>Change is not real.
>Perception is illusory.
This is the foundation of Eleatic philosophy. However, when we turn our awareness not outwards into the world but inwards toward our experiences, we must note that:
>Perception itself changes.
This is a problem because we cannot claim that we are experiencing illusions about our illusions changing. If we affirm this second-order illusion, then we admit that original perception does not change and thus participates in outward Being wholly. This leads to a refutation of the principle of no change since we perceive change. On the other hand, if we reject this second-order illusion, then we admit that perception is not illusory, and again we are led to believe that change is real because we can perceive it.
In conclusion, if our perceptions change, then either change is real, or perception is not illusory. This is not a refutation of the core principle of Eleatic philosophy, that Being is unitary, indivisible, eternal, and unchanging. But both are so tied into each other in Eleatic philosophy in its failure to reject empiricism that rejecting one (change) means rejecting the other (real perception). Once cannot believe that perception is real but change is not or vice versa and continue to subscribe to Eleatic thought. Another way forward must be sought.
>This is a problem because we cannot claim that we are experiencing illusions about our illusions changing. If we affirm this second-order illusion, then we admit that original perception does not change
How does that logically follow? Are you trying to say that if the second order perception is an illusion then that reverses the ontological status of the first-order one to the effect that the illusion of change in the world is reversed, with the result that change in the world is therefore real? You didn't actually provide the underlying logical argument that would illustrate why this is the case so there appears to be a gap in your argument.
If the second order perception is true (and not an illusion), then we have affirmed change. If the second order perception is false (and is thus an illusion), then we have a strange contradiction.
I've been struggling to communicate this in Eleatic terms, and I think there's multiple mechanisms one can imagine to explain the consequences of this contradiction. But what I'm trying to get at is that second order perception cannot be wrong about experiencing itself changing because it is directly connected to the objects it describes, which is itself. I hope we can try to get to the root of the topic and try to unpack this than get stuck in whatever primordial and insufficient argument I've mustered to point out this problem.
>I don't follow; *if* Eleaticism rejects both change and perception, why would it be the case that an Eleatic has to defend one or the other? They reject both, right?
There is a misunderstanding here. There is a vested interest in Eleaticism to reject perception in order to reject change given their epistemology. They can't just say "perception is not illusory, but the objects of perception are not what Being is." The way they've constructed Being and the way they've formulated polemics, they cannot incorporate changing perception into a higher unchanging Being, so they have to say it is illusory entirely.
>But perception doesn't seem to come into it, unless you take "to perceive" = "to think", which doesn't seem to be the argument made.
It is very difficult to imagine perception as disconnected from thought. And self-perception is about as "thoughtful" as perception gets, given that the objects of self-perception are entirely mental.
>If the second order perception is true (and not an illusion), then we have affirmed change. If the second order perception is false (and is thus an illusion), then we have a strange contradiction.
There is no logical necessity to affirm the second order illusion, for example, the second order illusion can consist of the mistaken attribution of the act of perception to oneself, in this case, both the change inhering in the objects would be illusory, and the assumption that one's own self or consciousness is perceiving them would also be a mistake; but agreeing with this doesn't reverse the illusory status of change in the external world to once again being real.
In fact, a second-order illusion of this exact type is taught in three schools of Indian philosophy, specifically Samkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedanta, although only the last of the three further agrees that change in the external world is illusory (the first order one). All three of them teach that the foundational/root Self (Atman) or Consciousness (Purusha) is formless, inactive, and free of changing acts of perception and that it is through a mistaken attribution of the insentient intellect's function perception to the Self that we mistakenly conceive of ourselves as perceiving objects. Granted, this may not have been the exact position of Parmenides but it's a working way to answer the objection by someone defending the tenet that change is illusory.
>They can't just say "perception is not illusory, but the objects of perception are not what Being is."
Their arguments though aren't about perception, but about opinion, which Parmenides links to speech disconnected from what can be thought (bracketing whatever might be meant by "think" in his poem), consider Parmenides fragment 8 from line 50 on. One can maybe argue over Zeno's arguments presupposing something about perception, but the arguments as summarized and quoted in Plato and Aristotle aren't about perception per se.
It is very difficult to imagine perception as disconnected from thought. And self-perception is about as "thoughtful" as perception gets, given that the objects of self-perception are entirely mental.
Isn't this wavering between the various senses of "perception"? If perception by itself tends to connote what we experience through organs such as the eyes and ears, isn’t arguing by the phrase "self-perception" an argument that ignores that distinction? Granted, if I look down at my hands, I can be in a sense "self-perceiving", but if I'm thinking about, say, my motivations in doing something, "self-perception" just means "thinking" where the object of thought is internal, and surely I'm not doing so with my eyes, right?
>Isn't this wavering between the various senses of "perception"? If perception by itself tends to connote what we experience through organs such as the eyes and ears, isn’t arguing by the phrase "self-perception" an argument that ignores that distinction? Granted, if I look down at my hands, I can be in a sense "self-perceiving", but if I'm thinking about, say, my motivations in doing something, "self-perception" just means "thinking" where the object of thought is internal, and surely I'm not doing so with my eyes, right?
There's an interpretive element in every instance of perception, which is mental. When you take away the sensory element (because the object of perception is the mind), you're only left with mental elements of what you're examining and what you're interpreting.
What do you mean by "real"? If by real, you mean "is / has being", such that "real" = being, what would it mean to say "change is real" if you grant that "Being is unitary, indivisible, eternal, and unchanging"?
>But both are so tied into each other in Eleatic philosophy in its failure to reject empiricism that rejecting one (change) means rejecting the other (real perception). Once cannot believe that perception is real but change is not or vice versa and continue to subscribe to Eleatic thought.
I don't follow; *if* Eleaticism rejects both change and perception, why would it be the case that an Eleatic has to defend one or the other? They reject both, right?
Parmenides' poem sets out two conditions for Being: 1) Can it be spoken about? 2) Can it be thought? Condition 1 isn't satisfactory by itself, since the argument of the poem is that opinion can be spoken, but what opinion pertains to cannot be thought, whatever that might mean. But perception doesn't seem to come into it, unless you take "to perceive" = "to think", which doesn't seem to be the argument made.
doing a reconstruction of his face from his bust is insanely moronic because the bust isn't even him, it's based off of epicurus. anyway, I didn't read your arguments.
>Parmenides/Goddess doesn't say that there are illusions, or that "perception is illusory".
>Parmenides/Goddess rejects presentist models of change.
>OP eternally btfo'd
You have to go back (to the primary source material (also to reddit)).
Then where does it come from?
Where does what come from? Ffs anon, you spent all this effort "refuting" some moron-tier interpretation of the eleatics that you are incapable of rooting in the text. Have you ever read the fragments or Parmenides or any other Eleatic?
>Where does what come from?
The idea that perception is illusory as part of Eleatic philosophy.
It is one of several popular interpretations. If you want an "ancient" source that very clearly states it, then go to the neoplatonist Simplicius. In his commentary on the first book of Aristotle's Physics, he presents long-form quotes from Parmenides and interprets him as a dualist who posited a true world and an illusory world. Simplicius distinguishes his interpretation from the interpretation presented by Aristotle. Simplicius says that Aristotle presented Parmenides as a monist (true), but that Aristotle only did so to respond to morons and that deep down Aristotle knew Parmenides was a dualist. It's part of Simplicius' overall project of harmonising all the ancient thinkers and connecting them into some neoplatonist nonsense (so obviously he needs to go with the illusion world interpretation to bring Parmenides in line with his own neoplatonist worldview).
What do you think the Eleatics would have made of perception?
I go with the interpretation that there is actually only one path - "is". Whatever you perceive "is". The problem is when people think they can stray from that path, positing an "is not", and they wander double-headed and confused, as the goddess says. The attack on "change" is specifically on presentist models that involve positing an "is not" that then "becomes" "what is". Which is really what Eleatics were hyper focused on - how to describe Being and ensure that whatever we say complies with its nature (on pain of our words being gibberish).
>Whatever you perceive "is".
Ever heard the phrase "Never judge a book by its cover?"
But anyway, if someone has that interpretation so be it, but at least be able to explain how you got there and why you reject the other interpretations out of hand and declare this the "foundation of eleatic philosophy". As though the existence of an illusion world of doxa is somehow the real truth behind the eleatics, rather than their understanding of "is" in the omnipresent sense and the ramifications this has on things like creation and destruction. It's insane.
oh sweet! more unfalsifiable impractical nonsense
I never liked how Parmenides depicts himself as the arbiter of truth (literally at the halfway point between night and day) in this poem when his entire brief system is unfalsifiable anyways.
>change isn't real
*changes from alive to dead*
Uh... Parmesanidesisters? Our response?
>Parmesanidesisters
You can't be an Eleatic Discord troony. It is literally impossible. If change isn't real, then neither is transitioning. It is the epitome of YWNBAW.
tfw no eleatic discord troony gf
There is an apocryphal tale that Diogenes was at a lecture by Parmenides where he said change isn’t real and then Diogenes got up and walked away. Actually it might’ve been Zeno of Elea and not Parmenides in this story but same difference.
>and then Diogenes got up and walked away.
proved Parmenides's point. there's no universe where Diogenes understands the unity, simplicity, indivisibility, and eternality of Being.
To Diogenes, it doesn’t matter either ways because there is no conclusive way to prove his theories and it doesn’t actually affect your life in any way so it is baseless speculation and navel gazing. That is the point of the anecdote.
Realizing the truth of Being put everything else in perspective. In that sense, that's the most valuable thing one can learn.
It's the only way to ensure that one maintains some basic degree of coherence.
>TIL about Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BC), who claimed that motion is nothing but an illusion. Upon hearing Zeno's arguments, Diogenes the Cynic stood up and walked away.
https://www.reddit.com/r/todayilearned/comments/gva0ol/til_about_greek_philosopher_zeno_of_elea_c_490430/
So if change and perception are illusory, how can you ever tell?
A good Eleatic would object that 1) perception doesn't change, 2) you don't know what you mean by perception, and 3) even the idea of a subject of perception is nonsensical, since it already entails a difference between entities (e.g. there is a subject and an object, or, there is a subject and his own activity, and so on).
I'll just mention an argument by Zeno, which is quoted by Simplicius. It is an argument aimed at establishing that differences are impossible. Let's say, hypothetically, that there are two entities A and B, and that they differ in something. They do not differ because of their Being, since they both are. So, if they are different, they differ because of their non-being. But non-Being isn't, which means that A and B cannot differ in anything, which in turn means that they're actually the same identical thing. As such there cannot be different entities.
Notice that the same argument can be applied to properties and activities too.
>They do not differ because of their Being, since they both are. So, if they are different, they differ because of their non-being. But non-Being isn't, which means that A and B cannot differ in anything, which in turn means that they're actually the same identical thing.
Why can't they differ due to their predicates of their Being?
As I have mentioned, you can apply the argument to literally any difference. So, if you posit a distinction between Being and predicates of Being, you can just substitute those to A and B and get the same conclusion.
What is inbetween Being and non-Being?
>Being
Being is not the only property which can be attributed to something. The fact that you even use Being as a way to describe something which does not encompass the entirety of the object shows this. "They both are" is just one of many possible statements you can make about an object. You cannot totalize this one statement over the entire rest of the field of meaningful statements. That's just incoherent.
>Being is not the only property which can be attributed to something.
This is exactly what the argument aims to refute. Let me re-apply it to the present objection: let's say hypothetically that there are two classes of properties, one (A) including Being and the other (B) including every other property. A and B must differ in something. The rest of the argument is identical to the previous formulation.
>The fact that you even use Being as a way to describe something which does not encompass the entirety of the object shows this.
The argument I have posited applies to ANY distinction. This includes the distinction between Being and the object that is. This also entail that Being is not the predicate of another object, rather, Being is the only existing object.
>That's just incoherent.
It's up to you to refute this argument, I've merely proposed it. Personally, I think there is an issue with it, but I can't pinpoint it. That said, I think the only way to refute this argument is to prove that Being must have difference as a condition of existence (in that case Plato's Sophist is enough to do the trick).
The question is ill-posed, since Nothing isn't, which means that it cannot be an extreme, with the other pole being Being, for which something else can be between them. According to the Eleatics ONLY Being is.
>Let's say, hypothetically, that there are two entities A and B, and that they differ in something. They do not differ because of their Being, since they both are. So, if they are different, they differ because of their non-being. But non-Being isn't, which means that A and B cannot differ in anything, which in turn means that they're actually the same identical thing.
Let me try this out. So we'll posit A and B, where A = Truth, and B = Opinion. Now, they both are but seem to differ, but not insofar as they are. Therefore Truth is the same identical thing as Opinion. Huh, incredible.
Correct. Now you just have to realize that this now applies to all the identifying factors and truth and opinion. Once this is realized, they will be completely undifferentiated concepts (they will lack any sort of positive, distinctive determination), and therefore will be reduced to pure Being. Dunno if I have been clear, I'm summarizing a lot
>OH NO NO NO PARMESANDESISTERS
it's over. it was always over. it never began.
"friends of the forms" win another puppet show! Hooray, fellow Platonists, this is what philosophy is about!
You may have misread the passage, for the "friends of the forms" were completely blown the frick out in that screencap. To believe in eternal, unchanging forms is to deny the accessibility of intellect itself. For intellect to be accessible in any way (e.g. knowledge), then it would have to admit of change. This is also a strong argument that Plato never believed in the facsimile of "eternal, unchanging" forms the way that is often presented.
This argument is also a challenge for the Parmenideans, for they would have to explain how thinking works without separating thought from Being.
The Eleatics have been real quiet ever since this dropped...
This passage is resolved in the Sophist.
Resolved in favor of what? Certainly not a static realm of forms, but rather a more Heraclitean conception of logos. Plato's Eleatic sympathies are annihilated for reasons described in that picrel.
If there's no difference between truth and opinion then what's the point of disparaging claims of difference as mere opinion? They would be equivalent to truth and therefore you're acknowledging difference.
>Resolved in favor of what?
Resolved in favour of the truth, which is that being is not a genus, and so stasis and change (or motion) are wholly separable from Being. Being is not the same as "remaining the same." Both Being, Stasis, and Change, all exist, but the latter two partake of Being. Therefore it's illogical to state that Life and Intellect do not exist because they are subject to change, like it does in the image posted.
>Certainly not a static realm of forms
Both a static realm of forms and a non-static realm of change, both of which partake of Being.
>Therefore it's illogical to state that Life and Intellect do not exist because they are subject to change, like it does in the image posted.
I don't think that image says that. Rather, it says that if intellect did not undergo change, then it would be inaccessible, as nothing could interact with it.
Also, can you explain how:
>which is that being is not a genus, and so stasis and change (or motion) are wholly separable from Being.
does not contradict
>Both Being, Stasis, and Change, all exist, but the latter two partake of Being.
>I don't think that image says that. Rather, it says that if intellect did not undergo change, then it would be inaccessible, as nothing could interact with it.
What the image says is this, paraphrased: "It is absurd to assert that Being has no intelligence or life or knowledge, simply because change cannot be present in Being." This is a very weak reductio ad absurdum argument, but it's eradicated anyway by the counter-argument I just hashed out which is shown in the Sophist in more detail.
>Also, can you explain how:
Stasis and Change being wholly separable from Being means that they are in no sense the same as Being. Therefore Stasis and Change could both cease to exist, and Being would still remain. In terms of modal logic, one would say that Being is the necessary truth, and Stasis and Change are contingent truths which might not exist. That makes Stasis and Change wholly separable in possibility. The error of the train of thought in Theatetus is the common mistake where "Being" is taken for the same thing (or coextensive) as "Stasis" or "Remaining-The-Same." The resolution in the Sophist is that Being really transcends Stasis and Change, so that Being neither changes nor remains the same, because it is the substratum for both of these manifestations.
>"It is absurd to assert that Being has no intelligence or life or knowledge, simply because change cannot be present in Being."
That's not what I read at all. It's saying the complete opposite would be absurd. The position it wants to make absurd is that held by the "friends of the Forms." Therefore, Being has to admit of change in order to admit of intellect.
>The resolution in the Sophist is that Being really transcends Stasis and Change, so that Being neither changes nor remains the same, because it is the substratum for both of these manifestations.
That makes a lot of sense, thank you.
>The position it wants to make absurd is that held by the "friends of the Forms."
This is what the reductio I just quoted is attempting to do. I didn't disagree with you there.
>Therefore, Being has to admit of change in order to admit of intellect.
This is not quite what was being argued, but close, you only missed the final conclusion which is a refutation rather than an affirmation. They have assumed (rightly or wrongly) that the "friends of the forms" hold Being as the same as Stasis. If Being is the same as Stasis, then this results in a logical absurdity for the "friends", because Being will be devoid of anything resembling life or intellect. So there is a twofold need for the philosopher who is interested in preserving A) knowledge, and B) life. The first need is for that which remains the same, the second need is for that which changes. Knowledge needs something which stays the same to be known, but at the same time requires something which changes in order to "know", or change objects of knowledge. Does Being need life or intellect in the passive sense (the sense in which life and intellect change)? That is the absurdity the image is counting on. It tries to push the false dichotomy that Being must be EITHER the same OR changing, and if it is the same then it is not an intellect, but if it is changing then it is not Being because it is changing out of Being. But it fails to step back and consider whether Being is present in both of these cases, because in this case it would be manifestly wrong to limit Being to either changing or remaining the same, given that Being is actually present in both cases, Change and Stasis. If it is, then what? That's what the Sophist dialogue moves into asking and exploring.
Anything that does not change in some sense, but which is not purely unchanging.
A purely discursive response to that question does not answer that question, since by manifestation I think we understand the same thing: experience.
>This is not quite what was being argued, but close, you only missed the final conclusion which is a refutation rather than an affirmation.
Perhaps this wasn't clear from only posting a single paragraph. But that's not the case as this is Perl's reading that specifically argues for the motion of the intellect. Admitting of any movement when previously there was no movement is an affirmation, which is what Perl tries to show. The crux of that whole paragraph was to point towards a motion-inclusive account of the forms, not to reaffirm the only the static forms.
What is a manifestation of stasis?
>If there's no difference between truth and opinion then what's the point of disparaging claims of difference as mere opinion? They would be equivalent to truth and therefore you're acknowledging difference.
You're still assuming that truth has certain positive determinations that individuates it in a specific way. The point if that if you reapply this argument to every argument you will always get pure Being, since every other determination must differ from Being in something, yadda yadda
Being is no substrate in my reading of Sophist. Each greater kind requires every other greater kind, meaning that each kind can function as both a genus and a species for each other kind (e.g. being can be the genus of identity, and identity can be at the same time the genus of being). Being loses all its prominence, mostly because it is shown that it has no ontological independence (consider the passages in which it is shown that Being must be "whole" and "one). The mistake of orthodox eleatics was thinking that Being could be considered as something completely independent and autonomous, while in actuality it requires the other greater kinds to be what it is
>Being is no substrate in my reading of Sophist.
My reading is that the Sophist is the first affirmation of what was later called the analogy of being, so calling it a substrate is indeed misleading depending upon how you understand that word. This means that Being is ontologically fundamental (by definition), but it is not reducible to a genus or species, nor is anything else reducible to Being in the same way. It transcends all categorical understanding, because, as stated in the dialogue, the lesser categories cannot be predicated of Being without resulting in absurdity. I think this is why Plotinus ends up affirming The One as that which is beyond "Being." Of course, there is a terminological mixup here. Plotinus's "Being" is not the same as the Being discussed in the Sophist, given that Sophist is obviously not referring to a pure Intellect or Demiurge.
>Being loses all its prominence, mostly because it is shown that it has no ontological independence
I struggle to see how you can take this from the dialogue. The dialogue builds up to showing how there is only Being, and that "non-Being" is actually the "form" or category of Difference. Given that the dialogue is attempting to grapple with the Parmenidean contention that non-Being is absurd (and ultimately agrees with them in the absolute sense), it seems clear that the emphasis is on the fundamentality of Being. In other words, when you say that "each kind requires another greater kind", Being is exempted from this regress, because it is not itself a "kind."
>In other words, when you say that "each kind requires another greater kind", Being is exempted from this regress, because it is not itself a "kind."
Check the passages I have mentioned. If you want I can give you the specific numbers tonight. Being for example depends on other determinations such as the ones of Identity, Oneness and Wholeness.
>Check the passages I have mentioned. If you want I can give you the specific numbers tonight. Being for example depends on other determinations such as the ones of Identity, Oneness and Wholeness.
I'm confused. Are you asserting that Being is a kind or a substrate? And which passages are you mentioning? I'm trying to follow the debate as an outsider.
>
You're still assuming that truth has certain positive determinations that individuates it in a specific way. The point if that if you reapply this argument to every argument you will always get pure Being, since every other determination must differ from Being in something, yadda yadda
How doesn't this undermine the point of philosophy itself (and thus the Eleatic perspective by implication)? The account invalides itself.
How so?
Because everything is true, truth and opinions are alike, and everything is an opinion. Philosophy is a futile venture then, because we started with opinions and ended with opinions. Any system that claims that everything is just an opinion leads itself to claim that it is only an opinion too, which seems a bit ridiculous in that it aimed for the final truth and yet opened the door for more discourse in such an ugly fashion.
Let me try this way: what is the mesnung of "truth"? How does it differ from the meaning of "being"?
Nta, but "truth", "a-letheia" is unconcealment, and so derivatively the "manifestness" of something, presumably of Being or a being. There's clearly a relation there, but I wouldn't say they're the same.
(A question here might be: does Truth happen in the world or nature, or is it something that happens in thinking when we encounter Being / beings (consider the word "dis-cover"), or is it something that happens in speech (consider the verb aletheuein, "to speak truly")?)
I just feel like you're trying to meander around the point, especially when Parmenides himself distinguishes between truth and opinion, with the clear desire to convince you, the reader, to adopt truth over opinion.
>we cannot claim that we are experiencing illusions about our illusions changing
Of course you can. This isn't babby's first philosophy help-center. More people need to learn to say git gud scrub and let you work out yourself. You're on the internet, there's no excuse to be a moron
The point is that the changing sensory world relies on an inner-outer distinction that falls apart when you internally observe internal objects. The mere fact that you directly observe change within your own cognition (changing perceptions) suggests that change is real. What could be causing the change? You don't know, but it's there.
I don't get Tweetophon. He'll rail against "difference" but then admit that he holds the Plotinean view of difference, meaning that he simply holds a higher principle above everything else. The only difference between him and Plotinus is that he holds Being and thought to overlap completely instead of thought being a subtle emanation from Being.
Whoever this Tweetophon guy is, he definitely is not Plotinean. Any attempt to reduce Being to one principle among many, or as a sort of umbrella that is separate from those seeking shelter, or an emanating principle that holds things in some limited sense that gives rise to new things/change, is going to fail.
Reality is one big thing, "Being", and it can be described as all affirmative ontological status, "isness" writ large, whatever bit of meaning or significance one might mention. There are many signs that Being is one, etc. The idea of separating out "Being" into some sort of metaphysical dichotomy, like a context as somehow distinct from particulars/possibilities, is not going to work. NeoPlatonism fails in large part because they try to reduce Being, and it stems back to their desire to incorporate their knee-jerk hopes about indeterminate "change" via non-being, so their whole philosophy becomes worthless and irredeemable. Daoists fall slightly short because of their apparent failure to shed cosmological language and language of change, etc, but they both had a broad scope of enquiry and dealt with many particular topics, and some of them are very insightful. Eleatics were right but hyper-focused on metaphysical questions of ontology & change. Plotinus doesn't need to be mentioned unless it's as an example of errors and their consequences.
Nobody even mentioned Daoism. We know it's you Tweetophon. Besides:
>Look at this... When we describe particular things, we use distinction to whittle away everything else. We also affirm its place it in a context - we say it partakes in certain broad contexts or categories, like change or colour.
>To explain THE WORLD, what-is, we do no whittling at all, we affirm no particularity. We have a particular perspective, so the effort is imperfect.
>The point is: we're not trying to find something “other than itself” (beyond what-is) to explain what-is. Sheer gibberish.
>https://twitter.com/Tweetophon/status/1477923161018552320
How is that not compatible with Plotinus? You do recognize that particular things can be talked about, only that they have lower ontological priority than Being itself.
>"Whoever this Tweetophon guy is"
>brings up Daoism
Lmao, c'mon Tweetophon
OP didn't even read the text. So, OP, how it goes is that Parmenides attempts to construct a discourse about Being (that-it-is), given that the other "ways" of discourse, being 1) it-is-not (which is impossible) and 2) the way of mortals (which is wholly unproductive), don't grant access to truth. (I don't remember if he says truth explicitly, but it's essentially correct).
Really the foundation of Parmenidean thought is that "nothing" cannot be. I hope this has taught you enough to where you can pretend better like you've actually read it.
Unfortunately these texts become completely unintelligible, as long as they keep positing distinctions of these sorts (subject-object, subject-perception, entity-truth, subject-predicate, substance-property, and so on). To even grasp the eleatic framework (even just to refute it) one has to abandon every sort of distinction, and this is extremely hard to do for a novice.
I'm sorry Parmenides makes being a dilettante so difficult.
>and this is extremely hard to do for a novice.
It's literally impossible to do so long as you are saying anything at all.
>The meaning of the river flowing is not that all things are changing so that we cannot encounter them twice, but that things stay the same only by changing.
>change is not real
>steps in and out and in a river again
I disprove it thus.
Very interesting discussion. I am too high to understand it fully so what is actually the issue? Why is there disagreement about being. I know that Heidegger wrote a book being in time and he mentions the following: That said, the basic idea of Being and Time is extremely simple: being is time. That is, what it means for a human being to be is to exist temporally in the stretch between birth and death. Being is time and time is finite, it comes to an end with our death.
>That said, the basic idea of Being and Time is extremely simple: being is time. That is, what it means for a human being to be is to exist temporally in the stretch between birth and death. Being is time and time is finite, it comes to an end with our death.
That's not the thesis of B&T, which opens with the intention: "Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being."
My bad. Time is greater than Being. For time creates Being, and the created is inferior to the creator.
Boy howdy that's not it either.
I dumbed down your highfalutin language.
>If we affirm this second-order illusion, then we admit that original perception does not change and thus participates in outward Being wholly.
That wouldn't follow, because you haven't ruled out there being an infinite regress of illusory perceptions which doesn't bottom out in an original perception. In any case, I don't see why the Eleatic can't just restrict their error theory to first-order perceptions, which are the only ones that appear to us anyway.
>first-order perceptions, which are the only ones that appear to us anyway.
You can't perceive your perception? Are you an NPC?
I mean, I'm aware of the fact that I'm perceiving things, but that awareness is itself just an appearance like any other, not the thing in itself. If I'm wrong about what I'm experiencing right now, that fact obviously wouldn't apparent to me.