Why does he treat hypostasis and Person as different things in the objections 2 and 3, and in the objection 4 writes "Person or hypostasis", as if they were the same thing? I just wanna understand this.
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm
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No idea.
He didn't have a computer and it was too much work to go back and re-write the old stuff that he wrote.
have you read Kant?
I think it's because he establishes in article 3 that the union cannot have taken place in the person and not also in the hypostasis:
>because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms...
This means that if one is composite the other must be also; so, with regards to article 4, they can be used interchangeably.
I don't know, it doesn't appear that the word "or" signifies interchangeability, because in article 3 he writes "suppositum or hypostasis" and they are the same, no?
The or he uses in latin is vel which indicates a non essential alternative (at least in classical latin, I do not know the specifics of its use in the scholastics), so it can be used both for a semantic alternative and for one that does not change the essence of what is being said, even if the two alternatives are different.
OP here. But if they are alternatives, why does he treat them as a single thing? Take a look at this passage from the same article:
>I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word.
"It is", not "they are".
>Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.
"It belongs", not "they belong".
Do you know the part and article? Coincidently this passage that I quoted in this post is about subsistence, but I don't know if it's the one to which you were refering.
>The hypostatic union is two natures in one person and so using them interchangeably is okay
Are you saying that Person and hypostasis are the same thing? Then why does he approach them separately in the articles 2 and 3?
I can't live it if I don't understand if God can become man, though.
But what does hypostasis mean, afterall? I thought it meant "Person of the Trinity".
>I can't live it if I don't understand if God can become man, though.
I understand the desire to know. But understand that true knowledge of God is impossible. We can only use approximate language.
But if you believe in God as the creator and sustainer of existence itself, why would the Word of God not be able to become man? What exactly is your issue? Do you believe in the miracles of Jesus?
Our reality is not material. It is mental/immaterial/spiritual. The physical world is a representation. Don't be deceived by your five senses.
Read Kant?
>why would the Word of God not be able to become man?
What I thought was that God becoming man is contradictory. A man by definition is not all-powerful, not present everywhere, not all-knowing, not creator of the physical and metaphysical world and not existing before eternity. If God becomes man, it will become a being without these attributes (not God).
>What exactly is your issue? Do you believe in the miracles of Jesus?
I don't know if they happened, but that is not the central point in Christianity for me. I mean, the Resurrection is a central point. But more central is if God can become man.
>Read Kant?
I've never read him.
God does not operate on the same plane of existence as us. God is non-competitive with our world of existence. Essentially, our world (and us) exist as ideas in the mind of God. So to make an analogy, in our world, a stick becomes a cane only when a mind recognizes it as a cane. So God can do the same thing with anything, including a human being. It's the same thing with transubstantiation. The bread literally turns into Body of Christ in the mind of God, even if the accidental material we perceive doesn't change.
If you haven't read Kant you should. Aquinas hylomorphism is the correct view of the world but cannot be fully understood without an idealist metaphysic (IMO).
>Read Kant?
Sorry, were you asking if I read Kant or recommending for me to read him?
>are they the same?
Hypostatic union is the adjective and Person is the noun.
>Then why does he approach them separately in the articles 2 and 3?
To prove that they necessarily refer to one another. I highly recommend reading how he talks about Christ in the Summa Contra Gentiles as it will be much simpler but for Thomistic thought "Who / what is God?" and "Is God?" answers the same question.
>But what does hypostasis mean, afterall?
This does a good job of explaining it https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07610b.htm. Keep in mind St. Augustine says that the Trinity is only distinguished as one entity, either as being Father, Son, or Holy Spirit to us and not to God though God views them as personified. You're putting in the right effort with the right skill but might be going in the wrong order for what it's worth.
I don't have the part memorized but if you do a quick search engine search you'll find Aquinas' coverage of subsistent relations. It's...that easy. That's what I've done many times before to find the passage again. Also, use newadvent.org/summa if you want.
>The Blessed in the Kingdom of Heaven Will See the Punishments of the Damned So That Their Bliss May Be More Delightful to Them
that's all nice and everything but where does his resentment come into this?
I haven't read this passage yet, where is it?
Aquinas is the only Nicene out of all the Nicenes to get closest to giving a good account of the Nicene Trinity and it still comes down to "the logical structure of the Trinity is showable not sayable and trying to "say" it must come down to what is to our minds inconsistent and impossible." If you don't know, check out what he says about subsistent relations.
>and it still comes down to "the logical structure of the Trinity is showable not sayable and trying to "say" it must come down to what is to our minds inconsistent and impossible." If you don't know, check out what he says about subsistent relations
In the same book or in other?
It's in the Summa yes
Okay it's confusing but his Sed Contra in 4 is a negative. The hypostatic union is two natures in one person and so using them interchangeably is okay.
Article 2
>Reply to Objection 3. The Word of God "did not assume human nature in general, but 'in atomo'"—that is, in an individual—as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.
Article 3
>Reply to Objection 2. Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Read these together and that should help. I highly recommend reading Aristotle's metaphysics and physics first and ideally St. Thomas's commentaries on those because he relies on those nearly totally.
>interchangeably
What I mean is person refers to the locus and hypostatic to the mode of union of two natures. They both are discussing Christ as one being with two natures but one is referring to it as the degree of the union, i.e. in an atom, and the other is how the union is - both are basically equivalently saying Christ. I would imagine St. Thomas would argue that hypostasis does not necessitate the person limitation but the person necessitates hypostasis - not sure.
I love learning about theology and philosophy and metaphysics but at the end of the day it is true that Christianity must be lived. It is an experience. Your mind can only take you so far. Even Aquinasehad a revelation and immediately stopped writing because he realized he could never do Truth justice.
So take the leap of faith and live it.
Alternatively, this just means that Christianity cannot be rationality justified. God is Reason Itself, and must be approached through reason.
St. Thomas says God should be approached by pure rationality by saying what God is not.
Find out for yourself if you want. Nothing wrong with that. But one day you might realize that life is passing you by while you struggle for the "answer."
I'm giving you the cheat sheet to skip to the end.