Was Peirce right when he said that all phenomenological "fourthness" is simply a composition of "thirdness" relations (and thereby doesn't exist)?
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Peirce and Fourthness
I found an interesting article, but unfortunately it is pay-walled.
>https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.4159/harvard.9780674862906.c20/pdf
Another website briefly describes Schneider's insights.
> A more detailed proposal for Fourthness comes from Herbert Schneider. Schneider concedes three categories to be adequate for dealing with cognitive processes, but argues for "importance" as a category of Fourthness. He notes that, for Peirce, any purpose or good has meaning only in relation to a completely general summum bonum. "No Kantian idealist could have stated this conception of moral science more formally."23
>Schneider observes this scheme does not accommodate norms which might apply "even in the absence of a summum bonum," itches that call to be scratched for their own sake. Such norms he proposes as a phenomenological aspect of Fourthness: logical import is Thirdness, vital importance Fourthness. Satisfaction may comprise either the Thirdness of achievement or the Fourthness of satiety or contentment. The moral self-control of Thirdness in pursuit of an abstract summum bonum is only an abstract "intellectual framework" until it is taken up into the "concrete universal" of the moral self-criticism of Fourthness. Fourthness supplies what depth psychology, but not the Kantian "moral law within," acknowledges.24
>In logical terms, Fourthness would constitute a temporal sequence, though one which is an absolutely discontinuous string of points superimposed on the triadic continuum. Triadic semiosis is "prospective and cumulative"; tetradic semiosis adds a fourth factor which is non-cumulative, but "retrospective" along the hierarchy of categories, giving "meaningful individuality" to instances of Firstness. Since Firstness and Secondness "look 'forward'" to Thirdness while Fourthness "looks back" to Firstness, Thirdness in a sense "governs" Fourthness while Fourthness provides the steam to "drive" Thirdness.25
It sounds like grasping the form of the Good. But I can't really ascertain more details.
not appearing on z-lib, nor does it appear to be free to access on De Gruyter. not in uni anymore, sorry bro.
Quick rundown on all this talk about Pierce and triads?
it's based. he's like Pythagoras, Aristotle, and Hegel wrapped up in one guy
Misunderstood, overspecific, and too popular?
just look up his categories of being
Just look up X8 0AP / X 0TNG
wtf is that fed shit
I gotchu. It has to do with his theory of representation, or what he delightfully called cenopythagorean categories. What are the categories of representation?
These ideas are quite hard to grasp and explain so I'll describe it in the simplest terms I can think of.
Firstness is possibility. It is a quality or sense impression that is not tied to a specific object and without relations. For example "redness" belongs to the first category, as it prescribes the possibility of all red objects. Firstness is a vague "something".
Symbolically firstness is represented by what he calls an "icon". An icon is a symbol that resembles its object. So for example the Egyptian hieroglyphic for water looks like a wavy squiggle . A wavy squiggle does not indicate any specific body of water, it is a generic impression.
Secondness is correlational and comparative. What are the relationships between items in the first category? Secondness is about refining firstness until one has particular information about a specific thing. It's about particulars and specificity. It connects two things and therefore sharpens your understanding of each specific thing by comparing .
The sign for secondness is an "index". An index is anything that conveys information without iconically representing the thing. It is what "points" to another thing and by virtue of that relation signifies info.
So a weathervane is an icon, because whatever direction the wind blows it shows you which way the wind blows.
Where there's smoke, there's fire, because smoke is an index of fire.
Finally, thirdness is about representation. It integrates the other two categories. It is about universals and systematization. Thirdness standardizes and generalizes the first and second categories as knowlege.
So for example, a natural law is an example of thirdness, as this explains a universal pattern.
A theory is an example of thirdness.
The syntax and grammar of a language is thirdness, because it specifies rules for generating any statement.
The sign for thirdness is a "Symbol." A symbol does not resemble its object but captures a concept. So for example E = MC^2 symbolizes matter/energy equivalence but does not resemble any of its applications.
>So a weathervane is an icon,
An index I mean
Thanks for the great explanation anon. It was genuinely helpful. Any particular work Pierce discusses this theory in?
>Pierce
ysk that it's PEIRCE, pronounced PURSE.
>Peirce loved to joke that he made it through sheer Peirce-severance.
Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs is probably his most direct statement of it.
If this is your introduction to Peirce then god help you. He is notoriously hard to read and peppers everything with his own neologisms and invented terminology.
I looked to see if this paper was online. Sadly, many of his writings are hard to find . Although there is a book Philosophical Writings of Peirce which contains it that you can get on amazon
what is fourthness
The being of four (4)
what is the being of four (4)?
The being of four is two-in-one. Each of its members has a sense of unity to itself. The unity between them means there is a division and plurality within and at the same time without itself. It makes no sense without its distinction within the other, in a relation of differentiation, the other two (2) and three (3). It’s like having a finger where you should have only one. The otherness of the finger means the finger to be part of the body, and at the same time not to be part of it, since the finger also stands apart from itself. Yet this also means, the finger, is in a position to be part of the body from all the directions in which it is not. The other side of one does not refer only to the finger. The differentiation of other-ness means each of its parts have a sense of itself not merely as a separate but as separate from itself at the same time. This sense of unity is never in the sense of it being in itself alone, in other words it’s never self-contained, since in a sense the part is apart from it – the part is not a part of itself, in other words it’s not self contained, in a sense there are two (2) and three (3) in the being of four.
This sense of unity in four can only be understood in other, in the other two and in what it doesn’t know of other than itself. The other side of one (4) knows nothing of itself but the other. The other side of one (4) is the essence of (3), it’s the knowing part; the other side of one also has its other side as the doing part – the part of two. That of being in two has no separation from being in three. Two and three in that sense make possible the understanding of its own other side, and by this make possible the knowing other to itself, both in and apart from three and two which always are two and three that is known in its unity. And if one tries to break from the other, they both are a unity to each other through being united to the other. They form a two and a three which becomes three and two at the same time as it forms in itself.
Thank you for the in-depth explanation. But if the being of four (4) is a unity-among-multiplicity containment of the being of two (2) and three (3), then where does the being of one (1) come into play? And are there higher beings, like the being of five (5), or is this a nonsensical question to ask, phenomenologically speaking? Peirce himself denied that the being of four (4) was a valid category within his "categories of being" due to it being, in his eyes, reducible to the being of three (3).
>if the being of four (4) is a unity-among-multiplicity containment of the being of two (2) and three (3), then where does the being of one (1) come into play?
The being of one is a being-among-multiplicity containment of nothing but an “if” and nothing otherwise.
>are there higher beings, like the being of five (5)
Yes, but these are "socio-beings" contingent on what? Nothing we know of in any sense that has anything like continuity.
How many more categories of being can we derive?
256
BULLSHIT
Nothingness. Nirvana. Zero. Infinity minus negative infinity.
What is Peirce’s platonism?
Yes
Deed? Oya
Rent. Spell it
firstness --> sensing, earth
secondness --> feeling, water
thirdness --> thinking, air
>problem of continuity, infinity
fourthness --> intuition/will, fire
>beyond mere nature and naturalism
fifthness --> spirit, aether
Literally Neoplatonism bullshit. Who’s putting all this in my guy Peirce?
s/in/on
no homo
Apparently Peirce did himself
>I may mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord -- I mean in Cambridge -- at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations. (CP 6.102)
he's not just a neoplatonist, but a kabbalist too (by accident)
whoa... this can't be a coincidence
>10 sign trichotomies = 10 sefirot
>66 classes = 22 paths x Peirce's 3 categories of being
take your meds
not going to until somebody takes my schizo connections seriously for at least a second
>Peirce
Who?
Who?