>Is there a single more embarrassing cause of death than getting filtered by Kant?
Getting filtered by Hume by thinking that Hume's conclusions about the necessity for pure reasoning are in fact Kant's conclusions.
Kant is moronic though. >Bro, we don't like, really know anything like about tables and trees. Like, we only know what our minds think about trees man.
You could recreate Kantianism by just giving freshmen weed.
The Transcendental Aesthetic is a brilliant exposition of working through the consequences of accepting Hume's conjecture that observing things coinciding can never give absolutely thorough evidence of causal relationships in reality, and hence that experience only allows us to posit physical laws via hypothesis (i.e. which can turn out to be wrong due to some observation being made that doesn't fit existing theory, even if no mistake was made by the scientist), yet also accounting for that mathematics does, in fact, seem to allow mathematicians to independently make hard conjectures concerning the geometric forms *of objects that we observe* by necessity (i.e. which will only be wrong *if some error of reason is made*) anyway, and purely through thinking without any further need to gather evidence from the world.
The final page of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first edition of the CPR is up there with the most profound and forcefully definite statements of thought ever made. It's a shame its Logic is so much more of a mess.
>Hume's conjecture that observing things coinciding can never give absolutely thorough evidence of causal relationships in reality, and hence that experience only allows us to posit physical laws via hypothesis
As with his arguments against miracles, Hume is simply engaged in question begging. It isn't trivial question begging, so it has its merits, but it is still not a good argument.
If throwing a ball at a window causes it to break then watching a ball smash a window simply IS seeing cause. Packed into Hume's argument is assumptions about cause dominant in Hume's time. Because Newton's gravity worked through a sort of mysterious action as a distance it was assumed that natural laws were real ontic entities that essentially "caused" everything to act the way they do. It helped that this dovetailed with medieval and ancient Christian though re Christ's role as the Logos in which all things are created and "hang together." (John 1, Colossians 1).
So Hume is assuming that cause has to be external laws deciding things. Very few people think of cause this way now. Kirpke's internalism or some form of it is more dominant, particularly because of Cartwright's work on "scientific laws," and how they are normally just approximations. Laws are now seen as just descriptions of how things interact and things interact because of what they are. Actually, there aren't even things, but universal fields that might be unified.
Cause then works like computation, and pancomputationalism is indeed dominant in modern physics. But if that's true, then seeing a ball move another is very much observing causation, which is just how one state of a system entails the next.
>yet also accounting for that mathematics does, in fact, seem to allow mathematicians to independently make hard conjectures concerning the geometric forms *of objects that we observe* by necessity (i.e. which will only be wrong *if some error of reason is made*) anyway, and purely through thinking without any further need to gather evidence from the world.
I am pretty sure Kant uses the example of a triangle needing to have angles that sum to two right angles in this sense. But it isn't true because we now know we can have other consistent systems of geometry where this is not a fact. The vast changes in logic and mathematics since Kant's day, along with Quine and co's arguments against analyticicity, and advanced in developmental biology call into question the idea of any true "a priori." We could also consider Hittinka's Scandal of Deduction and ask if such thinking actually produced any knowledge too.
Kant ultimately takes the step that Aquinas and Aristotle worked so hard to avoid, cutting us off from the world by having it that we experience images of things, not things. He wasn't the first in this, the Brits started it, but he popularized it. This has had rather disasterous consequences for philosophy.
Ideas are the tools we use to experience the world, not the things of experience. We don't say "humans can never drive a car, all they can do is move steering wheels and push pedals," but this is how philosophy began to talk about experience.
Hegel points out how this stems from dogmatic assumptions in Kant, but of course he is a horrid writer and reading the Logic is torture, so this didn't catch on.
From this, we get the anti-metaphysical turn and the seeds of the deflation of truth, disasters. I'd tend to agree with Alistair MacIntyre's thesis that Enlightenment moral theory has also been disastrous, leading to relativism and nihilism.
>Hittinka's Scandal of Deduction and ask if such thinking actually produced any knowledge too
I have always had a problem with this line of thinking which assumes that deduction has to produce any new knowledge. Is knowing that a rectangle just like a square, has 4 sides new knowledge, and to whom? Just because some autist in england published an esoteric theory, doesn't mean its suddenly new knowledge to everyone in the world. The term is subjective and seems mostly to apply to induction, especially since deduction assumes self evident axioms.
>If throwing a ball at a window causes it to break then watching a ball smash a window simply IS seeing cause
Hume's contention here is under what circumstances is the ball causing the breaking of the window and becomes relevant once you consider larger scales. It's all nice and cosy to imagine physics computationally, but then you come to the n body problem, how do you explain the stability of the solar system given computers can't even calculate the dynamics of n rigid bodies without becoming chaotic? What is the origin of that stability?
1 month ago
Anonymous
Why do you think the solar system is stable?
1 month ago
Anonymous
Think of it this way, you are walking on a circular bridge, and the bridge has planks that routinely collapse before you, and you have been doing this for some time, then someone else comes along and starts recording this, he sees you skip every few minutes where there's a gap, he then goes away, then comes another person who records you and sees you walking naturally as you now changed the rhythm by taking longer strides, this person now tries to walk beside you and falls to his death because he doesn't have the information you did when you learned to walk on the now damaged bridge. Physicists are trying to model the n-body dynamics of the solar system without knowledge of the initial conditions. It's easier to answer why the equations go chaotic than to answer why the reality is stable.
1 month ago
Anonymous
I don't understand your analogy at all.
There is no reason to expect the solar system to be stable indefinitely. It only seems stable on the human timescale.
1 month ago
Anonymous
That's irrelevant, the equations go chaotic regardless, they predict planets colliding with each other, that's what chaotic means, there's no explanation for any kind of stability whether long term or short term.
I don't understand how you think trying to computationally model some complex systems that then results in chaos somehow means it's not computational. Maybe you just have incomplete information, or your computational methods are inadequate.
Chaos can be thought of as another way of searching for a solution in the infinite dimensional space of initial variables/conditions, it's a np-hard problem, therefore not computable. If you have a differential equation with a certain solution, you can work back to the initial conditions that produced that solution, this is basic ode theory.
1 month ago
Anonymous
But if you had perfect information about the solar system, down to the atomic level of every particle, why wouldn't you then be able to predict the motion of the planets forever?
1 month ago
Anonymous
But you can't have this kind of information, and even if you did, you would to know this, for all the time that came before, i.e the initial conditions
1 month ago
Anonymous
I mean practically yeah it would be impossible, but that doesn't mean physics isn't computational, it's just not practically feasible a lot of the time.
I don't think the laws of the universe are fundamentally some computation in some great super computer. We observe the universe and notice patterns that we can model computationally because it's useful for us to. If we somehow did have perfect information we could model everything perfectly, but that's infeasible, so it's not a perfect tool.
1 month ago
Anonymous
>That's irrelevant, the equations go chaotic regardless, they predict planets colliding with each other, that's what chaotic means, there's no explanation for any kind of stability whether long term or short term.
Equations don't suddenly 'go chaotic' at some point in time. They are always sensitive to initial conditions. Why are you looking for an explanation of stability when we agree the system is not stable?
>Chaos can be thought of as another way of searching for a solution in the infinite dimensional space of initial variables/conditions, it's a np-hard problem, therefore not computable. If you have a differential equation with a certain solution, you can work back to the initial conditions that produced that solution, this is basic ode theory.
This is just wrong. Chaos is an extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. It has nothing to do with np-hard problems. Chaotic systems are computable. The issue is the limited accuracy of numerical methods due to the constraints of computer hardware.
1 month ago
Anonymous
Where is the instability in the solar system and if you mean large time scales then that's not what I mean. n-body dynamics can't even tell you the trajectory of all 8 planets next year, you have to rely on direct observation for this?
Chaotic systems are computable but the solar system is not chaotic.
This is the problem, you assume because your ode's are chaotic, that the solar system is also chaotic because you have been unable to predict its trajectory?? How can you tell the solar system is unstable when your model is chaotic?
1 month ago
Anonymous
I think you're confusing what chaos means here. Chaos in this context doesn't mean randomness, it means unpredictable as any minute difference in the initial conditions can change the prediction drastically and make attempts to see where the planets will exactly be billions of years from now inaccurate. For instance, the eccentricity of Mercury's orbit changes through time, and an inaccuracy of just a few millimeters of Mercury's position greatly impacts the prediction of the evolution of its eccentricity.
The orbits of the planets of the solar system by definition are chaotic because of this.
1 month ago
Anonymous
Ok let's do this, what happens when you try to predict the trajectory or position of all 8 planets using classical mechanics and not billions of years, just next year or next week? Does the solution say anything about the solar system or does it say more about the model?
1 month ago
Anonymous
You can predict the trajectory of the planets next year very precisely (except for mercury, you need general relativity)
1 month ago
Anonymous
So you can't because of precession and even using general relatively, its not exactly accurate for all planets. So is the solar system chaotic or is your model chaotic? This is almost like arguing, computers are models of the brain, computers are discrete, therefore the brain is also discrete. Just because your temporary model (that might change in the future) of the solar system produces chaotic trajectories, does not mean the solar system is unstable.
1 month ago
Anonymous
>n-body dynamics can't even tell you the trajectory of all 8 planets next year
Yes it can.
>the solar system is not chaotic.
Yes it is.
>you assume because your ode's are chaotic, that the solar system is also chaotic because you have been unable to predict its trajectory.
Why do you think we can't model the trajectories of planets?
>How can you tell the solar system is unstable when your model is chaotic?
There are a lot of tools for analyzing the stability of a dynamical system. Find your fixed points. Estimate a Jacobean. Examine behavior around fixed points, plot some trajectories. It gets messier and harder to visualize with higher dimensional systems, but there's nothing to prevent you from determining stable fixed points in a chaotic system.
1 month ago
Anonymous
>the solar system is chaotic, why, because our non-linear incomplete equations tell us so >the brain is discrete, why, because our incomplete model tells us so >god is a white old man, why, because our current most popular religion tells us so,
etc
Do you look at the sun and try to find an equation to tell you its hot?
1 month ago
Anonymous
>Do you look at the sun and try to find an equation to tell you its hot?
Yes.
1 month ago
Anonymous
the point is that you can, but its not necessary, the equation is a model, an incomplete description of reality
1 month ago
Anonymous
I don't understand how you think trying to computationally model some complex systems that then results in chaos somehow means it's not computational. Maybe you just have incomplete information, or your computational methods are inadequate.
1 month ago
Anonymous
>It's all nice and cosy to imagine physics computationally, but then you come to the n body problem, how do you explain the stability of the solar system given computers can't even calculate the dynamics of n rigid bodies without becoming chaotic? What is the origin of that stability?
This is not a problem for the idea of physics as computation. You're fundementally misunderstanding why physicists like pancomputationalism. Paul Davies has a pretty good anthology on this that also has some Seth Lloyd stuff called "Information and the Nature of Reality." Vedral's "Decoding Reality," and Tegmark's "Our Mathematical Universe," are good too.
Pancomputationalism is the idea that fields work akin to cellular automata, it doesn't have anything to do with our ability to model things. It's a quantum model so "indeterminacy" is built in. But if it is accurate, there is a sense where prior states of any physical system entail future ones, and this is generally what we refer to in terms of "cause."
Cause is now understood much differently after Russell but it is not not implausible to say cause is observerable in the sense that the universe is mathematically describable and its logic (due to what it is) dictated specific state transitions.
1 month ago
Anonymous
Nah don't read that basic shit. Jump right into category theoretic derivations of quantum mechanics and gravity, ZX-calculus, and formalizations of Hegelian dialectical. The Science of Logic was ahead of its time by 250 years.
Correct me if im wrong but math is synthetic so I don't see how what you're describing about math would contradict it being a priori knowledge. I also dont understand how the existence of alternate consistent systems matters.
1 month ago
Anonymous
As far as I know it doesn't and shouldn't. Kant is merely trying to show that *we* naturally perceive objects in space in ways that allow us to reason about how they will appear to us through productive mathematical reason, NOT that ANY being will surely intuit objects in this way. If I draw a bunch of lines on a board that make up a triangle, the angles within will sum up to 2, not 3, and this will be the case so long as I am a normal human looking at a flat board, and not some alien (which Kant DID very much take the the possibility of seriously) who intuits objects directly as things on a sphere, and our intuitive experience will not allow us to 'discover' the miraculous appearance of a triangle where this is not the case unless those backgrounding conditions change (taking us beyond 'human intuition' and altering possible experience by changing our faculties, which Kant thought of as largely immutable for a given being, but sort of knew he didn't have hard arguments for this).
>Hume's conjecture that observing things coinciding can never give absolutely thorough evidence of causal relationships in reality, and hence that experience only allows us to posit physical laws via hypothesis
As with his arguments against miracles, Hume is simply engaged in question begging. It isn't trivial question begging, so it has its merits, but it is still not a good argument.
If throwing a ball at a window causes it to break then watching a ball smash a window simply IS seeing cause. Packed into Hume's argument is assumptions about cause dominant in Hume's time. Because Newton's gravity worked through a sort of mysterious action as a distance it was assumed that natural laws were real ontic entities that essentially "caused" everything to act the way they do. It helped that this dovetailed with medieval and ancient Christian though re Christ's role as the Logos in which all things are created and "hang together." (John 1, Colossians 1).
So Hume is assuming that cause has to be external laws deciding things. Very few people think of cause this way now. Kirpke's internalism or some form of it is more dominant, particularly because of Cartwright's work on "scientific laws," and how they are normally just approximations. Laws are now seen as just descriptions of how things interact and things interact because of what they are. Actually, there aren't even things, but universal fields that might be unified.
Cause then works like computation, and pancomputationalism is indeed dominant in modern physics. But if that's true, then seeing a ball move another is very much observing causation, which is just how one state of a system entails the next.
>yet also accounting for that mathematics does, in fact, seem to allow mathematicians to independently make hard conjectures concerning the geometric forms *of objects that we observe* by necessity (i.e. which will only be wrong *if some error of reason is made*) anyway, and purely through thinking without any further need to gather evidence from the world.
I am pretty sure Kant uses the example of a triangle needing to have angles that sum to two right angles in this sense. But it isn't true because we now know we can have other consistent systems of geometry where this is not a fact. The vast changes in logic and mathematics since Kant's day, along with Quine and co's arguments against analyticicity, and advanced in developmental biology call into question the idea of any true "a priori." We could also consider Hittinka's Scandal of Deduction and ask if such thinking actually produced any knowledge too.
Kant ultimately takes the step that Aquinas and Aristotle worked so hard to avoid, cutting us off from the world by having it that we experience images of things, not things. He wasn't the first in this, the Brits started it, but he popularized it. This has had rather disasterous consequences for philosophy.
Quine's arguments against a hard synthetic/analytic distinction are completely on point and I'm reading Kant under the assumption that this is essentially an intellectual tool Kant made use of in the cultural climate he argued in, for the lack of a better way of clearly communicating the significance the of underlying productive power of the mental structures we have, and that he had no way of anticipating Quine demolishing this subsequently in such a way as he did.
Understanding Kant's main ideas isn't particularly difficult. The hard part is thinking for yourself in light of what Kant taught you, and many Kant readers end up falling back to their old beliefs.
I have a copy of K-pop's Logoc of Scientific Discovery like this, except the annotations are all like 'YES!', 'so true!', '!!!!' etc. It's only for the first couple of chapters though; the rest of the book is completely absent of them.
I had a used copy of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and it was so littered with underlines and marganalia that it was hard to read. Fourtanetly the heavy annotation was only for the first 10 pages or so and the underlines quit happening after page 20. The annotations got progressively more pissed off as they went. It was funny.
Is there a single more embarrassing cause of death than getting filtered by Kant?
>Kant kills plebs beyond the grave
That's exactly what happened to this guy kek
Surely he belongs more to the positive appropriation of Kant by Romanticism, a la Schiller?
>Is there a single more embarrassing cause of death than getting filtered by Kant?
Getting filtered by Hume by thinking that Hume's conclusions about the necessity for pure reasoning are in fact Kant's conclusions.
Why does Kant get people so worked up?
>Why does Kant get people so worked up?
Have you actually tried sitting down and reading Kant?
>never leaves his neighbourhood
>entire understanding of the world is filtered through representation
>manlet
>more influential than you
Yeah I can see how he'd be triggering
Black folk are easily triggered
>never leaves his neighbourhood
>entire understanding of the world is filtered through representation
>manlet
Literally me.
You go into philosophy because you love giving your stupid opinions
Kant is moronic though.
>Bro, we don't like, really know anything like about tables and trees. Like, we only know what our minds think about trees man.
You could recreate Kantianism by just giving freshmen weed.
The Greeks and Medievals make way more sense.
The Transcendental Aesthetic is a brilliant exposition of working through the consequences of accepting Hume's conjecture that observing things coinciding can never give absolutely thorough evidence of causal relationships in reality, and hence that experience only allows us to posit physical laws via hypothesis (i.e. which can turn out to be wrong due to some observation being made that doesn't fit existing theory, even if no mistake was made by the scientist), yet also accounting for that mathematics does, in fact, seem to allow mathematicians to independently make hard conjectures concerning the geometric forms *of objects that we observe* by necessity (i.e. which will only be wrong *if some error of reason is made*) anyway, and purely through thinking without any further need to gather evidence from the world.
The final page of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first edition of the CPR is up there with the most profound and forcefully definite statements of thought ever made. It's a shame its Logic is so much more of a mess.
>Hume's conjecture that observing things coinciding can never give absolutely thorough evidence of causal relationships in reality, and hence that experience only allows us to posit physical laws via hypothesis
As with his arguments against miracles, Hume is simply engaged in question begging. It isn't trivial question begging, so it has its merits, but it is still not a good argument.
If throwing a ball at a window causes it to break then watching a ball smash a window simply IS seeing cause. Packed into Hume's argument is assumptions about cause dominant in Hume's time. Because Newton's gravity worked through a sort of mysterious action as a distance it was assumed that natural laws were real ontic entities that essentially "caused" everything to act the way they do. It helped that this dovetailed with medieval and ancient Christian though re Christ's role as the Logos in which all things are created and "hang together." (John 1, Colossians 1).
So Hume is assuming that cause has to be external laws deciding things. Very few people think of cause this way now. Kirpke's internalism or some form of it is more dominant, particularly because of Cartwright's work on "scientific laws," and how they are normally just approximations. Laws are now seen as just descriptions of how things interact and things interact because of what they are. Actually, there aren't even things, but universal fields that might be unified.
Cause then works like computation, and pancomputationalism is indeed dominant in modern physics. But if that's true, then seeing a ball move another is very much observing causation, which is just how one state of a system entails the next.
>yet also accounting for that mathematics does, in fact, seem to allow mathematicians to independently make hard conjectures concerning the geometric forms *of objects that we observe* by necessity (i.e. which will only be wrong *if some error of reason is made*) anyway, and purely through thinking without any further need to gather evidence from the world.
I am pretty sure Kant uses the example of a triangle needing to have angles that sum to two right angles in this sense. But it isn't true because we now know we can have other consistent systems of geometry where this is not a fact. The vast changes in logic and mathematics since Kant's day, along with Quine and co's arguments against analyticicity, and advanced in developmental biology call into question the idea of any true "a priori." We could also consider Hittinka's Scandal of Deduction and ask if such thinking actually produced any knowledge too.
Kant ultimately takes the step that Aquinas and Aristotle worked so hard to avoid, cutting us off from the world by having it that we experience images of things, not things. He wasn't the first in this, the Brits started it, but he popularized it. This has had rather disasterous consequences for philosophy.
Ideas are the tools we use to experience the world, not the things of experience. We don't say "humans can never drive a car, all they can do is move steering wheels and push pedals," but this is how philosophy began to talk about experience.
Hegel points out how this stems from dogmatic assumptions in Kant, but of course he is a horrid writer and reading the Logic is torture, so this didn't catch on.
From this, we get the anti-metaphysical turn and the seeds of the deflation of truth, disasters. I'd tend to agree with Alistair MacIntyre's thesis that Enlightenment moral theory has also been disastrous, leading to relativism and nihilism.
>Hittinka's Scandal of Deduction and ask if such thinking actually produced any knowledge too
I have always had a problem with this line of thinking which assumes that deduction has to produce any new knowledge. Is knowing that a rectangle just like a square, has 4 sides new knowledge, and to whom? Just because some autist in england published an esoteric theory, doesn't mean its suddenly new knowledge to everyone in the world. The term is subjective and seems mostly to apply to induction, especially since deduction assumes self evident axioms.
>If throwing a ball at a window causes it to break then watching a ball smash a window simply IS seeing cause
Hume's contention here is under what circumstances is the ball causing the breaking of the window and becomes relevant once you consider larger scales. It's all nice and cosy to imagine physics computationally, but then you come to the n body problem, how do you explain the stability of the solar system given computers can't even calculate the dynamics of n rigid bodies without becoming chaotic? What is the origin of that stability?
Why do you think the solar system is stable?
Think of it this way, you are walking on a circular bridge, and the bridge has planks that routinely collapse before you, and you have been doing this for some time, then someone else comes along and starts recording this, he sees you skip every few minutes where there's a gap, he then goes away, then comes another person who records you and sees you walking naturally as you now changed the rhythm by taking longer strides, this person now tries to walk beside you and falls to his death because he doesn't have the information you did when you learned to walk on the now damaged bridge. Physicists are trying to model the n-body dynamics of the solar system without knowledge of the initial conditions. It's easier to answer why the equations go chaotic than to answer why the reality is stable.
I don't understand your analogy at all.
There is no reason to expect the solar system to be stable indefinitely. It only seems stable on the human timescale.
That's irrelevant, the equations go chaotic regardless, they predict planets colliding with each other, that's what chaotic means, there's no explanation for any kind of stability whether long term or short term.
Chaos can be thought of as another way of searching for a solution in the infinite dimensional space of initial variables/conditions, it's a np-hard problem, therefore not computable. If you have a differential equation with a certain solution, you can work back to the initial conditions that produced that solution, this is basic ode theory.
But if you had perfect information about the solar system, down to the atomic level of every particle, why wouldn't you then be able to predict the motion of the planets forever?
But you can't have this kind of information, and even if you did, you would to know this, for all the time that came before, i.e the initial conditions
I mean practically yeah it would be impossible, but that doesn't mean physics isn't computational, it's just not practically feasible a lot of the time.
I don't think the laws of the universe are fundamentally some computation in some great super computer. We observe the universe and notice patterns that we can model computationally because it's useful for us to. If we somehow did have perfect information we could model everything perfectly, but that's infeasible, so it's not a perfect tool.
>That's irrelevant, the equations go chaotic regardless, they predict planets colliding with each other, that's what chaotic means, there's no explanation for any kind of stability whether long term or short term.
Equations don't suddenly 'go chaotic' at some point in time. They are always sensitive to initial conditions. Why are you looking for an explanation of stability when we agree the system is not stable?
>Chaos can be thought of as another way of searching for a solution in the infinite dimensional space of initial variables/conditions, it's a np-hard problem, therefore not computable. If you have a differential equation with a certain solution, you can work back to the initial conditions that produced that solution, this is basic ode theory.
This is just wrong. Chaos is an extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. It has nothing to do with np-hard problems. Chaotic systems are computable. The issue is the limited accuracy of numerical methods due to the constraints of computer hardware.
Where is the instability in the solar system and if you mean large time scales then that's not what I mean. n-body dynamics can't even tell you the trajectory of all 8 planets next year, you have to rely on direct observation for this?
Chaotic systems are computable but the solar system is not chaotic.
This is the problem, you assume because your ode's are chaotic, that the solar system is also chaotic because you have been unable to predict its trajectory?? How can you tell the solar system is unstable when your model is chaotic?
I think you're confusing what chaos means here. Chaos in this context doesn't mean randomness, it means unpredictable as any minute difference in the initial conditions can change the prediction drastically and make attempts to see where the planets will exactly be billions of years from now inaccurate. For instance, the eccentricity of Mercury's orbit changes through time, and an inaccuracy of just a few millimeters of Mercury's position greatly impacts the prediction of the evolution of its eccentricity.
The orbits of the planets of the solar system by definition are chaotic because of this.
Ok let's do this, what happens when you try to predict the trajectory or position of all 8 planets using classical mechanics and not billions of years, just next year or next week? Does the solution say anything about the solar system or does it say more about the model?
You can predict the trajectory of the planets next year very precisely (except for mercury, you need general relativity)
So you can't because of precession and even using general relatively, its not exactly accurate for all planets. So is the solar system chaotic or is your model chaotic? This is almost like arguing, computers are models of the brain, computers are discrete, therefore the brain is also discrete. Just because your temporary model (that might change in the future) of the solar system produces chaotic trajectories, does not mean the solar system is unstable.
>n-body dynamics can't even tell you the trajectory of all 8 planets next year
Yes it can.
>the solar system is not chaotic.
Yes it is.
>you assume because your ode's are chaotic, that the solar system is also chaotic because you have been unable to predict its trajectory.
Why do you think we can't model the trajectories of planets?
>How can you tell the solar system is unstable when your model is chaotic?
There are a lot of tools for analyzing the stability of a dynamical system. Find your fixed points. Estimate a Jacobean. Examine behavior around fixed points, plot some trajectories. It gets messier and harder to visualize with higher dimensional systems, but there's nothing to prevent you from determining stable fixed points in a chaotic system.
>the solar system is chaotic, why, because our non-linear incomplete equations tell us so
>the brain is discrete, why, because our incomplete model tells us so
>god is a white old man, why, because our current most popular religion tells us so,
etc
Do you look at the sun and try to find an equation to tell you its hot?
>Do you look at the sun and try to find an equation to tell you its hot?
Yes.
the point is that you can, but its not necessary, the equation is a model, an incomplete description of reality
I don't understand how you think trying to computationally model some complex systems that then results in chaos somehow means it's not computational. Maybe you just have incomplete information, or your computational methods are inadequate.
>It's all nice and cosy to imagine physics computationally, but then you come to the n body problem, how do you explain the stability of the solar system given computers can't even calculate the dynamics of n rigid bodies without becoming chaotic? What is the origin of that stability?
This is not a problem for the idea of physics as computation. You're fundementally misunderstanding why physicists like pancomputationalism. Paul Davies has a pretty good anthology on this that also has some Seth Lloyd stuff called "Information and the Nature of Reality." Vedral's "Decoding Reality," and Tegmark's "Our Mathematical Universe," are good too.
Pancomputationalism is the idea that fields work akin to cellular automata, it doesn't have anything to do with our ability to model things. It's a quantum model so "indeterminacy" is built in. But if it is accurate, there is a sense where prior states of any physical system entail future ones, and this is generally what we refer to in terms of "cause."
Cause is now understood much differently after Russell but it is not not implausible to say cause is observerable in the sense that the universe is mathematically describable and its logic (due to what it is) dictated specific state transitions.
Nah don't read that basic shit. Jump right into category theoretic derivations of quantum mechanics and gravity, ZX-calculus, and formalizations of Hegelian dialectical. The Science of Logic was ahead of its time by 250 years.
Correct me if im wrong but math is synthetic so I don't see how what you're describing about math would contradict it being a priori knowledge. I also dont understand how the existence of alternate consistent systems matters.
As far as I know it doesn't and shouldn't. Kant is merely trying to show that *we* naturally perceive objects in space in ways that allow us to reason about how they will appear to us through productive mathematical reason, NOT that ANY being will surely intuit objects in this way. If I draw a bunch of lines on a board that make up a triangle, the angles within will sum up to 2, not 3, and this will be the case so long as I am a normal human looking at a flat board, and not some alien (which Kant DID very much take the the possibility of seriously) who intuits objects directly as things on a sphere, and our intuitive experience will not allow us to 'discover' the miraculous appearance of a triangle where this is not the case unless those backgrounding conditions change (taking us beyond 'human intuition' and altering possible experience by changing our faculties, which Kant thought of as largely immutable for a given being, but sort of knew he didn't have hard arguments for this).
Quine's arguments against a hard synthetic/analytic distinction are completely on point and I'm reading Kant under the assumption that this is essentially an intellectual tool Kant made use of in the cultural climate he argued in, for the lack of a better way of clearly communicating the significance the of underlying productive power of the mental structures we have, and that he had no way of anticipating Quine demolishing this subsequently in such a way as he did.
>You could recreate Kantianism by just giving freshmen weed.
Well, why don’t you go do that then?
Ask some Black folk in section 8
Understanding Kant's main ideas isn't particularly difficult. The hard part is thinking for yourself in light of what Kant taught you, and many Kant readers end up falling back to their old beliefs.
i hate philosophy so much
it's for losers
Reminder.
I have a copy of K-pop's Logoc of Scientific Discovery like this, except the annotations are all like 'YES!', 'so true!', '!!!!' etc. It's only for the first couple of chapters though; the rest of the book is completely absent of them.
I had a used copy of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and it was so littered with underlines and marganalia that it was hard to read. Fourtanetly the heavy annotation was only for the first 10 pages or so and the underlines quit happening after page 20. The annotations got progressively more pissed off as they went. It was funny.
>his filosofía is not immediately clear to even the most notorious moron on the short bus
kant deal with these pseuds