"Ito Kichinosuke, one of my teachers at university, studied in Germany in 1918 immediately after the First World War and hired Heidegger as a private tutor. Before moving back to Japan at the end of his studies, Professor Ito handed Heidegger a copy of Das Buch vom Tee, the German translation of Okakura Kakuzo’s The Book of Tea, as a token of his appreciation. That was in 1919. Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) was published in 1927 and made Heidegger famous. Mr. Ito was surprised and indignant that Heidegger used Zhuangzi’s concept without giving him credit.
Years later in 1945, Professor Ito reminisced with me and, speaking in his Shonai dialect, said, ‘Heidegger did a lot for me, but I should’ve laid into him for stealing’. There are other indications that Heidegger was inspired by Eastern writings, but let’s leave this topic here. I have heard many stories of this kind from Professor Ito and checked their veracity. I recounted this story at a reception held after a series of lectures I gave in 1968 at the University of Heidelberg at the invitation of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Japanese exchange students attended these lectures, and I explained that there were many other elements of classical Eastern thought in Heidegger’s philosophy and gave some examples. I must have said too much and may even have said that Heidegger was a plagiarist (Plagiator). Gadamer was Heidegger’s favorite student, and we ended up not speaking to each other for 4 or 5 years because he was so angry with me." - Imamichi Tomonobu
Fellow Daseins, we can't keep going with the flow with it...
This is the passage being referred to in the Book of Tea:
>But the chief contribution of Taoism to Asiatic life has been in the realm of æsthetics. Chinese historians have always spoken of Taoism as the “art of being in the world,” for it deals with the present—ourselves. It is in us that God meets with Nature, and yesterday parts from tomorrow. The Present is the moving Infinity, the legitimate sphere of the Relative. Relativity seeks Adjustment; Adjustment is Art. The art of life lies in a constant readjustment to our surroundings. Taoism accepts the mundane as it is and, unlike the Confucians or the Buddhists, tries to find beauty in our world of woe and worry. The Sung allegory of the Three Vinegar Tasters explains admirably the trend of the three doctrines. Sakyamuni, Confucius, and Laotse once stood before a jar of vinegar—the emblem of life—and each dipped in his finger to taste the brew. The matter-of-fact Confucius found it sour, the Buddha called it bitter, and Laotse pronounced it sweet.
That's literally it. The phrase "being in the world" appears once, and it's so sufficiently vague and broad that it's hard to say what exactly Heidegger stole besides a phrase. Plus, it's not as if the lecture courses from the 20s aren't accessible anymore, most of his discussions of "being-in-the-world" prior to B&T are tied to his readings of Aristotle's Ethics, Rhetoric, and De Anima in classes.
I remember watching a Keith Woods video about a book written by the founder of the Kyoto school, but I can’t remember anything about it. Can I get a quick run down?
>The Kyoto School was a group of 20th-century philosophers who undertook the task of integrating Japanese and Western modes of thought at a period when Japan was opening itself to the world in the Meiji Restoration following the isolation of the Edo period. These thinkers developed radically novel interpretations of place, body, and experience that were united and underpinned by the metaphysical principle for which they are, arguably, best known: absolute nothingness.1 This concept originates in the work of Kyoto School founder Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), who defined it as a field of potential within which being and non-being mutually co-specify one another. It should be noted here that absolute nothingness does not refer to the absence or nonexistence of some state or phenomenon, but rather affirms the existence of an ultimate “within which” all of reality takes place.2
>Nishida is often cited as the most important Japanese philosopher of the 20th century, and he was certainly the first to engage with the Western tradition.3 His major contribution to Japanese culture during the upheaval of the Meiji period was to reevaluate Japanese thought, particularly topics from Zen Buddhism, in terms of the Western philosophical tradition. In the late 1890s under the advice of his close lifelong friend D. T. Suzuki, Nishida took up the Zen Buddhist practice of Zazen, or sitting meditation. He became a keen practitioner who immersed himself deeply in Zen until the year 1905, when he stepped away from active Zen practice. By this time he had become preoccupied with the idea of reconciling the intuitive, nonreflective consciousness that he had experienced through Zen, with the logical and rational, reflective consciousness of the Western philosophical tradition. As such, his first book, An Inquiry into the Good, aimed to establish consciousness as an absolute unifying principle for reality through the transcendence of the subject–object dichotomy, a common theme in Zen discourse.4 His search for a means to transcend the subject–object dichotomy led Nishida to further develop and iterate upon William James’s concept of “pure experience” as “the original flux of life before reflection has categorised it.”5 While James viewed pure experience as the foundation of the conscious individual, Nishida characterized it as “the fundamental mode of true reality,” thereby extending it to provide a unifying theoretical foundation for existence itself. From this standpoint, an individual does not “have” experiences, but rather it is experience that “has” the individual because experience is both prior to, and contains, the individual. Accordingly, the subject–object distinction is somewhat addressed. For Nishida, this state of pure experience in which subject and object exist in an undifferentiated condition was synonymous with simple everyday experience.
>He built on this in 1926’s From That Which Acts to That Which Sees. There he argued that experience itself must unfold within a place/field/topos that would provide the necessary means for its existence and thereby provide the ultimate ground of reality as a “nothingness of the absolute." He used the term “basho,” or sometimes “basho of absolute nothingness,” to refer to this place, field, or topos. Heisig makes two important observations about the nature of Nishida’s absolute nothingness.6 It is a “nothingness” insofar as it is not of the world of being and so cannot be or pass away. It is “absolute” because it cannot be defined in relation to anything in the relativistic world of being “so that its only opposition to the world of being is that of an absolute to a relative.” As such, absolute nothingness cannot become the subject of conscious experience nor can it become an object of experience. It functions through self-negation in that it nullifies any definition applied to it while at the same time providing the means by which any such definition could even be applied. It is the absolute nothing by which all of the somethings of being are rendered relative. This sidesteps the essentialism inherent in the subject–object model by preventing nothingness from being positively characterized or affirmed. Being a groundless ground, it provides an epistemic and ontological source that is an alternative to foundationalist descriptions of reality that posit some bottom ground level upon which reality is founded. Nishida’s concept of absolute nothingness then is not some empty void beyond the world but acts as a creative and dynamic principle at work within the world. It is encountered as the basho, or “that within which” the concrete realities of everyday life unfold as pure experience. Pure experience and absolute nothingness are two sides of the same coin in Nishida’s philosophy, as absolute nothingness provides the basho in which pure experience unfolds.7
The concept of absolute nothingness was transformed in the work of Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962).8 Tanabe rejected Nishida’s take on pure experience as a starting point for his own thinking and was suspicious of what he saw as religious undertones to Nishida’s rendering of absolute nothingness. While he agreed with the idea in principle, Tanabe disagreed with Nishida’s formulation of absolute nothingness as a basho. He felt that this reified the nothingness, turning it into a kind of object by affirming the negation implicit in the concept rather than negating it. Tanabe also criticized Nishida’s basho of absolute nothingness for silencing the historical and sociocultural worlds, an issue he would try to address in his own work. In developing his own philosophy he turned to the Buddhist concepts of śūnyatā or dependent origination, and the Hegelian notion that individuals are always defined in relationship to one another. For Tanabe, individuals are relative and can be both self and other, depending upon how they are encountered. Furthermore, all of reality is relative and interrelated. The individual contents of reality, objects, people, and social institutions can only exist and make sense in terms of their relationships to other “things.” This he describes as “self-in-other” and for Tanabe, nothing can exist beyond these mutual co-defining interrelationships. He reformulated absolute nothingness in terms of absolute mediation, which for him is the animating principle that mediates the web of interrelations from which reality is composed. Absolute mediation is the observation that “one” cannot be posited with the mediation of an “other” and that affirmation, or being, is impossible without the mediation of negation, or non-being. Tanabe’s further assertion is that nothing can relate directly to another thing but that all relationships are mediated by further relationships, and this mediation is absolute in that it permeates all aspects and elements of reality.
10 months ago
Anonymous
>The Kyoto School was a group of 20th-century philosophers who undertook the task of integrating Japanese and Western modes of thought at a period when Japan was opening itself to the world in the Meiji Restoration following the isolation of the Edo period. These thinkers developed radically novel interpretations of place, body, and experience that were united and underpinned by the metaphysical principle for which they are, arguably, best known: absolute nothingness.1 This concept originates in the work of Kyoto School founder Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), who defined it as a field of potential within which being and non-being mutually co-specify one another. It should be noted here that absolute nothingness does not refer to the absence or nonexistence of some state or phenomenon, but rather affirms the existence of an ultimate “within which” all of reality takes place.2
>Nishida is often cited as the most important Japanese philosopher of the 20th century, and he was certainly the first to engage with the Western tradition.3 His major contribution to Japanese culture during the upheaval of the Meiji period was to reevaluate Japanese thought, particularly topics from Zen Buddhism, in terms of the Western philosophical tradition. In the late 1890s under the advice of his close lifelong friend D. T. Suzuki, Nishida took up the Zen Buddhist practice of Zazen, or sitting meditation. He became a keen practitioner who immersed himself deeply in Zen until the year 1905, when he stepped away from active Zen practice. By this time he had become preoccupied with the idea of reconciling the intuitive, nonreflective consciousness that he had experienced through Zen, with the logical and rational, reflective consciousness of the Western philosophical tradition. As such, his first book, An Inquiry into the Good, aimed to establish consciousness as an absolute unifying principle for reality through the transcendence of the subject–object dichotomy, a common theme in Zen discourse.4 His search for a means to transcend the subject–object dichotomy led Nishida to further develop and iterate upon William James’s concept of “pure experience” as “the original flux of life before reflection has categorised it.”5 While James viewed pure experience as the foundation of the conscious individual, Nishida characterized it as “the fundamental mode of true reality,” thereby extending it to provide a unifying theoretical foundation for existence itself. From this standpoint, an individual does not “have” experiences, but rather it is experience that “has” the individual because experience is both prior to, and contains, the individual. Accordingly, the subject–object distinction is somewhat addressed. For Nishida, this state of pure experience in which subject and object exist in an undifferentiated condition was synonymous with simple everyday experience.
>He built on this in 1926’s From That Which Acts to That Which Sees. There he argued that experience itself must unfold within a place/field/topos that would provide the necessary means for its existence and thereby provide the ultimate ground of reality as a “nothingness of the absolute." He used the term “basho,” or sometimes “basho of absolute nothingness,” to refer to this place, field, or topos. Heisig makes two important observations about the nature of Nishida’s absolute nothingness.6 It is a “nothingness” insofar as it is not of the world of being and so cannot be or pass away. It is “absolute” because it cannot be defined in relation to anything in the relativistic world of being “so that its only opposition to the world of being is that of an absolute to a relative.” As such, absolute nothingness cannot become the subject of conscious experience nor can it become an object of experience. It functions through self-negation in that it nullifies any definition applied to it while at the same time providing the means by which any such definition could even be applied. It is the absolute nothing by which all of the somethings of being are rendered relative. This sidesteps the essentialism inherent in the subject–object model by preventing nothingness from being positively characterized or affirmed. Being a groundless ground, it provides an epistemic and ontological source that is an alternative to foundationalist descriptions of reality that posit some bottom ground level upon which reality is founded. Nishida’s concept of absolute nothingness then is not some empty void beyond the world but acts as a creative and dynamic principle at work within the world. It is encountered as the basho, or “that within which” the concrete realities of everyday life unfold as pure experience. Pure experience and absolute nothingness are two sides of the same coin in Nishida’s philosophy, as absolute nothingness provides the basho in which pure experience unfolds.7
I remember watching a Keith Woods video about a book written by the founder of the Kyoto school, but I can’t remember anything about it. Can I get a quick run down?
>Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), another member of the Kyoto School, would further develop Nishida’s idea of absolute nothingness He came into contact with Zen through the writings of D. T. Suzuki during a period of struggle in his early life. Suzuki’s work shaped Nishitani’s early understanding of Buddhism, and Nishitani would continue to admire and learn from Suzuki as he became personally and professionally acquainted with him later in life.9 He began focused Zen practice in 1937, and in time Zen came to be one of two defining features of his philosophy, the second being nihilism. Like Tanabe, Nishitani spent two years studying under Heidegger at Freiburg at a time when Heidegger was also engaged with the question of nihilism; while Nishitani learned much from Heidegger’s phenomenology, Heidegger in turn spent much time learning about Zen from Nishitani.10
>In his approach to philosophy Nishitani’s interests in nihilism, existentialism, and phenomenology were united. He concerned himself with the dynamics of interaction between the two extremes of essentialism, the belief that self and world contain some essential and objective root nature or substance, and nihilism, the idea that self and world are devoid of any objective nature whatsoever. He felt that people tended to get trapped in a vicious cycle of oscillation between these two extremes and aimed to interrupt this cycle through Nishida’s absolute nothingness. He viewed the nihilistic standpoint as a relative nothingness that can be overcome when a person turns the “Great Doubt” of nihilism back upon itself so that one’s certitude about their own nihilism is dissolved or “trans-descended” in a standpoint of absolute nothingness that, in similar fashion to Tanabe, he identifies with the Buddhist concept of śūnyatā. In Nishitani’s thought, this absolute nothingness or śūnyatā is a space in which the relative world of being is allowed to manifest in its natural “suchness” or immediacy, free of the errors of nihilism and essentialism that are relativized against the backdrop of absolute nothingness. In his appeal to śūnyatā Nishitani, like Tanabe, was using the language of Mahayana Buddhism to elucidate his take on absolute nothingness as a creative or productive force. Śūnyatā, in this context, negates the existence of an essential nature or substance for the self and the world. Instead, it affirms a relativistic model in which the self, world, and their contents exist within an interconnected web of mutual relationships, a phenomenon termed dependent origination. The central innovation here is in building on the work of Nishida and Tanabe to produce a philosophy of absolute nothingness that becomes highly personal for the individual thanks to its reformulation through an existentialist lens.
You're genuinely a fricking moron.
What level of weeaboo must you be to diminish Nietzsche and especially Heidegger like this.
You're an absolute idiot.
>Why does IQfy never discuss the Kyoto School? Without them Nietszche and Heidegger become essentially worthless.
weeb pseud
Not diminishing Nietszche and Heidegger. In fact I believe that, when fully interacting with Mahayana philosophy, they overcome the East and realise themselves more properly. The fact of the matter is that Nietszche, Heidegger and Schopenhauer are either consciously or unconsciously doing baby steps within the fields of philosophy the East has down lock and key. The same could be said about the East when investigating those positions the West is most prominent in. But the West is ultimately the superior.
read the philosophy of zen buddhism by byung-chul han, he talks about heidegger in relation to it pretty extensively. also tl;dr with your post because you're wrong lol
Peak pseud. Byung just restates Kyoto. Plus he is like a pop philosopher.
yeah but at the end of the say Mahayana and Nietszche, Heidegger and Schopenhauer are just entertainment and there is zero truth in it.
Wtf are you talking about? They embrace Mahayana. They read those western philosophers well too. They just have a positive concept of nothingness. I think it is a worthy counterpoint to le woe is me nigilism. Relative meaning and relatve nihilism are dissolved in the absolute nothing which is also the creative nothing and chora so to speak of form from which all meaning flows forth...
not ready yet
DT Suzuki is more interesting
Pill me
because then they would have to admit that the orient was more advanced than the west in the past.
one of the least interesting eastern philosophies linked up with the most overrated western thinkers, need it or keep it?
"Ito Kichinosuke, one of my teachers at university, studied in Germany in 1918 immediately after the First World War and hired Heidegger as a private tutor. Before moving back to Japan at the end of his studies, Professor Ito handed Heidegger a copy of Das Buch vom Tee, the German translation of Okakura Kakuzo’s The Book of Tea, as a token of his appreciation. That was in 1919. Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) was published in 1927 and made Heidegger famous. Mr. Ito was surprised and indignant that Heidegger used Zhuangzi’s concept without giving him credit.
Years later in 1945, Professor Ito reminisced with me and, speaking in his Shonai dialect, said, ‘Heidegger did a lot for me, but I should’ve laid into him for stealing’. There are other indications that Heidegger was inspired by Eastern writings, but let’s leave this topic here. I have heard many stories of this kind from Professor Ito and checked their veracity. I recounted this story at a reception held after a series of lectures I gave in 1968 at the University of Heidelberg at the invitation of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Japanese exchange students attended these lectures, and I explained that there were many other elements of classical Eastern thought in Heidegger’s philosophy and gave some examples. I must have said too much and may even have said that Heidegger was a plagiarist (Plagiator). Gadamer was Heidegger’s favorite student, and we ended up not speaking to each other for 4 or 5 years because he was so angry with me." - Imamichi Tomonobu
Fellow Daseins, we can't keep going with the flow with it...
This is the passage being referred to in the Book of Tea:
>But the chief contribution of Taoism to Asiatic life has been in the realm of æsthetics. Chinese historians have always spoken of Taoism as the “art of being in the world,” for it deals with the present—ourselves. It is in us that God meets with Nature, and yesterday parts from tomorrow. The Present is the moving Infinity, the legitimate sphere of the Relative. Relativity seeks Adjustment; Adjustment is Art. The art of life lies in a constant readjustment to our surroundings. Taoism accepts the mundane as it is and, unlike the Confucians or the Buddhists, tries to find beauty in our world of woe and worry. The Sung allegory of the Three Vinegar Tasters explains admirably the trend of the three doctrines. Sakyamuni, Confucius, and Laotse once stood before a jar of vinegar—the emblem of life—and each dipped in his finger to taste the brew. The matter-of-fact Confucius found it sour, the Buddha called it bitter, and Laotse pronounced it sweet.
That's literally it. The phrase "being in the world" appears once, and it's so sufficiently vague and broad that it's hard to say what exactly Heidegger stole besides a phrase. Plus, it's not as if the lecture courses from the 20s aren't accessible anymore, most of his discussions of "being-in-the-world" prior to B&T are tied to his readings of Aristotle's Ethics, Rhetoric, and De Anima in classes.
>Okakura Kakuzo’s The Book of Tea
Amazing book, btw. Highly recommend.
kek if a nazi addicted to mental ramblings and israeliteesses thinks something is good, protip it means the thing is shit
It's just Buddhist nihilism, it's a discursion at best.
>Why does IQfy never discuss the Kyoto School? Without them Nietszche and Heidegger become essentially worthless.
weeb pseud
I remember watching a Keith Woods video about a book written by the founder of the Kyoto school, but I can’t remember anything about it. Can I get a quick run down?
>The Kyoto School was a group of 20th-century philosophers who undertook the task of integrating Japanese and Western modes of thought at a period when Japan was opening itself to the world in the Meiji Restoration following the isolation of the Edo period. These thinkers developed radically novel interpretations of place, body, and experience that were united and underpinned by the metaphysical principle for which they are, arguably, best known: absolute nothingness.1 This concept originates in the work of Kyoto School founder Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), who defined it as a field of potential within which being and non-being mutually co-specify one another. It should be noted here that absolute nothingness does not refer to the absence or nonexistence of some state or phenomenon, but rather affirms the existence of an ultimate “within which” all of reality takes place.2
>Nishida is often cited as the most important Japanese philosopher of the 20th century, and he was certainly the first to engage with the Western tradition.3 His major contribution to Japanese culture during the upheaval of the Meiji period was to reevaluate Japanese thought, particularly topics from Zen Buddhism, in terms of the Western philosophical tradition. In the late 1890s under the advice of his close lifelong friend D. T. Suzuki, Nishida took up the Zen Buddhist practice of Zazen, or sitting meditation. He became a keen practitioner who immersed himself deeply in Zen until the year 1905, when he stepped away from active Zen practice. By this time he had become preoccupied with the idea of reconciling the intuitive, nonreflective consciousness that he had experienced through Zen, with the logical and rational, reflective consciousness of the Western philosophical tradition. As such, his first book, An Inquiry into the Good, aimed to establish consciousness as an absolute unifying principle for reality through the transcendence of the subject–object dichotomy, a common theme in Zen discourse.4 His search for a means to transcend the subject–object dichotomy led Nishida to further develop and iterate upon William James’s concept of “pure experience” as “the original flux of life before reflection has categorised it.”5 While James viewed pure experience as the foundation of the conscious individual, Nishida characterized it as “the fundamental mode of true reality,” thereby extending it to provide a unifying theoretical foundation for existence itself. From this standpoint, an individual does not “have” experiences, but rather it is experience that “has” the individual because experience is both prior to, and contains, the individual. Accordingly, the subject–object distinction is somewhat addressed. For Nishida, this state of pure experience in which subject and object exist in an undifferentiated condition was synonymous with simple everyday experience.
>He built on this in 1926’s From That Which Acts to That Which Sees. There he argued that experience itself must unfold within a place/field/topos that would provide the necessary means for its existence and thereby provide the ultimate ground of reality as a “nothingness of the absolute." He used the term “basho,” or sometimes “basho of absolute nothingness,” to refer to this place, field, or topos. Heisig makes two important observations about the nature of Nishida’s absolute nothingness.6 It is a “nothingness” insofar as it is not of the world of being and so cannot be or pass away. It is “absolute” because it cannot be defined in relation to anything in the relativistic world of being “so that its only opposition to the world of being is that of an absolute to a relative.” As such, absolute nothingness cannot become the subject of conscious experience nor can it become an object of experience. It functions through self-negation in that it nullifies any definition applied to it while at the same time providing the means by which any such definition could even be applied. It is the absolute nothing by which all of the somethings of being are rendered relative. This sidesteps the essentialism inherent in the subject–object model by preventing nothingness from being positively characterized or affirmed. Being a groundless ground, it provides an epistemic and ontological source that is an alternative to foundationalist descriptions of reality that posit some bottom ground level upon which reality is founded. Nishida’s concept of absolute nothingness then is not some empty void beyond the world but acts as a creative and dynamic principle at work within the world. It is encountered as the basho, or “that within which” the concrete realities of everyday life unfold as pure experience. Pure experience and absolute nothingness are two sides of the same coin in Nishida’s philosophy, as absolute nothingness provides the basho in which pure experience unfolds.7
https://online.ucpress.edu/res/article/4/1/69/195805/The-Kyoto-School-and-Sound-ArtA-Nothingness-of-the
The concept of absolute nothingness was transformed in the work of Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962).8 Tanabe rejected Nishida’s take on pure experience as a starting point for his own thinking and was suspicious of what he saw as religious undertones to Nishida’s rendering of absolute nothingness. While he agreed with the idea in principle, Tanabe disagreed with Nishida’s formulation of absolute nothingness as a basho. He felt that this reified the nothingness, turning it into a kind of object by affirming the negation implicit in the concept rather than negating it. Tanabe also criticized Nishida’s basho of absolute nothingness for silencing the historical and sociocultural worlds, an issue he would try to address in his own work. In developing his own philosophy he turned to the Buddhist concepts of śūnyatā or dependent origination, and the Hegelian notion that individuals are always defined in relationship to one another. For Tanabe, individuals are relative and can be both self and other, depending upon how they are encountered. Furthermore, all of reality is relative and interrelated. The individual contents of reality, objects, people, and social institutions can only exist and make sense in terms of their relationships to other “things.” This he describes as “self-in-other” and for Tanabe, nothing can exist beyond these mutual co-defining interrelationships. He reformulated absolute nothingness in terms of absolute mediation, which for him is the animating principle that mediates the web of interrelations from which reality is composed. Absolute mediation is the observation that “one” cannot be posited with the mediation of an “other” and that affirmation, or being, is impossible without the mediation of negation, or non-being. Tanabe’s further assertion is that nothing can relate directly to another thing but that all relationships are mediated by further relationships, and this mediation is absolute in that it permeates all aspects and elements of reality.
>Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), another member of the Kyoto School, would further develop Nishida’s idea of absolute nothingness He came into contact with Zen through the writings of D. T. Suzuki during a period of struggle in his early life. Suzuki’s work shaped Nishitani’s early understanding of Buddhism, and Nishitani would continue to admire and learn from Suzuki as he became personally and professionally acquainted with him later in life.9 He began focused Zen practice in 1937, and in time Zen came to be one of two defining features of his philosophy, the second being nihilism. Like Tanabe, Nishitani spent two years studying under Heidegger at Freiburg at a time when Heidegger was also engaged with the question of nihilism; while Nishitani learned much from Heidegger’s phenomenology, Heidegger in turn spent much time learning about Zen from Nishitani.10
>In his approach to philosophy Nishitani’s interests in nihilism, existentialism, and phenomenology were united. He concerned himself with the dynamics of interaction between the two extremes of essentialism, the belief that self and world contain some essential and objective root nature or substance, and nihilism, the idea that self and world are devoid of any objective nature whatsoever. He felt that people tended to get trapped in a vicious cycle of oscillation between these two extremes and aimed to interrupt this cycle through Nishida’s absolute nothingness. He viewed the nihilistic standpoint as a relative nothingness that can be overcome when a person turns the “Great Doubt” of nihilism back upon itself so that one’s certitude about their own nihilism is dissolved or “trans-descended” in a standpoint of absolute nothingness that, in similar fashion to Tanabe, he identifies with the Buddhist concept of śūnyatā. In Nishitani’s thought, this absolute nothingness or śūnyatā is a space in which the relative world of being is allowed to manifest in its natural “suchness” or immediacy, free of the errors of nihilism and essentialism that are relativized against the backdrop of absolute nothingness. In his appeal to śūnyatā Nishitani, like Tanabe, was using the language of Mahayana Buddhism to elucidate his take on absolute nothingness as a creative or productive force. Śūnyatā, in this context, negates the existence of an essential nature or substance for the self and the world. Instead, it affirms a relativistic model in which the self, world, and their contents exist within an interconnected web of mutual relationships, a phenomenon termed dependent origination. The central innovation here is in building on the work of Nishida and Tanabe to produce a philosophy of absolute nothingness that becomes highly personal for the individual thanks to its reformulation through an existentialist lens.
You're genuinely a fricking moron.
What level of weeaboo must you be to diminish Nietzsche and especially Heidegger like this.
You're an absolute idiot.
Not diminishing Nietszche and Heidegger. In fact I believe that, when fully interacting with Mahayana philosophy, they overcome the East and realise themselves more properly. The fact of the matter is that Nietszche, Heidegger and Schopenhauer are either consciously or unconsciously doing baby steps within the fields of philosophy the East has down lock and key. The same could be said about the East when investigating those positions the West is most prominent in. But the West is ultimately the superior.
How does the School of No Sword react to German Idealism?
read the philosophy of zen buddhism by byung-chul han, he talks about heidegger in relation to it pretty extensively. also tl;dr with your post because you're wrong lol
I read Hegel in the womb, and Heidegger via anti-fascist street fighting. Zen I read by shit fricking Daoists in the toilets at work.
Whom do I divorce?
Peak pseud. Byung just restates Kyoto. Plus he is like a pop philosopher.
Wtf are you talking about? They embrace Mahayana. They read those western philosophers well too. They just have a positive concept of nothingness. I think it is a worthy counterpoint to le woe is me nigilism. Relative meaning and relatve nihilism are dissolved in the absolute nothing which is also the creative nothing and chora so to speak of form from which all meaning flows forth...
yeah but at the end of the say Mahayana and Nietszche, Heidegger and Schopenhauer are just entertainment and there is zero truth in it.
weeb who likes Nietzsche here, where do I start?
Nishitani - Self-Overcoming of Nihilism
Thank you
Religion and Nothingness is anyone one.
Because reading Japanese is very hard.
>Without them Nietszche and Heidegger become essentially worthless.
An idiotic statement, but Nishitani is great and overlooked.
>postwar french gay appropriation of Germans, then add another few layers of 'wrong side of history' and arcane orientalism and walla
I took Hegel in his anus, and he opened unto me like a flower. This is the power of zazen.