A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed. It persists when unobserved, can be observed by two or more people in the absence of another, ect.
A platonic form has no material substance, it exists only as an abstraction in the mind. An idea or abstraction can not directly effect the material world. Therefore a material objects form can not be predicated upon a platonic ideal.
It was all nonsense. From the very beginning..
Plato was very busy making a primitive ass of himself.
The Greeks were a step up from cavemen. Stop treating them as if they were wise or intuitive about nature, they had no fricking idea, they were just making shit up.
their water was foul. it had clloudy stone and lime in it. Their mines were a scene out of hell. Their customs were barbaric, they were violent savages obsessed with masculinity and machismo, there conception of 'law' was that the strong should rule over the weak, their religions were pathetiic and indulgent, hedonistic and unpious, undisciplined, and lacking in insight and introspection.
And their philosophies were all psuedo-science, psuedo intellectualism, and theater poetry jams that had frick all to do with morality or values.
Half the shit we found in those ruins was porn. Porn on jugs, Porn in stone tablets, porn porn porn. Nothing they believed was real, they were supersticious idiots who allowed their lives to be controlled by what they refused to even try and understand.
they were aggressive, warlike, ammoral, they practiced rape and rampant hedonism, promiscuous homosexuality. They concieved of barbaric tortures, castrated young boys and used them as sex slaves, they were opportunistic theiving corrupt c**ts who prayed on the poor and misfortunate and practiced generational, chattel slavery where you could NEVER free yourself from bondage, they had sex with their slaves and sold their children into slavery. It was an oppressive, violent, thuggish and stupid society and it should remain dead and buried until the end of time.
FRICK ROME
The natives of north america may not have had the technology of the greeks, but they were miles more civilized thousands of years before their decadent way of life could even be conceived.
Your power is not a measure of your virtue.
thank god for this post, i'm so sick of homosexuals hearing saying "START WITH THE BARBARIAN Black person GREEKS FIRST TO GET INTO PHILOSHOPY!!!" Those homosexuals don't know shit about life and were all just bullshiting whatever the frick they could find. I hate rome and i'm one of the men who don't think about it other than they were savage homos.
And they had sex with boys!
Plato thought that forms were actual and existed in their own plane. So it isn't really a refutation.
a plane that can not be reached or observed, and has no material presence on earth. how covenant.
>Absolute Truth can be attained through acquaintance knowing only by those who are the truly initiated. Being initiated
actually means not only being of the correct philosophical temperament but also being thoroughly practised in dialectic. Hence, dialectic or propositional knowledge has a role to play in the attainment of this ultimate knowing. It helps open and direct the "eye of the soul" (the noetic acquaintive faculty, or illuminative intuition) to its proper object
correlate.
you know those words mean nothing
>those words mean nothing
only to brainlet smoothbrains
>actually means not only being of the correct philosophical temperament but also being thoroughly practised in dialectic. Hence, dialectic or propositional knowledge has a role to play in the attainment of this ultimate knowing. It helps open and direct the "eye of the soul" (the noetic acquaintive faculty, or illuminative intuition) to its proper object correlate.
how so?
quantitative change reaches a threshold where a qualitative change appears. Think about it like the way a plant grows: the little bits of unnoticable quantitative growth per minute, produce noticeable qualitative transformation over time. A good phrase is that direct aquaintance of supersensible reality supervenes on the discursive cognition of dialectic after an as yet undetermined period of continual dialectic or, if you will, development or growth of the intellect.
But dialectic can just swing back between aporetic positions all the time. That's why the dialogues are the way they are. discursive reasoning leads you from point A to B, and then from point B to A. there's no guarantee of any final conclusion.
>dialectic can just swing back between aporetic positions
then you havn't gone far enough in the dialectic
>there's no guarantee of any final conclusion
not with that attitude
>y-y-you just haven't gone far enough
Considering that "going far enough" just brings you back to where you started, I'm not convinced. How many times do you have to prestige class with the dialectic?
Not reading your shill book unless you make a good argument here.
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/2741/1/2002burgessphd.pdf
The Transcendent A Priori Tradition in Epistemology
Not all dialogues are aporetic, lots of them (and this includes pretty much all the important ones) usually offer a definite conclusion.
Name five.
Cratylus, Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus
Among the ones that do not have Socrates as the protagonist: Timaeus, Sophist, Statesman, Laws, arguably Parmenides
just off of the top of my head
>Cratylus
absolutely ends in aporia
>Republic
Socrates never answers Glaucon's question
>arguably Parmenides
you have to be fricking kidding me dude
Nta, but Socrates does answer the question Glaucon opens bk. II with in bk. IX. That said, I agree with you over that anon that the "doctrinal" dialogues tend to be, sometimes more or less implicitly, aporetic.
>That said, I agree with you over that anon that the "doctrinal" dialogues tend to be, sometimes more or less implicitly, aporetic.
I genuinely do not understand how could anyone read, say, Sophist, Philebus or Timaeus and still interpret them as aporetic. Moreover the Republic is a collection of books more than anything, even if Plato did not answer Glaucon's question you would still have hundreds worth of absolutely positive statements, including a positive foundation of the entire system of metaphysics of Plato. The skeptical interpretation of Platonic dialogues is, ultimately, an hellenistic degeneration of very little philosophical, philological and hermeneutical import
>including a positive foundation of the entire system of metaphysics of Plato
which Socrates refused to elaborate on at several key points and which gets almost entirely demolished in Parmenides and rebuilt in the Late Dialogues
At no point Parmenides demolishes the theory of forms, in fact he admits forms in his ontology in the prelude to the gymnasia, and praises Socrates for not having ignored them. Moreover you still find it unscathed in the late dialectical dialogues, like Timaeus, Sophist and Statesman. What we find in the first section of Parmenides is a series of issues that must be resolved by young students, and at no point they're deemed unsolvable. It's no wonder that in that section we find a young Socrates, while the mature Socrates (in other dialogues) is still completely willing to positively defend the theory of forms. Nor the conceptual content of late dialogues nor their drammatic structure entail any rejection of said theory.
>At no point Parmenides demolishes the theory of forms
There it is, the big lie.
>and praises Socrates for not having ignored them.
As a step in the right direction*, but then Parmenides gently rebukes Socrates for having completely naive metaphysics.
>Moreover you still find it unscathed in the late dialectical dialogues, like Timaeus, Sophist and Statesman
The forms of the Late Dialogues are not even remotely commensurable to the earlier versions of the forms. The introduction of the One and the Indefinite Dyad makes it impossible to draw a 1-to-1 relationship.
>As a step in the right direction*, but then Parmenides gently rebukes Socrates for having completely naive metaphysics.
Wrong, he does it AFTER his objections to young Socrates' interpretation of the theory of forms. Reread it, what you'll find is a critique to a naive interpretation of the theory of forms, rather than a critique of the theory of forms in general.
>The forms of the Late Dialogues are not even remotely commensurable to the earlier versions of the forms. The introduction of the One and the Indefinite Dyad makes it impossible to draw a 1-to-1 relationship.
Someone here should reread Sophist and Timaeus too.
Sophist presents a baffling and arbitrary method of inquiry that somehow shows in the sixth definition that Socratic philosophizing is sophistry, and this is shown in a setting that takes place on the day of Socrates' trial. Timaeus opens with Socrates recounting a truncated version of the Republic (roughly books 2-part of 5, lacking the rest of 5 through 7), notes the absence of a mysterious fifth figure, has Timaeus present an account of the cosmos meant to ground Socrates' Kallipolis in a way that he both acknowledges is out of order and that would be impossible once put into proper order, follows with Critias' Atlantis account that ends in an interruption, and gives us nothing from the mostly silent Sicilian general Hermocrates who's present. The Philebus' presentation of the mixture, if worked through (as with Timaeus' cosmos if put in chronological order), shows that nothing is good, for the sake of having the limit one was seeking.
It's worth noting that arguments about the interpretation of the dialogues happened from the beginning, with Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle, and Theophrastus all disagreeing with each other both over how to take a dialogue (e.g., Aristotle presents Timaeus as meant to be literal, Xenocrates takes it as metaphorical), and what Plato's "unwritten doctrines" actually are (so both Speusippus and Xenocrates, who separately understand themselves to disagree with Plato's doctrines, also disagree with each other and Aristotle over the characterizations of those doctrines).
>Sophist presents a baffling and arbitrary method of inquiry that somehow shows in the sixth definition that Socratic philosophizing is sophistry
It certainly does not, the sixth definition is only a point of similarity between the philosopher and the sophist, which is why the Stranger calls it noble. As the stranger says many times, positing a difference between the sophist and the philosopher is difficult exactly because of these similarities, and compares it to the similarities between wolves and dogs. It is with the seventh definition that Socrates is posited outside of the figure of the Sophist (other definitions too excluded Socrates, but they were not of much conceptual import; e.g. the act of selling one's own intellectual products inside or outside one's own native city).
>has Timaeus present an account of the cosmos meant to ground Socrates' Kallipolis in a way that he both acknowledges is out of order and that would be impossible once put into proper order, follows with Critias' Atlantis account that ends in an interruption, and gives us nothing from the mostly silent Sicilian general Hermocrates who's present
It seems to me that you're entirely dismissing the metaphysical framework employed hy Timaeus (who is characterised by Socrates himself as a philosopher of the highest level). In this metaphysical framework the theory of forms is employed, and it is so, oddly enough, in a way that resolves most of the objections posited by Parmenides, since it denies the forms' efficient causal power on the chora, positing a mediating causal power that is not immediately identical with any individual form. In the Sophist one finds solutions to other issues, by clarifing the theory of self-referentiality of the ideas through the theory of the greater kinds.
Had you said that in later dialogues we find a refinement of Plato's theory of forms I would have surely agreed. But you went overboard, by claiming that Parmenides refuted it (even though he praised Socrates for not having excluded intelligible entities from his ontology, and even though we still find costant references to the form in his dramatic successors, namely the eleatic stranger, and even though the older Socrates in later dialogues still makes ample use of it).
Re: Sophist, recall that we never get the Philosopher, and that the seventh definition at the end is comprehensive, including all of the prior ones as guises of the sophist. That leaves it wholly unclear whether Socrates and his practice are cleared of being sophistical. (And one still has to ask whether the Stranger and Socrates are compatible.) This also doesn't clear up the strangeness and arbitrariness of the Stranger's method.
As for Timaeus, I think on the one hand you're confusing me with the other anon you're arguing with ("But you went overboard, by claiming...etc." I've said nothing about Parmenides in this thread), and on the other, I don't see any "metaphysical framework" that explains either the specific peculiarities of his account, nor the general peculiarities of the dialogue and its sequel Critias. The only framework I see him working in is presenting a "likely story" meant to serve a purpose for the speech Socrates gave the day before, and which Critias intends to follow it with. I don't think the Parmenides lets the account of Forms off in the Timaeus, since the Forms in the latter, being paradeigmata, similarly fall prey to the Third man (note that there's two Third Man arguments in the Parmenides, the one relevant to the Forms as paradeigmata is at 132d-133a), and I don't think it can be done away by construing the critique in Parmenides as pertaining to "efficient causal power."
>Re: Sophist, recall that we never get the Philosopher
We do not get the definition of the Statesman either, but you would not call it aporetic because of that. Regardless, but this is a personal take, I really don't think the definition of the Sophist is the crux of that dialogue. It is mostly just an occasion to showcase a number of theoretical progresses in his theory of form, namely his theory of definition, his theory of the Greater Kinds, and all the consequences that stem from it (organicity of the intelligible world, resolution to the problem of self-predication, explanation of the formal determinations of the Idea as Idea, and so on).
That said, I must still point out that Socrates does not fall into the final synagogè, and that the fact that the sophist shares some properties with the philosopher is a point that the stranger makes almost obsessively thorough the dialogue (remember the wolf-dog distinction).
>I think on the one hand you're confusing me with the other anon you're arguing with
If that's the case I apologize for it.
Regarding the second point, I haven't said that in Timaeus you find a response to all objections, only some of them. Specifically, the third man objection is cleared off in Sophist, where the issue of self-predication (on which the third man objection arises) is entirely solved through the theory of the Greater Kinds.
>The Philebus' presentation of the mixture, if worked through (as with Timaeus' cosmos if put in chronological order), shows that nothing is good, for the sake of having the limit one was seeking.
What do you mean by this, especially
>for the sake of having the limit one was seeking
?
I'm a bit busy at the moment, but I'll address this later tonight.
no worries. I won't let you off the hook
>you have to be fricking kidding me dude
>has not read Proclus
Proclus isn't the end-all, be-all authority on Parmenides.
He at the very least shows the possibility of a positive Interpretation of the Parmenides. Remember that I have said "arguably", since I knew it would be the most controversial inclusion. Personally, I think that by reading it alongside Sophist and Timaeus (and maybe Philebus), many of the passages in the second part become completely intelligible (potentially all of them, although I cannot guarantee it, since I am still in the process of understanding the meaning of some of the last 4 deductions).
Every dialogue is "arguably" positive if you "read between the lines" and say "it actually says this." That doesn't mean that it isn't stylized as aporetic on the surface. The fact that you don't get the importance of presentation makes me seriously doubt that you have anything value to say about the nature of Plato's work.
>That doesn't mean that it isn't stylized as aporetic on the surface
Dunno, maybe I'm just not as superficial as you. If integrating the content of different dialogues is above your paygrade, then Plato might not be for you. Someone like Hume would be a better fit, he holds his readers' hand far more than Plato.
>The fact that you don't get the importance of presentation makes me seriously doubt that you have anything value to say about the nature of Plato's work.
I actually care very much about it. The problem here is that you have probably not thought much about what the gymnasia is, and what's the meaning behind the choice of having Parmenides give an example on it in front of both two young uninitiated men (Socrates and Aristoteles) and his best student (Zeno). Once you factor in the dramatic relation established by Plato between Parmenides and the Eleatic Stranger the picture becomes very different from the one you've depicted.
>Dunno, maybe I'm just not as superficial as you.
You're actually more superficial than me in that you don't regard the presentation itself as important. You can't find the depth without the surface, and the choice of surface itself is always intentional.
>Once you factor in the dramatic relation established by Plato between Parmenides and the Eleatic Stranger the picture becomes very different from the one you've depicted.
And what that may be (both your interpretation and the dramatic relation between Parmenides and the Eleatic Stranger, who I haven't mentioned and I think you're confusing me with somebody else).
>You're actually more superficial than me in that you don't regard the presentation itself as important. You can't find the depth without the surface, and the choice of surface itself is always intentional.
This must be why I have talked so kuch about the actual dramatic portrayal of the dialogue, instead of boiling it down to "le it's aporetic because its content is not spoonfed to me, even though it makes perfect sense for it to not be spoonfed to me, given its dramatic context".
Ah, sorry for being so caustic, I'm in a bad mood. I'll try to refrain from it in the future.
>And what that may be
In the gymnasia Parmenides offer a presentation of the logical form of the ontological categories that must be present in any good ontology and metaphysics, which in turn fits Plato's metaphysics (this also means that here the focus is on the formal aspect, which is why it is not yet shown how these categories are related to each other): and this makes perfect sense – considering for example the Idea of the Good, it is clear that a novice might make mistakes wrt its presentation if he is not familiar enough with its logical form, which is why the first deduction becomes useful as preliminary knowledge. Since he is exposing it to a novice he uses mostly physicalist concepts that can be easily understood by the philosophically unsophisticated; but through a confrontation to other dialogues one can easily find intelligible concepts in which they can be translated (e.g. time and its intelligible explanation in Timaeus; circularity and linearity wrt the different status of the definitions of the Greater Kinds, whose definition is always circular, and the ideas that are not Greater Kinds; and so on). As such the gymnasia must be presented in a way that can be understood by both those who are the beginning of their philosophical training (Aristoteles) and those who are at the end of it (Zeno). The gymnasia will appear as aporetic to the untrained, for whom this will have the effect of a preliminary training, while it will appear as a formal exposition to the trained, for he will be able to associate the various deductions to ontological categories he has already met. This is also why an integration with the other dialectical dialogues is absolutely necessary in order to understand the possibility of a positive interpretation of the dialogue. To all this it must be added that here the gymnasia is offered by a man, Parmenides, who is characterized in the dramatic context of the platonic corpus, as a peak philosopher, whose defended even in the form of his successors.
All the things I have mentioned take into account all the fundamental dramatic components of the dialogue and its surrounding corpus: its contents, the character of all the dialogants, the linguistic exposition that is used, its explicit relation to other dialogues.
>This must be why I have talked so kuch about the actual dramatic portrayal of the dialogue, instead of boiling it down to "le it's aporetic because its content is not spoonfed to me, even though it makes perfect sense for it to not be spoonfed to me, given its dramatic context".
And guess what? If it is dramatically portrayed as an aporetic dialogue, then it is an aporetic dialogue. The interlocutors reach an impasse. That's all that there is to it.
Is there a deeper meaning? Obviously, yes. Is there an interpretation that Plato leans to? Probably. Is it fruitful to compare themes and cross-reference ideas across the dialogues? Absolutely. But you have to appreciate the text as it is presented to you if you want to make any headway into the text.
>And guess what? If it is dramatically portrayed as an aporetic dialogue, then it is an aporetic dialogue. The interlocutors reach an impasse
There's no impasse in the gymnasia, which is conducted to its natural end once all the possibilities (wrt the logical forms of ontological categories) have been exhausted. It is true that there is an impasse in the first section, but that is used as an occasion to introduce the second section, which is the essential part of the dialogue the first part mainly deals with issues that are easily resolved in earlier and later dialogues, and is more of an exposition of the kind of naive interpretation an untrained student might assign to the theory of forms), the second part on the other hand puts on the side the young Socrates, who is still too unexperienced to solve them, in order to focus on the kind of preliminary training that will help the student going through the formal logical elements that compose platonic ontology and metaphysics.
But given your second paragraph, I think our disagreement might be due to a disagreement on what a genuine aporia is, and about what's the genuine focus of the dialogue.
I like your exposition on the gymnasia, and I've love to read as much as I can about it. However:
>But given your second paragraph, I think our disagreement might be due to a disagreement on what a genuine aporia is, and about what's the genuine focus of the dialogue.
I think you're overcomplicating things. For example, in Euthyphro, there is clearly aporia at the end, yet you're obviously not supposed to side with Mr. "Straight Thinker." That's all that there should be to it. Aporia doesn't mean "unsolvable contradiction."
I fully agree on Euthyphro, I think the main difference is that the main point of that dialogue is left at an impasse. On the other hand in the Parmenides the main point of the dialogue (which imho is the gymnasia) is exhausted with no aporetic ending
Like a lot of philosophical positions, it serves a parsimonious explanation to solve a bunch on problems that Plato had. Especially, the problem of the One and the Many. It's meant to square the circle of identity across objects which maintains their similarity despite differences, which can be true in reference to an ideal of that object which exists beyond time and space. There are plenty of people who will argue the exact same thing in modern day about numbers as 'abstract objects'. Personally i prefer immanence as a solution, but i don't think it is an absurd theory.
>The initiates are certainly given hints to the existence ofa secret doctrine. Cornford is right to say that Socrates' failure to define knowledge in propositional terms. in the Theaetetus, definitely points the way towards the inadequacy of propositional knowledge to attain the final revelation. The revelation is the direct acquaintance knowing of the Forms, but of course this is left unstated. In passages, from the Republic, there is an indication that the truths revealed by dialectic are not ultimate. Socrates tells Glaucon that it appears that dialectic brings us to the end of philosophical enquiry. However, he then hints that there is a further path to ultimate knowledge that dispenses with images and symbols and attains truth directly. Glaucon is then told that, despite having the will to do so, Socrates is unable to show him this path:
>[Q27] Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying. You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of good will. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth as it appears to me.
>This evidently hints at the type of intuition Kant denies in the Inaugural Dissertation when he observes, "No intuition of things intellectual but only a symbolic [discursive] knowledge of them is given to man".
By the divided line theosophists are wrong because they think they can attain nous on their own, as if humans innately had within their power some way to gain knowledge of the divine without any help from what is higher. Sure the path of a philosopher is active but it is only worthy of the inner mysteries when it is passive and recipient to the divine gift bestowed upon him due to piety, and theosophists lack piety. In terms of Plato's divided line, they introduce a third aspect of knowing beside reason and sense, of which is the soul and its faculty of nous to attain essence of reality on its own without any external help, of which is completely missing the humility of knowledge that socrates possessed.
Hegel doesn't grasp Plato's divided line due to pride, namely the pride in thinking you can lay out the mind of God by the dialectical process. Ultimately blending the upper two divisions in the divided line. For Hegel my understanding is that he believes that you could arrive at the Quality of essence by the infinitesimal calculus of quantitative dialectic approaching its absolute limit of Essence. But even calculus students know that as a function approaches its limit it is never equal to its limit, in order for it to be equal it would require a discontinuous jump, and this problem is never addressed by Hegel. Therefore Hegel's path ends in never acquiring any knowledge worthy of the name due to not recognizing limits of dialectic and human mind.
As for Kant, he does understand Plato's divided line quite well, and one of his best contributions is observing that the Noumena(essence) is outside of the means of humans to attain, and accurately describes its relation as a priori to phenomenal reality. However, he lacks the philosophical spirit. At the crossroads when one has arrived at the humble knowledge that humanity can never by any of its powers attain knowledge of the Noumena, but forever glimpsing at its shadows of it like the prisoners in plato's cave. At this limit of human knowledge, aware of the abyss that separates noumena from phenomena, he gives up. So he is a person who is aware of his own human ignorance like Socrates, but unlike a true philosopher he just gives up and continues to live his life not chasing after the one thing worth chasing. Fully aware of his own and humanities own wretched state of poverty, but instead of continuing the journey he turns back, and reorients the direction of Europe by affirming that there is no point in searching for noumena, that the foolish scholastics are happily leading the greatest minds down into the abyss, that the leap between phenomena and noumena is too great to achieve with our feeble human powers. Instead focus on phenomena, and by this path Europe, nay the World, will achieve glory and phenomenal paradise on earth. A paradise completely devoid of even interest in noumena, proclaiming all such pursuits worthless.
>But even calculus students know that as a function approaches its limit it is never equal to its limit, in order for it to be equal it would require a discontinuous jump, and this problem is never addressed by Hegel.
and yet it (the integral function) moves
>Hegel doesn't grasp Plato's divided line due to pride, namely the pride in thinking you can lay out the mind of God by the dialectical process. Ultimately blending the upper two divisions in the divided line. For Hegel my understanding is that he believes that you could arrive at the Quality of essence by the infinitesimal calculus of quantitative dialectic approaching its absolute limit of Essence. But even calculus students know that as a function approaches its limit it is never equal to its limit, in order for it to be equal it would require a discontinuous jump, and this problem is never addressed by Hegel. Therefore Hegel's path ends in never acquiring any knowledge worthy of the name due to not recognizing limits of dialectic and human mind.
Honestly you're so far from any coherent understanding of Hegel that my only advice is to assume that what you've just said is nonsense, and start actually reading Hegel's Science of Logic.
I say it with no malice.
t. entry-level Hegel scholar
Not entry-level at all, I have studied him for years now. But realistically even a novice could find around 1000 mistakes in your post, so many that it is not even worth addressing (since given your current prejudices it is clear that you wouldn't understand any of those answers). Again, my advice is to abandon these silly prejudices (like, just assume that all the preconceptions you have about Hegel are misguided) and study the Science of Logic instead, if you're interested in his works; and if you aren't, avoid talking about him, since you would do a disservice to yourself (you seem intelligent, so there is no need to appear stupid just because you feel the need to talk about authors you still do not understand)
I was just trying to help you. Hope you'll follow my advice, it will help you avoid embarassing situations like this one in the future. Have a nice day anon
You'd think that a paramount expert on consciousness such as a Hegel scholar would understand that "embarrassment" is primarily a social phenomenon. Embarrassing myself in front of one guy, who purportedly claims to be a Hegel scholar (haven't seen any proof yet), is not that big of a deal. And I likely haven't embarrassed myself in front of other people because 1) IQfy is anonymous; and 2) most IQfyners are not Hegel scholars. In fact, I can't even understand that I've embarrassed myself because I don't know what I don't know, and the only way to find out is, well, through reading something difficult that will only bring me more psychic pain (allegedly). And why would I do that to myself at the request of some random guy on the Internet?
But apparently that whole dynamic escapes you. Which is why you make dumb claims like "that's not Hegel!", "I am a Hegel scholar!", and "you're embarrassing yourself!", all without giving me any concrete reason to believe that any of these things are true, or that I should have any reason to care about their truth. Why? Because you're a posturing neckbeard who looks like this:
For these reasons, I don't actually think you are a Hegel scholar, and there's nothing you can teach me that I don't already know.
btw I'm not the guy who posted
, I just get annoyed when people do that status-posturing thing on an anonymous internet board instead of engaging with the ideas. nobody gives a frick that you tortured yourself with Hegel and now you feel special.
>Accuses me of being of being an "entry-level scholar"
>Tell him that I have actually read him for years, without boasting
>Throws a 4 (FOUR) paragraphs long tantrum
yngmi
>a sentence is a paragraph
behold, the supposed Hegel scholar
now your Hegel scholar LARP is really unbelievable kek.
Lmao this guy doesn't know what a sentence is
I don't think you know what a paragraph is, let alone what Hegel wrote. Basic reading comprehension is too hard for you. You stand no chance with Hegel.
Try me, are you going to leave hegel defenseless after my "pathetic" attack? Do not deprive me and others of your knowledge, anonymous man who has studied hegel for years.
It is my unenlightened opinion that at the heart of the argument is epistemology, do you not agree with my assessment of hegels epistemology (namely how he blurs the upper half of the divided line) in light of platos epistemic diagram of the divided line? Or are they so different that comparing them does no good? Or am I mistaken about the whole idea and am completely off the mark?
>Or am I mistaken about the whole idea and am completely off the mark?
Pretty much this. You're so off the mark it does not even seem worthwhile to me to actively engage with your post. Im not judging you negatively because of it, knowing your Hegel is not a duty, what I'm saying tho is that you're clearly clueless about the contents of his philosophy, to such an extent that the only recommendation I can give you is to either read his SoL, or to avoid talking about him (since you would only risk to be ridiculed by people who will now know you're willing to authoritatively speak about philosophers you've never studied). I've tried to be really diplomatic, since I can see that you've at least actively engaged with Plato, which is always admirable.
No, anon, engage with the ideas he presented, because otherwise you look pathetic, you look like you're more interested in shutting someone down and dominating in this inter-personal drama rather than actually engaging in discussing ideas.
>Hegel doesn't grasp Plato's divided line due to pride, namely the pride in thinking you can lay out the mind of God by the dialectical process.
Do you agree or disagree that Hegel thinks that you can lay the mind of God by the dialectical process?
Do you agree that
> Hegel's path ends in never acquiring any knowledge worthy of the name due to not recognizing limits of dialectic and human mind.
why can't you just say a few things that prove you know what you're talking about? why do you talk as if the wider audience reads Hegel, knows Hegel, and is likely to take your side?
Because it is literally meaningless rambling that has no relation to Hegel's text, so it becomes hard to even begin any sort of refutation of it. Like, take this passage for example
>For Hegel my understanding is that he believes that you could arrive at the Quality of essence by the infinitesimal calculus of quantitative dialectic approaching its absolute limit of Essence
Literally nothing of this is in Hegel. I don't even know where he took this stuff from, it is entirely made up. It is not an interpretation, nor it is a quotation, nor it is a critique that attacks anything resembling in the slightest Hegel's philosophy. When you find """summaries""" of this sort one can only give up and recommend to the guy to either read Hegel, or to at least look for an introduction to his philosophy that even just vaguely resembles its content.
What are you talking about? Hegel talks often about calculus, especially in the Science of Logic. Like, I could Google "Hegel calculus" right now and pull up a secondary source that sounds like it's touching upon that idea:
>This connects with the earlier point that the progression of the ratio to 0/0 is the mathematical form of the divergence of measures (for example, in phase transitions), which is itself the way that Hegel introduces a nonmathematical concept, namely, essence (Wesen). What Hegel might have seen given his own analysis of powers is that the taking of the limit is itself a way to generate the concrete conception of the relation between dramatically different scales that is built into the notion of an essence. This would be a different route to a far more Deleuzian metaphysics, in which strictly mathematical tools do more work than the more traditionally metaphysical concepts Hegel employs in the Doctrine of Essence. But, instead of using the divergence of measures, he turns to a different mathematical resource developed earlier in his number theory: the relation between unit and amount.
This is all in the Science of Logic, specifically the latter half of Chapter 2, and it sounds like what that other poster was talking about. It's extremely dishonest to say that it is "not an interpretation, quotation, critique, etc.," as if the poster wasn't coming from anywhere even tangential to what was discussed by Hegel. So, unless you have a bone to pick about the rigor of his language, or that there's a clear gap of understanding in his language, then I'm going to assume that you're out of your element here.
Feel free to prove me wrong, but until then, you're just another posturing admirer of Hegel, which is a dime a dozen around here.
First of all, I have literally never claimed that Hegel never mentioned the word "calculus" or that he never dealt with it.
Secondly, he literally talks about actual calculus, as in, the mathematical branch that we call calculus. As in, he literally just derives the categories of calculus (and in general in the quantity section he just derives the categories of math). It has nothing to do with essence, nor it has anything to do with the claim for which "you could arrive at the Quality of essence by the infinitesimal calculus of quantitative dialectic approaching its absolute limit of Essence". Hell, since you've read the index of the SoL you'll know it's not even in Book 2, which is where the concept of Essence is developed. It's not even the section in which the passage from the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence happen (that would be the section on Measure, in which not only the categories of calculus, but Quantity AS A WHOLE has already been sublated!)
Again this is completely made up, and it is so divorced from anything resembling Hegel's philosophy that I don't even know where to start with it. It's as if someone said "from what I understand Plato believes that the quantity of the Idea is caused by the icastic imitation of the chora": just a string of words that has absolutely no relation to anything Plato ever said, even though all these words might have appeared in his dialogues.
>he thinks noumena actually exist
Hegel's whole point is that there's no need to bride the gap between phenomena and noumena because there *is* no gap.
>a plane that cannot be reached or observed
>what is thought
The forms do exist on earth albeit fleetingly. For instance you can only glimpse true beauty.
You already said in your gay OP that things exist that can’t be observed.
What a massive moron you are
type of moron who thinks hypotheticals can't be taken seriously because they don't exist materially
the material presence of an object can not proceed from an idea or abstraction.
we've been teaching this shit for years, and its clearly incorrect. Why?
>A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed
>begins with petitio principii
ngmi
alright, ill bite. spoonfeed me.
>>A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed
prove this is not so.
>makes claim without proof
>demands proof from opposing claim
what can be preposed without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
ILLITERATE
are you honestly suggesting that the universe would not exist without someone to observe it?
Earth dwelled without life for billions of years prior to the advent of life, we know its existence predates any form of direct observation.
an object exists whether it is being observed or not. this should not come as a shock to thinking adults.
yes
>The Boltzmann brain thought experiment suggests that it might be more likely for a single brain to spontaneously form in a void, complete with a memory of having existed in our universe, rather than for the entire universe to come about in the manner cosmologists think it actually did.
are you a fricking toddler?
a toddler understands object permanence. they understand that their parents still exist when they are not being observed.
Are you saying you do not have the mental faculties of a toddler? that you have a working understanding of the universe less developed than a newborn infant?
>object permanence.
fell for meme
C'mon man, we KNOW this, why do we let them get away with this pedantic shit? Why doesn't anyone ever call them on their bullshit?
Plato was completely full of shit, he was a moron, they are all fricking morons, just fricking empty talking heads, endlessly blathering about fricking NONSENSE and we treat them like they are these honored intellectuals, they are fricking con artists.
We should throw every fricking philosopher's book and treatise in a fricking bonfire and expose this shit for what it is.
Its just begging for charity by people who are just slightly too well to do to be on the dole, people who beg their upper crust associates for publication and stipends to allow them to pursue their life of pride and abject poverty, fricking literary paupers sucking the life out of every occasion and pretending to be the smartest person in the room when they can't even figure their way out of a paper bag.
>t. filtered
you will always claim to know, but you never will.
way to miss the point, Mr Hyle. it's obvious that God is doing the observing here.
>Earth dwelled without life for billions of years prior to the advent of life, we know its existence predates any form of direct observation.
ngmi
You're either trolling or too ignorant to take part in philosophical conversation. Either way, frick off.
>what can be preposed without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
*whoosh* the irony
its ridiculous.
Plato is fricking ridiculous.
Its psuedo-intellectualism.
an observation is not derived from an abstraction, an abstraction is derived from an observation.
sweet summer child
>reflective understanding took possession of philosophy. We must know exactly what is meant by this expression which moreover is often used as a slogan; in general it stands for the understanding as abstracting, and hence as separating and remaining fixed in its separations. Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain. In this self-renunciation on the part of reason, the Notion of truth is lost; it is limited to knowing only subjective truth, only phenomena, appearances, only something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond: knowing has lapsed into opinion.
But there is no unmediated observation. Abstractions necessitate observations just as much as observations necessitate abstractions. As soon as one tries to talk about an immediate object, a “This”, by invoking language, they are, without knowing, invoking the universality of forms and essences.
>An idea or abstraction can not directly effect the material world.
>can not
>effect
KEK
but regarding the content
>t. doesn't know
I'm seeing a bunch of statements, but no argument.
What are properties, OP?
Let me explain to you plato's divided line so you could accurately understand his position before critiquing a straw man version of plato.
First as you say, there exists material reality in essence, and there exists our perception of material reality via sensory organs.
Likewise there exists reality of the forms in essence and our perception of the forms via thought and abstraction. The forms are not abstractions, because that would be saying that forms exist in the human mind when they are independent of us and in fact are principles of reality. This confusion is a common one due to calling platonic forms platonic "ideas" which is due to the translation of the Greek "eidos" into the English idea, but for our context we think of ideas as being begotten by the mind when plato doesn't mean that at all when talking about forms. We can know forms not in essence but via our mental faculty of abstraction of visible objects, such as pointing out how all things that are beautiful are only so in as much as they participate in the form of Beauty itself.
In both cases there exists a reality that we can only know a diminished and fragmented sense of. So in order to gain a better understanding of those realities we can gain more data and collate it so we can arrive at an approximate knowledge of that reality closer to the essence of it, but never actually arriving at the essence because that is the limit of both sensory and thought/abstraction of the object in either physical or intelligible realities. And this is the meaning of the prophecy of Apollo through his oracle at delphi saying, "Socrates is the wisest of men" for Socrates only knew that he knew nothing, and by knowing nothing he means he is without knowledge of intelligible realities of which alone is responsible for certainty and truth.
However, one must keep in mind that the socratic philosophic journey is built on the pursuit of gaining knowledge of the forms. But to be a philosopher means to be a lover of wisdom, and to love something means that you do not possess it, therefore all philosophers do not have wisdom, or else they would cease to seek it. But they are not ignorant, for the ignorant in their lack of even interest in wisdom are happily content in such a state, for that is the ignorant and foolish thing to do. But a philosopher is unhappy in such a state for he realizes his own poverty of wisdom and desires that which is divine and good, the wisdom of the forms, that which can turn his poverty into riches.
Didn't Socrates say that gnosis is denied to mortals? I thought this is what Socrates meant when he said "I don't know".
If you read Thaetetus socrates explains how he is philosophically barren (unable to gain knowledge of forms in life) but acts as a barren midwife to help others 'conceive' the forms, and he is dictated who is worthy and who isn't by his daimon. Sadly I'm of the opinion that he wasn't able to accomplish his mission before he died, otherwise there might have been hope for Athens to have a revival.
To me I am quite certain by both mind and sense it is impossible to attain the forms, due to the reasons aforementioned in the last post. However it is not fruitless to pursue the forms by observation (senses) and dialectic (mind) because they can act as preparation for some type of 'discontinuous jump' that is never adequately explained but only referred to in passages in various dialogues. (Such as republic 511 b)
Book 6 511 b, mb
I've heard the forms described as "pre-conceptual." So, does that mean we can't think about them? I can understand that thinking about forms isn't like discursive thinking, but surely there's something "mental" about it? Else, I feel like it would be impossible to know anything at all.
>surely there's something "mental" about it?
INTELLEKTUELLE ANSCHAUUNG
>However it is not fruitless to pursue the forms by observation (senses) and dialectic (mind) because they can act as preparation for some type of 'discontinuous jump'
It could be said that there's no point trying to prepare for that 'discontinuous jump' because nothing can prepare you for it, it's going to be something unexpected and mind-blowing anyway.
On the gate of the Academy it says
>Let no one ignorant of geometry enter
In Symposium it says
>But souls which are pregnant (for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies) conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions? Wisdom and virtue, in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice
In the Republic Plato assigns the Quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) as mandated for all philosophers to learn
Nothing you say is of value unless you confess your hatred of israelites
oh you mean the master race?
Socrates never said he knew nothing in any of the dialogues. He said he didn’t overestimate his knowledge
Read apology, thaetetus, and frankly most platonic dialogues.
Or at least quote a source to back up your claim and don't forget the translator because that heavily affects meaning of the text.
If I may qualify both of you, Apology 21b-d is the famous "all I know is that I don't know anything" (which is really qualified to not knowing anything beautiful and good, and further qualified as not supposing he knows the things he know he doesn't know). That passage has to be evaluated by the circumstance of Socrates having to speak before a public.
There's the Theaetetus passage (149a-151d), and this and the above should be compared with Symposium 202a. But further, there are several places where Socrates says "I don't know anything great, except erotics" (Symposium 177d, Phaedrus 257a, Lysis 204b-c, and Theages 128b), and those passages plus the above should be carefully thought about.
>Socrates says "I don't know anything great, except erotics"
no wonder coomers love the greeks
>expecting big grown men or women who only know how to frick and fight not get into erotics
rome was such a frick fair man
Filtered
damn, OP got BTFO ITT. I think he died. pray for him bros.
>A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed.
How do you know?
Whoa...
> material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed
How do you know?
worst post on lit right now
This is Aristotle moron. Plato thought that the forms exist independently of the mind.
hylic thread, come back when you crack consciousness in the first place
saged btw
Is no one gonna mention how that elephant is having sex with a rhino
OP is the rhino and Plato is the elephantine dick Chad elephant.
I find this the most observant post in the thread. The rest is mostly discussion, which, as everyone knows, leads nowhere.
Nice critique, apart from the fact that it doesn't engage in the slightest with what Plato actually said
>A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed.
Pure ideology.
>A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed
>An idea or abstraction can not directly effect the material world
Your conception of the "material world" is an abstraction in your mind you colossal fricking moron.
Draw the shortest line between two points. You can't make up a new form that satisfies the given context. The line already exists embedded in the chaos of reality and you can extract it with logic.
Answer me this about the platonic forms.
An apple exists. No wait, 100 different species of apple exist. There is thus a form of apple in our minds which transcend any given physical example of an apple. There are yellow apples and red apples and green apples of varying shades. We thus rule out that the form of an apple is any of these colors.
Now imagine we obliterate all apples from physical existence, and all apple trees and seeds too. The only remaining apples are in our minds and in drawings. The ideal of apple lives on.
BUT, what happens if we are unable to represent the form of apple? What happens when, after this, all of us who hear of the apple, the magical lost fruit die out. Does the idea die with the last of us who remember apple? Is this whole platonic line undone by the fricking if a tree falls in the forest question?
You're riddling me as to why you're not asking why the apple should not thrive, but asking an if-question as to the apple should die. Will to live, Anon!
>A material object exists regardless of whether or not it is observed.
Source? Proof?
What stops these objects from their participation in the forms? I was under the impression that they could participate.