Plato's Eikasia/Aristotle's Phantasia

What's the relationship between Plato's eikasia from the Divided Line and Aristotle's phantasia from De Anima, if there is any?

Also, how many fricking words did the Ancient Greeks have for the "look" of things? Were they the inventors of lookism or something?

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  1. 8 months ago
    Anonymous

    It's not fully clear to me how one would put them together besides both pertaining to images. Eikasia (which is a rare term in Plato, whereas the noun eikos is very common) seems to be the power of mind that recognizes images *as* images of something, whereas, if I understand De Anima (personally questionable to me), phantasia seems to be the power of being able to present images to oneself of what is not in front of you.

  2. 8 months ago
    Anonymous

    >Eikasia (which is a rare term in Plato, whereas the noun eikos is very common) seems to be the power of mind that recognizes images *as* images of something
    Is that a common interpretation of the first part of the divided line? I always thought it was a naive acceptance of the images presented before us, or perhaps even part of the image-generating, "presentation" process itself.

    • 8 months ago
      Anonymous

      Well, it seems like the initial presentation of the line is predominantly about its objects (509d-511e), and the images are said to be likenesses of the objects of the subsequent part of the line, and culminates in assigning four affections (or experiences) of the soul to each line segment without further detail. A bit later (533c-534a) we get another summary confirming the assignment of these names to these segments, but not really any further detail about what exactly these affections are, at the expense of focusing on noesis (so eikasia, as a term, I think, only appears three times in all the Republic), so it's admittedly ambiguous or not spelled out whether each affection takes the objects as they are, or whether each affection lower than noesis is fooled into believing that their corresponding objects are real. There does at least seem to be this concrete difference between the objects of eikasia and Aristotle's phantasia: the examples Socrates gives of the former are shadows, reflections in water, reflections in smooth bright things (like mirrors or glass or smooth, wet stones, or what have you), which are things seen by the eye and perhaps understood not to be in there (i.e., we see our own reflection in the water and seem to recognize it as an i.age of ourselves, and not as another self mysteriously in the water), whereas Aristotle has in mind the kind of imaging activity we do when we close our eyes and picture something.

      • 8 months ago
        Anonymous

        >whereas Aristotle has in mind the kind of imaging activity we do when we close our eyes and picture something.
        I always understood phantasia as the faculty which constructs whatever is presented before the mind, whether it is sensible, recollective, or imaginary.

        • 8 months ago
          Anonymous

          That's right, I don't mean to make it seem like it's exclusively picturing to oneself, but a kind of power of the mind bringing forth what may not be present in front of one's eyes, more or less.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            I thought phantasia was intrinsically tied to sense-perception, which would make some of its objects the same as eikasia's objects.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            It is tied to sense perception, but it's less clear how it relates to eikasia's objects, per

            Well, it seems like the initial presentation of the line is predominantly about its objects (509d-511e), and the images are said to be likenesses of the objects of the subsequent part of the line, and culminates in assigning four affections (or experiences) of the soul to each line segment without further detail. A bit later (533c-534a) we get another summary confirming the assignment of these names to these segments, but not really any further detail about what exactly these affections are, at the expense of focusing on noesis (so eikasia, as a term, I think, only appears three times in all the Republic), so it's admittedly ambiguous or not spelled out whether each affection takes the objects as they are, or whether each affection lower than noesis is fooled into believing that their corresponding objects are real. There does at least seem to be this concrete difference between the objects of eikasia and Aristotle's phantasia: the examples Socrates gives of the former are shadows, reflections in water, reflections in smooth bright things (like mirrors or glass or smooth, wet stones, or what have you), which are things seen by the eye and perhaps understood not to be in there (i.e., we see our own reflection in the water and seem to recognize it as an i.age of ourselves, and not as another self mysteriously in the water), whereas Aristotle has in mind the kind of imaging activity we do when we close our eyes and picture something.

            . By the description of the divided line, eikasia's objects are visible images of the objects on the next part of the line, but they seem to be treated as almost exclusively visible shadows or reflections, and not images in the mind. On the other hand, if you look everywhere else in the Republic for how eikos is used, it's plainly broader and gets closer to what's going on with Aristotle's phantasia (so things like the ring of Guges, the city in speech, the Cave, the Sun, the Divided Line, the myth of Er, are all eikoi of a kind). But it might also be broader than what Aristotle has in mind.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            Wouldn't eikos be the objects of eikasia? I thought that the comparison with shadows, reflections, etc., is metaphorical, comparing what images get you compared to what they originate from.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            I think we're supposed to extrapolate that, but it's curious that if you go to the passage that's supposed to be an account, it seems to be a narrow presentation of the objects. But this is just to say that, though eikoi are important for the entire Republic, their actual account is missing, and maybe even distorted by the arguments addressing specifically the kind of people Glaucon and Adeimantus represent (I have in mind both critiques of poetry in bks. II-III and X, which, taken strictly, undermine the entire dialogue).

            [...]
            Also it's worth noting that Plato describes the shadows, reflections, etc., as phantasmata.
            >[510α] μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.
            Obviously, Aristotle is the first thinker to flesh out what phantasia, phantasmata are, and he is often dealing with different concerns than Plato, but I thought it was worth pointing out. I don't think Aristotle would deviate too far from standard colloquial usage of the word.

            >Also it's worth noting that Plato describes the shadows, reflections, etc., as phantasmata.
            A nitpick, but it's specifically "appearances in water", and not a characterization of everything.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            >A nitpick, but it's specifically "appearances in water"
            That's a good nitpick. "Where" exactly is this metaphorical water? Out in the world, and then apprehended? Or in the mind? Water, given its ability to take on any shape, is a natural analog to the mind, especially considering the extreme malleability of water and Aristotle's later writings on the potential intellect. Things occur outside water, which are then reflected in water, which can take on any shape. Light illuminates both.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            That might be something, but I don't see anything in the Republic, anyway, that would allow us to take water as analogous to mind. But it is regularly related to images and reflections, here they all are (since the number of passages are few), and maybe they'll help some:

            >363d
            >N/A, related to punishment

            >402b
            >"Now isn't it also true that if images of writings should appear somewhere, in water or in mirrors, we wouldn't recognize them before we knew the things themselves, but both belong to the same art and discipline?"

            >404a-b
            >N/A, related to either elements/drinking water

            >509e-510a
            >"I mean by images first shadows, then appearances produced in water and in all close-grained, smooth, bright things, and everything of the sort, if you understand."

            >510e
            >"These things themselves that they mold and draw, of which there are shadows and images in water, they now use as images, seeking to see those things themselves, that one can see in no other way than with thought."

            >516a-b
            >"At first he'd most easily make out the shadows; and after that the phantoms ofthe human beings and the other things in water; and, later, the things themselves."
            >"Then I suppose he would be able to make out the sun-not its appearances in water or some alien place, but the sun itself by itself in its own region-and see what it's like."

            >532b-d
            >"Then," I said, "the release from the bonds and the turning around from the shadows to the phantoms and the light, the way up from the cave to the sun; and, once there, the persisting inability to look at the animals and the plants and the sun's light, and looking instead at the divine appearances in water and at shadows of the things that are, rather than as before at shadows of phantoms cast by a light that, when judged in comparison with the sun, also has the quality of a shadow of a phantom-all this activity of the arts, which we went through, has the power to release and leads what is best in the soul up to the contemplation of what is best in the things that are, just as previously what is clearest in the body was led to the contemplation of what is brightest in the region of the bodily and the visible."

            >550a
            >N/A, watering the soul

            >561c
            >N/A, drinking water

            >602c-d
            >"And the same things look bent and straight when seen in water and out of it, and also both concave and convex, due to the sight's being misled by the colors, and every sort of confusion of this kind is
            plainly in our soul."

            >606d
            >N/A, watering the soul

            >621a-b
            >N/A, water of the river of carelessness

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            Thank you for the extensive compilation. I think it works pretty well, though I'd still take it with a grain of salt. The problem is, I always felt like the Divided Line and anything connected to it was mostly connected with theory of mind, empiricism vs. rationalism, judgment, and the possibility of intelligibility at all. So, something akin to what Kant was trying to investigate in the CPR.

          • 8 months ago
            Anonymous

            Wouldn't eikos be the objects of eikasia? I thought that the comparison with shadows, reflections, etc., is metaphorical, comparing what images get you compared to what they originate from.

            Also it's worth noting that Plato describes the shadows, reflections, etc., as phantasmata.
            >[510α] μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.
            Obviously, Aristotle is the first thinker to flesh out what phantasia, phantasmata are, and he is often dealing with different concerns than Plato, but I thought it was worth pointing out. I don't think Aristotle would deviate too far from standard colloquial usage of the word.

  3. 8 months ago
    Anonymous

    It’s because they had a patent for “seeing things” if you look at the patent office record the first patent ever made was for the concept of “seeing things”. The idea and such and such. So they had many names for the many types, some lost to time so they just became synonyms for looking at things in general.

  4. 8 months ago
    Anonymous

    oh, it’s this thread again.

    • 8 months ago
      Anonymous

      We like the philosopher.

  5. 8 months ago
    Anonymous

    frick Aristoteles

    • 8 months ago
      Anonymous

      take that back Black person

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