reductive materialism btfoed by 1 page long proof

>There's no problem in defining what you mean by "someone being fooled" or "someone believes X" even if you assume consciousness isn't real.
Then why have you not done it?

If we investigate why what makes us very angry makes us very angry, we can learn a lot about ourselves. Try some soul searching anon, and return to this board after youre fone being a huge homosexual

You can't do it because such a thing isn't possible
I'm sorry anon but Dennet is wrong, he's a very smart man but he's still wrong. It's okay you dont have to get angry at this.

>Who is there to define?

That is not really a problem so much as what it means to

"Define definition."

So already, you have to have some preliminary notion of definition, you might call it D' in order to define definition. But then you have to have the same problem for D' so you have D''. But if you start in a more ARistotelean manner, where entities like Socrates, vigor, courage, etc. are taken to already exist, we dont PROVE they exist, then you avoid all of these problems.

Like, you're never going to hath a mathematical proof of what "the courageous man" does, but it seems like most people know it is courageous to run into a burning building to save a baby, without it ever being proved to mathematical certainty, whatever that means. So it is possible that philosophy (and lots of math) is just autistics/schizophrenics coping w/ lack of pragmatic language.

>You guys should drop the equations sometimes and read some philosophy, specially that made before the mids XX century, some of it is as rigoirous and schizo as the best math

They should all read Richard Rorty and realize that plenty of adults just dont approach life this way---American Pragmatism is not mathematically derivable, but so what? The cash value is important, unless you're a schizo math prof w/ tenure who just gives his paycheque to his wife, who cooks for him (I knew a couple profs like this, they literally just did their schizo math or whatever and their wife fed them, while mocking them, one told us how his wife would routinely say things like "well, you wouldn't understand, you've got no common sense, all you do is math.")

New arrival here, grad work in philosophy (no degree) and my general impression is that all of these guys remind me of the guy in my first year epistemology class who was completely certain that the prof (dual PhDs in math, specifically set theory and philosophy, w/ background in the german language) was just not making any sense when he described things like Russel's paradox.

There are broadly two types of academics, those who are interested in "teaching the controversy" because they recognize education is a process that repeats with every general, and those who are concerned with 'being right." The former are very rare, and the latter make education seem like a bureaucratic hellscape.

>Who can say if things have a definite mass and volume and colour if all we can rely on is our subjectivity and that relies on consciousness

Well, they dont all rely on subjectivity, unless you are fairly radical about what subjectivity means. It is subjective how painful being stabbed in the foot is, but it is objective that the metal is piercing the flesh, unless, again, you are a fairly radical sort of idealist/subjectivist.

The volume and physical properties of the knife that make it able to physically pierce your foot, as opposed to a piece of jello, I struggle to say these are "just subjective." It's not a mathematical argument, tho, it is scientific: we have never seen jello stabbing someone in the foot.

Or a "loud pattern," e.g. a paisley checkered suit, that is subjective, but there is a very definite objective nature to the pattern, e.g. that it is a series of different materials that reflect different wavelengths that many people call "loud." Or "clashing colours" etc.

But if your real issue is radical skepticism about the external world, I dont think you can argue anyone out of that.

>Also you seem to have a weird fixation for saying math and philo are for autistic and schizo losers who cant understand humans

That is my impression of much of academia---universities evolved out of monastic communities, aka communities for high functioning mentally ill people, tho I guess it is a bit salty to call reliugion a mental illness.

>we are no different than a rock and we would laugh if someone said a rock is expressing herself when she rolls down a cliff

This is actually, IMO, the direction you have to go if you want to save minds, you have to go animist and say everything has a mind, as many indigenous cultures did.

> My argument is that if we consider consciousness an ilusion, we are also labeling as ilusions subjectivity, individuality, personhood and freewill

Yeah, and this is the direction, again, IMHO, people who want to argue for minds go in, they have a strong commitment to one of these entities, often freewill or personhood, so they ignore the ample scientific evidence.

The problem is that science is a method, it is not a discourse. You don't do science by going

"Let us define Water to be wet..."

You experience water as wet, and you note that you also experience ethanol as wet, but if you apply two equal sized candles to equal volumes of water and ethanol, the ethanol starts evaporating first, because it has a lower boiling point.

I once had a chemistry prof explain all of this, in the context of a long-running aristotle seminar at my uni---he was just not a fan of Aristotle's world-view, and he explained that scientists (or at least chemists of his ilk) did not have a notion of "susbtance" (ousia) in the ARistotelean sense, which is why everything derived from that, such as 'qualities of substances' rather than 'properties of materials' just does not make sense.

Scientists dont investigate truth, they investigate patterns. The fact that you never get to say "it is true that we have observed..." just 'we have observed..." does not impact the doing of science.

There is a POSSIBLE argument that this is just because scientists are not REALLY understanding what they are doing, but I am skeptical about that.

>Materialism is not defensible, but I also believe panpsychism or something like that has much more weight

Well, OK. The issue is that if materialism is correct, what you think is not amenable to argument--you are like a weather pattern, and I cannot change the weather, by talking to it, can I?

Can change another by bumping into it*

It literally doesn't matter whatsoever that there are or aren't materialists in the medical industry or chemistry or whatever.

Because whether or not materialism as an ontology is correct or incorrect is not related to whether there are people in the medical industry who are materialists.
I am not interested in question begging or arguments from ignorance. Make a better argument.

I want to know what is going on in reality. I can't explain all phenomena via pure materialism or pure idealism, so I don't care about them.

Chemistry and medicine can't explain all phenomena

They can't explain qualitative perceptions, mathematical objects, what came before the big bang, etc. As has been pointed out several times

What do you mean "where these things are"
Qualitative perceptions exist in a mind
Mathematical objects exist in the platonic realm
Whatever was before the big bang existed before the big bang
etc.
This is very easy to understand.

Things don't need a defined location to exist.
Also, I am educated in pure mathematics lol

My point is that even if they claim to believe materialism but, they dont, because believing in materialism really believing in it, cant even get a person out of the bed
Thats like if I said money is an ilusion but I was also a big investor, or if I said joy was an ilusion but were constantly laughing and being happy
>inb4 stoicism says that
No stoicism says there is no permanent state of things, so joy has no real lasting ultimate substance anymore than sadness
>inb4 money is ilusion
No, it is a convention and has pragmatic value
If you stretch the world ilusion to mean anything it becomes useless

>if full determinism was possible, ghen any materialist would have to go the buddhist way and stop identifying with consciousness if he really believed what he preaches

Why would consistency of belief be important, except in some ideal sense?

Consistency of belief should be improtant when arguing
Thats why I said materialism is undefensible

>because believing in materialism really believing in it, cant even get a person out of the bed

Again, to a materialist beliefs are just brain processes.

So, I set my alarm clock every morning at 5am, it rings, and I brush my teeth, then I have coffee, then I walk to the bus stop, go to the WalMart where i greet people for 8 hours, then I go home, eat dinner, brush my teeth, go to bed, and the next day it repeats.

Why do you think beliefs are necessary for this process? It's not a 'belief" that I need to eat or pay rent, if I want to avoid starvation/homelessness.

I mean, you can say "you must believe that, otherwise why would you do it?" but I dont see how that is necessary.

>When a materialist argues it seems like he wants to convince everyone he doesnt exist

This is sort of the problem I meant with language pragmatics.

Like, if I said to a chemist "there is no I, I mean, I am saying that to you, but as chemists we know we are constellations of matter that we describe as elementary particles in the standard model, and "I" is something that certain configurations of matter call themselves, and "you" is something they call other configurations of matter, with which they perceive themselves to be interacting, but, of course, that perception is itself contingent, becuse the standard model only allows for interactions of elementary particles, not of "you" and "me.""

That is a sort of foundational materialist account that makes sense to me, and it requires one to use "I" in two senses, the colloquial sense, and the reductive sense.

>Lewis Carroll tier dialogue

I'm not sure why you find something wrong with that, we should be so lucky. Also, he was a Logician.

>but "i" and "you" exist phenomenally, then the standard model is not the entirety of existence.

God exists phenomenally, lots of people perceive that God exists, so you could make the exact same argument against materialism on the basis of God, but you are prob. not going to do that, are you?

>But you forget he also was a priest
He was a deacon and given a dispensation to avoid taking priests' orders because he did not want to preach, that is one thing I hav read.

> live in two separate realities, the "I" reality and the "standard model" reality, like a schizo, and you dont see anything wrong with that

I am not the one saying they are two separate realities, I am saying that one is, for example, in a court of law we assert we are individuals wigh rights, personality, etc. In a chem lab, we dont do that. However, if the chem lab has a University (legal entity) overseeing it, we do end up in this schizo realm, whether we liek it or not.

Your attempt to resolve the schizophrenic tenseion between facts (rocks in the pile) and values (number of rocks), science and law, etc. etc. is not going to work. But thankfully, in practice, it does not matter that much.

It is empirically clear that only a small minority of people think about these things, and the people who carry on do not, and it is not to their detriment.

>Consistency of belief should be improtant when arguing

Why is this? Are we arguing or conversing? Is there a difference?

My argument is against people that think consciousness is an illusion, because when they said that they are basically destroying the ground for debate. I expressed my views more clearly here

You seem to always ignore the core argument and go in a tangent prompted by a corollary of what I wrote
My argument is that if we consider consciousness an ilusion, we are also labeling as ilusions subjectivity, individuality, personhood and freewill. Because if only matter exists and subjective experience is an ilusion, we are just a bunch of matter experiencing causality and so have no self, our thoughts are just casually determined phenomena etc, we are no different than a rock and we would laugh if someone said a rock is expressing herself when she rolls down a cliff
After that, you cant really argue about anything because the concept of a conscious being that can argue is denied by your own arguments
Do you have anything to say about that?

Hope kt explains my point but feel free to ask for clarifications if that dont suffice

Ok, but that leaves the problem of causality there
If its only emergence from physical properties, its pointless for example to argue for or against consciousness because the results of the discussion have been settled when the first atom started rolling, yout get me?
So why are you arguing about that?

>Again, if materialism is accurate, then there is no reason "why" things happen, we just ask what is happening, why is always with reference to some material process, which is either deterministic or indeterministic. (predictable or unpredictable).
And yet on a personal level you could answer me why you are doing something
>That suggests determinism, things could be indeterministic, but that still doesnt save consciousness in the thick sense.
Determinism and indeterminism can o ly be talked about in reference to a mind tgat can perceive and try to predict, but even if full determinism was possible, ghen any materialist would have to go the buddhist way and stop identifying with consciousness if he really believed what he preaches

>Again, if materialism is accurate, then there is no reason "why" things happen, we just ask what is happening, why is always with reference to some material process, which is either deterministic or indeterministic. (predictable or unpredictable)
The brain is complex in a way that allows it to escape materialism;

All things without brains are stuck in their place of time and space, things with brains can percieve multiple locations of time and space and choose which area to move towards.

>that is the more logically consistent point of view, but the problem with it is that it just doesnt provide any way of making predictions
Idealism is a metaphysical postulate, as is physicalism/materialism. It doesn't mean that physical science is invalid. It just means that matter is derivative of mind or is emergent in mind as opposed to the other way around. In fact, the scientific method takes place entirely in minds. And all scientific experiments happen in minds. All human experience takes place in minds. All of the physical world is only ever experienced in minds. When you think deep about it, as max planck did as seen in this quote here

>When you get up and start walking why are you not walking in Brazil and Japan and Australia right now?
Why would I be?
>Andor are you suggesting brain in a vat simulation theory?
The brain would also be rendered only upon measurement/observation, according to what would be probable, given the specs of the observer who is interfacing with a physical body/avatar to which the brain is assigned, just as all physical reality is only rendered upon measurement as described by the collapse postulate. So the brain in the vat is a scenario that still retains the idea that matter has stand alone/observer independent and objective existence. If this is not the case, as QM seems to show, then consciousness can not reside in matter, being that matter is not even defined apart from a superposition of possible outcomes prior to measurement. It (the brain in the vat)maintains the idea that consciousness is the output of a physical brain as well. I believe this is backwards. The brain would be the output in a probabilistic, simulatory way, and the consciousness would be the computer. The physical world, including brains, would be a stream of processed, organized and structured data rendered by consciousness in a mind. So matter, then, would be emergent from mind as opposed to mind emerging from matter.

and
Erwin Schrdinger

>Consciousness is not computational
True. The physical world is the output displayed in a mind. Consciousness is the computer.The physical world IS computable. Consciousness is not. Consciousness is not physical and it is not 'in' the physical world, it just gives the observer the qualia of immersion in the physical world. The avatar body that the mind controls is governed by physics though. The consciousness is not 'in' the virtual/physical body though. It's just given a first person shooter vantage point as if it is.

you can never get out of consciousness.
So materialism has no claim to science or predictions or anything else. It's just a metaphysical world view which makes a claim about the ontic status of matter and consciousness, the same as physicalism. Both are substance monist metaphysical world views.

>And yet we have physicists who have never studied metaphysics, along with chemists.
Yes, you can study these things and not know anything about philosophy, true. I didn't state otherwise.
>Even the question "the ontic status of matter and consciousness" is just gibberish to a certain sort of chemist
I suppose that is true of some chemists. I would argue that most likely at least know what ontology is. This is a pretty basic concept. But this is irrelevant to anything I have said. Whether or not some particular chemist knows what ontic means has no bearing on the actual ontology of things. And the OP was about the exact thing. If you say that matter and energy are all that exist at the fundamental level, then that is an ontological statement. And then that means matter and energy most somehow account for consciousness. Even though no materialist can do it.
>let's say we have someone who never sees anything except through a TV screen mounted over their eyes. Does this mean everything really happens "in TV"? OF course not.
Not really sure how this relates to anything I am arguing.

>>The brain is complex in a way that allows it to escape materialism
My unfortunate error I meant to type, escape determinism, not escape materialism

>There are broadly two types of academics, those who are interested in "teaching the controversy" because they recognize education is a process that repeats with every general, and those who are concerned with 'being right." The former are very rare, and the latter make education seem like a bureaucratic hellscape.
Print this on t shirts and sell it at the campus store brother

>where if you believe matter and discredit subjectivity as an ilusion you erode the basis you used in order to believe matter

This is only a problem if you are going for some sort of structural, foundational argument. It also neglects that when arguing for materialism, one is not necessarily going to save every subjective "illusion," e.g. colour.

A lead weight has a definite mass and volume, but its colour is a perception. A bath has a definite temperature in degree celsius, but whether that is hot or cold is a perception.

Basically, if your idea is that you will be able to go

W is the Universe, and here are all the properties of W, and the objects in W, you will fail, even on some mathematical grounds, because you are using W as a sort of "container" for everything, and nothing contains everything, because it cannot contain itself, containment is a property of something larger than something else, a bucket cannot contain itself.

I can recommend Richard Rorty's collection of essays The Linguistic Turn in which there is a discussion of philosophical methodology---a recurring theme is that philosophers (and mathematicians, who attempt to substitute "rigorous" math for "non-rigorous" philosophy) are missing the point and trying to cope with their difficulties with pragmatic language, aka autism, tho they dont quite go that far.

Most of these "propblems of philosophy" are still taught to undergrads for pedagogical reasons, because they do expand your mind, especially if you were the sort who never thought about tese sorts of things, but in a world of The Matrix and the INternet, that is sort of more rare.

And at the graduate/faculty level, it is mostly a business, and you sort of just argue what your advisors argued, because your goal is to get tenure to pay off your student debt---good luck!

Philosophy is more political than anything else in the humanities, tho the sperglord faculty rarely admit it, because they lack insight into their condition.

>So if you ignore a demonstrably real aspect of the universe, then you can argue for materialism.

What, color? Why do you think things have color? Why not think that things are made of material, that material reflects wavelengths of light, and creatures like ourselves have evolved to perceive that wavelength as color?

>Genuinely moronic

Arguing over what color something is, it is like arguing over whether a bath is "too hot." That is a perception. Even if you say "it will burn off your flesh!" that does not make it "too hot" it just makes it "a high enough temperature that flesh will get burned."

>color and our perception of it exists, and is not material. Very simple.

If that is true, why do different, documented variations in the physiology of people cause differences in color perception, e.g. color-blindness?

"In humans, the perception and ability to distinguish different colors is mediated by a variety of mechanisms in the retina as well as the brain. Understanding the physiologic basis of color vision is essential to detecting abnormalities and devising treatments. In this article, we will review the cellular and genetic mechanisms that underlie color perception and apply these mechanisms to characterizing defects in color vision and avenues for treatment." (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK544355/)

Why can we do all of this work without any concept of "mind"?

If at bottom what you are looking for is some proof that brains cause minds, but you cant find it, this is probably because "mind" is not a well-defined concept, like many metaphysical concepts. But if you go "well, what I call mind is just my brain chugging away, but I cant prove it mathematically, only empirically," you might find that satisfying, or you might think it's unsatisfying, because it is not a proof merely from asserting a string of symbols, but that shouldn't surprise you, because the brain is not a string of symbols, it is a 3 dimensional object.

>The perception of color still exists.

I didn't say it didn't, I the issue is that perception of color is a physiological process, it does not require a mind or even a 'self.'

>Name a single thing you have ever had perception of without your mind

You are presupposing that perceptions imply minds, rather than that perceptions are something that occur in brains. I mean, I suspect you would even have trouble with "brain" and "mind" being synonymous, or even with "brains cause minds." But I dont favor either of those, I think we can accomplish everything we want to say by talking about brains, and if we talk about minds, we inevitably come into problems with how the brain and the mind differ, and how does one influence the other, givent hat they are not the same thing.

>Give an example of a single thing you have ever perceived or experienced that wasn't via your mind.

This is the philosophical equivalent of "have you stopped beating your wife?"

If you are taking the five senses to be "mental experiences" in a thick sense, rather than that "mental experience" is a folk-psych way of talking about brain processes, then you are right.

Like, why is it impossible that brains cause sensations, and that sensations are completely described by material activity in the brain? Why is it impossible that the result of a physiological process could be a sensation? The medical community has no difficulty with this view, btw, its not like it is some weird idea I have come up with.

>two neural networks that fire in the exact same way physically can be having entirely different mental experiences.

What is your proof of this?

>There does not exist an isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence between neural nets/brain activity and mental perceptions/experiences.

I dont think we are anywhere near the place where we could put a brain in a scanning machine and scan it and go "it is seeing X." I don't know if we can even scan and reproduce the visual field of objects in front of the eyes, from the brain.

> Two brains can have the same mental experience despite having an entirely different network of neurons activating

There is no reason that there cannot be multiple different neurological configurations that cause the same perception, just like how multiple different types of CPUs all calculate 1+1=2 and get the same result, but have very different interior architectures.

> So I will ask you again: name a single thing you have ever experienced that was not via your mind.

This is just a way to get me to admit that everything is mind, you strike me as a sort of idealist.

>Literally all neuroscientific evidence shows this btw, so even using neuroscience, we have disproven pure materialism.

No, it doesnt show that, but whatever, if you are an idealist, then I have difficulty thinking we will do much more than recapitulate, as I said much earlier, what Rorty calls a mind'/body problem.

Idealists posit that minds exist, and, except in the radical sense of EVERYTHING being pure perception w/o body/material (a sort of religious view, all is spirit, etc. etc.) then you will inevitably run into the problem of how the "ideal" (mind) rubs up against the "material" (body) such that they interact, but without the mind being material, because then it would simply be body, and how the mind interacts with the body, without being body.

Like, if we substitute "God" for mind, do we really lose anything? We can just attribute to God everything we attribute to mind, e.g. "we are God experiencing himself and His fractured body" which is what many progressive churches have as their 'theology.'

>Are you just being moronic? I don't understand what you're arguing for. You just disproved your own reductionist materialism.

I am not arguing for some ideal foundation, I am just having a conversation. But it doesnt seem to me that idealism gets one anywhere, tho it is possible, I guess, that idealists also have certain mental properties that may facilitate certain sorts of interactions with environment.

Like, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to my mind that if we did a survery, idealists might, say, be more likely to be lawyers and tenured professors---hence they make more money. This would be an argument that being an idealist (whatever that means materially) is good for your bank balance, but that is all it would mean to me.

>We are talking about which ontology is more sensible. Stop bringing up professions

Wouldn't your ontological commitments be at least partly influenced by your professions?

It is pretty easy for a chemist to say "speed limit? That's not anything..." but for a lawyer, it is much harder, no?

You are giving arguments based on certain fields of study, in the hope you will come up with a Field that unifies them all.

We had that in the Univesity system until the 19th century in many places: it was called Divinity or Theology.

The next rung down in the medieval university is law, then medicine, then the sciences and other things.

So, you probably would think it silly if I said "God" were the primary ontological category, same for "right" same for "health." I am saying this question is not as important as people think it is, why do you think a sensible "ontology" even matters?

Are you solving ontological problems, or are you sovling legal problems, chemistry problems, health problems, etc?

Nothing contains everything, so you're always in some field, you are never in the "field of fields."

>So far, it seems that it can not, so there is no reason to think it is correct. Stop dodging.

How can I argue that I see a tree? You could say it is a shrub. How do I prove to you it is really a tree? DO we call in an arborist and appoint him Judge?

Whether it is a tree or a shrub, why does that matter? The sense I get is that you are playing a game with words, which is fine, but you seem to think this is a game with "rules" that one can "win" at. I don't share that view.

> arguments in defense of reductionist materialism

I am not really strongly defending materialism, I am just saying I don't really understand the arguments for idealism---I would not argue for either one as foundational, but I do have some sense that if I break my leg, it is a material problem, not an ideal one.

You and I can have an entirely different perception of red despite having the same rods and cones and receiving the same wavelength of light. That is what is meant by qualia. It is a very simple concept to understand, and I don't believe that you don't actually understand it, you're just pretending to be ignorant because you think you need to in order to be a reductive materialist.
I am not interested in arguments from ignorance. Make a better argument.

I am not arguing that material things do not exist.
I am arguing that not only material things exist.
It's not an either or. There are material things, like the fundamental particles, and there are non material things, like platonic mathematical forms.
Why is this scary for you? I don't perceive it as something to be angry at, it's just what it is. I have never heard a sold argument in favor of pure materialism nor pure idealism that can explain all phenomena, so I have no reason to consider either of them correct.

I have given you some, several times now.

I'm not interested in arguments from ignorance. Come up with better arguments, you're not doing very well.

>but "i" and "you" exist phenomenally, then the standard model is not the entirety of existence.

God exists phenomenally, lots of people perceive that God exists, so you could make the exact same argument against materialism on the basis of God, but you are prob. not going to do that, are you?

I would. God has a 100% probability of existing.

I am not religious at all

No it doesn't. You just accept materialism as true a priori despite not being able to make a solid argument for it, and then accept that mathematical objects don't exist because you can't figure out a way to rectify them with materialism.
The actual thing to do here, is to see that assuming materialism is true can not explain all phenomena and implies a contradiction, so materialism must be false. We do this a lot in mathematics, it's one of the most common forms of proof.
There is no reason to reject this btw, you just don't want to for some reason, I don't get it. Seriously get over it anon, materialism IS. NOT. TRUE. There actually do exist things in reality that can not in any way be explained via purely material means. It's not a big deal, it's not something to be upset about, it's just that materialism is wrong. Update your priors.

>Things don't need a defined location to exist.
>Also, I am educated in pure mathematics lol

This is what I mean, that is something a mathematician would say.

It is sort of the ontology that some mathematically oriented philosophers came up with, e.g.

"To be is to be the value of a variable."
https://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/onwhatthereis.pdf
"atever we say with help of names can be said
in a language which shuns names altogether. To be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a variable. In terms of the categories of traditional grammar, this amounts roughly to saying
that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun. Pronouns are the basic media of reference; nouns might better have been named pro-pronouns. The variables of quantification,
'something', 'nothing', 'everything', range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true."

My historical view of this is that it is a way to save incorporeal entities like rights, universities, etc. so that the being of a university is as solid as that of a tree, becuse both are capable of being variables in a quantificational logic. I think that is Lewis Carroll nonsense without the insight that it is "funny."

But this all comes down to explaining EMPIRICALLY observed phenomena, like color perception, the sense of "I", the origin of the big bang, etc. Mathematical objects also have a need for explanation. Materialism proper can do none of this, so it is wrong.

It really is that simple.

>Big if true, they are unheard of.
No they aren't, I have provided several already and you pretending otherwise is again an argument from ignorance.
>The idealism is true, but it does not exist, and it requires material to be known and realized;
No it doesn't, this has also already been explained several times.

You guys are genuinely terrible at this.

>Big if true, they are unheard of.
No they aren't, I have provided several already and you pretending otherwise is again an argument from ignorance.
>The idealism is true, but it does not exist, and it requires material to be known and realized;
No it doesn't, this has also already been explained several times.

You guys are genuinely terrible at this.

Show me the mind born on earth that writes 2+2= 4 without a body

>If you wish to say matter can exist without a mind to perceive it, then there is no reason to deny that mathematical truths or objects can't exist without a mind to perceive it. You can artificially privilege matter without reason, but then you could artificially privilege mathematical objects too.

Except it seems like there is matter at the bottom of, say, a trench in the ocean no one has ever gone to, that does not seem to me controversial.

To say there are unperceived mathematical objects, that just seems strange. But I don't think math is discovered, I think it is invented, and it models things we have perceived---we abstract notions like "1 2 3" from "1 fish 2 fish 3"

I agreed, before concious beings were I the solar system, there existed 8 or 9 planets or so. Quantity, pattern, sequence, interacting, addition, subtraction, totally exists without humans or percievers.

It is different to say that is the case, therefore necessarily mind/conciousness is in exactly the same class.

So, you agree material does exist, you proclaim God made the material universe and, immaterial souls (maybe just, material not made of universe material) placed in material bodies on earth.

Like other anon said, runs into figuring out the mind body interacting joy stick controls command center problem, though that problem remains as the hard problem of conciousness.

But still, I am past all that, I asked you to define and describe and talk about the possible nature of the immaterial' mind/conciousness/soul; you are satisfied with just saying: this is the way of things it's all I want to and need to know; I know ALL about a tree, it has roots, trunk, branches, leaves; I know everything there is to know about a tree.

I know ALL about mind/conciousness/soul; namely and totally, that is immaterial. I know this for certain and can't elucidate on it any further

It is not naive at all.
If you are arguing that matter is independent from mind, but the only way you ever have of understanding matter is via subjective qualitative and mathematical models of such, then you have no reason whatsoever to privilege what you call "matter" over the very things you're using to understand the "matter".
This is so dogshit easy to understand that you simply are feigning ignorance to even attempt to argue otherwise. I do not believe that you are such a sniveling dogshit moron that you don't comprehend this.

Why not, there is material substance and non material substance, and neither develop from the other or are more fundamental, they both exists as defined against each other, not coming from each other, like any opposite.
This is what I actually consider to be the what's happening

Non material things would be all the experiences that are not one-to-one with any material.
The idea of a triangle is something that exists independent of any material, when you or I or an alien or an AI think of a triangle, we all have the same concept despite having entirely different material substrates and algorithms and neural nets firing and computing in entirely different ways. Triangles are not a material thing, they are an idea which is not material but still exists. The qualia of red is not tied to any specific material, as another direct example that we all experience. Whatever came before the big bang is not material, as a more grandiose example, etc.

The reason I hold this position is because it is literally the only one that has a solid argument for it, and the only one that accounts for all empirical evidence of basically all phenomena. There is no other position on this debate that I consider to have as much evidence behind it. Thats basically the reason.

A line is a solution to the equation y = mx + b
This is not dependent on any material

>A line is a solution to the equation y = mx + b
>This is not dependent on any material
Yes it is you would never know this or be able to write or say this, if you had never seen a line, those series of letters would be meaningless.

A blade of grass is a purer example of a line than those human specific abstract series of letters describing and mapping a blade of grass

>Material cannot be the cause of its own manifestation
Material is One word used to describe billions of very different things; billions of very different things interacting create novel activities that may not exist besides the many different things interacting in many different ways.

You can rearrange the 1000 or however many parts of a computer a million different ways, but there are only a handful of ways that result in what we know a human can achieve

Computers don't experience representations, there has to be an observing entity for any conscious manifestation.

Laws of physics aren't themselves material

You had to use a mental construct influenced by the material world to prove a line, though.

No I didn't, why would that be the case? I simply solve the equation y = mx + b, that's a line. No material necessary.

>If there's truth to the statement without a human to interpret it, that doesn't necessarily move it out of the class of material things.
It removes it from the class of material things and into the class of pure mathematical objects.
Qualia is really the strongest argument, as even trying to define material requires non material qualia which are your perceptions etc. When we even talk about "material" objects (basically the particles of the standard model) it's all qualia

You're not fully recognizing your own sapience.

It's nearing the bump limit, so feel free to make one later. I've enjoyed reading.

This means nothing whatsoever, because "fire" "mudhuts","running water", etc. are themselves mental objects that you're pretending are someone more privileged than the other mental objects that you're using to talk about them. You are doing this without any argument or reason btw

>This means nothing whatsoever, because "fire" "mudhuts","running water", etc. are themselves mental objects that you're pretending are someone more privileged than the other mental objects that you're using to talk about them. You are doing this without any argument or reason btw
My reason is that 3 anons can be hiking, a boulder crushes and kills one, that anon would claim Thee entire world ended, but really the entire world exists, and he is just a part of it, and his access to the world ended.

Even if earth is a simulation there likely or I want to say there must be, a physical difference that results in tree, boulder, pond, and so when I interact with these I am interacting with some non nothings.

Even brain in vat matrix soul simulation, there likely, or must, be a difference of the world map, and code that equals the various aspects of the map.

I would say the trees and boulders and ponds in such a simulation, to such a brain in vat, would and could be considered material; because ultimately a particular somethingness must be responsible for maintaining their existence and appearence and interact ability

>If text of "Lord of the rings" is independent from mind, does it mean Gandalf is real?

As an aside, in my uni metaphysics course, we read some preprint from some academic philosopher, the upshot of which was that we could not say "Gandalf exists in Lord of the Rings" but that "Gandalf exists."

For some reason this wasnt a reductio ad absurdum, tho, to say "Gandalf exists just as much as I exist."

h8 metaphysics
h8 ethics
h8 aesthetics
Philosophy of science, who needs more?

>could not say "Gandalf exists in Lord of the Rings" but that "Gandalf exists."
You must be remembering it backwards. There is no way an average human could be so plainly incorrect and dumb, let alone someone considered at all in some position of philosophical academia no less.

You cant say "gandalf exists in lord of the rings".

Uh, I mean you can't say that statement is true.
But it is true.
Oh yes, it is true, ok it can be said after all.

I geuss also vague semantics; maybe the wouldnt have a problem saying; Gandalf is a fictional character in the book lord of the rings?

Whereas the vague:.gandalf exists in the Lord of the rings;

Does saying a persons name, exists.. in... Imply strictly that they are a real person?

Like, if someone said ______your name_____ ( let's say your name is John) exists in lord of the rings, if we were naiave dumb ai robots we might react, omg John is trapped inside a book let's get him out

Humans exist, fictional characters exist.
George Washington existed, the memories and acts of George Washington exist. Hamlet exists (as a character), gandalf exists (as a character), Elon musk exists (as a real person, and maybe as a character)

Is Quine the based computer scientist behind the computer program of the same name?

Based predecessor to the halting problem. One of the rare instances of someone who was provably conscious.

>My existence is not equal to gandalfs existence.

I can't cite the paper, nor can I remember the specific argument, but it is that, as existing beings, or things, or whatever you want to call them, your existence and Gandalf's existence are identical qua existence.

There is no difference between "types" of existence, that is, it's not like we really have two existential quantifiers, eR (really exists) and eF (fictionally exists) such that

eRx Gandalf(x) = False
eFx Gandalf(x) = True
eRx You(x) = True
eFx You(x) = False

You just have the ol' existential quantifier and

Ex Gandalf(x) = True
Ex You(x) = True

So you would say "Gandalf is in Middle Earth" and "You are in State of New Hampshire", or "Gandalf is in a book" and "You are in a state."

The issue is predication vs. existential quantification. You don't have two different types of existential quantifiers, you have different predicates that are satisfied by the quantified variables.

>John Jimbo Johnson exists, we presume it is reffering to a flesh man, for that is most often the case.

In Aristotle's tradition, we are referring to a substance that is far more like Gandalf. For example, we say "his own body" meaning the body that belongs to him, "him" is not the body, it is just a bound variable, to which the body belongs. So you will never find anything predicated of a variable that is the variable, the variable is something else.

Socrates is Primary Substance, but Socrates' body is something that might have decayed long ago, but we still say "Socrates exists," no? A person does not cease to exist when dead, they still have an executor.

So, if Socrates leaves a will, Socrates's executor is still predicated vis a vis Socrates, e.g.

ExEy Socrates(x) and ExecutorOfSocrates(y)

Ok because to say gandalf exists in lord of the rings; is to exclude the fact that gandalf exists as a figurine on your shelf.

But human conventions allows for probable assumptions;

And we'll actually; humans assume when you say;.so and so exists, they are refering to a real life person. So assumption has to be made there;

Anyone unfamiliar with LoTR would say; what's that? .response would be, a book.

They would then say, oh, gandalf is a character in a book; and know from experience that it is possible for a character in a book to be made into figurines for shelves

Ok, but it is often generally the case that the things existing at the same time one is existing, are given more weighted real presence over past or future, before you scramble to argue about that let me finish: in your example the 1000 year from now clone, or whatever; as much as they can believe gandalf was a real person, they could go outside touch a tree, and say, this tree right now is more existing than gandalf?

Now I see that gets into territory of the power of attention, if I post posters of Shakespeare all over my room and cut out and paste pages of his books on my wall and read them 24 7, and ignore my dad, you might say Shakespearenat that time to me is more real and powerful than my parents, but yes, a person's output and effort and work can be powerfully impactful for generations after they die, but their exact liveliness bodyness is not livly on earth exisiting, the great pyramids for instance.

So stories are stories, stories of gandalf, tales, histories, can be large and powerful, and some people can be tricked into believing many things many ways, but there is always a difference between body person existing on earth, and stories about them; if the clone was sufficiently learned, it would know the possibility that gandalf could just be s literary character and not have existed, and it could knows gandalf the being body does not exist in his world then

Ok yes I agree, the mind can come to be satisfied with it's imagination, day dreams, thoughts and fantasies, more than interacting with the seemingly substance of the outer world

>Whats the difference between your immaterial mind and a newborn babies?
In terms of substance, nothing. They are both consciousness and informational.
>How many types of immaterial is there? How many forms?
Not sure exactly what you mean here
>But would you not agree that perception of what we call orientations of materials, also effect ideas?
What I observe on my space time screen which is rendered to me in my mind does effect my ideas, yes.
>What is the relavance of this thought experiment in relation to the powers, primiacy, existence, of immaterial and material?
There is still a ruleset in my idealist worldview, namely the laws of physics. There are still boulders and material objects rendered/simulated in my mind. So they are ultimately mental. So mental objects in the form of mind generated mental objects can effect my subjective mentation, yes. Just like in a dream, which is another consciousness based simulation of a material world. Albeit there is another ruleset in terms of what I can do in a dream, I can fly etc. But I can have sex with a simulated girl as well. And that simulated material object of mind can effect my subjective consciousness and I can have a wet dream. There is no mind body problem in idealism.
>Is the boulder an illusion?
No. The boulder is a virtual boulder rendered in my mind. If you were there, it would also be rendered in your mind. What the boulder would be doing would be what it would be probable to be doing at any given time. But it wouldn't be rendered at all unless there were consciousnesses there to observe it in the first place. So the difference is that there is not some object, the boulder, resolved of uncertainty, self existent, there at all times, even when unobserved. This is consistent with experiment facts. Otherwise the boulder 'exists' in superposition. But not a super position of actual, physical states of instantiated material objects, like the MWI says.

>But the boulder would have began falling before any of us observed it

Exactly, if a boulder is merely a mental object, and I am facing away from a cliff, and a boulder falls on my head, where does the mental activity come from? Again, Berkeley solves this with everything going on in God's mind.

So how do mental entities that are not even part of my mental experience crush my head? My mind is part of God's mind/within God's mind's influence and/or part of some simulation, where God and Simulation are basically serving the same function, e.g. as an ordering mind/entity that is not physical.

>You based your world view on faulty interpretations of science experiments

It's also just not how philosophy is done, at least in most cases---we do some experimental philosophy nowadays, but many ppl poo-poo it, I went to a talk w/ Saul Kripke, and he snorted and voiced his disdain for it.

materialism does not emerge as a "philosophical" view per se, Leucippus/Democritus and their atoms are pre-socratic, so the whole Plato -> Aristotle worldview, Democritus is an entirely different "trajectory" and most of the mathemagician Aristoteleans (reformed by Russel et al in the 20th century, but still convinced that verbal arguments are more important, even merely as a "justification" for science than science itself, along with cheerfulness) are simply so far along the track that it doesn't make sense for them to think otherwise.

As soon as you are offering a worldview that takes math or some sort of philosophical argument as how you "prove" something, it could be that is just the wrong path, the Atomists had the right idea, but atomism doesnt really provide high-falutin' arguments about justice, the state, etc.

>But even before Nietzsche most knew and realized how important power is; and how understanding more and more about the world and being able to control and utilize it can and often did contribute to witholding and gaining power

Most of the problems of philosophy are known and stated by the presocratics, all that Plato and Aristotle do is give different ways of solving them.

The reason philosophy is valuable is because everyone starts out as a young man and, possibly, grows into an old man, and there are different views at different stages of life, different hobby-horses.

So this idea of rods and cones and photons hitting eyes and that causing what we see in consciousnesses is a MODEL. And indeed, if you examine eyes, eyes which are rendered to observers in minds, then you will be rendered rods and cones etc, according to what would be probable. But the rods and cones of 99.9% humans never need to be rendered in their entire life, any more than rods and cones need be rendered to see in a dream. Consciousnesses don't see through eyes in the waking state anymore than you see through eyes in dreams. you are just given that first person shooter vantage point by your mind. And no photons need need to ever be rendered in the physical world to produce light anymore that they need to be rendered in a dream to produce light. If you go down and make a measurement, like in a double slit experiment, then you will get your photon rendered based upon what would be probable to be there. But it wasn't 'there' before you measured it. It was in a super position of potential 'there's' in god's hard drive. So this idea of an outside, self existent observer independent world that we are all looking onto through eyeholes is fake news. It's just a model. The equations work to make predications, but what they are modeling is not 'out there' it's processed, organized and structured data (information) rendered by consciousness in minds. And it only has to be rendered to the detail demanded by an observer. No atoms need ever need be rendered unless you go down and measure at that detail. Anymore than your mind has to render the atoms of your desk that your computer is on. No rods, no cones, no photons. Just experience rendered at the detail in your mind according to your specs. If you are near sighted and lose your glasses, you get rendered the blurry shit because that is what would be the probable vision given your specs.

Besides faulty shoddy incorrect popsci woo woo quantum mechanics interpretations, what compelled one to believe this as fact?

If I dont know where a particular apple is, it must not exist, thee, every time I close my eyes the moon really disappears

>if you remove the ability to process information then there is no such thing as reality.
Your ungrounded unfounded just for fun leap of faith.

There's no reason for you not to assume; stuff exists. That which exists exists some way. Whether we are here or not, interacting with the stuff or not, the stuff exists the way it does.

You have no way of being certain this is not the case. Why are you so quick to believe it is not the case (besides what a pop sci faultily interpreted YouTube video told you)?

If you didn't happen to be born in the era of computers you would never have had the luxory to have these thoughts, unless you were some ancient persian prince in their orchard.

Your luxory of avoiding interacting with the physical world, and being proud of the power you have to drag and click a mouse to have food brought to you, makes you believe that your perception is the most powerful thing real thing, for look all it has done for you. You are denying the power and validity of any deductions of any type at all.

You refuse to consider stepping outside your instant immediate box if thought, and having the simple consideration that, yes just because you don't know doesn't mean that there is no reality beyond your ignorance. There is no validity in assuming because i cannot see, there is nothing to be seen

I am an idealist too by the way, I am just challenging to try to see the ways in which inferior idealists might make faulty defenses for our belief system

So, even if we develop a theory about the noun "brain" and say 'brains cause mental experience,' we are still comitted to a fairly thick notion of "mental experience" because this is how, in an Aristotelean view, we arrive at nouns having meanings.

The phrase "by convention" in the Greek is "kata suntheke" which means "by agreement," suntheke is the word used for bilateral agreements between equals. Diatheke, on the other hand, means inheritance.

The problem is that Aristotle does not do it this way, where at bottom you will have to have some independent "mental realm," that is his teacher, Plato.

"Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention." (Aristotle, Interpretation I.4)

So, this is sort of the problem you are running up against, Aristotle says words symbolize mental experience, and that the words we use to describe that are a convention/agreement. But the mental experience is the same for all. However, it clearly is not, at least you are saying it is not.

We both see a cat, and we can both put it into a pillowcase with some bricks and toss it into a river. I think that can be explained, from my motivation to do such a thing, to the trajectory the pillowcase takes, using biology, physics, neurochemistry, etc. etc.

You want to posit that it happens "somewhere" called a "mind" or "universe"---it is the same thing, because, as I said above, the universe cannot contain itself, so nothing contains everything.

Instead we are left with limited discourses and no foundation, except for the uniformity of our mental experience, which is not PROVED to be our mental experience, it is apprehended as such by ourselves.

The idealism is true, but it does not exist, and it requires material to be known and realized;

But anyway in relation to conciousness, this topic of material/immateriality is more important and prescient than 2+2 eternally equaling 4 whether or whether not intelligent minds were around to realize it

When pushed into a corner they make arguments from ignorance. It's pathetic and sad to be honest.

>apple -> eyes -> visual cortex -> perception
Yeah, qualia is just a term for the fact it concious experience. The fact you experience the taste of apple and the taste of tomato and the taste of cheese and the taste of strawberries is what is meant by Qualia;

That you can disect the strawberry and apple, and find molecules more and less responsible for the taste, but you won't see or detect the taste itself, that unique taste is detectable only via the specfic interaction of the molecules through the body through your head; the qualia is the result of the interaction between the materials of the outer world, and the particular mechanisms processing on the inner world of body/brain.

Not everything is understood about the brain, so there are still some mysteries in these regards, ala the hard problem of conciousness;

It's one thing to point to a tree and say I know ALL about a tree: roots, trunk, branches, leaves, I know and completely understand a tree certainly.

You and i know there's more to understand about the existence of a tree than those simple generalities.

You are doing the same thing when you simplify and generalize unfortunately all we have of your understanding of the most micro and fundamental mechanics of brain/mind/conciousness situation.

>Qualia perception
A million complex matters coherently interacting with a million other complex matters
>the laws of physics
See

>The laws of physics are not material
The "laws of physics" don't exist, they exist in material when man writes them on paper, but the universe is matter that interacts with each other depending on the state of the matter, there is no immaterial invisible rules written everywhere that planets stop and read to know how to act, there is just stuff of a certain type of a certain way, interacting proportionally to other stuff of types and ways.

I believe God made the Universe by the way

>mathematical objects
See

>Mathematics is another example of a platonically real, non material thing.
But if there was eternally gureenteed to be absolutely 0 material of any kind in reality, what would be the existence of math?

We can know of math, we can know and do of anything, we can at all, we at all, due to all the various materiality.

What Good is math without pen, paper, sand to draw lines in, computers, apples, to count and talk about,

>whatever existed before the big bang
Matter cannot be created or destroyed (ultimately, conservation of), matter and energy (energy is stuff in motion) exist now, matter and energy cannot be totally brought out of existence, this means matter and energy have always been in existence;
The quanta of quanta that existed after the big bang existed in some equivelently proportional manner before the big bang

Any other examples of possible immateriality?

Either the brain can generally percieve relatively accurate accounts of some externality existing beyond it or it can to 0 degrees do so. There is much more evidence for the former

What is your obsession with math? I have a degree in pure mathematics and theoretical computer science. What we're talking about has nothing to do with math. Stop trying to hide behind mathematics here, it makes no sense.

>not related in any way and there is no reason to make this shoddy analogy. Its meaningless with respect to the color discussion.

" Not only does the scientific mainstream tradition conflict with the common-sense understanding of color in this way, but as well, the scientific tradition contains a very counter-intuitive conception of color. There is, to illustrate, the celebrated remark by David Hume:

Sounds, colors, heat and cold, according to modern philosophy are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind. (Hume 1738: Bk III, part I, Sect. 1, [1911: 177]; Bk I, IV, IV, [1911: 216])

Physicists who have subscribed to this doctrine include the luminaries: Galileo, Boyle, Descartes, Newton, Thomas Young, Maxwell and Hermann von Helmholtz. Maxwell, for example, wrote:

It seems almost a truism to say that color is a sensation; and yet Young, by honestly recognizing this elementary truth, established the first consistent theory of color. (Maxwell 1871: 13 [1970: 75])" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/color/)

And here mind is not used in a metaphysical sense, it simply means what we experience because we have brains, and why do we think that? Because creatures with brains apparently perceive certain things in their environment. Some of these are there objectively, e.g. shape, and some are perceptions, e.g. color and taste.

>Why do you think things have color?
They emit light at certain wavelength due to their properties, so color is their property.

Is sweetness a property of fruit?

Is an official baseball game possible with 1 player?

>but the sweetness is in the tongue, not the fruit.
But the sweetness in the tongue requires the fruit to interact with it to unlock it, is that correct?

The music is in the piano, but requires a composer and player to interact with the piano to get the music out of it?

All the potential music is only materialized when made material. The potential """""exists""""" and it does not actually """"exist"""".

Human brains/minds, this is largely what seperates the mind from rocks and things, is the ability to grapple with potential, If I do A to B; so or D can happen;

If I do Q while doing A to B there is a better chance C will happen than D because xyz....

This simulating computation of possibilities, is some such thing you might like to call immaterial, though it depends on material outside and inside the head.

you are more than welcome to suck a wet fart outta my ass while I am dunking so hard on you mouth breather

>(YOU)

How is it incoherent?

>it exists independent from measurement
This is called macro realism and it was ruled out by this
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leggett%E2%80%93Garg_inequality
>The Leggett–Garg inequality,[1] named for Anthony James Leggett and Anupam Garg, is a mathematical inequality fulfilled by all macrorealistic physical theories. Here, macrorealism (macroscopic realism) is a classical worldview defined by the conjunction of two postulates:
>Macrorealism per se: "A macroscopic object, which has available to it two or more macroscopically distinct states, is at any given time in a definite one of those states."
>Noninvasive measurability: "It is possible in principle to determine which of these states the system is in without any effect on the state itself, or on the subsequent system dynamics."

And then it was even expanded to cover even more loopholes as explained here.

A Stronger Theorem Against Macro-realism
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.00022.pdf

>>Macrorealism per se: "A macroscopic object, which has available to it two or more macroscopically distinct states, is at any given time in a definite one of those states."
>>Noninvasive measurability: "It is possible in principle to determine which of these states the system is in without any effect on the state itself, or on the subsequent system dynamics."
A planatery body is a macroscopic object, can be in one state at once but more than one state total (it's state of rotation, visible crators, storms on surface) and it can be mesaured non evasively by the reflection of light off it

Observation happens through physical interaction, so only physical bodies can participate in observation. Consciousness is neural activity in brain, so in a sense, it's brain that observes. It should be noted that you didn't understand what "brain observing itself" refers to.
Since being conscious is a property of the brain, then it's brain that is conscious.

>Consciousness is neural activity in brain
No, neural activity in the brain is nothing more than neural activity in the brain. Neural activity in the brain is NOT the subjective/first person experience of the person belonging to the brain. If consciousness is just 'neural activity in brain' then in viewing this activity you should be able to observe the subjective phenomenal consciousness of the person belonging to the brain. Obviously you can't, and so there is obviously something more, ie the actual first person experience of the consciousness. Things in the physical world are objectively observable, unlike subjective experience.
>Since being conscious is a property of the brain, then it's brain that is conscious.
This is just begging the question. It's the worst case of begging the question I have seen.

>Subjective experience is an aspect of neural activity.
No it isn't, because there does not exist a one to one correspondence between neural activity and subjective experience; Both your papers actually provide evidence for this btw so you literally just btfo your own position.

>Is it because you say so?
No, because all evidence says so
>Pattern, function or form, that sort of thing. Consciousness is one aspect, memory is another, intuition is third aspect, reflexes are fourth and so on.
None of which have a one to one correspondence with any material substrate
>Huh? You mean reading mind doesn't amount to knowing what the person thinks?
Nope, first of all you can't even do this (read your own papers that you linked) and secondly you wouldn't have an understanding of the thought without yourself already having experienced that qualia beforehand.
A colorblind person with red-green colorblindness can in theory read the neural activities of a brain and conclude it is seeing red, but they still wouldn't know what red looks like just from that. They have no experience of it, and looking at another brain is not enough to bridge that gap, regardless of the level of detail. The only way to do so would be to get to such a level of precision that you are somehow running the perception of "red" on their neurons directly, which does not solve the problem, as you still have no idea if the red that they are perceiving is the same red as the red that another person is perceiving.
There is no way to bridge this gap via materialism, even in principle.

How is this an argument from language? Your Aristotle quotes have not done what you're claiming they have.

A purely behaviorist position doesn't explain the qualitative perception.
You can have equal reactions to stimuli via a behavior but different subjective sensations to the stimuli. There does not exist a one to one correspondence between the subjective experiences and the stimuli/neural network/etc.
Behaviorism can't explain all phenomena

>For you to even confidently talk about a color blind person implies there is some consensus between non colorblind people in regards to agreement about internal recognition of colors.
How so? A red-green colorblind person would describe everything that they see as basically being brown, but the specific brown they see doesn't need to be the same brown I see. They would just see fewer colors overall, but the colors specifically are not needed to be any specific set of colors. Two different people with the same red-green colorblindness disorder need not see the same qualia of color. They'd still be trained to react to their colors in the same way just like any other person.
The point of using the colorblind person is to clearly demonstrate that qualia can not be known via external material means. I could have used a non colorblind person and we'd still not be able to know what the qualia is just by looking at brain synapses, without already knowing what the perception is beforehand.

>Do you consider the processes that generates super Mario bros on a screen to be at all an immaterial process?
Yes
>Is light immaterial?
No
>Is the feeling of lust immaterial?
Yes
>Is dreaming immaterial?
Yes
>And if you answer yes to any, must you caveat it by saying, partially immaterial, as you recognize there is a supplanting material component to the interactions and relations?
You define what you mean by material, and do so in a way that can explain qualitative sensations.
Saying they don't exist is not valid btw, try to rectify qualitative sensations with reductive materialism. When you do this I'll do what you're asking

>And if you answer yes to any, must you caveat it by saying, partially immaterial, as you recognize there is a supplanting material component to the interactions and relations?

This is where immateriality/idealism break down, IMO, if the ideal realm doesn't supervene on the material realm. And even if it does, then you still get a situation where you have to specify how the immaterial supervenes on the material, which I cant fathom how you would do, so then you get the material supervening on the immaterial, which is just weird to my mind, tho it seems to make sense to a lot of "smart" amthematicians and other people who seem to think consistent definitions are more important than experiments.

matter <-> ideal

<-> is the way in which they interact. So is some part of <-> ideal and some material? Then you just get this:

matter <-matter-ideal-> ideal

So it literally just recapitulates the same problem ad infinitum, because you will always have some material part interacting with the "ideal," unless you are a radical idealist ala esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived, then every perception is a "being" and all matter is merely a perception.

It almpst makes christianity seem "ontologically" reasonable, as they at least insist God was incarnate, that is, made flesh. But how? Well, religious ppl insist that is a mystery. How the mind gets into the body in the idealist's view is not well-specified.

And if, like the guy here, the idealist's argument is fundamentally "well, everything you know is a perception," this requires us to ask why our perceptions are so consistent. The arch-idealist Berkeley gave God as cause for that, and it seems many "smart" idealists like to use some bizzare fact about quantum mechanics, set theory, etc. and it serves the same function as "God" in Berkelian idealism.

>You mean qualia? But qualia is only one aspect of mind.
Qualia is the only aspect of mind that you will ever have access to
>So you agree other aspects and functions of mind are neural activity?
Where?
>That means a huge chunk of mind is neural activity, and there's only a small gap left to hide your god. You think this shrinking god of the gaps is all evidence for your beliefs?
"neural activity" literally does not exist as anything other than a model that you have in your mind. So no, this is also not true.
>For that there's a precedent with 4d geometry. There's no way to experience it, but one can develop 4d intuition by looking at its 2d projection. This means qualia can be reproduced without directly experiencing it.
No you can't. You do not actually have understanding of a 4d geometry by coming up with another model in 2d space to help you understand it.

Surely my good sir

>No part of this relates to my argument at all.

>It has no mass because it is not material, yet evidently to anybody who is not an npc it exists.
>Thus it btfos reductive materialism.

This is really not a good argument. By NPC you mean in academic philosophy what is called a zombie:

"Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike the ones in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness." (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/)

So, an argument of the form:

(1) I believe X
(2) Everyone who believes X is not a Zombie
(3) Therefore I am not a Zombie

(X could be "I believe I believe", etc. etc.)

Your argument is more about how you are not a Zombie, rather than what anyone else is, because there is no way you could know if someone is really a Zombie, unless you adopt the attitude that their utterances are proof, but there is no reason a Zombie could not utter the argument above, while having no interior mental state corresponding to it.

So, utterances can never prove someone is not a Zombie. It is possible for a Zombie and a non-Zombie to have the exact same behaviors, e.g. to make the same assertions/utterances concerning consciousness, etc.

> It has no mass because it is not material, yet evidently to anybody who is not an npc it exists.

A zombie is equally capable of making this assertion, but making the assertion does not prove you are not a zombie, or NPC as you are calling it. There is nothing about this assertion such that a Zombie cannot make, they are simply making it without any conscious experience.

So your idea that people uttering things like "it is evident that qualia exist because I have perceptions," philosophical zombies assert that they have perceptions, just like an AI could assert "I have perceptions," but the Zombie, by definition, does not, and the AI probably does not.

The issue is that you saying "it is evident" does not prove you are not a Zombie. So, your saying that you experience qualia does not mean you do, you could be a zombie. How do you prove you are not?

>Where was I claiming to prove this to anybody but myself? As I said, none of this relates to my argument.

OK, so you are content to have an idealist view where the only think you really know is that you are conscious, and everyone else might be a zombie, and you can never know if other people have minds.

I think this is called solipsism---rather than admit minds are immaterial and therefore eliminate them, you want to say "well, I know I have a mind, but hte rest of you, I dunno"

What does it matter of minds are material or immaterial, what's the difference?.what does it mean?

>Describe how you know such a zombie under these parameters could do that

This is just part of what a philosophical zombie is, it is a creature that has no conscious experience. A zombie can say "I have conscious experience" but it does not, it is just saying that.

You seem to be saying (if you are the same person) that someone who says "I experience qualia" is somehow proving they're not a zombie, but that's not true: a zombie could argue for the existence of qualia.

Further, conscious experience does not imply qualia, I am pretty sure I am conscious and having experiences, but I don't believe they have qualities in any ontological sense, I am quite satisfied to say that the apple that I perceive as sweet is so becuse of a material interaction that produces the sensation, but it does not produce a qualit.

The quality of experiencing an apple decided by selection pressures. You sense the taste as favorable because many systems have evolved to recognize the survival value. If you found it disagreeable it could well be its spoiled and again the systems are working correctly.

Qualia is stupid and gay.

"What its like" is just putting a layer of obfuscation in front of threat detection and avoidance working as usual.

>Qualia is pural, so qualia are stupid (and fake) and gay.

I don't think that philosophers/mathematicians/computer scientists can understand just how batshit insane qualia would sound to the medical community/chemists/etc. It would just sound like insanity, doctors know that they can minimize pain with drugs that act on opiod receptors, do these opiods also act on qualia?

>>doctors dont know that drugs effect their patients in different ways

Well, that doesn't really have anything to do with what I am saying.

ARe you suggesting that if Patient X needs x mg of morphine, and patient Y does not respond to that,the difference is in some immaterial mind and a product of qualia, e.g. the pain qualia are "too strong for that dose"?

How isit that an opiod reduces qualia if qualia are not simply a mistaken way of talking about neuropharmacology, in this case?

>>patient Y does not respond to that,the difference is in some immaterial mind
>>he doesnt know what a placebo is and thinks doctors dont know what it is

Where is a placebo being mentioned? I think you might be the moron, fren. ARe you suggesting all opiods are placebos?

>Placebo is a reminder that controlling our body is the main job of our mind.

Except this control is going to be limited---someone might be able to take arbitrarily more morphine than someone else, especially a tolerated addict, but at some point, you push 100mg of fentanyl into them, their lungs are going to stop working and they will pass out. This is just not controversial.

So then you are left with explaining how, in patient X, 100ug fentanyl doesn't "over-ride" the mind, but 100mg does. This implies some sort of interaction between fentanyl and the mind, but how is that possible if the mind is immaterial?

Again, if you are an idealist and think both the mind and fentanyl are "immaterial" then you can make a logically consistent position, but it is only logically consistent in hte sense that you presume everything is immaterial, so then you dont have the interaction problem, but you are still left trying to explain what the "immaterial" container is.

The material container of the "mind" (the aggregate of mental activity) is the brain, situated in the body. The immaterial container of the mind is what? The mind has no container, the mind is the foundational entity, and everything flows from that? But then we are, again, struck by how things like fentanyl seem to act on the body (respiratory depression) no matter what someone thinks about them---fentanyl would work on the body if you just put 100mg into someone's cornflakes, even if he didn't know it was there.

So then it is "God's mind" or 'the simulation' which one anon has atleast admitted. But I think this stuff has no cash value---I think it is an interesting thing to think about, but I can't imagine how it is true.

>The mind may be immaterial, but it does have a structure

This just does not make any sense---how can an immaterial thing have a structure? Structure is literally a material thing, e.g. a house of cards, or a table. What is the immaterial made out of, such that it is structured>?

It's possible. There are people who have learnt to ignore any amounts of pain.

>if medications can diminish pain (or cause the heart to stop, etc.) and these things were all "mental" activity, then that doesn't make sense
It makes perfect sense. Introduce new chemicals into the metabolic order of things, and the quality of things change. Points to a 1:1 without much need for outside factors.

I interrupt your serotonin uptake, you feel different. I can change anything about (You) like this with material factors. I can get you drunk and you go from wimp to Superman.

The hard problem is god-of-the-gaps. "Yeah, but that doesn't say what its like!"

Really it does, just not in a way that satisfies a made-up problem.

>that introducing a quantity of material into a body can change qualia
It indicates that "qualia" is poor descriptor of the effect. Let's set it aside. You were in a negative state. Through nothing but chemical reaction, your state shifted to less-negative. Its not a leap to posit our preferred states are intimately tied to material factors.

>Why does the feeling need to have this further category
This is precisely the problem with trying to make everything fit the qualia model as though it were a third-ingredient. Everything can be neatly explained with action-reaction. The problem is that Nagel and Chalmers types have a hard-on for making this a special case.

"All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these."

So, quales translates poioi in Boethius's categories, and it just means "the nature of something."

ποιότης • (poiótēs) f (genitive ποιότητος); third declension

quality

poiotes is the noun, quality. So this just seems to me like it may be bad Latin, which always sounds profound, why say quality when we could say quale! But they are not the same thing, a sunburn is a poites, a quality, and this attempt to restrict qualia to be a noun meaning only certain internal affective dispositions, cleaving it from qualities like sunburns, it just seems like the analytics (as they often do) have hacked off a piece to chew on it.

The big point I think is that, the brain/mind/body is an arena of chambers which reactions take place.

Nature is not all rocks, the brain/mind is not a solid rock that simply touches rocks (partly or mainly the reason that anon claims the brain/mind is not very solidy materially)

The brain/mind/body is nearly uncountable pieces of a varying range of hardnesses and softnessess, stiffnesses and bendnesses, tubes, spheres, cubes, cylinders, wires, screen, reflectors, crystals, chemicals, electro magnetic lights, fluids, gasses...etc. etc.

The brain/mind/body has quantites and qualities X Y Z.....

Objects in Nature have quantities and qualities A B C....

When the brain/mind/body consumes an object of Nature:

A B C.. + or * X Y Z...

Does not simply equal A B C X Y Z

What is a "negative state"?

>The mind is trained to experience pain whenever it detects a specific signal

You're still not explaining how a mind detects a signal. The signal comes from the body and goes into the mind where? In the brain? In the liver?

>You're treating the mind as a special case and not a conglomeration of signals itself.

This sounds basically like Aristotle's account of the soul, in de Anima, have you read that?

>(Yes I have read a lot on contemporary philosophy of consciousness)

If you like philosophy, read Aristotle, esp. de Anima and On Interpretation and Categories.

It's not a matter of the taste being favorable or not, it is a word pointing to the fact that the activity of taste at all Is possible; something is experiencing the sensation of tastes, likely not your big toe, likely not your toe nail, likely no your knee cap,likely not your hair, likely not your shoulder...

The activity or no taste no taste no taste no taste .....seconds of complex profile of apple flavors ... .... .. no taste...wait some slight faint apple residue.... No taste.... No taste.....

Words are made to describe all things that are possible and distinct activities. Don't you think such a phenomenon deserves one?

Evolution can't create light, it can only adapt to the already existing phenomenon. Evolution can't create red, it can only adapt to the already existing phenomenon.

>I just realized qualit is a new type of particle, not a typo of "qualia."

Qualit, or quale, is singular of qualia.

>Compare w/ Derrida, etc. He does not use a phallogocentric worldview that privileges first order logic, etc. etc.
Does that make him illogical?

Likely not completely, because being taught language at all, and communicating at all coherently, he just utilize some logics

my personal take is one of complexity. derrida, and many postmodernists, in fact, talk about topics that have a very high inherent complexity. the fact that they are able to discuss them at all, and often come to some very profound realisations and even present them via elegant prose, is incredibly impressive. unfortunately, it takes effort to understand this stuff. many people cannot be bothered to put in this effort, so dismiss postmodernism as gibberish, etc.

>ould have argued the.vagueness is meant to provoke unique philosophical effort and activity from the reader

There is a video of Derrida talking about American students and how they expect him to tell them what to think or learn or something like that, rather than developing their own responses to the text.

"I dont want to think, Prof. Derrida, just tell me what to say to pass your final!"