektuelle anschauung because there are no noumena
you
are an
idiot
Triple concentroidal kykloidodonic microcosmic god-eye refracted mirror reflecting bursts of photonoid wave the production of the ahedonic supermind metastasizing as ununderdefinable dyadic cross double pentadic emanating transcendental relation of subject to noumenal noise-like fractured contradiction cognized non contradictorially by a speculum specially protracted from gelluloid neutral stuff that is the prima anima conjunctively self definatory, spiral but web-like conspanding non-contractively but dual in this sense so the white muons merge like golden or black soup self inhering as its medium and representandum out emerging as self creating yet simultaneously emanated as goop and iron mutual causology anima pulcherrima res creata est a deo uncreato illa machina mens compounded forged thusly binary spirit crucial circles never cessate yet ruthlessly reproduce into hyperspatial double direction rotation logoi self reinarchate as archonic ogdoad forerunners to poemandic revelatory capacity ingressing into anima mundi also known as aphrodite our double yin yin for yin as the yang in yin or the medium of the valley which actualizes evolution vague matter rematerializes into formal monadic conceptualizables which prior and posterior both status occupy inside the human supercosmic ultrareality where time is eliminated alethic unity ensues retro and postactively inhering into the hyperfacts generated non-axiomatically as mythological signs for genetic religion generecizing universality of the perennial emanatory revelation indicates emanatory intelligence resides fractally in supercomputational neurons participating brahman and therefore infinitely mediating to become unity of the unity of voice or gymnastic words like the sword imposing itself on ginnungagap vital deathmaking becomes the second great vehicle for the sublime machinations of the apocatastasis non-created out of pure evil or of the pure evil created out of retroactively achieved apocatastasis of the ultraviolence initiated by conscious development of syzygy brainchild of dual principle or that is the moon circling as vessel of lunacy and sublunar or supersolar tree without hell-roots nest of Pluto's gold or Saturnalic traditions forgotten or revived like reverse mutual synthetic symbiosis for hyperorganic racket of superhenotic felixean unity.
^ about as meaningful as the replies to your post will be
this proves what I suspected all along: AI is moronic
>there is no intellektuelle anschauung because there are no noumena
[citation needed]
Ah sweet, another pseudo-intellectual intuition thread. Keep at it schizo
books on achieving intellectual intuition?
any you anons know where aristotle talks about noesis?
There is perhaps no epistemological theory more universally rejected, by modern philosophers and commentators, than transcendent apriorism. In fact, the notion that the pure human intellect, purged of sensory contamination, can somehow transcend the limits of all possible experience is now disdainfully regarded as an obsolete Platonic fantasy. In the latter half of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant had vilified those who defended such extreme versions of rationalism as, "dogmatic champions of supersensible reason". Regrettably, during more than two centuries of philosophical inquiry, this derogatory attitude has hardened into an obstructive prejudice. It is certain that the process has done much to impede, truly objective modern research into transcendent apriorism's basic epistemology. In fact, even foundational issues relating to the definition and categorization of the theory have been neglected, or only superficially considered. As a result, numerous misleading "straw man" versions of the doctrine have been promulgated, by the Logical Positivists and others, and then very enthusiastically denigrated. The consequent defective analysis and the prejudice that engendered it have seriously distorted modern appraisals of the theory's epistemological legitimacy. Similarly, contemporary studies of transcendent apriorism's philosophical history have been infected with damaging errors. This contamination is particularly transparent in the flawed theory of K. Ajdukiewicz that "radical apriorism" had adherents "almost entirely among ancient thinkers".
The aim of this thesis is to provide a new and comprehensive analysis of transcendent apriorism that remedies such prevalent misconceptions. The principle objective will be to remove the encrusting layers of prejudice, error and confusion that blight conventional epistemological and historical treatments of the subject. Ultimately, this procedure will function to disclose the doctrine's essential nature, its origins and the true course of its historical development. In the light of this analysis, we will be in a better position to determine whether extant arguments claiming to refute or undermine transcendent apriorism are legitimate or erroneous.
Burgess, Mark Robert (2002) Nous, noesis and noeta: the transcendent apriorist tradition in epistemology. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.
i believe bros
The idea that the solitary thinker, using pure reason, can unlock the deepest mysteries of reality is certainly an exciting one. The rationalist dream began with Parmenides of Elea and became the epistemological foundation for the greatest metaphysical systems ever constructed. This thesis traces the complete historical development of this neglected epistemology and inaugurates a radical new appraisal of its method. The new clarity provides fresh insights into traditional puzzles like the Cartesian Circle and whether Plato had a secret esoteric doctrine. A new positive re-evaluation of a doctrine thought to have been refuted by Kant and the positivists will provide interest for students, philosophers and those interested in the history of ideas.
Platonic noesis of universals via abstraction has to be distinguished from the exclusively nondualist Plotinist noesis of the One. And moreover, Kant offers three definitions of intellektuelle anschauung. One is non-passive and fully active, hence not mediated by intuitive content (empirical or otherwise), that he attributes to God alone, and which Fichte coopts for self-consciousness of the I. But we all have self-consciousness, and some (not Fichte) would argue that is distinct from actual active God-like intuition. The other two senses Kant discusses are compatible with passive intuition: one is positive, and requires a non-empirical content; the other is negative, and simply bypasses mediate content, but is compatible perhaps with passivity. So there's like six different notions at play here, they're not really the same, "intellectual intuition" is more or less a catch-all term for mental operations which aren't sensuous or logical-deductive. For example, neither the Neoplatonists or German Idealists consider the nature of Fregean sense/reference and whether intuition of abstracta like propositions (or numbers for Godel) is another species of intellectual intuition, or whether intuition of referents via Fregean senses is yet another species of intellectual intuition (passively thinking an object without mediation, or indeed without the object causing anything in you, but also without you actively causing anything to it),
>Burgess, Mark Robert
are you this guy?
No. What does he say?
see
Have you read the whole book? I can't tell what it's really saying past the thesis being stated in these two excerpts. Does he prove what he sets out to prove, and how does he do it? I looked at the chapter titles and they sound interesting but I've been disappointed before with promising book and chapter titles.
haven't read it yet, just learned about it and started shilling it bc I got hyped about it
here is the preface. it sounds very promising.
/2
I looked at it online, but I'm more interested in a review of the whole book. Make sure to read it for us and report back anon. I can't find it on libgen, do you have a pdf?
no pdf, but I believe the book is a reworking of his dissertation and that might be available online.
are you also an a priori transcendent metaphysics believer?
Gnoesis
The first generation of post-Kantian idealists accepts the conclusion of Immanuel Kant's systematic account or science of the a priori conditions of intelligibility, viz., that experience does not conform to the object, but rather depends for its possibility on space and time as forms of sensibility, as transcendental aesthetic shows, and the categories of the understanding, as transcendental logic shows. However, the idealists reject the presupposition of Kant's two-stem science, viz., that space, time, and the categories are brute facts about our subjective constitution, i.e., radically contingent or groundless conditions. Hence K.L. Reinhold describes 1790's Letters on the Kantian Philosophy as his “attempt to present [Kant's] results independently of the Kantian premises”,1 J.G. Fichte tells Heinrich Stephani in a letter, mid-December 1793, that “Kant's philosophy, as such, is correct—but only in its results and not in its reasons”,2 and F.W.J. Schelling tells G.W.F. Hegel in a letter, 6 January 1795, that “[p]hilosophy has not yet reached its end. Kant has given the results: the premises are still lacking. And who can understand results without the premises?”.3 The post-Kantian objection is that the conclusions of Kant's science of intelligibility lack rigour unless they are derived from premises that are not brutely subjective, but are rather absolutely necessary.
Schelling develops his criticism of Kant in 1795's “Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge” by saying that he must “depict the results of critical philosophy in their regression to the last principles of all knowledge” because “the Critique of Pure Reason cannot possibly be the way of philosophy as a science”. His evidence is that the first Critique “names the only possible forms of sensible intuition, space and time, without having examined them according to a principle”, while “[t]he categories are set up according to the table of the functions of judgment, but the latter are not set up according to any principle”. For Schelling, one has an “interest in truth” only if one is “interested in the question of the highest principle of all knowledge”, i.e., the origin from which one can derive space, time, the categories, and the functions of judgment and thereby ensure that they are not merely brute facts about humans.4 He therefore seeks a first principle to render Kant's science of intelligibility truly rigourous. Moreover, in order to avoid both the pre-Kantian presupposition that experience conforms to the object and the Kantian presupposition that it conforms to the subject, Schelling aims to cognize this principle as the identity of subject and object, i.e., of thought and being. Throughout his career, Schelling defines this cognition as absolute knowledge and assigns it to intellectual intuition.
>Some have wanted to explain my proposition of a positive philosophy as a change of mind. But since my studies of the Kantian philosophy, it has been clear to me that the latter could not be the whole of philosophy. I wrote in my Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism that a mightier, more majestic dogmatism would rise up against Kant's criticism, and this was the positive philosophy. Thus, the notion of a positive philosophy has been inscribed in me for a long time
>we often find knowledge contrasted with faith, and faith at the same time explained to be an underivative or intuitive knowledge — so that it must be at least some sort of knowledge. And, besides, it is unquestionably a fact of experience, firstly, that what we believe is in our consciousness — which implies that we know about it; and secondly, that this belief is a certainty in our consciousness — which implies that we know it. Again, and especially, we find thought opposed to immediate knowledge and faith, and, in particular, to intuition. But if this intuition be qualified as intellectual, we must really mean intuition which thinks, unless, in a question about the nature of God, we are willing to interpret intellect to mean images and representations of imagination. The word faith or belief, in the dialect of this system, comes to be employed even with reference to common objects that are present to the senses. We believe, says Jacobi, that we have a body — we believe in the existence of the things of sense. But if we are speaking of faith in the True and Eternal, and saying that God is given and revealed to us in immediate knowledge or intuition, we are concerned not with the things of sense, but with objects special to our thinking mind, with truths of inherently universal significance. And when the individual ‘I’, or in other words personality, is under discussion — not the ‘I’ of experience, or a single private person — above all, when the personality of God is before us, we are speaking of personality unalloyed — of a personality in its own nature universal. Such personality is a thought, and falls within the province of thought only. More than this. Pure and simple intuition is completely the same as pure and simple thought. Intuition and belief, in the first instance, denote the definite conceptions we attach to these words in our ordinary employment of them: and to this extent they differ from thought in certain points which nearly every one can understand. But here they are taken in a higher sense, and must be interpreted to mean a belief in God, or an intellectual intuition of God; in short, we must put aside all that especially distinguishes thought on the one side from belief and intuition on the other. How belief and intuition, when transferred to these higher regions, differ from thought, it is impossible for any one to say.
>All our external perception presupposes, firstly, an activity of the mind which is checked and which we call sensation; secondly, an activity of the mind which gives to this felt sensation an infinitely divisible extension and which we call contemplation; and, thirdly, an activity of the mind which objectivates the thus extended sensation and asserts it to be an external thing, and which we call thinking.
Hello Metaphysicsanon, would you say that intellectual intuition is just a mystical experience? It seems to me that this is what Guenon affirms.
Also, didn't Hegel refuse this very notion in the preface of the phenomenology, when he affirms, against "religious edification", that the Absolute cannot be seen only through an intuition because we wouldn't get the form of this knowledge?
>would you say that intellectual intuition is just a mystical experience?
>Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same as what, in special connection with religious experience and doctrines, used to be called Mysticism. The term Mysticism is at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with superstition and deception.
>On which we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity; whereas the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative, is the concrete unity of those propositions which understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition. And if those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for them too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract identification, and that in their opinion, therefore truth can only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason captive.
>But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just consists in embracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements. Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical – not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding.
So doesn't Hegel refuse the Anschauung, as it remains abstraction and mystery? If the "reason-world" is beyond understanding, then reason cannot comprehend it.
>Thus the reason-world may be equally styled mystical – not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding.
understanding and reason are not the same
So does reason go beyond understanding? If I remeber correctly, reason is the identity between consciousness and self-consciousness, which attempts at becoming its universal object and thus searches itself in the world. But how could reason go beyond understanding, if it relies only on self-intuition? How can reason exist if it doesn't understand itself?
>reason is the identity between consciousness and self-consciousness, which attempts at becoming its universal object and thus searches itself in the world.
Hegel
>the mystical, as synonymous with the speculative [Reason] is the concrete unity of those propositions which understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition
Reason "sees" the whole, understanding "sees" the parts. Reason runs ahead of understanding, but provides the the "map" of the whole by which understanding can put the pieces or parts together. Think like a jigsaw puzzle: you are given an image of the whole puzzle, but even so the actual putting together of the pieces is a slow tedious process, and even with the image of the whole many times you do not understand which parts are which or where they go, except by trial and error, or experiential learning, which is understanding.
Okay, if I understand correctly, reason already anschauet itself and the point of the singular consciousness is to reach that universal viewpoint? Isn't already the Spirit?
But still, doesn't that imply to reject intellectual intuition, because it is direct, whereas the whole point of dialectics is to always develop opposites and never remain in a direct (i.e. abstract) unity?
>whereas the whole point of dialectics is to always develop opposites and never remain in a direct (i.e. abstract) unity?
dialectic is the midway point between abstract thought of the understanding and the speculative thought of reason.
So how would it include or lead to intellectual intuition if it is neither? Shouldn't the Anschauung only be something direct, by definition?
Hegel demonstrates that nothing is truly immediate except the whole, even the apparently immediate intuition. He calls it the mediation of the immediate. We presuppose something as imnediate only from a lack of spirit to inquire into its condition, even sensation and ego. These are both products of antecedent thought.
>Hegel demonstrates that nothing is truly immediate except the whole
That's not exactly right, is it? Sure, his whole point is that what we consider immdeiate is already mediated, but he accepts the concept of an absolutely immediate, contained within Anschauung (but brushes it off as religious edification). However, this immediate is purely abstract, the night were cows are black. But, shouldn't this very abstraction be the Anschauung, since he literally defines it as something felt through some sort of (mystical) "feeling" but which is flawed because it is impossible to mediate through language/reason? Logic cannot achieve intellectual intuition.
What makes understanding abstract? Understanding feels like the more instinctive and intuitive parts of intelligence. If you understand something, you feel it, sometimes to your core.
>What makes understanding abstract?
it focuses on one part of reality at a time hence abstracts from everything else
Why is it so instinctual and practically focused then? It’s synonymous with ready-to-hand.
>synonymous with ready-to-hand.
idk about that
It’s a know-how, not a know-that
i disagree, I would see both knowthat and knowhow as belonging to understanding
Know-that is an individual point contained in a continuous line of know-how.
noses?
Good to see IQfy catching onto this as much of my philosophical journey has been digging into the strange loss of intuition over philosophical history and its ramifications, especially the disconnection of philosophical learning from life and its transformation. The basis of intellectual intuition, of course, being the unity of the knower and the known, this direct knowledge both transforming the knower and in fact demanding a transformation in advance in order to know it. Hence the demand of purificatory exercises in the case of those like Plotinus, or of a life directed towards the spirit apart from the desires of the flesh and of material delight as in Spinoza's emendation of the intellect.
There are some solitary stars in modern philosophy which keep this tradition somewhatalive, those like Spinoza, Schopenhauer, the German Idealists, even Deleuze. But those like the German Idealists already betray a modern attitude by divorcing intellectual intuition from life and practice - this, of course, created a division between what is perceived as the cold rationalism of someone like Hegel to the vitalism of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche's existentialism. The connection of philosophy to life now became a matter of subjectivity and even irrationalism, against the pre-modern 'tasting' of universal truths that go beyond the individual mind. Access to a part of the soul that is unrelated to those contingent aspects of ourselves allowed a superior everlasting peace, now seemingly lost.
It is strange to see how universal this was for pre-moderns, yet almost impossible for moderns to understand without years of unpicking our prejudices. For those interested, I would recommend reading texts from those with an especially practical bent (like Al-Ghazali's Ihya, the Buddhist Pali Canon, or the Philokalia), as it is the element of practice that is absolutely necessary for understanding. Some elementary texts at the beginning for helpful discursive knowledge includes Maritain's 'Degrees of Knowledge', Guenon's 'Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines', Agamben's 'Taste', Al-Ghazali's Deliverance from Error, and David Herbertson's ' Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect', but one must quickly move on to practical instructions to go beyond dianoia.
A few questions:
1) Why do we have discursive reasoning at all? It seems so different from sense-perception and intellection intuition (both seem to be the same thing but with different levels of resolution with respect to the world). It’s almost “perpendicular” to them both.
2) What kind of metaphysics suits intellectual intuition? Parmenides? Heraclitus? Something else?
3) What do all these practical instructions have in common?
1. Discursive reasoning is closer to intellectual intuition than sense perception, despite many using a certain level of sensual language to describe intellectual intuition. Unless I misunderstand you. Bergson's intuition is closer to being related to sense perception, but not so for someone like Plotinus. So there needs to be a step between the time-laden diversification of sense perception and the timeless unity of intellectual intuition as it is otherwise too large a bridge to jump - discursive reasoning allows us to rise away from sense perception while still remaining within time, then eventually allowing us to take the further step into pure intellection.
2. Anything that makes a strong enough split between the universal and the particular, unity and multiplicity, sameness and change. So Parmenides and Heraclitus works equally, depending on the person. Plato likewise who combines these aspects, as well as Aristotle who focuses a little more on the embodied aspect of form+matter. Ibn Arabi, for example, states that all proper theology is united when it comes to intellectual intuition but may have variety at the level of its philosophical explication, depending much of the time on what aspect they focus on as a means to ascend. It is useful to try and see where doctrines that make a split between the Universal and the contingent are fundamentally united.
In my view apophatic theology works the best - the task is less to discern some positive phenomenon like an Idea, but to discern the extent to which everything you know in your experience is contingent and impermanent, so that you let go of its appropriation to let the soul naturally rise. Then parts of your being previously unknown become available.
3. Preventing absorption in the senses. The more you are absorbed in the senses through pursuit of sensual desires or distractions, the less perspective you have in regards to them, the less you are able to ascend to that universal perspective. That then applies also to the negative affections, which are equally underlied by absorption and dependence on the pleasure of the senses. Hence temperance, withdrawal, courage, solitude, virtue, contemplation, non-distraction.
good post
How come you describe discursive reasoning as “in time”, even though it describes things such as mathematical objects?
Not him, but likely because reasoning about mathematical objects is done in time. That doesn't bring eternals into time, but it means time is used as a bridge to the eternal, the bridge being discursive reasoning.
Admittedly, there is a flaw here you might be able to pick up on. How can time be a bridge to its own negation? That's because it's not, truths about mathematical objects can be apprehended with or without that bridge through direct identification. In other words, the bridge is helpful to some, but unnecessary for others, in that there is always a "leak" in time which leads directly to the eternal regardless of how much time you have spent reasoning or creating proofs through the discursive intellect. This can happen in an instant, or it can happen after many years, hours, or minutes of thinking. In my opinion, this is why you will see the splits in certain traditional schools, like Northern and Southern Schools of Chan Buddhism, where one school emphasizes "purification", and another school seems to emphasize direct identification at the cost of rigorous purification efforts. It's not that one is right and the other wrong, they have different techniques.
This is an excellent thread, but I'm too much of a brainlet to really grok what posters like are getting at.
Is diving in to the prereq material for Kant's works as in pic related a good place to start?
i think so. the only think missing I would find helpful are his lectures on logic.
>The Divided Line
Refuted by Christianity. Pistis is higher than noesis since the Incarnation. If you don't understand this, you need more (Orthodox) Church hours.
The Disturbing Follow-Up To "The Mothman Prophecies"
Is there a single intelligent force behind all religious, occult, and UFO phenomena?
Strange manifestations have haunted humans since prehistoric times. Beams of light, voices from the heavens, the “little people,” gods and devils, ghosts and monsters, and UFOs, have all had a prominent place in our history and legends. In this dark work, John Keel explores these phenomena, and in doing so reveals the shocking truth about our present position and future destiny in the cosmic scheme of things.
Are we pawns in a celestial game?
In the Orient, there is a story told of the seven towers. These citadels, well hidden from mankind, are occupied by groups of Satanists who are chanting the world to ruin. Perhaps this is just a story; perhaps there is some truth behind it. But what if there is yet another tower, a tower not of good or evil but of infinite power? What if all our destinies are controlled by this cosmic force for its own mysterious purposes? And what if UFOs and other paranormal manifestations are merely tools being used to manipulate us and guide us toward the cosmic role we are fated to play? Perhaps, after all, we are not independent beings but are instead the creations and slaves of the eighth tower.
JOHN A. KEEL (March 25, 1930 – July 3, 2009) was an American journalist and influential UFOlogist best known as the author of "The Mothman Prophecies." The least known of his tremendously influential works, "The Eighth Tower" was derived from material left out of "The Mothman Prophecies." Keel’s first book, "Jadoo," and his breakthrough UFO book, "Operation Trojan Horse," have also been reprinted by Anomalist Books.
you do not see with your eyes. here is a key.
ngl this image is powerful. imagine looking into absolute nothing.
Imagine looking into absolute something
boobs
नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन । यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनू स्वाम्
This Atman cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas, or by intelligence, or by much hearing of sacred books. It is attained by him alone whom It chooses. To such a one Atman reveals Its own form.
क्लेशोऽधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम्।अव्यक्ता हि गतिर्दुःखं देहवद्भिरवाप्यते
Greater is their trouble whose minds are set on the unmanifested; for the goal; the unmanifested, is very hard for the embodied to reach.
अथ चित्तं समाधातुं न शक्नोषि मयि स्थिरम्।अभ्यासयोगेन ततो मामिच्छाप्तुं धनञ्जय
But if thou canst not fix thy mind firmly on Me, then, My beloved friend, try to do so by constant practice.
अथैतदप्यशक्तोऽसि कर्तुं मद्योगमाश्रितः।सर्वकर्मफलत्यागं ततः कुरु यतात्मवान्
If thou art unable to do even this, then, resorting to union with Me, renounce the fruits of all actions with the self controlled.
श्रेयो हि ज्ञानमभ्यासाज्ज्ञानाद्ध्यानं विशिष्यते।ध्यानात्कर्मफलत्यागस्त्यागाच्छान्तिरनन्तरम्
Better indeed is knowledge than practice; than knowledge meditation is better; than meditation the renunciation of the fruits of actions: peace immediately follows renunciation.
SIR DO NOT REDEEM
For Sri Aurobindo, intuition comes under the realm of knowledge by identity. He describes the human psychological plane (often referred to as mana in Sanskrit) as having two natures: The first being its role in interpreting the external world (parsing sensory information), and the second being its role in generating consciousness. He terms this second nature "knowledge by identity." Aurobindo finds that, as the result of evolution, the mind has accustomed itself to using certain physiological functions as its means of entering into relations with the material world; when people seek to know about the external world, they default to arriving at truths via their senses. Knowledge by identity, which currently only explains self-awareness, may extend beyond the mind and explain intuitive knowledge.
He finds this intuitive knowledge was common to older humans (Vedic) and later was taken over by reason which currently organises our perception, thoughts and actions resulting from Vedic to metaphysical philosophy and later to experimental science. He finds that this process, which seems to be decent, is actually a circle of progress, as a lower faculty is being pushed to take up as much from a higher way of working. He finds when self-awareness in the mind is applied to one's self and the outer (other) -self, results in luminous self-manifesting identity; the reason also converts itself into the form of the self-luminous intuitional knowledge.
SIR PLS DO NOT REDEEM
Balanovskiy, Valentin (2018). "What is Kant's Transcendental Reflection?". Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. 75: 17–27. doi:10.5840/wcp232018751730. ISBN978-1-63435-038-9.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326377298_What_is_Kant's_Transcendental_Reflection
Just let it die if no one has anything more to add.
i don't want it to die
all things must come to an end, my child