>space is a condition of sensibility
>how do I prove that space is transcendental? If space were empirical it would have to appear in space!
this is textbook circular logic lmao, space is a priori because it’s the consition of sensibility because… because it just is ok!
Why do people on this board still fall for this? Empiricism is obviously correct. The mind invents space in a creative act to organize sense data. It’s really the 21st century and you still believe that the brain comes pre-installed with space like an xbox? lol. Kant autists must die
homie the brain is in space
The brain is in a 4d spacelike manifold called spacetike which it interprets using its vague intuition of euclidean space. Of course you’re probably an anti-realist Kunttard who wants to argue sophistically that because we can only imagine the brain in space its irrelevant to le transcendental philosophy. Of course you’re a troglodyte who hasn’t read Whitehead to realize that logical and phenomenological priority does not equal real priority. Sad!
>the stuff that comes after is really the stuff that comes before!
>just trust me, a someone who you met years
after the first stuff
what's so hard to understand? imagine if you're a wienerroach, do you really think that the categories in the mind of a wienerroach are actually "prior" to the wienerroache's nervous system? no, because logical/phenomenological priority does not imply priority in the real essence. this shouldn't even be an arguable point, but anti-realists have completely destroyed their ability to reason.
>imagine if you're a wienerroach,
>do you really think that the categories in the mind of a wienerroach are actually "prior" to the wienerroache's nervous system?
yes
>the real essence
literally refuted by the whole fricking critique
>anti-realists have literal achieved a higher state of consciousness
kys
Is this bait?
>he’s so buck broken by Kunt’s sophistry that he can’t comprehend there might be people out there who are non-moronic enough not to fall for it
Many such cases!
>absolutely filtered
literal moron take. read it again.
It's a pity Kant never had a child. The acquisition of knowledge of 3-dimensional space takes place over the first two years of a childs life. The child can't even place itself within it 2-dimensional field of vision for the first couple months, it takes many instance of trial and error to have the hand grab objects in its vision. Objecthood itself is a bit of a misnomer, babies can recognize saliency and colour but not any of an objects other properties including extension.
What babies can and can't cognate doesn't matter. What matters is that they intuit spatiotemporally by necessity. This is the same argument as "what about schizophrenics?" and doesn't actually respond to what Kant is saying.
> What matters is that they intuit spatiotemporally by necessity
Source? Also, maybe because they live in a universe that is made of spacetime in itself? The level of insanity reached by anti realists is truly something.
>Source
The entirety of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Read the author you're talking about.
>So he could have his "geometrical proof" which unites the rationalism of Cartesian mathematics with the empiricism of Newtonian science.
Kant barely speaks about Descartes, apart from a half-handful of times where he says Descartes is wrong.
>Space can easily be an empirical intuition acquired through experience, as per the rest of the transcendental aesthetic.
What?
>we need some "first" intuition to make sense of all sensory data or else intelligibility is impossible. What is that first intuition? I don't know.
That "first intuition" (intuitions) are space and time. Read Kant.
Where in the transcendental aesthetic does Kant prove that infants “intuit spatiotemporally”?
>Where in the transcendental aesthetic does Kant prove that infants “intuit spatiotemporally”?
In the entirety of it, wherein he demonstrates that human sensibility contains two pure intuitions, space and time, which all other intuitions are represented within.
Have YOU read it anon? He doesn’t prove anything in the TA, he only asserts that space and time are the condition of sensibility and that they don’t give the thing in itself.
>Have YOU read it anon?
Yes, I have.
>He doesn’t prove anything in the TA
Yes, he does.
>he only asserts
No, he doesn't.
>I've read Kant, and I disagree that space and time are the first intuitions. What are you going to do now?
Nothing.
>The funny thing is, you probably never even looked into *why* Kant decides that space and time are the pure intuitions which align the tables of judgments.
He decides this by abstracting all empirical data from the sensible intuitions.
>He offers no proof of it except that it seemed adequate and resulted in some perceived metaphysical harmonies.
Yes he does. Read the Transcendental Aesthetic.
>space is the realm of the empirical, time is the realm of the mathematical.
What?
>claiming an a priori conception of space is necessary is not an argument.
In reality this depends on what the original anon was claiming. I took him to be arguing that the claims about babies disprove Kant by way of them not intuiting space from birth, in which case it was a misunderstanding of what Kant was saying. Babies may not have perfect knowledge of space, but this doesn't mean they don't have a pure intuition of space and aren't capable of subsuming these intuitions under the elementary concepts.
>Babies learn about space.
Babies can, perhaps, subsume intuitions under elementary concepts over their early lives to form cognitions concerning space. However, they intuit in space necessarily. They simply may not have evolved the understanding to a point to, say, move successfully through space according to their will.
>and aren't capable of subsuming these intuitions under the elementary concepts.
I mean to say, aren't capable of subsuming these intuitions (given in space) under the elementary concepts.
>He decides this by abstracting all empirical data from the sensible intuitions.
... using intuitions he already has. How can he distinguish a pure intuition from an empirical intuition? He's presupposing that there's nothing more there through the bias of being a full-grown adult with a certain way of looking at the world. The other poster pointed out that babies do not have a concept of space (they also don't have object permanence, among other things), and yet they can both cognize to some extent AND they acquire these intuitions as they mature.
There's also the problem of defining space. Is space supposed to be three dimensional? Then babies do not have a pure intuition of space, and it is acquired over time.
>Yes he does. Read the Transcendental Aesthetic.
No, he doesn't. And plenty of people have looked back at the Transcendental Aesthetic, autistically pored through it, and realized that Kant had no idea what he was talking about when it came to the nuts and bolts of his system. Hegel, Peirce, Heidegger, etc., all included.
>... using intuitions he already has.
Okay. Go ahead then. Go do something without using intuitions you already have.
>How can he distinguish a pure intuition from an empirical intuition?
Reductio ad absurdum B38.
>The other poster pointed out that babies do not have a concept of space
It doesn't matter if they have a concept of space. They have a pure intuition of space in the sensibility.
>they also don't have object permanence
Good thing this has nothing to do with the conversation.
>and yet they can both cognize to some extent AND they acquire these intuitions as they mature.
Yes.
>Then babies do not have a pure intuition of space, and it is acquired over time.
Please read the text you're trying to refute. It would safe you a lot of embarrassment.
>No, he doesn't.
Yes, he does.
>And plenty of people have looked back at the Transcendental Aesthetic, autistically pored through it, and realized that Kant had no idea what he was talking about when it came to the nuts and bolts of his system.
Oh yeah?
>Hegel, Peirce, Heidegger, etc., all included.
Those are some big names. You've read all of them, but not Kant? Great job.
All you've read is the Wikipedia page, and it painfully shows. You can go back to R*ddit with the R*ddit-tier chunk & snark analysis. I'm sure you'll be in good company over there.
I am giving you R*ddit-tier chunk and snark analysis because that's all you deserve, dog. You're talking about things that you have no understanding of. You're not even using his terminology correctly. If you had read his text then I would have responded to you properly and addressed the points, but the mistakes you're making aren't nuances or even typical misunderstandings, they'd be impossible to make if you had read the book. I'm not going to sit here and explain it to you.
Kant accepts that he's only given presentations of things; space itself is a presentation, as is time. It's not an undermining of his system in any way.
Intuitions are received passively by the sensibility in some way that we don't have access to. Concepts subsume various presentations (i.e., intuitions or other concepts) under one presentation, so that we can form judgements using them as subjects/predicates. "Space" is not a concept. It's a pure intuition; everything you experience you experience in space. You can have other intuitions (you receive these passively), and these are not pure, they're empirical. Concepts are thought spontaneously, and subsume various intuitions under one concept. For example, the concept "green" subsumes various objects given in intuition and determined as being green as green things.
>I'm... I'm not going to sit here and EXPLAIN it to you because if you had just read the book, then you'd accept Kant's axioms! it's just that obvious chud!
By the way, if you don't think that Kant spoke of "pure intuitions" versus "empirical intuitions", which is the only terminology I've used besides categories, judgments, inner sense, outer sense, etc., then you've only convinced me that you've done none of the reading yourself. Not a good look pretending to know more than you actually do.
damn, start capitalizing the first letter of His pronouns, why don't you?
>be me
>became blind
>can only tell if someone is talking by hearing or touching them
>write a philosophy book where i explain that sound and touch are the only possible media through which one can receive another's voice
>autistic IQfy incels will virulently defend my work for the next 500 years
>write a philosophy book where i explain that sound and touch are the only possible media through which one can receive another's voice
You conveniently left out the qualifier “for a blind person” in regards to sound and touch being the only possible media to receive another’s voice. This is the entire point of Kant’s critique and if you don’t understand this you don’t understand what “idealism” even means in Kant’s system.
then Kant's system is pointless because he's only proving that space and time are THE transcendental conditions of sensibility FOR HIMSELF. You've basically just given me permission to completely dismiss his philosophy because I think in a different way from him.
>space and time are THE transcendental conditions of sensibility FOR HIMSELF.
no because if they are not universal, then the universal applicability of mathematics to nature remains unexplaines.
but modern mathemtical clearly demonstrates you can formalize the same mathematical proposition in basically endless different ways and you can prove that each way is equivalent. type theory, set theory, category theory, algebra, analysis, geometry, all these can say the same thing in different ways. so clearly I can use different categories and transcendental conditions of sensibility other than space and time to arrive at the same universal hypothesis as others.
>clearly
nope because the issue that Kant solves and no else could is the mystery of the universal applicability of mathematics to the sensible world. checkmate.
you have a problem
nope. I have read Kant.
I dont think Kant would be impressed by, say, modern geometry, insofar as you cannot construct anything with it. Two parallel, intersecting lines cannot be represented in space, you just have a formula that is technically consistent, but which is completely detatched from intuition.
Im glossing over contemporary non-geometrical maths because there's nothing in it that contradicts Kant philosophy.
>which is completely detatched from intuition
Holy shit you're a mathlet.
Yeah, I am, if I am wrong tell me. Can you represent in an immediate, graphical manner two parallel lines interesecting one another? Notice that I am not asking neither for a formula nor for the representation of a function mapped on euclidean space.
>I think in a different way from him.
you don't because without the Categories there is no you
>Okay. Go ahead then. Go do something without using intuitions you already have.
Isn't... isn't that the point of his argument? You're just accepting his premise and throwing it back at him as if it wouldn't just affirm what he was saying? You are a special kind of stupid.
How the frick can you have an intuition but not a concept of something? What the frick does that even mean?
by literally just not thinking. simple as brainlet. qed.
I don't think about my "concept" of 3D space as much as a baby doesn't think about his "intuition" of degenerate space. It's just there. That makes my concept of 3D space just as much of an intuition as the baby's intuition (and vice versa).
>I don't think about my "concept"
>t. hasn't achieved metacognition
exactly. that's why you're an npc.
Alright, if you're going to be cheeky chucklefrick, then I'll be a cheeky chucklefrick back. How moronic are you to believe that I don't think about the concept, when I'm here, discussing the nature of said concept and its origin? That's literally the definition of metacognition.
All you've done is successfully made yourself out to be an intellectual spastic.
>I'm here, discussing the nature of said concept and its origin
>I don't think about my "concept" of 3D space
make up your mind
I did make up my mind. I was using think generally in one sense, and specifically in another sense. You're just being an autistic pedant. I don't think about the fundamental reality of 3D space when I stand up from my desk to go to the bathroom and take a piss. I just do it.
>I don't think about the fundamental reality of 3D space when I stand up from my desk to go to the bathroom and take a piss.
ngmi
>Babies can, perhaps, subsume intuitions under elementary concepts over their early lives to form cognitions concerning space. However, they intuit in space necessarily.
What does it mean to intuit space? The transcendetal aesthetic is terse to a fault, you cant just appeal to it. Kant's most compelling argument for the a prioricity of space and time was by showing how they furnished the pure concepts of the understanding and the analytic a priori concepts with intuition, but he himself recognized that time had a more compelling case than space, which was relegated to being a condition for geometry. The natural numbers and magnitude are both conditioned by time. As I said, our comprehension of space as something to be navigated is learned empirically. Our understanding of space as distance is also learned empirically. Any cognition involving space requires only two things a priori, our visual field and a mapping of the visual field to our motion. Where is the necessity for an a priori intuition of space?
>What does it mean to intuit space?
Intuit in space, not intuit space. It means you receive presentations within space passively. Babies receive presentations passively within space, however they might not have the higher conceptual framework for certain mechanisms familiar to adults.
>The transcendetal aesthetic is terse to a fault, you cant just appeal to it.
I wasn't appealing to the Transcendental Aesthetic in my response to you. I kept mentioning it to others because I'm being asked for "sources" on statements that aren't explicated in just a paragraph or page, or being told that Kant doesn't attempt to prove anything in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and that it's just a list of assertions.
I don't think we're in disagreement. I'm not against the idea that cognitions concerning space are learned over time and empirically, I'm against the idea that the observations anon made about babies disprove Kant in any way - they're not providing evidence against space as pure intuition, only against cognitions about space we might make, which Kant doesn't claim are retained a priori by the mind in any way.
I never said if you'd read the book you'd accept his "axioms". I said if you'd read the book you'd know that what you're saying he's saying doesn't make any sense.
>if you don't think that Kant spoke of "pure intuitions" versus "empirical intuitions"
Tell me where I said this.
Maybe I should. Kant was a great man.
>Tell me where I said this.
You implied it earlier by acting confused when I referenced "empirical intuitions", as if I misused his terminology, even though I used exactly the right terminology in exactly the right way.
>You implied it earlier by acting confused when I referenced "empirical intuitions"
Quote where I implied it, and quote the line where I suggested you misused the term. I'm not sure what you're referring to.
>Intuit in space
Kant was talking about a pure intuition of space. The most significant feature of the pure intuition is that it is the condition for a priori concepts, which I tried to show by demonstrating how these other concepts can arise from empirical sense data. Its function as that under which empirical intuition is given to the understanding is only coherent to Kant's very outdated transcendental psychology, which I charitably did not bring up. The notion of a passive and active faculty united by the imagination has no parallel in reality. Visual information is structured by virtue of the light receptors in our eyes. This isnt some mystical process, its one of the very few things our brains can do that we can actually simulate. The relation of one cone to the other isn't mediated by an a priori intuition of space nor is the intuition necessary in order to "give" to other parts of the brain a unified structure. I'm sympathetic to the other anons asking for further elaboration beyond "just read Kant lmao".
>tried to show
*tried to refute
>That "first intuition" (intuitions) are space and time. Read Kant.
You didn't even try to parse my point lol. I've read Kant, and I disagree that space and time are the first intuitions. What are you going to do now?
The funny thing is, you probably never even looked into *why* Kant decides that space and time are the pure intuitions which align the tables of judgments. He offers no proof of it except that it seemed adequate and resulted in some perceived metaphysical harmonies. Space is the outer sense, time is the inner sense, space is the realm of the empirical, time is the realm of the mathematical. And Kant was a huge fanboy of Newton and wanted to protect the mathematical-empirical method (making observations, then mathematicizing them) from Humean criticism. This is literally how he did it.
The irony of pic rel is that not that we should be sceptical of external world but rather of our mind that produces these stuff.
Ill never get how idealists for example, use such examples to disprove certain knowledge of external world, yet they dont see implication of it, that very thing (the mind) it self is the thing we should not trust.
>We cant trust our senses... no no, our senses do theyr job as they should, the brain (mind) is the thing that process it.
Idealism isn't about whether the world exists but rather what is the substance of the world and what drives it.
Idealism is form non-realism philosophy anon, well in epistemological context.
Idealism can be a form of realism. Saying otherwise is just evidence of your ontological commitment to materialism.
More like Berkeley chads win again. No wonder people thought that Kant was just Berkeley 2.0, now with more logical autism.
Indeed anon. Thank your for informing me.
Temporality and time-consciousness is another matter but simply claiming an a priori conception of space is necessary is not an argument. Babies learn about space. They have "a priori" a visual field given structure in virtue of the geometric arrangment of rods and cones. This only has significance as they are able to move their body around in the space; knowledge of space is knowledge of how the bodies range maps to the visual field, gathered empirically.
Theres an interesting aside in Moynihans Spinal Catastrophism where he mentions that feed-forward networks can help explain time-consciousness. Kant's as well as the layperson's conception of sensation is that at time t you are dealing at sense data from time t but based on the axon pathway latency alone, not to mention the actual activation methods of neurons, at time t you are dealing with sense data from a duration of time. The sections in the schematism and analogies where he requires an a priori conception of time in order to have the concepts of magntitude and objecthood have an intuition fall apart if you are actually experiencing a multitude of times simultaneously.
>but based on the axon pathway latency alone, not to mention the actual activation methods of neurons, at time t you are dealing with sense data from a duration of time.
What do you mean? Correct me if I'm wrong, but at time t, wouldn't you really dealing with the data from time t - latency? Are you saying that the perception of a continuity of time comes from having a sense-perceptive latency? I'd like to hear more.
True, but the content of what I said remains the same. The lay conception would be "at time t you cognize sense data from time t-τ", whereas properly you have "at time t you cognize sense data from the duration [t-τ1,t-τ2], τ1<τ2". And the argument isn't just about latency although thats a part of it. The argument is that our minds are experiencing a temporal range of sense-data since just like electrical components our axons have a transient response, which is then mentally organized into a linear sequence for our consciousness. Thus in a sense we can say that we have an a priori concept of time but its not a concept as much as a process. Where this contradicts Kant is in his analogies, where he quite brilliantly points out that in order for there to be a persistence of objects in time to someone who only experiences the instantaneous present one must have a conception of time that links the past to present object. This view, and the others in the schematism where his concept of time furnishes the transcendental concepts with intuition, can be negated by having the mind continuously experience a duration of time as then the persistence of objects only requires pattern-matching.
I'm still confused at what you're trying to say. I wish you could unpack
>where the duration comes from
>the implications of a experiencing a temporal range of sense-data
>what this mental organization is like
>differentiating a concept from a process
>how this contradicts and/or affirms Kant (you seem to say it does both)
>how Kant's view can "be negated by having the mind continuously experience a duration of time as then the persistence of objects only requires pattern-matching" as I don't know what you mean by that.
>duration
Take consciousness at a given time as some function of whatever our current neural activity is plus whatever sense data we are getting. The sense data does not come from the given time or a specific past time thought, it comes from a continuous range of times. We are constantly experiencing the past. Kant conceives of time as continuous frames that have no reference to eachother if not for some a priori intuition of time that enables the understanding to connect past to present. This is negated if we have a biological facutly that does this instead
I see what you're saying, that each perceptive moment is really taking in sense data that was received from a range of different moments in the past. It's not a clean and even one-to-one mapping.
From Zeno to Hume people pondered the nature of a discrete time. Hume noted that we don't have a reason to associate instances in time beyond their similarity, which is an inductive process. Kant showed how the pure intuition of time must be what enable us to to use the categories on intuition which is necessary for some sort of unity etc.... the end result being the a priori time is a condition for us as conscious beings capable of objective judgment. In showing how pure intuition in time isn't necessary for us to have a conception of succession and persistence and simultaneity and possibly magnitude you destabilizs the whole thrust of his argument.
Babies come out hardwired to either laugh or cry in response to stimulus.
>It's learned behavior!
Rope.
instinct has nothing to do with cognition and epistemology. even Locke had no problem with instinct.
>instinct has nothing to do with cognition and epistemology
>t. doesn't know
>nooooo this critique of Kant's axioms with scientific evidence is not responding to what Kant is saying because it doesn't assent the same axioms that Kant has
have a nice day if you think that's an adequate rebuttal
And we all know why Kant assembled his intuitions, categories, etc., in the way that he did. So he could have his "geometrical proof" which unites the rationalism of Cartesian mathematics with the empiricism of Newtonian science. Have his cake, eat it too, and make it seem mathematically true. Space can easily be an empirical intuition acquired through experience, as per the rest of the transcendental aesthetic.
But this is just quibbling over details over the main insight that Kant had: we need some "first" intuition to make sense of all sensory data or else intelligibility is impossible. What is that first intuition? I don't know. And neither do you, apparently.
> we need some "first" intuition to make sense of all sensory data or else intelligibility is impossible
We clearly don’t since the foetus starts out with zero braincells.
The embryo isn't remotely conscious until it develops something akin to a central nervous system. Any other response prior is a reflex, a crystallized input-output mechanism that completely lacks sentience, the ability to make sense of that input and generate a variety of outputs as the creature sees fit.
It builds the central nervous system out of nothing. All it can do is guide how the neurons will learn by positioning them in a certain geometry. It can’t preprogram individual neurons before they exist. Neurons dont need to intuit space to learn.
Kant's transcendental deduction is refuted by relativity and quantum physics. We now know that much space is organised in a non-Euclidian manner. Therefore it cannot be structured by Kant's categories.
I don't think Kant's categories have much to do with the essential nature of Euclidean geometry or any kind of geometry at all. It was all posturing and veneer.
Explain to me how our mental categories construct Riemannian space, then.
Why should I? I never claimed it did. I don't know what the essential categories of any space are, what space aligns with actual space (if it exists), or if our minds have a necessary connection to any of the aforementioned spaces. Way above my paygrade.
kantbros, we are getting btfo hard. how will we recover from this thread?
Anyone claiming that Kant is wrong about space and time being the basis for all intuition must show why he's wrong.
You just like to say things and make accusations then forget you said them 5 minutes later, don't you? You're the worst kind of bad faith poster.
Remind me, little buddy. Find the lines and quote them.
>Space can easily be an empirical intuition acquired through experience, as per the rest of the transcendental aesthetic.
>>What?
>You're not even using his terminology correctly.
>you'd know that what you're saying he's saying doesn't make any sense.
By the way, your only "rebuttal" so far has been to simply contradict my statement that the first intuition may not necessarily be space and time, without giving any reason for that except ThAt Is NoT wHaT KaNt SaId. Then I provided another reason that makes any abstraction suspect, the fact that it is impossible to introspect and discern a "first" intuition from all present intuitions with certainty, only for you to throw it back at me as if that didn't just prove my point?
The only thing you've proven is that you're great at regurgitating another man's thoughts but you're extremely bad at thinking and performing philosophy in general. It's like dealing with a robot that's only programmed to accept certain protocols and shortcircuits when you mess with them. And you had the nerve to call me a dog for doing what literally millions of people (and every great thinker post Kant) did which was critique Kant, rightfully so because while he asked great questions and gave monumental answers, he hardly told the full story.
Concerning the first quote; I said "What?" Because this claim that space can be an empirical intuition is exactly what the Transcendental Aesthetic is arguing against. Specifically:
"1. Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer experiences" (B38)
"2. Space is a necessary a priori presentation that underlies all outer intuitions." (B38)
Your claiming that what you said can be found "as per the rest of the transcendental aesthetic" is so contrary to the point of the Transcendental Aesthetic that I can only conclude you haven't read it.
>You're not even using his terminology correctly.
And I stand by this. You conflate the "concept of space" with space the pure intuition here
You've made multiple claims about Kant and using his terminology that are inconsistent with Kant and his terminology. I am not "arguing" for or against anything, because I'm not going to argue with someone who hasn't read what they're arguing about. That's why my responses are vague and uncritical.
I called you a dog for speaking as if you've read something you haven't.
lol i remember you being super autistic about the difference between concept and intuition in some other thread too.
based
These are two separate things here. There is the pure intuition of space, and then there are intuitions in space (which are empirical). The pure intuition of space is an aspect of the sensibility, in which all objects must be received passively as intuitions. An intuition in space is just as described; an object received passively by our sensibility *in* space.
What I believe you're saying is that a priori cognitions concerning space don't require space the pure intuition, because they can instead arise from empirical sense data. However, empirical sense data is just empirical intuition, and thus given already and only in the pure intuition of space; i.e. space is presupposed on your account.
Psychologistic refutations of Kant's system do not hold up and ended with Russell's attempt, because Kant is not giving an account of the mind as brain. This is discussed iirc at the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic.
Functionally, what does this mean? My understanding of the a priori pure intuition of space was in modern terms a pre-existing 3-dimensional grid, but in Kantian terms as that which passively brings the intuitions into the transcendental synthesis of imagination so as to be brought under the categories. This is negated by our modern understanding of light reception in terms of the rods and cones in our retina. What is the immediate representation of our sensation is the visual field (unless you are blind). Magnitude and distance are learned empirically, and the relation of objects to space is also empirical. The a priori space is superfluous.
>This is negated by our modern understanding of light reception in terms of the rods and cones in our retina.
How? I don't understand why the structure of rods/cones or visual stimuli would refute Kant's conception of space as pure intuition, which again, is purely philosophical, not psychologistic or concerning physical structures of the brain. The empirical knowledge of relations between cones is cognition which results, as any cognition does, of the structures of the mind Kant espouses, and as far as I understand don't lead to internal inconsistencies within Kant's system.
Unless you are prepared to hold that our visual receptors are the pure apriori intuition of space you have to explain why it is necessary in the first place. Kant thinks it is the ground for all spatial intuition, and that is why he initially believes that it is necessarily pure a priori. If, which has been established, that role goes to our visual receptors, then the pure intuition is either superfluous or equivalent.
>you have to explain why it is necessary in the first place.
On Kant's account the pure intuition of space is necessary in the first place for anything like light receptors to give us presentations in space. A conglomerate of empirical data, which forms our "visual field", can only be used to abstract to space if it's already given in space.
That is, to receive visual stimuli, that stimuli must already exist in space, and so it wouldn't make sense to empirically abstract from it a concept of space. We would not know that b is in x place in our visual field and c is in y place in our visual field without having an a priori intuition of space already. If we did not have this, then there would be no way of having sensations in different areas (in different sections of our visual field in particular) to abstract from.
Kant is talking about human minds not wienerroach minds.
if the wienerroach nervous system is prior then so is the human nervous system.
Thoughts are prior to the human nervous system only in the sense that the concept of a nervous system is simply a concept subsuming other concepts which subsume the intuitions we have regarding the nervous system. The analogue to the nervous system in Kant's philosophy, i.e. the sensibility, is side-by-side with the understanding, in that we cannot have cognitions without both intuitions and concepts. Our understanding of the physiology of wienerroaches is empirical and has nothing to do with the function of the human mind.
the nervous system is "real" because even if it is a concept, it isn't just a concept subjectively in one person's mind. our understanding of the physiology of human minds is also empirical, unless you want to lapse into solipsism. you're giving a completely solipsistic description of it.
>you're giving a completely solipsistic description of it.
In some sense it's solipsistic because Kant is dealing with the structure of the mind of the subject as it is presented to the subject. However, it is not solipsistic in the sense that, after dealing with this presentation, we can be sure that there's an exterior phenomenal world in which people exist seemingly as their own subjects. I wouldn't be completely against the argument that Kant is a solipsist, however the subject (or self) is already a presentation on Kant's account, and so I don't see how it wouldn't hold that others in the phenomenal world are also subjects.
>Kant-speak to our modern conceptions of space the pure intuition amounts to a pre-existing spatial grid.
It already is a pre-existing spacial "grid" in Kant speak; it's a prior structure existing in the mind which all sensations exist within.
>but the baby has no intuition of x coordinate and y coordinate, or whatever else you propose, this is all learnt.
You're right that it has no intuition of x coordinate or y coordinate. Location in space is a concept, specific objects being in particular locations is cognition. So, the baby can learn through the spontaneous evolution of non-elementary concepts via the understanding. When speaking of "in space", it's not "in space at x position", it's "in space" alone. Any speak of presentations in space as being in a particular location belongs to the understanding. I think of it as something like what a DMT trip probably looks like, but even less structured than that, in that there aren't patterns or separate colors and so forth. "thoughts without content are empty, intuition without concepts blind".
This is exactly it, when converting from Kant-speak to our modern conceptions of space the pure intuition amounts to a pre-existing spatial grid. Note that this is not an issue for modern philosophers, Carnap dealt with it in a couple lines. But back to the baby example, there is no initial mapping to the visual field and spatial objects or concepts, including Kant's object-in-general/transcendental object. The baby can seek the teat, which if anything was to be a priori knowledge it would be to suck the breast, but the baby has no intuition of x coordinate and y coordinate, or whatever else you propose, this is all learnt. If space is precisely the visual field it is fair to say that we have a pure intuition of space, but if like any other field it includes something else, say coordinates and magnitude, then we don't as those are learnt.
you can't have a "purely philosophical" premise, that's just one of Kant's delusion, which this other guy is perpetuating as he's said that a wienerroach's thoughts are prior to its nervous system. why anyone takes "transcendental" philosophy serious is beyond me. how ironic that Kant's project to ground science has no resulted in the most insane denial of science possible.
>This is negated by our modern understanding of light reception in terms of the rods and cones in our retina.
>t. thinks empirical knowledge can refute results of transcendental critique
ngmi
show me the post liar
The only thing "inconsistent" I've been with Kant is accepting what the pure intuitions are. Otherwise I've used everything correctly. You mistake philosophy for religious dogma and that's such a disgusting way to live that I can't believe that the spirit of Kant himself hasn't tried to haunt you for it.
>The only thing "inconsistent" I've been with Kant is accepting what the pure intuitions are.
You thought the Transcendental Aesthetic demonstrated that space is empirical intuition.
I didn't say that. You have poor reading comprehension which is weird because you also claim to understand Kant.
>Space can easily be an empirical intuition acquired through experience, as per the rest of the transcendental aesthetic.
Do you understand what I was trying to say there?
Yes. You're saying that, as per the Transcendental Aesthetic, it's possible for space to have been acquired through experience.
Not exactly. I'm asking you to imagine holding the general principle of the Transcendental Aesthetic in place, but switch out its axioms of pure intuition for some other axiom of pure intuition. Complicated, I know. You might have to do some original philosophical thinking to understand its implications.
>holding the general principle of the Transcendental Aesthetic in place
Oh yeah? What's that general principle?
Black. Power.
>space is a priori because it’s the consition of sensibility because… because it just is ok!
Kant gave 5 distinct arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic and another one in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences and this cretin still believes that Kant simply affirmed it without any supporting argument.
A thread died for this
>The mind invents space in a creative act to organize sense data. It’s really the 21st century and you still believe that the brain comes pre-installed with space like an xbox?
How can the mind invent space if the idea of what to invent from sense data didn't come pre-installed?
Because we’re in a universe that actually has space, so it’s obvious idea to get. Your position only makes sense if evolution doesn’t exist and humans were deus ex machinad onto the scene, because otherwise no animal would ever be able to get an intuition of space since it didn’t know to invent it.
>Because we’re in a universe that actually has space, so it’s obvious idea to get
This is directly contradictory to the proposition that mind "invents" space. Unless you are arguing that the mind is somehow able to create an exact copy of outside space.
>Evolution
That's just another phenomena that presumes the existence of space.
The space that your mind uses is an invention. We are in a spacelike world, that’s described by einstein or some other theory. We interpret that as our vague intuition of space.
>That's just another phenomena that presumes the existence of space.
How many times do I have to say it? Logical/phenomenological priority DOES NOT IMPLY PRIORITY IN THE REAL ESSENCE.
Anon can you clarify what you mean by:
>Space is invention of mind
>We are in space like world
The transcendental space described by Kant is purely the subjective intuition of space whereas real space (non-euclidean spacetime) is a lot different from our Euclidean intuition (though I would also argue that our subjective intuition of space isn’t even purely Euclidean because of its vagueness inside your head, it only becomes Euclidean when we formalize it in mathematics)
What I’m saying is that the external universe is not just purely a subjective phenomenon but that it has an element of reality and that our brains learn to perceive the real things in it (Einsteinian space) using our own tools (euclidean space) in order to parse reality as efficiently as evolution has provided.
And the reason I said “spacelike” is that relativity doesn’t even have to be the true theory, as long as the world has something in it that we can interpret using subjective space.
I see. So what you are saying is that our models dont necesserely reflect the true state of reallity (as it is independent of human perception) but they are usefull because they allow us to for example predict things (how they work)?
In other words, all our theorys are but interpretations of which we vhoose those that allow us to comprehand reallity?
The subjective intuition if our brain is just an interpretation. The scientific method provides greater certainty about the real nature of reality. None of our theories can be said to be true but they each have a measure of certainty and must in some way have arisen from a real world that’s independent if subjectivity.
Thank you anon.
>We are in a spacelike world, that’s described by einstein or some other theory
Yes. But again all those theories are themselves derived from pre-concieved notions about what space it derived 100% from the space we see that is "invented" by the mind.
What even is space anyway? To even presume that space is a thing you'd need objects with space between. But to see the world as differentiated objects is still a resultant of phenomenology.
For example- you can say that the distance between NY and LA is xyz miles. But how can this distance exist in the thing in itself if there is no NY or LA in thr thing in itself?
>all those theories are themselves derived from pre-concieved notions about what space it derived 100% from the space we see that is "invented" by the mind.
That doesn’t mean that the theories can’t be true because the brain’s notion itself was already drawn from reality. You say everything comes from the mind but the mind comes from reality.
>But to see the world as differentiated objects is still a resultant of phenomenology.
The fact that we can individuate reality at all implies there is a pluralistic substratum.
>But how can this distance exist in the thing in itself if there is no NY or LA in thr thing in itself?
There is no NY or LA but there is a plurality of things and relations that manifests itself to the mind as NY and LA. It must be true to say that one or a complex of the relations existing in this plurality is at least somewhat similar to our perception of the distance between NY and LA.
>That doesn’t mean that the theories can’t be true because the brain’s notion itself was already drawn from reality
I'm not saying that the theories aren't true. I'm saying that the theories only describe objects as they appear to our mind. So we haven't escaped the mental objects.
>The fact that we can individuate reality at all implies there is a pluralistic substratum.
But we aren't individuating the thing in itself. Only representations. And infact we aren't actually individuating them. Its the very nature of representations as our mind constructs them.
>relations that manifests itself to the mind as NY and LA.
You simply can't prove that this plurality and relations are not complete objects of the mind but are manifestations of something outside it. You are simply assuming that it is so
>I'm saying that the theories only describe objects as they appear to our mind
You can describe the actual object by observing how it behaves from many different perspectives. If there’s a box that you can out a number in and get another number out, then you can input numbers, come up with a function to explain what the box is doing, and then test it by inputting more numbers and seeing if it continues to agree. This can establish a very good certainty that the box actually is doing the rule you described. This shouldn’t even be controversial.
>But we aren't individuating the thing in itself. Only representations
Anon, a representation is already an individuation. There can’t be representations all the way down, even Kant said this.
>You simply can't prove that this plurality and relations are not complete objects of the mind but are manifestations of something outside it
Even Kant admitted that the existence of the mind and categories implied they were caused by a thing in itself, he just didn’t admit that the thing in itself was similar to mind and could be accurately reached by it with certainty.
>You are simply assuming that it is so
If I didn’t assume it it would be impossible to explain the efficacy of science.
>You can describe the actual object by observing how it behaves from many different perspectives. If there’s a box that you can out a number in and get another number out, then you can input numbers, come up with a function to explain what the box is doing, and then test it by inputting more numbers and seeing if it continues to agree. This can establish a very good certainty that the box actually is doing the rule you described. This shouldn’t even be controversial.
I have literally zero issues with this as long as we are clear on the fact that the box, the inputs, the outputs are mental objects of perception.
>Even Kant admitted that the existence of the mind and categories implied they were caused by a thing in itself, he just didn’t admit that the thing in itself was similar to mind and could be accurately reached by it with certainty.
Yes. But the plurality of objects like NY and LA and the relations between them are still purely phenomenological. Kant makes no allusions to such things being properties of the thing in itself.
Think about it. How can NY and LA be two different things if earth is one continues surface, geographically speaking. Infact how can earth be something distinct from the space outside it if everything (including outer space) is just a distribution of matter which is more dense at some parts and less dense at others. Which itself is just flunctuations in the quantum field which permeates literally everything.
You literally need a human mind to make sense of concepts like NY and LA. Now you'll argue that the very presence of distinct flunctuations in QF proves that there is some fundamental truth to there being an NY or LA. But you completely missed the part where we literally had to presume the existence of space and time for QFT to nake sense. To allow for flunctuations to appear at different points in space. Concepts we derived from nothing but our mental perceptions.
We've already been through this based meme.
>If I didn’t assume it it would be impossible to explain the efficacy of science.
I see your point here. It indeed seems so that new scientific knowledge shouldn't be impossible if all objects are mental constructs. This prompts some thought on what a "scientific theory" even is.
For those who are discussing this matter in the posts above, here's two useful fragments you could use to steer the conversation more rigorously.
1/2
2/2
In these fragments Kant provides an argument for the claim for which the form of space cannot be applied to things in themselves, not even in principle. You should take them as a reference if you want to discuss this matter seriously.
>Kant provides an argument for the claim for which the form of space cannot be applied to things in themselves
so he debunks himself? awesomesauce
How does he debunk himself? He makes the same claim in the first critique
Frick ive posted them in the reverse order. Read
first, then
Sorry, I meant
first, then
. Frickkkk ive messed this too many times
>divisibility is a meme
>space is an illusion
>matter is an illusion
Eleatic chads win again
I'm too dumb for Kant.
we know