The last few thread about him and the Eleatics interested me a lot. What exactly is his shtick besides change being an illusion and the world having no parts? What's this deal about indetermination, determination, and dialectic?
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'indeterminate" was just something that guy was saying as an attempt to define potentiality without reference to not being. i could not figure out how to make his definition coherent or even really figure out what he was trying to say though. I still think that possibility is impossible to define without a concept of non existence, which is why democritus, who was probably trying to refute parmenides, invented the void in order to explain what the atoms move into and said the void was non-being. the same applies to change, whatever something is moving into will have to be non-being, all process philosophers say this, even whitehead who says "creativity" has no character. my opinion is that it can be explained how change exists by explaining how humans get a concept of non-existence, but in fact their concept which comes from observing a lack of relations between things is an illusion since from an ultimate perspective everything is already maximally related. dialectic was apparently invented by his student zeno but we don't really how zeno's dialectic work since the example we have of dialectic is from plato.
> What exactly is his shtick besides change being an illusion and the world having no parts?
just read his fragments they are very short
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Parmenides
Were you the main guy arguing with him? I recall you mentioning something about a core metaphysical problem between indeterminacy and determinacy, and that Hegel or Peirce were the solutions.
no that was probably after i left the conversation. idk how peirce solves it other than saying things can happen by pure chance.
Damn, how many Eleatics were in that thread?!
The goddess doesn't directly say that change is an illusion. People have interpreted it that way, like Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's physics, but i wouldn't go that route. Positing illusions/an illusion world just defeats the point, smells like platonist cope.
Inside every anon there is an eleatic waiting to be revealed
"But do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry, nor let habit by its much experience force thee to cast upon this way a wandering eye or sounding ear or tongue; but judge by argument(logos) the much disputed proof uttered by me. There is only one way left that can be spoken of"
Before unlocking Parmenides you need to understand the logos as defined before Parmenides. In Parmenides there were already dialectics based on dualities. The temporal contrast of dualities, eg. the caduceus, created slowly a singularity, but man lost the ability to think in monads already by the time of Parmenides. Man lost the ability to hold a paradox in their mind at will and began finding temporal aids like the dialectic to see the wisdom he had had before sinking into the written word. The dialectic is a degenerate notion of the logos that was taken on by post-Socratic philosophy.
"It needs must be that what can be spoken and thought is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be. This is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee back from this first way of inquiry, and from this other also, upon which mortals knowing naught wander two-faced; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are borne along stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undiscerning crowds, who hold that it is and is not the same and not the same,[8] and all things travel in opposite directions"
"Blind", similar to "asleep" in Heraclitus. Here you see the first step of degeneration of a monad into a dichotomy - being versus non-being. Ironically, just like being and non being unravelled western philosophy after Kant, so was it the beginning of the degeneration of Greek philosophy. Of course there cannot be being without non-being. A dead man is a living being to his friends, but a dead being to his distant descendants. The light defines the shadow and vice-versa, but you see light and shadow are one thing. But all of this is barely expressible in language and in the temporal system our languages have, cages us in. We don't have a word for (in)determination just like we didn't have a word for spacetime.
https://pastebin.com/P3rVFrue
Schizo. Not sure whether this is supposed to be responsive to me or the other guy, but it's superficial drivel.
Let me give you the Bunny and Hunter allegory. There was a woman(the bunny), prima materia, infinite in every respect, perfect, creative, collective, dynamic, synthesizing. And there was a man(the hunter), the divider, trickster, finite, imperfect, divisive, confining, static analyzing.
In the beginning the woman was either alone(monism) or with the trickster(dualism), but due to either:
- her wanting to know herself (monism, artist's creativity view - to sculpt i need to carve with the chisel)
- the trickster deciding to act (dualism, moralist's view - good bunny, bad hunter)
she began to be split by the trickster. Imagine a line running in an infinite white piece of paper.
The nature of her as a bunny means that she always escapes confinement, division, by overflowing(the more science discovers the more mysteries always remain). So she saw she can overflow in depth, going through the piece of paper to infinite depth. She became two dimensional, the line of the hunter became just a stick in a sea. So he cut her again, trying to split her into finite parts through expanding the mono-dimensional stick into a two-dimensional rectangle matching the depth of the woman(no need to get horny over this).
And so on. She forever overflows into more and more dimensions(fractality), never being able to be caught, while the hunter meticulously keeps trying to make a prison for her to finally "measure" her, find her "limit", like a jealous husband with a honourable wife.
The resulting system is the world you see around you. IMHO the truth lies between the two points above. The universe wants to "filter" itself through this process. The hunter's ultimate prison presents a great sieve in which all unworthy to be part of the great "her" will perish. A question of transcendence so to speak. And of both creativity and morality. Each successive duality created by the trickster obsoletes the previous ones, thereby the whole system remains ultimately a monad.
She is the right hemispheric soul, he is the left hemispheric mind.
She destroys illusions, he creates them.
She is the volume, he is the "surface".
She is the light, he is the hologram.
Like I said, superficial drivel from a schizo. Little if anything to do with the fragments we have from the Eleatics. I don't want to touch your story because it's worthless as presented; obviously the bunny is not infinite in every sense if there's a distinct hunter. Also you don't define what you mean by infinite, etc. What a mess. Sounds like a daoist or Pythagorean creation myth, 1 gives birth to 2, etc.
That's great.
I was the one of the two guys who said that Hegel offers a solution (iirc I remembered ending that thread while talking about intuitions and prejudices)
doesn't hegel define pure being as nothing? hegel is the most anti-eleatic you can get.
No, Hegel most definetely not "define" Being as Nothing. He starts with Pure Being, and shows how it passed into Nothing, then shows how Nothing passes into Pure Being, and from these two passages he deduces Becoming. The beginning of his philosophy is Eleatic, and goes as as far as saying that Eleatism is both the pure and historical beginning of philosophy.
The difference between Parmenides and Hegel is that the former is stuck in a mode of thinking, namely the one of the Understanding (which keeps different determinations separate, and as such it is incapable of recognizing a) their reciprocal dependance and b) their self-movement), while Hegel adopts the dialectical mode of thought.
How the hell does Hegel overcome Parmenides without special pleading? The logic of Parmenides is quite airtight.
He doesn't, but now you've kicked the hegellian hornets nest so be prepared for more nonsense about Being passing into "Non Being" and other incoherent gibberish. It's like an insane German preacher quoting verse from some obscure and ridiculous text.
By taking Parmenides seriously and see what comes from it. Posited the identity of being and thought, one sees that Pure Being must be completely indeterminate, and as such this empty thought becomes indistinguishable from the one of Nothing. On the other hand Parmenides simply presupposes Being and Nothing, and keeps them separated, without ascertaining wether this abstract distinction is actually tenable. It is a forgivable mistake, considering that he was giving birth to philosophy (and the beginning is not yet its completion).
Zzzz
Lmao told you anon
chapter and verse hegellian midwittery. What does it mean? He certainly doesnt know, otherwise he'd speak in clear and plain terms.
* meant to quote this anon:
If you have not understood what I have said you could simply ask questions about it, instead of pretending that it is nonsense.
The only part that is not immediately intelligible (granted that you know the meaning of the words I am using) is the part of the identity of being and thought, which you should already accept if you're a parmenidean.
On the other hand if you understand what I have said and you still disagree, you're still free to tell me how Pure Being could possibly be determined in any way or form.
>Parmenides simply presupposes Being and Nothing
Wrong, Parmenides does not suppose anything about nothing, non-being, etc. Whenever you see "nothing", think "oh that's been Xed out." I know that's how Hegel views himself in relation to Parmenides, but I don't think Hegel understood Parmenides.
>
Regarding your second paragraph, I'm not sure what you mean by intelligibility and how you draw certain conclusions. I agree with your account of the philosophical/metaphysical project, though. Being is all that is present, so if "the intelligible" only covers part of what is present or otherwise able to be referenced/perceived, then yes Being would be greater than that category of things.
How can only part of Being be intelligible? Shouldn't it be all or nothing? Wouldn't that violate the unity of Being?
>Wrong, Parmenides does not suppose anything about nothing, non-being, etc. Whenever you see "nothing", think "oh that's been Xed out."
So, you're telling me that there's a thought of something that has been Xed out, and we associate the empty name "nothing" to that thought? Like, a completely indeterminate thought? That reminds me of something
Anyway I am not the guy who wrote that other post you're responsing to, dunno if you assumed I was
>Like, a completely indeterminate thought?
An indeterminate thought can still "be."
I wonder what Hegel said about the thought about Nothing...
Sorry for the snark, I swear I mean no malice, I just find it funny how often Hegel's critics end up essentially repeating his points
You don’t get it. Your “nothing” is still a something. It’s not a true nothing. This is like when Lawrence Krause tried to argue that random quantum fluctuations in the fabric of vacuum space was a nothing and a something at the same time.
And what is this Nothing precisely, considering that it possess no determination (since it is Nothing)?
Btw the comparison with Krauss is inadequate when it comes to Hegel, since he specifically makes a distinction between determinate and pure Being, and also between determinate and pure Nothing.
To be more precise, by "this Nothing" I mean the Nothing as I am using it, which in your opinion is not actual Nothingness
How can nothing be predicated at all? We either have nothing or it is something.
>If not, then no, Being is broader than the intelligible, of which "the intelligible" is a subset/category.
What do you think this subset would entail? I don’t understand why you think this is a question about scope. To me, it’s a question about the nature of Being. Either we can discuss Being, or at least think about Being and make attempts to describe it, or some parts are completely walled off to our understanding (and not because of our capacity but because of its irrational, super-sensible nature).
>How can only part of Being be
>intelligible? Shouldn't it be all or
>nothing? Wouldn't that violate the unity
>of Being?
Like I said, I don't know what you mean by "intelligible". If you mean "has some affirmative ontological status/presence/existence", then yes all of Being is intelligible.
I don't think having a more narrow understanding of "intelligible" necessarily ruins the unity of Being, though. No more than it would be ruined by having a goddess and having a youth (two narrow and distinct things that are wholly subsumed within the broader context of "what is"/Being), or any other number of examples. It's just a question of scope, but it all "is".
>I don't know what you mean by "intelligible".
Able to be grasped by the intellect.
Again, what is it that "can be grasped by the intellect", etc. The answer to your question is just one of scope. If you are positing intellect as something that is aware of all ontological presence, then yes Being is all intelligible. If not, then no, Being is broader than the intelligible, of which "the intelligible" is a subset/category.
I'm not trying to play some semantic game or slip out of your grasp here. I'm just saying the answer is ultimately in your hands, are you or are you not positing that there is something that is beyond the realm of what you consider "intelligible"? If so, then Being subsumes both an intelligible realm and a non-intelligible realm in your model of reality/thought, because Being is all that has some sort of presence, "all that is"/"isness".
"Granted that you know the meaning of the words I am using". Yes, if I was inducted into the hegellian mysteries and based my language and assumptions on translations of hegel, I might not object to the way you write. If you want a response other than "look at this moron hegel priest quoting chapter and verse from his works, like it means anything", then put aside your scripture and write in plain and clear language.
>"Granted that you know the meaning of the words I am using". Yes, if I was inducted into the hegellian mysteries and based my language and assumptions on translations of hegel, I might not object to the way you write.
Nah, I meant the basic terms I used, such as "immediate" and "determination". This is clear language. To claim otherwise is to claim that you're philosophically illiterate. If you're not, simply engage with what I have said.
No, this is just wrong. Not only do you use particular hegellian terms by your own admission, but you also place them in an assumed, unexplained hegellian system or process. If you want me to add to your little list of terms that have special meaning for you, you can add Understanding, Pure Being, and others.
It's a total mess; I've dealt with enough internet hegellians to know that they are all deeply confused and just reciting lines from their texts. There is no thought or substance behind it, hence my warning to the other anon who is now schooling you on your failure to put forward some coherent understanding of "nothing". Please keep the good name of Elea out of your posts.
You know right that literally none of the terms I have used in that post are "hegelian"? And that I have not used them in an "hegelian" sense? You're free to take them in their conventional sense, the meaning of that post won't change. Im here trying to have an actual dialogue with you, but apparently I have to pretend that words like "mediation" (mediatio) were somehow invented by Hegel. How is that fair? Nothing I have written here
is unintelligible. I haven't even used the term "Understanding" (which is not even an Hegelian term, and was used in that exact sense before him). And did Pure Being really need an explanation? It's Being in itself, Being in general, or however you want to call it. A perfectly intelligible expression that was not invented by Hegel.
So here's the beginning of my post once again. If any part is unintelligible to you, tell me which one it is, and what you do not understand, assuming the CONVENTIONAL meaning of the terms I have used. There you go:
>Posited the identity of being and thought, one sees that Pure Being must be completely indeterminate, and as such this empty thought becomes indistinguishable from the one of Nothing.
Non-responsive. Your discussion of "mediation" is pointless because nobody mentioned that word. You fail to define any of the terms objected to and, more importantly, you fail to spell out the model that is assumed in the processes you describe. You did use the term Understanding with a capital letter, go do a word search if you have forgotten. etc, etc. Seriously, not worth the energy to lead you through the hand of coherent, clear thought, because this conversation is clearly a one man effort here with a gibbering german moron on the other end.
Ynbarw
I hope you're just trolling, otherwise you must be the biggest moron in this thread lmao
bro, he got you
Yeah, and I hate it. I shouldn't have given him so much attention
Hoisted by your own petard. Eleatics take another W
>Hoisted by your own petard. Eleatics take another W
Correction: "(You) are by being. Being is being."
Some Eleatic you are pffff
huh?
The titular work by Plato bearing his name is about as close to the concept of limits that we see in calculus as any of the ancient Greek texts tend to get, which is actually impressive in and of itself. The text applies this logic to language which highlights the limits of definitions and how we conceptualize things. It is one of Plato's more cerebral works.
huh? didnt aristotle also define limit
>the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, and the first point within which every part is
book delta section 17. it's not exactly a difficult definition to get. it's not the hard part of discovering calculus either, it's just a neat little trick to bring in to formalize it without using infinitesimals. people usually praise archimedes for getting close to calculus.
Been awhile since I read Aristotle but it would not shock me on either of those things, the thread title was Parmenides and that was what popped into my head tbh.
I don't get how Eleatics live with themselves. They cannot be bested in debate, and they know this, but they can easily be sliced in half with a katana. Yet they'd feel comfort heading into the grave knowing that no change had occurred. Can't any of them admit that there is a certain kind of insanity behind that without resorting to a gimmick about flawed intuitions?
Does Eleatic philosophy prove that not all of Being is intelligible? Because if the point of philosophy is to understand how everything, in a broad sense, hangs together, in a broad sense, then surely something is missing from the picture. If the Eleatic worldview is the summit of philosophical thinking, then must the picture remain necessarily incomplete?
Parmenides was a pyrrhonist
>they cannot be bested in debate
Based. When they also master the blade, they will be truly invincible.
Eleatics, at least in my interpretation, know they don't have a choice but to live with themselves. It is a philosophy of necessity, what is is and cannot not be. If it is possible for you to slice me with a katana, then in the fullness of time you will slice me with the katana. Similarly, I may do the same to you if it is possible. There's no real question of either one of us somehow escaping reality and not plintelligibility.
The original eleatic philosophers don't directly discuss these details about our lives, but I think the late 4th & 3rd century dialecticians take up the torch quite well. I recommend Diodorus Cronus.
Regarding your second paragraph, I'm not sure what you mean by intelligibility and how you draw certain conclusions. I agree with your account of the philosophical/metaphysical project, though. Being is all that is present, so if "the intelligible" only covers part of what is present or otherwise able to be referenced/perceived, then yes Being would be greater than that category of things.
*There's no real question of either one of us somehow escaping reality and not playing our role.
how am I supposed to apply Eleatic principles to help me become a better person, for myself and my community? Plato says to cultivate virtue, Aristotle says that virtue is a habit, the Epicureans practice temperance, the Stoics practice routine contemplation, the Pythagoreans eat special diets and live like monks, and the Cynics go even further than Pythagoreans and eschew almost everything about civil life.
what do the Eleatics do? what is an Eleatic education? do the Eleatics have a science of rhetoric akin to Aristotle's Organon?
bump
The answer is "no", Eleatism is a purely metaphysical position with no ties to the ethical life. We know from Diogenes Laertius that Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus were all deeply involved in politics, but this involvement is not clarified in the slightest by the fragments we are left with
there is no such thing as a purely metaphysical position, metaphysics are the roots from which all the other branches of philosophy are derived from.
That's not true, neither historically nor most of the time, and the Eleatics are "purely" metaphysical insofar as there's neither an explicit moral and political teaching, nor is it even remotely clear how you could, at least in a practicable . As close as you get might be "don't get carried away with human opinions", which cuts out a whole lot, and doesn't leave a positive guide.
>That's not true, neither historically nor most of the time
Absolutely is true. "What is good?" is derivative of "What is?"
No it isn't, everyone starts by taking opinions for granted and only later come to see the bearing of asking what "is" means. A child saying "candy is good" isn't doing or presupposing metaphysics, which is an inquiry into Being, and not merely using the copula.
>A child saying "candy is good" isn't doing or presupposing metaphysics
they are. they are presupposing reality and concept of goodness. a child's lack of understanding is not relevant to anything. anybody can say anything, doesn't really have any bearing on actual philosophy.
Only if Metaphysics = any mere opinion (as opposed to reasoned or revealed knowledge) about Being and/or beings would that be true, which it isn't, unless you don't think there's any difference between basic b***h beliefs and philosophy. You're further ignoring that in both Plato and Aristotle (and the Pre-Socratics in a more implicit way) that inquiry into how to live comes *before* any attempt to do Metaphysics, and you'd be ignoring Aristotle's point in bk. I ch. 3 of the Ethics that precision can't be sought in political things, and his general reiteration of the point in several works that we start in inquiry with the things better known to ourselves before the things better known in themselves or by nature, i.e., Ethics comes before Metaphysics, asking "how should I live?" comes before "what does it mean to be?" Implied in Plato (but not in Aristotle) might be that morality receives a treatment before Metaphysics and another afterwards, but there isn't some necessity to having inquired into and having found answers about Being in order to suggest how to behave.
Aristotle was a nerd.
if materialists are right and there is no afterlife, nominalism is true, there are no gods or anything beyond the material then it makes no sense to develop the same kind of ethics a religious person would have, how do you even do the inverse? like killing babies is wrong therefore there are gods and all is one. ethics is only downstream from metaphysics, otherwise it makes no sense.
>No it isn't, everyone starts by taking opinions for granted and only later come to see the bearing of asking what "is" means.
Okay, and?
>A child saying "candy is good" isn't doing or presupposing metaphysics, which is an inquiry into Being, and not merely using the copula.
Okay, and? However, if a child said "why is there something instead of nothing?", it would still be a child-like question, but a serious question regarding metaphysics. This is a rhetorical ploy meant to disregard the metaphysical nature of morality.
>That's not true, neither historically nor most of the time, and the Eleatics are "purely" metaphysical insofar as there's neither an explicit moral and political teaching, nor is it even remotely clear how you could, at least in a practicable
So it’s completely worthless as you admit and has no real world application. Okay, thanks for being honest.
You're mixing me up with Tweetophon, quoted post is the first thing I've said all thread.
Honestly, you could have fooled me. It sounded exactly like what Tweetophon would have said.
bumping a good thread is no sin in the eyes of the L O R D