So... it's like... we've got numbers, right? And the first one is, well, One. But then this One isn't one, it's actually a pair, since it is itself and it exists. Yes, it has being. So with One automatically comes the pair One and Being. So with One, it's actually two. And with all of this, you have difference. Now we have a triplet: One, Being, and Difference. So from One, you get One, Two, and Three. And I guess they're all prime n shit, and you can use them to make any other number. And there we have it, the generation of numbers.
...
...
Please tell me that this isn't the most moronic shit I've ever seen.
We’re Parmenides right about every single thing it still would have no real world use or application. It is non-falsifiable garbage.
>Plato’s text sets four concepts to work on the basis of the apparent couple of the one and the others: the one-being, the there-is of the one, the pure multiple ( plñqov) and the structured multiple ( poll?). If the knot of these concepts remains undone in the fi nal aporia, and if the void triumphs therein, it is solely because the gap between the supposition of the one’s being and the operation of its ‘there is’ remains unthought.
>This gap, however, is named by Plato many times in his work. It is precisely what provides the key to the Platonic concept par excellence, participation, and it is not for nothing that at the very beginning of the Parmenides, before the entrance of the old master, Socrates has recourse to this concept in order to destroy Zeno’s arguments on the one and the multiple.
>In Plato’s work, as we know, the Idea is the occurrence in beings of the thinkable. There lies its point of being. But on the other hand, it has to support participation, which is to say, the fact that I think, on the basis of its being, existing multiples as one. Thus, these men, these hairs, and these muddy puddles are only presentable to thought insofar as a one-effect occurs among them, from the standpoint of ideal being in which Man, Hair and Mud ek-sist in the intelligible region.
Out of my thread, queer!
Why is this supposed to be moronic? In the second deduction Parmenides is dealing with the hypothesis for which the One is, while not being identical to Being (which is to say "the One is" is not a tautology, buy a synthetic proposition that unites One and Being as different element of a single proposition): since this is the standpoint in which multiplicity is affirmed it only makes sense for Plato to place here the derivation of all numbers.
because it sounds like a combination of both the fallacy of reification and a "just so" story. how can something be a "pair" before it is a "number"? it makes no sense. makes me think a lot of this metaphysical stuff, after going to a deep enough level, is about splitting "atomistic" concepts that really can't be split any further. but once you split that "atom", if you pretend it is a valid operation, then you can get zany consequences like "being is one and many" and other things.
You have insufficient IQ
Or maybe my IQ towers over yours, because you get excited over discovering your first abstraction, while I'm bored by it because I thought about it a long time ago and already recognize all its pros and cons.
What's it gonna be champ?
Thank you anon, beautifull reminder.
>if you pretend it's a valid operation, then you can get zany consequences...
Thank you, anon. "Little" metaphysical errors can render much of one's subsequent thought worthless. Plato is very guilty of this, but he's not alone. It's basically why we have to go back to Parmenides and others.
Of all the books that needed an editor, this book needed it the most.
>Plato is very guilty of this, but he's not alone.
hold on Parmenidesgay, Parmenides is also guilty because if Parmenides is "right" then he's also a hypocrite and Being cannot be spoken of
It can be spoken of, just not in any veritable way using language.
"“What manner of training is that, Parmenides?” he asked.
“The manner is just what you heard from Zeno,” he said. “Except I was [e] also impressed by something you had to say to him: you didn’t allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms.”"
The one he speaks of is the first visible. It's the first line the artist draws on the paper.
https://pastebin.com/P3rVFrue
Nah, this guy
is right. If you talk of evens then you by necessity, must talk of odds. That’s even proto-beginner stuff.
the point is that the even and odds stuff has no bearing on being. you mistook the trees for the forest.
I'm already in your discord server goofy 😀
>because it sounds like a combination of both the fallacy of reification
You're the one reifying, since you're treating numbers as independent from actual quantities (e.g. assuming that the number 2 can be in a state of affair in which there aren't 2 things)
How am I doing that? It's clear I'm doing the complete opposite.
Then you should agree with Parmenides. He is basically deducing 2 from the fact that in the second hypothesis there can be two different things. This is the opposite of reitication.
The reifying method would be to say that 2 is an independent thing, and then deduce from it the existence of 2 things.
In general, you seem very confused anon
I guess I'm operating from the mentality that one can "construct" an arbitrary classification that can encompass a variety of different things, qualities, etc., without actually getting to the root of the matter. And this is what I perceive to be going on when I spoke about violating "atomistic concepts" here:
. When Plato spoke about
>the One is a pair, being itself and having being
it sounds like at least one of those concepts has to be false. Because how can "one" "thing" be two? One is defined by the quality of one-ness. But now we're saying it's two, and 1=2?
The conclusion is that either one isn't a thing, being isn't a thing, or this whole operation is a process of "constructing" concepts so that one can have the desired outcome, a pair of things associated by one but isn't technically two (even though a pair of things includes, two things). But why stop there? We could continue to construct more and more concepts. Why not say that One isn't just a pair, but it is an infinite-togetherness?
I may well be confused, but to me, I feel like I'm doing the opposite of:
>You're the one reifying, since you're treating numbers as independent from actual quantities (e.g. assuming that the number 2 can be in a state of affair in which there aren't 2 things)
because I'm explicitly saying that a pair needs two things by definition, but you're saying it doesn't. Your conclusion, holding to this 1=2 setup, means that numbers (like two) are independent from actual quantities (pairings).
>Because how can "one" "thing" be two?
By having a definition that required two different properties. Here we have already accepted the difference of Being and One (while in the first deduction Being and One were seen as identical). To give another example, imagine the platonic notion of man: man had a body and a soul. He must possess both properties (which is to say, he must be both a body and a soul), but this doesn't entail two different subjects (since here soul and body are unified in man).
>One is defined by the quality of one-ness. But now we're saying it's two, and 1=2?
Here oneness will be the unity behind a multiplicity, so the 1=2 equation is disanalogous. Basically he is saying that for One to BE One, it must have two properties: the one of Oneness, and the one of Being (if it lacks the former the One will not be One, if it lacks the latter the One will not be, it will lack existence).
>But why stop there? We could continue to construct more and more concepts. Why not say that One isn't just a pair, but it is an infinite-togetherness?
He doesn't stop at two, as you have already mentioned the One becomes the ground of all natural numbers (e.g. with Difference it becomes 3). Moreover Plato is willing to make the jump to infinity, since as he says each participated One always splits at least in the One-Being Dyad. So, One is composed of One and Being, but this second One is also composed of One and Being, and so on ad infinitum.
>because I'm explicitly saying that a pair needs two things by definition, but you're saying it doesn't.
No, I am saying that two things is the ground for 2. First you have 2 things, then you can talk about 2, and not vice versa. This is the opposite of reification.
I would add, I think you're kinda confused about Parmenides' project here. This is perfectly justifiable, it is after all one of the most enigmatic texts in the history of philosophy. That said, you should always keep in mind that Parmenides is trying to analyze all the ways in which the One can be concieved, in 8 different deductions. I say this because at times you seem to adopt the standpoint of different deductions to criticize this one, as if Parmenides simply did not consider those possibilities. For example treating the One as not containing any multiplicity is what he does in the first deduction,which you should have already read
>He must possess both properties (which is to say, he must be both a body and a soul), but this doesn't entail two different subjects (since here soul and body are unified in man).
I suppose this is where we can get into hot water again. What do you take as "subject", or should I say, "substance"? The individuals seem to underlie the components, but the components seem to underlie the individuals.
>Here oneness will be the unity behind a multiplicity, so the 1=2 equation is disanalogous
I don't like prepositional terms like "behind" and see them as obfuscations. We're trying to look at one complete snapshot of reality where everything is exposed. If something appears to be "one", but then we look deeper, dissect that something, and it turns out to be two things, then the initial front that it is "one thing" is wrong, or at least not the full story. That has to be accounted for.
>No, I am saying that two things is the ground for 2. First you have 2 things, then you can talk about 2, and not vice versa. This is the opposite of reification.
Are we not treating "One" and "Being" as two things until after the split is recognized as actual or something?
>He doesn't stop at two, as you have already mentioned the One becomes the ground of all natural numbers (e.g. with Difference it becomes 3). Moreover Plato is willing to make the jump to infinity, since as he says each participated One always splits at least in the One-Being Dyad. So, One is composed of One and Being, but this second One is also composed of One and Being, and so on ad infinitum.
Hmmm. And I suppose with Difference, we have a situation where One is split into One and Being, but Being is split into Being and Difference. So we have a bit of a fractal triadism happening here?
I guess another question worth asking is if this division of concepts is a "fundamental" thing. Can it be represented in other, "purer" ways?
>The individuals seem to underlie the components, but the components seem to underlie the individuals.
The individual underlie the unity, the components determine what kind of unity the individual will be. Without this second step you end up with the first deduction, in which the unity is completely abstract and isolated, meaning that it cannot even partake in Being.
>If something appears to be "one", but then we look deeper, dissect that something, and it turns out to be two things, then the initial front that it is "one thing" is wrong, or at least not the full story.
This was already accounted with the soul-body example. A difference in component doesn't preclude an unity between them. Similarly a difference in Oneness and Being does not preclude their unity, it only entails an internal differentiation. In this case the internal differentiation is necessary, due to the result of the first deduction.
>Are we not treating "One" and "Being" as two things until after the split is recognized as actual or something?
If the split is recognized then we have already posited a distinction, meaning that we have already posited two things. From there we can start talking about 2. To do it before the split you would have to reify 2 and treat it as something independent and self-subsistent.
>And I suppose with Difference, we have a situation where One is split into One and Being, but Being is split into Being and Difference. So we have a bit of a fractal triadism happening here?
I think it's the One that is split, not Being (since here we are focusing on the proposition "the One is", and One is here the subject). So if we get to the triad we would have One that splits into One, Being and Difference, then this second One splits again, and so on. Of course this process can be expanded by recognizing other necessary determinations, for example Identity and the other Greater Kinds. Maybe this process can also be applied to other Ideas, but here Parmenides focuses only on the One.
>i guess another question worth asking is if this division of concepts is a "fundamental" thing. Can it be represented in other, "purer" ways?
What do you mean?
>If the split is recognized then we have already posited a distinction, meaning that we have already posited two things. From there we can start talking about 2. To do it before the split you would have to reify 2 and treat it as something independent and self-subsistent.
Does
serve as a good way of trying to understand this?
>What do you mean?
I think I mean this:
>Of course this process can be expanded by recognizing other necessary determinations, for example Identity and the other Greater Kinds. Maybe this process can also be applied to other Ideas, but here Parmenides focuses only on the One.
Like, could you start with something other than "One" and uncover an analogous dyad/triadic procession? I think this is what Benardete referred to as eidetic analysis.
Regarding the Tao bit, I don't think that's necessary, but this goes into the finer points of Plato's metaphysics. For example from Sophist we already know that every possible idea partakes at least into itself and four other Ideas (actually there are more than 5 Greater Kinds, Oneness and Wholeness, for example, I suspect the Eleatic Stranger was just trying to keep things simple in that text, by mentioning only the Kinds that were necessary for his argument to work). So, I suspect that this triadic structure is not necessary, but Im not 100% sure about it, maybe some passage from the Philebus could help making that argument.
>Like, could you start with something other than "One" and uncover an analogous dyad/triadic procession? I think this is what Benardete referred to as eidetic analysis.
I have never read Bernardete, but Parmenides is pretty explicit on this point. The gymnasia he proposes must be appliable to all possible Ideas. He just picks the one of Oneness as an example. Notice for example how the first deduction can be reapplied to every possible Idea. The Idea X is only characterized as X, in complete abstraction from every other possible Idea, and since Being is an Idea of this sort, X won't partake in Being. It doesn't really matter wether you start with Oneness, Identity, Difference, or whatever else, the result is always the same. Similarly in the second deduction, when you will say "X is" while assuming that X and Being are different, X will always be characterized by an internal multiplicity.
Of course understanding the logic behind every single deduction is very hard, and personally this is not a task I have completed. For some I understand the underlying logic (for example I understand the first and second deduction, which is why I could contribute to this discussion), for others I don't.
>For example from Sophist we already know that every possible idea partakes at least into itself and four other Ideas (actually there are more than 5 Greater Kinds, Oneness and Wholeness,
Could you briefly go over this please?
>The Idea X is only characterized as X, in complete abstraction from every other possible Idea, and since Being is an Idea of this sort, X won't partake in Being.
>Similarly in the second deduction, when you will say "X is" while assuming that X and Being are different, X will always be characterized by an internal multiplicity.
This helps a lot, thank you, although I think it's worth rephrasing the 2nd quote because it makes it sound like it wouldn't work with Being. However, it does work with Being in a similar fashion, but not if you compare it with itself, but rather try to describe it as "One." It appears that this attempt to predicate Being leads to the pairing of concepts we were talking about earlier and the return of internal multiplicity. If that holds true, then that's where we find the scaffolding I've been talking about.
>This helps a lot, thank you, although I think it's worth rephrasing the 2nd quote because it makes it sound like it wouldn't work with Being. However, it does work with Being in a similar fashion, but not if you compare it with itself, but rather try to describe it as "One."
It also work by noticing that Being would not be identical to Being, since it would have to partake to Identity. In general for X to be X there are many conditions that have to be met, but in the first deduction they are not satisfied, since to be satisfied they require eidetic participation.
>Could you briefly go over this please?
You should definetely read Sophist before Parmenides, it helps understanding a bit of how Plato structure the eidetic world. The Greater Kinds could be seen as eidetic formal principles, as in, Ideas that are entailed in the structure of every possible Idea. The easier ones are the ones of Being, Identity and Difference (I will ignore now the ones of Stasis and Motion, since they require more background): for every Idea X to be itself, it must be (partakes in Being), it must be identical to itself (it has to partake in Identity, otherwise it would be another idea Y), and it must be different from other Ideas (it has to partake in Difference, otherwise it would be identical to Y, and as such it would be Y). In the Sophist the Eleatic Stranger (who is the protagonist of the dialogue) mentions only the 5 Kinds I have mentioned, but it is easy to notice that there are other Ideas that must be entailed by every other possible Idea. In the same dialogue he mentions Oneness and Wholeness in earlier stages, and one can see why each Idea X, to be the Idea X, must be One (insofar as it is the one Idea X, otherwise it would lack unity and it would be an accidental aggregate) and Whole (otherwise it would not be the Idea X, but only a part of it).
The Sophist clarifies nothing. Plato did not think philosophy could be written down, the dialogues were basically just trolls to "make you think, dude" and maybe lead you down the path of geometry->astronomy->Pythagoreanism.
"I did not, however, give a complete exposition, nor did Dionysios ask for one. For he professed to know many, and those the most important, points, and to have a sufficient hold of them through instruction given by others. I hear also that he has since written about what he heard from me, composing what professes to be his own handbook, very different, so he says, from the doctrines which he heard from me; but of its contents I know nothing; I know indeed that others have written on the same subjects; but who they are, is more than they know themselves. Thus much at least, I can say about all writers, past or future, who say they know the things to which I devote myself, whether by hearing the teaching of me or of others, or by their own discoveries-that according to my view it is not possible for them to have any real skill in the matter. There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself. Yet this much I know-that if the things were written or put into words, it would be done best by me, and that, if they were written badly, I should be the person most pained. Again, if they had appeared to me to admit adequately of writing and exposition, what task in life could I have performed nobler than this, to write what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature of things into the light for all to see? But I do not think it a good thing for men that there should be a disquisition, as it is called, on this topic-except for some few, who are able with a little teaching to find it out for themselves. As for the rest, it would fill some of them quite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt, and others with lofty and vain-glorious expectations, as though they had learnt something high and mighty.
For this reason no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language, especially not in language that is unchangeable, which is true of that which is set down in written characters."
Plato's real teaching, to the extent that it's discernible at all from testimony in other authors, was basically just Pythagoreanism with some minor differences. ("Dude... what if... like, instead of the Infinite, we had... like... the Great and Small, dude-and-then-we-have the One! Oh shit dude... far out...")
That's some pseud shit. get serious, otherwise you will never rise above the internet schizo level
It's from Plato's seventh letter...
This isn't even something that's seriously debated in contemporary Plato scholarship. The dialogues are just trolls. Sometimes they point to something real, like the idea of Forms - but the Forms Plato actually taught weren't like the Forms in the dialogue (he goes out of his way to point out how that theory is incoherent in the Parmenides). Or like the demiurge in the Timaeus - but the demiurge is only vaguely related to "the One".
You're just getting trolled by Plato. He didn't write his dialogues to make sense, that's why they contain so many bad arguments.
Nah you just got filtered.
I think you're overlooking too hastily this bit a little towards the end of your quote:
>But I do not think it a good thing for men that there should be a disquisition, as it is called, on this topic-except for some few, who are able with a little teaching to find it out for themselves.
(The Greek is better translated "to discover them through a small indication", i.e., it's in fact plausible to sprinkle indications that can lead a reader to the discovery of something. See Phaedrus 264b-e for a suggestion on how one might leave indications in writing and how to understand them.)
>Plato's real teaching, to the extent that it's discernible at all from testimony in other authors, was basically just Pythagoreanism with some minor differences.
The problem with this is that it's already blatantly on the surface of the dialogues, and apparently all one needs to do to discover Plato's thought is take Phaedo and Timaeus and abstract parts of Parmenides and Philebus and say "these latter are the principles of the former," and his opinion then is right out in the open with little effort.
You're right, I was just trying to mess with you because it's fun to troll, but you took the time to write a real and substantive reply so good on you. The neoplatonists recognized that there was an "unwritten doctrine" but that didn't stop them from studying the written dialogues closely.
I do, trolling aside, think that some of Plato's dialogues contain bad arguments on purpose (like the Phaedo, and pretty much all of the so-called "early dialogues") and that part of the point is to leave you wondering "what was wrong with that argument?" to set you thinking on the same lines for yourself, so that the knowledge meant to be conveyed wouldn't be a set of arguments that you had read, but something you really understood from the inside. He was clearly very concerned with logic, even if he never wrote logical treatises, so it's hard to believe that he made logical mistakes by... mistake. And of course he also did really believe in immortality, punishments/rewards after death, etc, he just didn't give the best arguments for them in the Phaedo or elsewhere.
I also think Aristotle's esoteric works (i.e. the only ones we have) are written the way they are intentionally to create this effect of "conversation within the soul". The standard line is that they are lecture notes, but it's hard to believe that he lectured much on this stuff when Theophrastus misunderstood him so severely in so many areas. Plato would famously refer to Aristotle's house as "the house of the reader" - I like to think Aristotle tried to do the same thing by dense/obscure writing that Plato did by dialectic. That's kind of silly and romantic though, I know, it's just a daydream.
Certainly Platonism was about more than understanding arguments, you were supposed to "become like God" as Socrates puts it in the Theaetetus through just and upright actions. So probably I'll never really get it, even if I do progress in understanding his train of thought, as long as I drink so much beer.
Im not that anon
>I do, trolling aside, think that some of Plato's dialogues contain bad arguments on purpose (like the Phaedo, and pretty much all of the so-called "early dialogues") and that part of the point is to leave you wondering "what was wrong with that argument?" to set you thinking on the same lines for yourself, so that the knowledge meant to be conveyed wouldn't be a set of arguments that you had read, but something you really understood from the inside
I don't think those arguments are bad, you just have to keep notice of the rhetorical underpinning of the dialogue. When Plato talks with someone he will use certain arguments to make him affirm, in clearer and more thoughtful terms, what he actually thinks, and this rhetorically involve playing with positions that were known at the time. Once you account for this rhetorical framework, you can start seeing how Socrates is actually and subtly criticizing these positions with very veiled critiques. But I think this requires some familiarity with the culture of 5th century Athen, which is why so many students end up assuming that Socrates was just a moron surrounded by yes men.
>I don't think those arguments are bad, you just have to keep notice of the rhetorical underpinning of the dialogue. When Plato talks with someone he will use certain arguments to make him affirm, in clearer and more thoughtful terms, what he actually thinks, and this rhetorically involve playing with positions that were known at the time. Once you account for this rhetorical framework, you can start seeing how Socrates is actually and subtly criticizing these positions with very veiled critiques. But I think this requires some familiarity with the culture of 5th century Athen, which is why so many students end up assuming that Socrates was just a moron surrounded by yes men.
Nta (I'm
and
), but I don't think there's anything shameful in acknowledging that some arguments are bad *as arguments*, BUT (and I *think* you, the other anon, and I might all agree on this) even bad arguments can point to something important that Plato intends. Cratylus, for example, is full of howlers, but for the sake of the more serious discussion of legislators and how the laws inform our opinions about things.
I mean, I agree, what I meant is that those arguments do not work only because they're still doing their work in a flawed rhetorical framework. For example if you presuppose an incorrect principle X, and think that from this principle only Z follows, and Y definetely doesn't follow, then a Socrates might ironically adopt X to show that Y follows from it. This puts you in a weird spot, since you want to affirm X while denying Y, which in turn makes you think more thoroughly about X (and at that point Socrates can help you understand how even X was wrong, since now you're actively thinking about it, while before you were just presupposing it). Moreover, as an added bonus, you now have a clearer understanding on the logic of X (and what really follows from it), and this understanding takes places at an higher standpoint. Knowing for example why Thasymachus is wrong means that you have already adopted another standpoint, from which you not only understand his position, but you also understand where it goes awry.
This is how I have always interpreted those weirder passages in the earlier dialogues. Dunno if you would agree with this interpretation. Personally I have matured this interpretation once I started discussing philosophical issues with people who were more clueless than me. At that point it becomes evident why at some times you might have to make a bad argument (in the sense i have described) to help them figure out what they're getting wrong.
I think that's a very sensible take.
Also please don't troll on this board, it is already filled with idiots in bad faith, there is no need to lower even more the level of these discussions (especially if you can actually offer some valid contributions, as you're doing right now)
Lol, that was my only post in this thread, so successful b8, anon! In any case, I agree with much that you say (though my take on Plato is that he's much more skeptical over what happens after death). I think your take on Aristotle is very plausible, and that it can be seen in how much more often he argues from topics than from principles (so, dialectic as the primary mode, not demonstration), or from tensions in positions like comparing "Nature does nothing in vain" with passages in the biological works.
>Plato's real teaching, to the extent that it's discernible at all from testimony in other authors, was basically just Pythagoreanism with some minor differences
That's a whole lot of nothing, considering that we know virtually nothing about Pythagorean philosophy. It is way easier to derive, through lots of abstraction and personal reflection, a coherent worldview from Plato's dialogues than to do the same with the few pythagorean fragments that are still in our hands
How the hell can one ever return to "regular" philosophical discussions about metaphysics once you get this deep into Plato? Form, attributes, res extensa, thing-in-itself, Dasein, etc., it all seems so... cute and irrelevant.
Heidegger blows this mystical woo-woo shit out of the water
no he doesn't
yes he does
>How can one thing be two?
It’s explained in the OP. Because of the state of being. Reread it and think about it and it’ll click.
The only way I can understand this is through something like the Dao De Jing, which simply posits that the world began with 1, 2, and 3, and then the "ten thousand things" (basically, the totality of being) emerged from that "foundation." So when we try to speak of emergence from the One, and we try to strictly speak of an ordinal progression, we're setting ourselves up for failure. Being rests on an eternal "tripod" scaffolding, and if we don't set up all the legs of the tripod at once, it falls apart.
Correct.
oh boy I cannot WAIT for this thread to restate the same eleatic vs peripatetic arguments as every other thread about Parmenides to be posted this summer!!!
the dialectic must advance... one day either the Eleatics or the Peripatetics will be crushed under the weight of discursive reasoning
it's been TWO THOUSAND YEARS
IT WILL HAPPEN
OR MAYBE NOTHING EVER HAPPENS
how the frick is this numbers thing connected to metaphysics. like, imagine telling somebody that because of 1, 2, and 3, they're matter and form
And how does metaphysics connect to matter and form moron?
uhhh it is metaphysics?
I was so close to figuring everything out bros... then the precipice of insight slipped from my fingers... it's not fair bros