What is exactly the confusion that people are having over Socrates's discussion of unity and the one and the many that people have here, especially from 14-15 onward? I know I have plenty of my own.
Conceptually speaking, as far as I'm tracking:
>it is part of the problem of the one and the many, universals and particulars, etc.
>it is brought on by the need to distinguish kinds with precision (specifically, pleasure and knowledge)
>it is connected to wisdom, the limit, and the unlimited
Rhetorically speaking, as far as I'm tracking:
>Plato usually uses "hen", and sometimes "henades", to refer to unity and the class of unities
>Plato seems to call both the unity of a particular and the unity of a universal by the same term
>occasionally, Plato refers to unity and unities as "monad" or "monades", but this is far less common than "hen" or "henades"
>they are seemingly used interchangeably, too.
Grammatically speaking, as far as I'm tracking:
>heis: one, cardinal (e.g. one in general)
>protos, one, ordinal (e.g. first)
>monas: one, collective (this is where I'm most confused, using one as a collective number, unless it means explicitly "only one").
I'm not sure how this plays out in other dialogues that feature the problem, or how this compares to other uses of hen, monad, etc., in Greek philosophy (e.g. Aristotle, Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, etc.). I checked out a secondary source here:
>https://chs.harvard.edu/chapter/excursus-a-one-versus-one-the-differentiation-between-hen-and-monad-in-hellenistic-and-late-antique-philosophy/
... and it seems that "henad" or "monad" is used interchangeably across all of Greek philosophy. If one school uses "henad" to mean one concept and "monad" to refer to another concept, another school will map the same concepts but in reverse. Very annoying and confusing.
Any commentary is welcome.
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>Plato seems to call both the unity of a particular and the unity of a universal by the same term
no fricking shit
It's not that simple, moron. A red rose and a red firetruck aren't red in the same exact way.
Uh anon they both derive their redness from Red
They aren't red in the same exact way though. Grasping them as merely red and not the exact shade of color they are is to think in low resolution. We're also begging the question here about whether such unities (e.g. prototypical universals) exist, which is what this whole exercise is about at the end of the day.
They participate in redness. To which degree they participate in redness depends on what else they participate in, with ratios and such. Ultimately everything is all participating in "the good" and so through their participation in goodness all things are connected. They are of goodness first, and everything else comes from this as an emanation
Regardless of somethings logical division into it's constituent pieces, not only are things which are both red, connected insofar as they derive their redness from Red, so to are all their constituent pieces connected to the good, in addition to themselves
Goodness first,.everything else after, in a nicely nested, inwardly, as goodness doesn't just emanate all things, all things are an emanation within goodness
What is participation? What explains why the different shades of red are still red? Is it all just mixtures of participation?
this is all discussed in the Republic and Aristotle's categories. The form or idea of "Red" from which all thinga derive their redness, insofar as they participate in it
Glad you brought up both. After the Republic, forms are problematized to the point where they're not necessarily meant to be the "anchor" for a thing's identity (e.g. Socrates's criticism of the form of dirt or hair in Parmenides) and rather become something akin to the metaphysical "framework" which undergirds everything intelligible. And bringing Aristotle into the conversation brings two problems to the table: 1) substances (e.g. things, persons, etc.) and qualities (e.g. adjectives, differentia, etc.) are both treated as if they're kinds, but Aristotle explicitly keeps them ontologically separate. And Aristotle also criticizes whether it's even possible for there to be an "original kind", e.g. whether Being can be a genus, because it absolutely cannot be a defined/derived/etc. genus the way other genera are.
Imo it's all fractured down into pieces, hair has a form sure, hair is excellent in so far as it participates with excellence in hair. Plutarch/plotinus expands on this nicely as all is ann emanation of the one.
Aristotle primarily disagreed with that exact point you brought up that we shouldn't need a sort of thing in itself or form for every thing, obviously that's needlessly complicated, so then everything is moved first by an single unmoved mover. Same idea but I suppose an important semantic distinction
>Imo it's all fractured down into pieces, hair has a form sure, hair is excellent in so far as it participates with excellence in hair. Plutarch/plotinus expands on this nicely as all is ann emanation of the one.
I don't think it's helpful to go down this road right now until the primary questions regarding things such as "the One" introduced in the OP are resolved. What is an "emanation" and how does it square with either kind of participation that was identified so far in this thread?
>Aristotle primarily disagreed with that exact point you brought up that we shouldn't need a sort of thing in itself or form for every thing, obviously that's needlessly complicated, so then everything is moved first by an single unmoved mover. Same idea but I suppose an important semantic distinction
So then what is everything else, then? The problem for Aristotle was understanding the nature of substance, that which persists. But if we zoom out our perspective enough, the only thing we find that has persistence is the unmoved mover. So there's only one substance, and everything else is... a temporary flux whose intelligibility, if there is any intelligibility, is predicated on its relationship to the unmoved mover. A reflection of the unmoved mover, a pursuit to be like the unmoved mover, whatever you want to call it.
All things are of the one. Neoplatonism is very bolt-on to platonic thought, they just changed some of the terms from "the good" to "the one"
Participation has been explained, if a thing derives a part of its essence from some idea, it's participating in that idea, as can be said to be "of" that idea. All ideas are "of" the "good" or "one" and all things are both of "one" and derive their unique identity from the unique set of proportions of participations particulars have with their forms. It's infinity
what is an emanation
Now these are both one except one has a greater magnitude
Red is not a universal. Read Plato (Meno in particular). Sensory inputs can't be universals because they're all particular, even if they have similarities. Even "red" does not have an "idea" because there is no way to pin down what it really is. In reality, colours are just a general tendency of perception, they have no independent reality. Instead there are only likenesses between colours. Hence Plato makes "the Like" an idea, but not many things which are "alike" (i.e. the things participate in Likeness).
>There's no form of redness
>Under Plato's theory, "redness" itself would indeed have an ideal Form. This means that every red object in the physical world participates in or imitates the Form of Redness, but no physical object can ever be the perfect embodiment of it. The idea is that there exists a perfect, unchanging concept of "red" that exists beyond our physical reality, even though we can never perfectly capture or see this Form in the material world.
>In Plato's view, our souls have an innate knowledge of the Forms, which we recall through a process of anamnesis (recollection) when we encounter their reflections in the sensory world. This means that understanding the Form of Redness—or any Form—goes beyond just seeing red objects; it involves a kind of rational intuition or recollection that allows us to grasp what Redness itself is, in its pure, abstract form.
First of all, if Plato didn't think sensory qualities were universals in some way, then explain his color theory in Timaeus, or his discussion of language and music in Philebus. Second of all, what is likeness, then, if the perceived likenesses themselves have no independent reality? What are they dependent on, what do they tell us about reality, and why do they seem to persist in some way?
Keep in mind, if we're evolving from forms representing objects to forms representing an "intelligible mesh", then what it means for something to "participate" in a form clearly changes. The former gives the impression of sets, classes, and kinds, organized in a taxonomy. But what is going on in the latter? Something quite different I suspect.
One, feel free to communicate with a geometric figure or ask a question about one or unity
>monas: one, collective (this is where I'm most confused, using one as a collective number, unless it means explicitly "only one").
This is wrong. Collective versions of numbers are meant to give a sense of oneness to a group of things. In English, you would just say "they were one", because there is no separate conjugation, but in other languages, the cardinal and collective versions can be different.
So, I presume, when Plato is calling these unities "monades", he's temporarily suspending the hypothesis that the universals are unities in the absolute sense. This means that they could be just useful groupings, and he's suspending judgment for the time being.
I have some more thoughts on Phaedo 101b-101e. Initially, Socrates speaks of ones being added together to form a two (as in a sum of two), or a one being divided (as in two halves). Then, Socrates speaks of how we recognize two as such and a one as such—by participating in duality and unity respectively. Unless Socrates is bringing in three subjects: >adding ones, dividing ones, and one itself suddenly at the end
it seems like the monades in
>"καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι"
>"whatever is to be one must participate in unity"
>"and from a unit which is about to be one." (alternative translation)
is meant to imply a "unit" as a useful grouping, recalling the example of a divided one; however, the grouping is useful insofar as they participate in unity, which can be the only basis for their grouping in the first place. A foundation, of sorts. If monades was used as a way of assuming hypothetical nominalism in Philebus, then here, it appears to be taking more of a moderate approach between nominalism and realism.
At least, that's what makes sense to me.
(1/2)
There's one last part in Philebus 56e where monades is used, during the comparison between common arithmetic and philosophical arithmetic, and I'm not exactly sure how Socrates is treating monades there, but I can start. Previously, I've written:
>Recall... Socrates extracts what allows for precise measurements in the first place, arithmetic, and speaks of many kinds of arithmetic as it used in standards of measurements at 56e. Again, we have another “one and the many” problem alluded to here, in that there are many incommensurable standards of measure (some consider the “smaller and larger” standards as wholly incommensurable in quality, others treat the “the myriad units” (e.g. two oxen, two Armies) as equal if the numeral is the same). Socrates finds that the only way to resolve the problem is to understand how all these measurements cohere together, which is through the exact “philosophical arithmetic” (the “one” that unites the “many”).
>What exactly is philosophical arithmetic, if it is not enough to make [the measured numerals] quantitatively the same [as common arithmetic]? Arithmetic with quality? Because that seems to be the confusion over unit. Unit as a quality, and unit as a quantity.
Like in Phaedo, to truly understand this argument, I think we need to away from understanding any of these "arithmetics" as they are in regards to quantity, particulars, etc., and turn our attention to what "universals" they participate in. So, I think it is being used in the same sense that it was used in Phaedo, a moderate nominalism/realism. The unit is a quality and its respective measure is defined by quality.
Anyway, there's a whole lot of stuff going on in Phaedo 101. Just like how earlier, Socrates said to ignore the causes of beauty such as shape, color, etc., and to just focus on beauty itself, Socrates also said to ignore the causes of a number, like addition, division, the quantity between two numbers, etc., leaving it to "wiser people", and just focus on the number itself, its greatness, etc. This, especially the parts in 101b, resembles a similar line of reasoning that Socrates uses in Philebus 27e-28a, when he argues that the scale of pleasure has nothing to do with pleasure's goodness, since the quantity can belong to either pleasure or pain.
In summary, there is a concerted effort by Socrates to relate particulars to generals by the means of generals, in essence only, and to avoid all efforts to relate particulars to generals by the means of particulars, even if they are merely relations between particulars (like size) and not explanations of participating in some idea like beauty. Why that is, I'm not exactly sure, but it is delicious food for thought.
To add to Philebus and Phaedo similarities, note at Philebus 12e that color and shape are mentioned again as things that have many contrary instantiations which cannot be reduced to mere sources or causes but are qualitatively contrary too (to a refute a similar argument with pleasure).
Perhaps it would be helpful if someone took 2 or more things and reduced them to units, what if some things are prime?
What do you mean by that?
Thing one divided by thing two makes thing three that measures itself and things one and two
what the frick are you talking about
moron
How can you divide a thing by another thing? In what world does that even make sense besides arithmetic?
How do you compare on man to another, what makes a man great or small, what's the measure of a man
Your language is just unclear and imprecise. You're not really dividing one man by an object the same way you divide numbers. And in any case, this is no bearing to the topic presented in the OP.
Imagine not understanding the universal language of mathematics I used in my figure, this makes me conclude that you are in fact moronic, also you speak of bearing, dud just hold one thing up to another to see how it relates to it, thus contradiction also shows the depth of your moronicness
I don’t think anybody understands what you’re getting at, especially since we’ve strayed so far from the original topic. And your aggressiveness isn’t necessary and speaks to your own insecurity and lack of confidence in your own understanding more than anything else.
We are still talking about unity and my figure shows how a unit is to be found tween two measures, why are you ignorant of geometry in a plato thread
We haven’t even defined what a unit is, as per OP. Is it a monad or a henad? What is the difference? You’re importing a topic from Statesman when there’s a far more salient topic from Philebus that needs to be answered first. Stay on topic.
I just made a unit why don't you explain why it's a monad or a head, also if one has a beginning and end then it also has a middle and that makes it compound and not very one like, what are your thoughts on this
>imagine not understanding my poorly drawn schizo scratchings
>they're the universal language of mathematics, moron!
sheesh, get a load of this Black person
Any man who calls this schizo scratches is obviously moronic
Nobody is calling that schizo scratches, as that is clearly an aptly-presented and well-explained geometric figure. Dunno why you aren’t even more embarrassed by posting that when it mogs the hell out of what you originally drew.
What number is number ab? If it's so clear to you
>What number is number ab? If it's so clear to you
That's a trick question. What is being represented is a proportion. Proportions are generally number-independent (in that any number would do as long as it fulfills the requirements of the proportion). So, AB could be a whole different array of possible numbers. What I *think* you were trying to ask if what number AH has to be when everything is set and done, and that would be 1 (when a unit remains). That would be the only segment here that is tied to a specific number.
By the way, try posting a more obscure Euclid section if you want to play this game well (or, better yet, not at all). And like I said before, to say that this "answers" the question in the OP is to beg the question in the first place. One... what? One thing? One as an abstract unity? Are abstract unities like Ones things themselves? Does this have any bearing on the problem of universals, especially as Plato would have seen them, because Plato seems to think that "form-numbers" are what form the basis for universals? Maybe we need abstract unities like Ones before we can have concrete unities like Animals. Idk. Drawing out diagrams does little to answer this question.
>why don't you explain why it's a monad or a head
That's not how a discussion works. First of all, I don't even know what the difference is between a henad or a monad is, except in a very dry, linguistic sense. Its philosophical import is still unknown to me, both in terms of how Plato uses it and how other Greek philosophers use it. And I'm not sure if Plato uses henad and monad interchangeably, or if he uses henad to refer to a one that is "real" as opposed to monad which is a one that is merely "nominal."
And before you complain about me not offering answers here... I can't offer an answer to a question I haven't fully understood or explored yet. That is the whole point of this thread. To investigate this question and to find a good answer, or at least a good starting off point. I'm not interested in your chicken scratch diagrams that are, frankly, a pain to read, nor am I interested in these gotcha games that ultimately detract from the topic of the thread. If you can't offer a substantive response in clear and non-combative language, then please sully another thread.
>also if one has a beginning and end then it also has a middle and that makes it compound and not very one like, what are your thoughts on this
I'd prefer this line of discussion, if you don't mind. That is a very good point and it reminds me of what Aristotle had to say about the infinite divisibility of space and time.
In terms of what Plato would have to say about it, I think we would have to first try to see if we could represent it in terms of the Limit and the Unlimited. The beginnings and ends would be limits, and the middle would be... I'm not sure how to describe it except as a relationship between limits. How would you go about it, if you don't mind sharing?
Another based Plato thread
I remember the statesman one on prudence
There was a Statesman thread dealing with prudence?
Plato also uses the term "monades" once in Phaedo, right after he speaks about what it means for something to be beautiful, at 101a. In fact, it seems like a deliberate introduction of the one-and-the-many problem, one that clashes heavily with participation in beauty.
>beautiful things said to be because of beauty and nothing else
versus
>bigger things are said to be bigger because... of another thing (e.g. somebody is taller by a head)? no you shouldn't accept this, it should be because of no other thing but bigness itself
The use of the word monades comes at 101c:
>καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι
>and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain.
Not sure what to draw from this passage yet about the meaning of monades. Stay tuned.
In Republic
>uhhh justice isn't about paying your denbts bro
In Phaedo
>uhhh my last words are... pay our denbts
what did Socrates mean by this?
just started reading hackett's 5 dialogues as my first philosophy book.
embarrassing question, but how long should I spend reading each dialogue? I could finish the entire collection in a day but I can mull over each page for 30 mins if I really wanted to.
>embarrassing question, but how long should I spend reading each dialogue? I could finish the entire collection in a day but I can mull over each page for 30 mins if I really wanted to.
Not embarrassing. It's a very good question, because both of your observations are correct. The answer is, take as long as you need, as long as you are interested in. I personally like to vacillate between reading for breadth and reading for depth. The more breadth you get, the more potential for intertextual connections you get, and the more depth you get, the more potential for intellectual understanding you get. And they both go hand in hand.
last bump
if it dies, it dies. Plato effortposting seems to be at an absolute minimum lately