>Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the unity of apperception, in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions according to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination.
that is taking it a little too far probably. imagination can borrow from the spontaneity of thought, no? moreover a spontaneity of sensibility should be able to produce sensations, is this what you're saying? but aren't real vs imagined sensations different? I can imagine hearing a sound, but is this imagination of a sound a sensation? am I actually sensing anything? i think you are twisting the meaning of sensation. to 'spontaneously sense' would mean to detect something, to be able to detect things at will, but how should i distinguish what i detect? it is time and space that already give a certain order to sensations, arranging them by place and time. but if i could 'spontaneously sense', i shouldn't be limited by the forms of time and space, no? but then i should be sensing anything and everything, without a form for their arrangement.
>moreover a spontaneity of sensibility should be able to produce sensations, is this what you're saying?
Time is the a priori form of inner sense. In effect, imagined sensations are sensations in inner sense as opposed to external sense.
>he can't see the apple
?
How do you imagine an apple would look if it was right in front of you?
if he's imagining something, even if it is something 'imaginary', he is relying on memory; this is different from 'spontaneously' producing sensations
>he is relying on memory
Why would he need to?
isn't it obvious? if he could spontaneously give himself sensations, then he could effectively hallucinate (even more than this) objects in front of him. hence he would not be 'imagining' the apple, in the sense that we use this word. obviously he does not do this, so what is he relying on? memory. if you asked him to imagine a color he had not seen before, he could not do it. but if it were given to him, then he could then apply it in his imagination to objects, and so forth.
>isn't it obvious?
No. How do you think visual art is possible? Is it all machine learning to you?
what?
Gaylords say what?
we are talking about sensation, but what you are asking about applies to contour, or form. for instance, we can make melodies in our head, or whatever, but still i cannot give myself the sensation of that melody, played on the flute, or the violin. if i attempt to do this, to give body to the melody, so that i can actually hear (sense) it, i am relying on memory. just because i can visualise or imagine the form of melody, effectively by drawing it in time or space, doesn't mean i am sensing anything. if i imagine a melody i rely on schematizing + memory, in order to give myself a vague 'sensation' of the succession of notes.
For example, how do you think Picasso could come up with cubism if he couldn't imagine the paintings before effectively painting them?
I won't pretend to understand how Picasso 'came up with' Cubism, I am simply asking you to show me how, before having experience containing the color red, or blue, or green, one can imagine anything with those colors? Once again you are confusing images, which are a complex mental product, with sensation, which is the content of intuition, in Kant's philosophy. We are not talking about the production of images, but sensations.
>you can't imagine bodies in space without hallucinating them
Please have a nice day and OP too. Don't bother responding.
you are just proving my point. imagining body means form, which is different from sensation. hallucination is more than mere form (e.g., shape, melodic line), something like the semblance of sensation, admittedly a confusing phenomenon. i don't think you have a grasp of the difference between sensation and imagination.
>i don't think you have a grasp of the difference between sensation and imagination.
I subsume imagination under the concept of sensation (per Kant). There difference lies in the degree of their intensity (reality, tangibility) and that the spontaneity of real sensation is hidden behind the appearance of a receptivity (that they are given rather than produced by you) because of the veil of the empirical ego (they are produced spontaneously by the transcendent Self), whereas the receptivity of imagined sensation is taken for a spontaneity because of a failure to recognize imagination as still being sensation, albeit inner sense of the soul, and therefore still subject to the necessity of the categories, i.e., the emiprical ego doesn't actually spontaneously produce imagined objects, in the same way it doesn't spontaneously produce real object-- both are spontaneously produced by the transcendent Self.
if the empirical ego veils the producing spontaneity, why would an imagined sensation be depicted as misrecognized for spontaneity if the spontaneity is a sensation being seemingly unveiled via "misrecognition"?
t. enthused ameboid
for the same reason we believe we have free will at the level of the empirical ego (as opposed to at the level transcendent Self): ignorance. Now why we are ignorant in the first place? That I don't know-- yet.
Not that guy, but I don't see why this should be particularly problematic in a kantian framework.
All Picasso needed to imagine that painting is a) a representation of space and b) a representation of colors. Now, these representations had to be given through experience, but once they're given any combination taking place in those representations is open to imagination. So, he didn't literally need to see an object that looked like the one in the painting in order to imagine it, all he needed were the representations required to construct such an image (i.e. space as a form of intuition, and colors as a form of qualitative reality). Similarly I do not need to see an unicorn in order to imagine one, I just need to be have the phenomenical materials required to construct such a figure.
>I don't see why this should be particularly problematic in a kantian framework.
correct as shown in critique of judgment
>Now, these representations had to be given through experience
The Great Mystery
>the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined.
Sure, but that wasn't the issue. If anything the passage you've quoted shows in very clear terms that Kant posited hard limits to productive imagination (meaning that solipsism is impossible, since imagination can be operative only if a manifold of intuition has already been given), but it doesn't really touch the issue of reproductive imagination, especially with regards to artistic creations (due to what I have said in my previous post)
It would look yummy.
SAUCY
yeah this is pretty much all you need to BTFO Kantcels. They could see the apple at one point. But they misread the allegory of the cave, got scared of the apple, and proceeded to cauterize their imagination.
>t. filtered by Kant's hidden doctrine
ngmi
>Kantcels == Kant
ILLITERATE
obviously i cannot give myself (spontaneously) the sensation of burning, or of thirst, etc. if I could spontaneously produce sensations, then i should be able to gain experience without actually being present, but this i obviously cannot do.
>obviously i cannot give myself (spontaneously) the sensation of burning, or of thirst, etc.
not in external sense, no, but as their imagined equivalent in inner sense yes. Remember the empirical for Kant is not just the external world of (outer) sense, but also the observable contents of the soul (inner sense).
>aren't real vs imagined sensations different?
indeed, but yet they are both sensation-- one in external sense, the other in internal sense.
Already refuted, https://warosu.org/lit/thread/22371536
The only point of imagination to serve as a medium, i.e. to apply itself to the sensible (which contradicts the notion an intellctual intuition). It being a priori is not special, since understanding is also a priori.
Stop thinking Kant believed it. He hated this sort of metaphysics and would laugh at you.
Karl Arnold Wilmans
The Similarity of Pure Mysticism with the Religious Doctrine of Kant, 1797
I ain't gonna deny that I'm a midwit, but why every philosophers passage I ever read sounds like a word salad? Can't they be a little less pretentious in their writing?
>...not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to intuition [what can be sensed], while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects.
Well he sounds like a gatekeeping c**t to me.
ok
clearly he thought this dense abstract language was the only way to make the point, either to avoid repeating himself, leading him to have to word the same thing in a less intelligible way, or because the subject material is itself so abstract and unintelligible. why do you expect to be able to understand metaphysics, the most abstract concept concievable, if you cant get through a paragraph of convoluted language? or are you unaware that a lot of these terms are defined in earlier sections of whatever book this is from, and previous knowledge is expected to be understood from you?
is it worth reading critique of pure reason? it seems like it has good insights, but i don't want to battle through that convoluted shit unless it's going to blow my mind and never see the world the same way again. if it's just shit we already osmotically believe from living in kant's world, then it's not worth the squeeze? idk
>if it's just shit we already osmotically believe from living in kant's world,
lol we are still in a Lockean world. Kant is still beyond our time.
it, along with plato, irreparably fricked humanity
Wasn't he the ultimate coomer? I guess jacking off is the way of the future.
>Wasn't he the ultimate coomer?
Sex is for materialist normalgays. It was the redirected orgone from his sex organs to his cognitive organs from voluntary celibacy that produced the supermind and the corresponding super thinking abilities of the great Kant. Develop the self discipline to resist sexual desire and thereby acheive the intellectual heights of the Empyrean like Kant did. The never ending chase on the hamster wheel of sexual gratification is mere cope for those that can't into Kant and their seetheposts against Kant are the only way they know how to release their pent up sexual frustration. I would tell them to kys but I am not so cruel, and instead I invite them to read a copy of the first critique today.
>We are such stuff as dreams are made on; and our little life is rounded with a sleep.
>Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses, except the intellect itself.
>the senses precede the sensual composite of the intellect, but the intellect wasn't present in the senses
or is it just referring to the *essense* of the composite of the intellect actualized after being realized?
>The true knowledge or science which exists nowhere but in the mind itself, has no other entity at all besides intelligibility; and therefore whatsoever is clearly intelligible, is absolutely true.
>Absolute idealism, however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of existence, to be created and governed by God.
-Hegel
Me whenever I pick up Kant
wut?
not reading this stuff because it bores me, but I always just thought imagination was the synthesizing process between any 2+ impressions in a certain way. that is to say, finding a new logic/method to connect things.
Guess that makes sense from what I am willing to labour to decode from this writing. where that "spontaneity" is the "new logic/method" I mentioned, but in a more analytical dissection of what that actually means.
>where that "spontaneity" is the "new logic/method"
that's not what that means
>performed or occurring as a result of a sudden inner impulse or inclination and without premeditation
sounds “new” to me.
>not reading this stuff because it bores me
that's why it sounds like that to you
i guess so.
it sounds like you guys are saying the same thing to me, at least if you take method more in a broad sense.
3abstract5me
Empirical science can not refute that which by definition is not yet empirically verifiable. Notice I said not yet. I say that because if you open yourself up to this possibility you will see that what is empirical depends on the limits of human sense and cognition as they now are, but what they are now is merely one way of experiencing reality by one conscious organization at one stage of a continuum of such organizations each with different capacities. And if you believe in evolution you would realize that our human experience is not the only possible kind of experience and that if we can modify our organism to access an extended range of sensations and cognition a whole new type of experience and hence reality is possible.
captcha: SHTAY
>as all our intuition is sensuous
Every thought we have comes from the senses in some way
>imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which alone it. . .belongs to sensibility
Imagination, as the originator of 'internal thoughts' (as opposed to thoughts that are caused by encountering things externally, outside of ourselves), therefore belongs to the senses as well
>But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable
The Imagination is actually different from sense however; Imagination not only produces new ideas out of nothing, but it can, when combined and in sync with the Understanding, settle on the closest thing we can call real - knowledge that is in us prior to any experience. The senses cannot do this, they only offer external stuff, which we can interpret but cannot be sure of
>consequently able to determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the unity of apperception
Imagination is therefore actually above sense, and guides how it functions, fitting it to the self
>in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sensibility a priori
The Imagination is therefore responsible for deciding how our senses work, and this ability belongs to it naturally, it is not learned through experience
I've been reading Kant for a while, I think I'm pretty close here, but would obviously welcome correction if I'm on the wrong track
>Every thought we have comes from the senses in some way
>I've been reading Kant for a while
anon how long have you been reading Kant?
literally the second paragraph in the intro to the critique:
>it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which THE FACULTY OF COGNITION SUPPLIES FROM ITSELF (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it.
I think a lot of this interpretation was solid, but the mistake is in seeing the Imagination as producing thoughts.
Like what the PNG in
is arguing, I think what Kant is actually saying is, Imagination and sense perform the same function, just in different areas. Sense brings information from the outside, while Imagination acts as a 'wrangler' for internal intuitions. It doesn't 'produce' anything on its own, these thoughts are spontaneous, it is just there to 'catch' them and to bring them to the attention of the understanding.
Imagination is therefore not responsible for how external sense functions, and is actually part of the same faculty of sense overall; however, Imagination is higher up the hierarchy than external sense, as only it has the possibility of engaging with internal and potentially a priori knowledge, while the senses only deal with experience
>I think a lot of this interpretation was solid
now there two midwits
>blah, blah, blah
>blah,blah, blah
Yah!
>I've got a problem with God.
>blah, blah, blah
>blah, blah, blah
Yah!
Repent.
das Bump
Now there *are* two midwits, you halfwit
Brainlet here. What are the best commentaries and works of secondary literature for Kant's critiques? I've heard H.S. Harris' work Hegel's Ladder floated as THE English-language commentary for the Phenomenology - is there an equivalent for the Critique of Pure Reason?
I'm currently reading Leibniz before I dive into Kant but with the way I'm struggling already I strongly feel that I'll need commentary of some kind to understand what he's getting at.