Logic is not a completely arbitrary system of axioms.

Logic is not a completely arbitrary system of axioms. The basic principles of logic, when applied to phenomenological objects, are as immediately evident as the fact that we are experiencing them. We know immediately what is denoted by "red", and by "not-red", but we also recognize "red and not-red" to be meaningless. The same applies to other logical laws.

What is arbitrary is the extension of logical laws to (1) abstract objects and (2) unobserved matter, which is supposed to be the cause of immediate sense-data. For abstract objects, the abstractions of pure mathematics express no meaning. They are useful and satisfying because they can be divided and combined in interesting ways, but they are ultimately built on primitive objects, which are meaningless. Abstractions in the sense of generalities (i.e., all red things are also x) are done by means of counterfactuals. "No red thing is not x" suffices for this extension, and all other such abstract statements are made the same way.

As for material reality, the extension made is based on ockham's razor, which IS an arbitrary principle, though a useful one. One thing x may be contingent on another thing y, which is just a way of saying "if y, x". If a thing's truth or falsity is dependent on nothing other than itself, I call it "gratuitously true/false". The principle of Ockham's Razor in its correct form, is NOT to minimize the number of beings (for then solipsism would be the most logical position), nor to minimize ontological categories, (this would result in the same), but to reduce the number of gratuitous truths or falsities. This justifies the position of materialism: "matter" is simply defined by means of logical contingencies from our sense-data (if rose, then red), and by positing different pieces of matter, the contingencies derived can predict the future. Physical laws are only attempts to minimize gratuitous contingencies (the result of this or that nuclear experiment is no longer gratuitous itself, but are dependent on the gratuitous truth E = mc^2).

Ockham's Razor is not itself an axiom, as axioms can only ever yield true results. It's an iterated process that can be used profitably, assuming some axioms about reality itself (that multiple observations are likely to yield correct inferences about the causes of our sense-data).

The universe is not the way it is by necessity. This is because the language which represents the universe is always self-referential. Logical dependencies occur within the language, but the fundamental reality of the universe (meaning that which differentiates it from the language to describe it) is outside of the language, This gap cannot be bridged, so the "realness" (that is, the immediately evident reality of the universe) is always gratuitous.

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  1. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Put it down, anon

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      havent read it.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      hes so hawt

  2. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Glad we agree. Now let’s go build the Overman

  3. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >apodicity

    Yea

  4. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    sounds about right

  5. 2 months ago
    Anonymous
    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      >IQfy - Literature

  6. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    If a tree falls in the woods and no one is around to hear it then it still makes a noise.

  7. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >The universe is not the way it is by necessity. This is because the language which represents the universe is always self-referential
    this makes no sense, language is also of the universe, so is it's existence necessary?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      It's just kantian autism. Already refuted retroactively by Leibniz. Turns out we can know things, shockingly enough.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      No, as I said, nothing exists necessarily. The laws of logic and the beings generated by Ockham's Razor are contingent on immediate sense-data. Any predicates applied to one simple sense-datum could conceivable apply to another simple sense-datum, because no analytic statements can be made about them. Thus, nothing is necessary.

      It's just kantian autism. Already refuted retroactively by Leibniz. Turns out we can know things, shockingly enough.

      illiterate Black person, have a nice day

      >logic is not a completely arbitrary system of axioms

      let me stop you right there. It is. We know this because you can assert any set of axioms whether they include the classics like negation, conjunction, disjunction, bivalence, reflexivity...etc. Logic doesn't have to be consistent or complete- that is just a choice among many that can be made.

      Since you got this wrong, nothing else you've said matters. This is shit you learn on the first day of an intro logic course.

      i claimed that the axioms of classical logic can be immediately known to be true as regards simple phenomenological objects. If you think I'm wrong, provide an example of a simple phenomenological object that violates the law of identity, or noncontradiction, or excluded middle. Otherwise, have a nice day troony.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        >immediately known

        Go ahead and demonstrate your solution to the problem of induction.

        >phenomenological object

        No such thing. Phenomenology is by definition the account of what it means to be a subjective conscious observer. Objects are mind independent. How about you take 1 single philosophy class before you shit yourself on the internet.

        >excluded middle
        EVery fricking sorites paradox.

        >identity
        Ship of Theseus

        >non contradiction

        falls apart in irreducably modal predicates.

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          >Go ahead and demonstrate your solution to the problem of induction.
          I said in the body of my post that induction was the groundless principle you moronic fricking Black person.
          >Phenomenology is by definition the account of what it means to be a subjective conscious observer. Objects are mind independent.
          You whine about semantics because you know you can't refute my point
          >Ship of theseus
          I said "simple phenomenological object", as in irreducible, because I knew that you would introduce Black person word games. When equality is given one definition rather than two, your "paradox" falls apart. Same with the LEM point.

          >irreducably modal predicates
          describe these "irreducibly modal predicates", troony, and I will show that they do not violate noncontradiction. Remember that this applies with regards to sense-data.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            seethe harder. You ignoring problems because you don't understand a lick of anything you're talking about.

            Without induction you don't get an external world, nor pattern recognition of any kind. Pls log off so you can enroll in a philosophy class.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >induction is groundless = there is no induction
            moron detected

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        There are no simple phenomenological objects

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          Yes there are. "Red" is an example. It cannot be reduced to other sense-data.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            You mean YOU can’t reduce it to other sense data. Not only is red reducible in the sense that it has a lot of predicates, it can be analyzed according to various properties such as brightness and relation to other colors etc. all these irreducible concepts also have things underlying them that appear in dreams.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >predicates
            name one
            >brightness
            abstraction from other sense data, not sense-data itself. Its definition is in terms of colours, each of which is itself irreducible. If you have an irreducibly concept x, and form a predicate P meaning "is equal to x", then P(x) doesn't make it reducible. Read

            Yes there are. "Red" is an example. It cannot be reduced to other sense-data.

            again.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Also all predicates applying to red which aren't tautologies are synthetic statements, maintaining that it is irreducible.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            Pick up a book of poetry. Analogical statements are valid predicates. Also again just because you can’t reduce it doesn’t mean it isn’t reducible in principle.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            If you are trying to parody early Wittgenstein, you are doing a really good job at it. This anon

            https://i.imgur.com/KIBsQwI.jpg

            Put it down, anon

            is right. Look up the color exclusion problem.

            My summary:
            A point in your visual field can not be "red" and "not red" at the same time
            If point x is red, than it is not blue, nor green, nor yellow, etc.
            So point x being red can be reduced to its not being all the other colors.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            I haven't read wittgenstein, but this looks like an interesting problem. My thought:

            The amount of sense-data is theoretically infinite, as it cannot be proven that there does not exist some hypothetical sensation that we have not yet experienced. So "not being any of these colours" does not really define red. If you simply mean "red is nothing other than red", then this is a tautology and defines nothing.

            Both this response and the problem itself seem somewhat off to me, though. My response makes it seem as though it would be negated if there were a finite number of possible sense-impressions. On the other hand, if someone did not know what red was, this definition of "not being other colours" could not possibly communicate that information to them.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            1. If colors were unanalyzable, painters wouldn’t be able to train themselves to have superior color perception
            2. Colors perceptions must have a corresponding neural structure in the brain. Since the neurons are a plurality, it is ridiculous to say that the color is simple.
            3. Colors are perceived through an inductive process. Simply describing a color wouldn’t allow someone blind to perceive it not because the predicates are insufficient but because they lack the neuronal structure to hypothesise the object that fits all the predicates. That can only mean they didn’t understand some of the predicates either, since the predicates will have to be founded in more primitive neuronal structures that approach the structure which creates a color
            4. It doesn’t matter if there are an infinite number of predicates. Irrational numbers for example are defined as negations. Square root of two is simply the number such that its square is neither greater than not less than two.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            1 - non sequitor
            2 - the sense-data is simple, the structure is a collection of matter
            3 - WYM? If a person has the neuronic structure to understand all colours other than red, would they have the capacity to understand red by the definition you gave? All the predicates which they must know in order to understand the definition are given to them.

            For a better example: given the definition "is not sight, sound, touch, etc.", would this communicate the information of sight to a person not already acquainted with it?

            4 - If the definition of sqrt 2 was "nothing other than the square root of 2", it would be left without definition. It is only defined by the already known concepts of square, equality, and 2. Infinite negations cannot themselves define without some condition for negation.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            *is not sound, touch, etc.

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            >"not being any of these colours" does not really define red
            But it does? If you knew how all the other colors looked like except red, then you could recognize it the first time that you saw it, just by the fact of its not being all the other colors.

            Now, to relate this to the subject:
            >If a thing's truth or falsity is dependent on nothing other than itself, I call it "gratuitously true/false"
            Something that don't seem to realize is, that the statements that we make about sense-data are not gratuitous. Their truth depends on the truth/falsity of other propositions. For any point x in your visual field, there is a compound proposition that goes like "(x is not blue)^(x is not green)^...", which is the logical equivalent of "x is red". Since propositions about sense-data are not gratuitous, the propositions based on them can't be gratuitous.

  8. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >logic is not a completely arbitrary system of axioms

    let me stop you right there. It is. We know this because you can assert any set of axioms whether they include the classics like negation, conjunction, disjunction, bivalence, reflexivity...etc. Logic doesn't have to be consistent or complete- that is just a choice among many that can be made.

    Since you got this wrong, nothing else you've said matters. This is shit you learn on the first day of an intro logic course.

  9. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Its physically painful when people like you try to talk about logic

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      No, as I said, nothing exists necessarily. The laws of logic and the beings generated by Ockham's Razor are contingent on immediate sense-data. Any predicates applied to one simple sense-datum could conceivable apply to another simple sense-datum, because no analytic statements can be made about them. Thus, nothing is necessary.
      [...]
      illiterate Black person, have a nice day
      [...]
      i claimed that the axioms of classical logic can be immediately known to be true as regards simple phenomenological objects. If you think I'm wrong, provide an example of a simple phenomenological object that violates the law of identity, or noncontradiction, or excluded middle. Otherwise, have a nice day troony.

  10. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >immediately evident
    Stopped reading there.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      >can't know nuffin

  11. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Red is apparently a specific period of oscillation of some fricked up universal field or whatever. The thing itself has little to do with how we perceive the colour in practice and we only perceive the parts of the wavelength that are relevant to finding fruit. The fruiting tree and the animal it used to transport seeds agreed on an arbitrary protocol but limitations of reality and details about the properties of light forced limitations on how arbitrary it could be. Red has real properties that cause it to emerge as relevant to life.
    Logical coherence in what we call the physical world can be similar. Information copiers that randomly emerged picked coherence out of the soup of random nonsense because it's useful for information to copy itself coherently.
    The qualia of red can't be accounted for using logical models which confirms that logic as we understand it only applies to a limited subset of reality.

  12. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >axioms can only ever yield true results

    Has anyone ever written anything more moronic on the internet? Why is this thread still up. Listen buckaroo, axioms do not have anything at all to say about the truth of a proposition or statement. In consistent and complete logic systems they only preserve relationships between variables. Go take a philosophy class.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      wow, you are a moronic Black person.

  13. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    for me, mathematical logic is beautiful. pure and simple. and what more can one ask for than beauty ?

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