The notion as it relates to Kant's Transcendental dialectic is usually one in which Kant has eliminated a number of possibilities but is left with a sort of tenuous conclusion and performs a less than logical reconciliation. The process itself is still popular and can lead to the generation of unconventional ideas, as to whether or not Kant was able to successfully counter high amounts of skepticism I guess this is still being debated but it is also technically a critical aspect of his idea of transcendental logic.
The qualifiers are unnecessary but I suppose I can try. We can sort of break down Kant's argument against scepticism of an external world to the lowest common denominator as an example. >1. I am aware of myself as a subject of different self-imposed mental states. >2. I am not directly aware of this subject of different self-imposed mental states. >3. Assuming the previous premises are true then this awareness of my state is accounted for indirectly as sort of an instantiation of unity. >4. Assuming the previous 3 premises are true then the awareness of my state is accounted for by this instantiation of unity. >5. If the preceding premise is valid then my mental state is in possession of this instantiation of unity. >6. This instantiation of unity cannot be accounted for by association. >7. Assuming the previous premise is true, then this instantiation of unity is a synthesis of what we know as a priori concepts. >8. This instantiated unity is the product of synthesis of a priori concepts. ('Accounted for by' also suitable nomenclature).
The nature of this argument is such that a typical skeptic would likely agree with either one or the other initial premises, and since the dichotomy is carried over then the following logic presents an argument that would end up performing if not an outright refutation then a serious critique of proponents who deny an external world. I suppose the opposition is left with extreme levels of skepticism but in all honesty no one cares what they have to say unless it is directly applicable and they have breached their own skepticism.
In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant aims to show that the categories derived in the Metaphysical Deduction are conditions of all possible experience. He achieves this proof roughly by the following line of thought: all representations must have some common ground if they are to be the source of possible knowledge (because extracting knowledge from experience requires the ability to compare and contrast representations that may occur at different times or in different places). This ground of all experience is the self-consciousness of the experiencing subject, and the constitution of the subject is such that all thought is rule-governed in accordance with the categories. It follows that the categories feature as necessary components in any possible experience.
>This ground of all experience is the self-consciousness of the experiencing subject
Apodicity. The categories structure experience in such a way as denying them is self-negating/contradictory/incongruent with making truth claims or empirical observations (about the world, outer & inner)
I cannot observe my experience directly, I can only observe the objects of my experience. I can only identify an object if it is continuous, that is, if it continues to exist even when I am not paying attention to it (otherwise its not an object). In order to know that an object exists even when I am not paying attention to it, I must be able to locate it in time. If an object is locatable in time, it must be subject to causality and change through time. I can identify the rotting apple on my counter as the same apple I bought from the store last week.
I, in the present, have privileged exclusive knowledge of my present experience. I can distinguish between the past and present.
The reality of time is presupposed by experience, and the reality of time presupposes the reality of objective sequence: that is, we really do live in a world in which change happens, and time is how we experience change in sequence.
Objects exist in time and space. Time and space are constructs of the human mind. Ican't have any real knowledge about the thing in itself, but I can have real knowledge about how things appear in time and space, and I can have real knowledge that the objects I am knowing can be represented in time and space.
Just read the Critique again bro, Kant puts it better than I can. Go slow and take notes and take frequent walks outside to think about it.
>I cannot observe my experience directly, I can only observe the objects of my experience.
What does that even mean? If you are experiencing, your are observing your experience, even at a faint level. If you notice something about noticing in general, you are noticing your experience. What even is an "object of experience"? The objects that are filtered through your experience? Well, then that sounds like you're directly apprehending them, doesn't it? And if make your past or present experience the object of experience (through recollection and meditation respectively), then aren't you observing your experience directly in some way?
The notion as it relates to Kant's Transcendental dialectic is usually one in which Kant has eliminated a number of possibilities but is left with a sort of tenuous conclusion and performs a less than logical reconciliation. The process itself is still popular and can lead to the generation of unconventional ideas, as to whether or not Kant was able to successfully counter high amounts of skepticism I guess this is still being debated but it is also technically a critical aspect of his idea of transcendental logic.
I said explain it
Did you read the CPR?
yes
Filtered
yes literally why I made OP homosexual
explain it as if I were a brain-damaged adult person of color with just the bare minimum of literacy
The qualifiers are unnecessary but I suppose I can try. We can sort of break down Kant's argument against scepticism of an external world to the lowest common denominator as an example.
>1. I am aware of myself as a subject of different self-imposed mental states.
>2. I am not directly aware of this subject of different self-imposed mental states.
>3. Assuming the previous premises are true then this awareness of my state is accounted for indirectly as sort of an instantiation of unity.
>4. Assuming the previous 3 premises are true then the awareness of my state is accounted for by this instantiation of unity.
>5. If the preceding premise is valid then my mental state is in possession of this instantiation of unity.
>6. This instantiation of unity cannot be accounted for by association.
>7. Assuming the previous premise is true, then this instantiation of unity is a synthesis of what we know as a priori concepts.
>8. This instantiated unity is the product of synthesis of a priori concepts. ('Accounted for by' also suitable nomenclature).
The nature of this argument is such that a typical skeptic would likely agree with either one or the other initial premises, and since the dichotomy is carried over then the following logic presents an argument that would end up performing if not an outright refutation then a serious critique of proponents who deny an external world. I suppose the opposition is left with extreme levels of skepticism but in all honesty no one cares what they have to say unless it is directly applicable and they have breached their own skepticism.
homie wtf is all this bullshit, imma put a cap in yo ass goofy cracka
I would normally say SWtG but you may just want to stick to YA.
imma stick to shank in yo neck homie
No, you're just a b***h. Be a good b***h and go back to the YA section where you belong.
homie wtf is a YA section, is that like a housing section like section 8
In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant aims to show that the categories derived in the Metaphysical Deduction are conditions of all possible experience. He achieves this proof roughly by the following line of thought: all representations must have some common ground if they are to be the source of possible knowledge (because extracting knowledge from experience requires the ability to compare and contrast representations that may occur at different times or in different places). This ground of all experience is the self-consciousness of the experiencing subject, and the constitution of the subject is such that all thought is rule-governed in accordance with the categories. It follows that the categories feature as necessary components in any possible experience.
>This ground of all experience is the self-consciousness of the experiencing subject
Apodicity. The categories structure experience in such a way as denying them is self-negating/contradictory/incongruent with making truth claims or empirical observations (about the world, outer & inner)
I cannot observe my experience directly, I can only observe the objects of my experience. I can only identify an object if it is continuous, that is, if it continues to exist even when I am not paying attention to it (otherwise its not an object). In order to know that an object exists even when I am not paying attention to it, I must be able to locate it in time. If an object is locatable in time, it must be subject to causality and change through time. I can identify the rotting apple on my counter as the same apple I bought from the store last week.
I, in the present, have privileged exclusive knowledge of my present experience. I can distinguish between the past and present.
The reality of time is presupposed by experience, and the reality of time presupposes the reality of objective sequence: that is, we really do live in a world in which change happens, and time is how we experience change in sequence.
Objects exist in time and space. Time and space are constructs of the human mind. Ican't have any real knowledge about the thing in itself, but I can have real knowledge about how things appear in time and space, and I can have real knowledge that the objects I am knowing can be represented in time and space.
Just read the Critique again bro, Kant puts it better than I can. Go slow and take notes and take frequent walks outside to think about it.
>I cannot observe my experience directly, I can only observe the objects of my experience.
What does that even mean? If you are experiencing, your are observing your experience, even at a faint level. If you notice something about noticing in general, you are noticing your experience. What even is an "object of experience"? The objects that are filtered through your experience? Well, then that sounds like you're directly apprehending them, doesn't it? And if make your past or present experience the object of experience (through recollection and meditation respectively), then aren't you observing your experience directly in some way?
this should clear things up: https://philpapers.org/archive/ACHAFO.pdf